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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2020-10-02 10:38:21 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2020-10-05 13:37:03 +0200
commit4f2d99b06b73800a5fb5b33e1899272e87ed7093 (patch)
tree34ae764d54685515a27a90b943d310191ec3cf43 /security
parentb64fcae74b6d6940d14243c963ab0089e8f0d82d (diff)
downloadlinux-4f2d99b06b73800a5fb5b33e1899272e87ed7093.tar.bz2
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(), and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected. Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this: return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id), read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK, 0, NULL); Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c20
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9dd9c5f4d736..6f2b8352573a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -648,15 +648,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
- if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -706,7 +697,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
}
break;
case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
- if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
+ if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
@@ -742,6 +733,15 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
char *description)
{
+ if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 0;
}