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Comparing current_work() against efi_rts_work.work is sufficient to
decide whether current is currently running EFI runtime services code at
any level in its call stack.
However, there are other potential users of the EFI runtime stack, such
as the ACPI subsystem, which may invoke efi_call_virt_pointer()
directly, and so any sync exceptions occurring in firmware during those
calls are currently misidentified.
So instead, let's check whether the stashed value of the thread stack
pointer points into current's thread stack. This can only be the case if
current was interrupted while running EFI runtime code. Note that this
implies that we should clear the stashed value after switching back, to
avoid false positives.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Add the missing #include of asm/assembler.h, which is where the ldr_l
macro is defined.
Fixes: ff7a167961d1b97e ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Unlike x86, which has machinery to deal with page faults that occur
during the execution of EFI runtime services, arm64 has nothing like
that, and a synchronous exception raised by firmware code brings down
the whole system.
With more EFI based systems appearing that were not built to run Linux
(such as the Windows-on-ARM laptops based on Qualcomm SOCs), as well as
the introduction of PRM (platform specific firmware routines that are
callable just like EFI runtime services), we are more likely to run into
issues of this sort, and it is much more likely that we can identify and
work around such issues if they don't bring down the system entirely.
Since we already use a EFI runtime services call wrapper in assembler,
we can quite easily add some code that captures the execution state at
the point where the call is made, allowing us to revert to this state
and proceed execution if the call triggered a synchronous exception.
Given that the kernel and the firmware don't share any data structures
that could end up in an indeterminate state, we can happily continue
running, as long as we mark the EFI runtime services as unavailable from
that point on.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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With the introduction of PRMT in the ACPI subsystem, the EFI rts
workqueue is no longer the only caller of efi_call_virt_pointer() in the
kernel. This means the EFI runtime services lock is no longer sufficient
to manage concurrent calls into firmware, but also that firmware calls
may occur that are not marshalled via the workqueue mechanism, but
originate directly from the caller context.
For added robustness, and to ensure that the runtime services have 8 KiB
of stack space available as per the EFI spec, introduce a spinlock
protected EFI runtime stack of 8 KiB, where the spinlock also ensures
serialization between the EFI rts workqueue (which itself serializes EFI
runtime calls) and other callers of efi_call_virt_pointer().
While at it, use the stack pivot to avoid reloading the shadow call
stack pointer from the ordinary stack, as doing so could produce a
gadget to defeat it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 23715a26c8d81291, which introduced some code in
assembler that manipulates both the ordinary and the shadow call stack
pointer in a way that could potentially be taken advantage of. So let's
revert it, and do a better job the next time around.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Unlike x86, which has machinery to deal with page faults that occur
during the execution of EFI runtime services, arm64 has nothing like
that, and a synchronous exception raised by firmware code brings down
the whole system.
With more EFI based systems appearing that were not built to run Linux
(such as the Windows-on-ARM laptops based on Qualcomm SOCs), as well as
the introduction of PRM (platform specific firmware routines that are
callable just like EFI runtime services), we are more likely to run into
issues of this sort, and it is much more likely that we can identify and
work around such issues if they don't bring down the system entirely.
Since we already use a EFI runtime services call wrapper in assembler,
we can quite easily add some code that captures the execution state at
the point where the call is made, allowing us to revert to this state
and proceed execution if the call triggered a synchronous exception.
Given that the kernel and the firmware don't share any data structures
that could end up in an indeterminate state, we can happily continue
running, as long as we mark the EFI runtime services as unavailable from
that point on.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack in the kernel
(Sami Tolvanen and Will Deacon)
* for-next/scs:
arm64: entry-ftrace.S: Update comment to indicate that x18 is live
scs: Move DEFINE_SCS macro into core code
scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code
scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code
arm64: scs: Use 'scs_sp' register alias for x18
scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functions
arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_info
efi/libstub: Disable Shadow Call Stack
arm64: scs: Add shadow stacks for SDEI
arm64: Implement Shadow Call Stack
arm64: Disable SCS for hypervisor code
arm64: vdso: Disable Shadow Call Stack
arm64: efi: Restore register x18 if it was corrupted
arm64: Preserve register x18 when CPU is suspended
arm64: Reserve register x18 from general allocation with SCS
scs: Disable when function graph tracing is enabled
scs: Add support for stack usage debugging
scs: Add page accounting for shadow call stack allocations
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
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If we detect a corrupted x18, restore the register before jumping back
to potentially SCS instrumented code. This is safe, because the wrapper
is called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
for interrupt handling.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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In an effort to clarify and simplify the annotation of assembly functions
in the kernel new macros have been introduced. These replace ENTRY and
ENDPROC and also add a new annotation for static functions which previously
had no ENTRY equivalent. Update the annotations in the core kernel code to
the new macros.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200501115430.37315-3-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Whether or not we will ever decide to start using x18 as a platform
register in Linux is uncertain, but by that time, we will need to
ensure that UEFI runtime services calls don't corrupt it.
So let's start issuing warnings now for this, and increase the
likelihood that these firmware images have all been replaced by that time.
This has been fixed on the EDK2 side in commit:
6d73863b5464 ("BaseTools/tools_def AARCH64: mark register x18 as reserved")
dated July 13, 2017.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180308080020.22828-6-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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