diff options
| author | Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> | 2022-02-25 17:54:38 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2022-02-25 15:35:19 -0500 |
| commit | 65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949 (patch) | |
| tree | 5412d30772bda69f399724371c13d53cfa4c1d96 /security/selinux | |
| parent | b97df7c098c531010e445da88d02b7bf7bf59ef6 (diff) | |
| download | linux-65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949.tar.bz2 | |
selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux
always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file
descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.
As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be
enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.
Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 |
4 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1e69f88eb326..b12e14b2797b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3682,6 +3682,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; + case FIOCLEX: + case FIONCLEX: + if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec()) + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); + break; + /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 2ec038efbb03..a9e572ca4fd9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC, __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index b89289f092c9..ebd64afe1def 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { "always_check_network", "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", - "genfs_seclabel_symlinks" + "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", + "ioctl_skip_cloexec" }; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index d91a5672de99..84f42fa8012f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); +} + struct selinux_policy_convert_data; struct selinux_load_state { |