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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2017-09-18 11:37:03 -0700
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2017-09-25 15:19:57 +0100
commit237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 (patch)
treebc95e55675ae062350f77c9f6d8f8d0816b83207 /security
parente645016abc803dafc75e4b8f6e4118f088900ffb (diff)
downloadlinux-237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3.tar.bz2
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user session keyrings for another user. For example: sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u sleep 15' & sleep 1 sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions, which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys: -4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000 -5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000 Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set. Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c23
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c6
4 files changed, 21 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 1c02c6547038..503adbae7b0d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
-extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
+extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring);
extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 83da68d98b40..e5c0896c3a8f 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 94f038967c17..4fa82a8a9c0e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1097,15 +1097,15 @@ found:
/*
* Find a keyring with the specified name.
*
- * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they
- * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is
- * skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been
- * revoked are skipped.
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
+ * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true,
+ * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
+ * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
*
* Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
* incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
*/
-struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
+struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
{
struct key *keyring;
int bucket;
@@ -1133,10 +1133,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
continue;
- if (!skip_perm_check &&
- key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
- KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
- continue;
+ if (uid_keyring) {
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+ &keyring->flags))
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 86bced9fdbdf..293d3598153b 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
@@ -94,7 +95,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);