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authorPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2017-12-30 22:41:46 +0100
committerPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2018-01-08 18:11:04 +0100
commita7f87b47e67e4341f6175cdb80e5c2eaadf30dcb (patch)
tree47f8be7118f28a8d3f4920968c96d3cb596d7ef2 /net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c
parentf6931f5f5b713705c3cc91e4f9c222f2b181e2ef (diff)
downloadlinux-a7f87b47e67e4341f6175cdb80e5c2eaadf30dcb.tar.bz2
netfilter: remove defensive check on malformed packets from raw sockets
Users cannot forge malformed IPv4/IPv6 headers via raw sockets that they can inject into the stack. Specifically, not for IPv4 since 55888dfb6ba7 ("AF_RAW: Augment raw_send_hdrinc to expand skb to fit iphdr->ihl (v2)"). IPv6 raw sockets also ensure that packets have a well-formed IPv6 header available in the skbuff. At quick glance, br_netfilter also validates layer 3 headers and it drops malformed both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. Therefore, let's remove this defensive check all over the place. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c8
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c
index 2b1a9dcdbcb3..b0524b18c4fb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c
@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ ip6t_mangle_out(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state)
u_int8_t hop_limit;
u_int32_t flowlabel, mark;
int err;
-#if 0
- /* root is playing with raw sockets. */
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) ||
- ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) {
- net_warn_ratelimited("ip6t_hook: happy cracking\n");
- return NF_ACCEPT;
- }
-#endif
/* save source/dest address, mark, hoplimit, flowlabel, priority, */
memcpy(&saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, sizeof(saddr));