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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-07-13 16:53:18 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-07-13 16:53:18 -0700
commit8d9107e8c50e1c4ff43c91c8841805833f3ecfb9 (patch)
treeabc57f38cf659d4031d5a9915a088f2c47b2cc7e /security/selinux/netlabel.c
parent16cefa8c3863721fd40445a1b34dea18cd16ccfe (diff)
downloadlinux-8d9107e8c50e1c4ff43c91c8841805833f3ecfb9.tar.bz2
Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel"
This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0. It bit people like Michal Piotrowski: "My system is too secure, I can not login :)" because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux policies. As a result, quoth James Morris: "Can you please revert this patch? We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others. Sorry for the hassle." Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/netlabel.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c34
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 8192e8bc9f5a..e64eca246f1a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
- rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
+ rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
+ base_sid,
+ sid);
else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
- SECINITSID_NETMSG,
+ SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
&nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -293,32 +295,38 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int rc;
- u32 nlbl_sid;
- u32 perm;
+ u32 netlbl_sid;
+ u32 recv_perm;
- rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+ SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+ &netlbl_sid);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
- nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return 0;
switch (sksec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
- perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
- perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
default:
- perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
+ netlbl_sid,
+ sksec->sclass,
+ recv_perm,
+ ad);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
- if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
return rc;
}