diff options
| author | Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> | 2008-08-27 16:08:54 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2008-08-27 16:08:54 -0700 |
| commit | 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c (patch) | |
| tree | 5969688468a63ee01db68be4adff671bd9aa85c8 /net | |
| parent | f2455eb176ac87081bbfc9a44b21c7cd2bc1967e (diff) | |
| download | linux-328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c.tar.bz2 | |
sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key
The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).
Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/socket.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index afa952e726d7..9b9b2c31dd15 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3144,7 +3144,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |