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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-05 11:26:35 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-05 11:26:35 -0700 |
commit | e24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31 (patch) | |
tree | 14fcec8728916092a9f6dbeb0f2b8d5c5a4e5c9a /kernel | |
parent | 7391786a64dcfe9c609a1f8e2204c1abf42ded23 (diff) | |
parent | c4758fa59285fe4dbfeab4364a6957936d040fbf (diff) | |
download | linux-e24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
- a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:
* several bug fixes and cleanups
* the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
securityfs symlinks
* it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.
* This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
of this.
- Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
permission. From Paul:
"While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.
Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
capabilities on policy load"
There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.
- Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
cap_capable call in privilege check.
- TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.
- Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.
- IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
the boot command line.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
integrity: Small code improvements
ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
ima: use memdup_user_nul
ima: fix up #endif comments
IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 65f61077ad50..98b59b5db90b 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters. */ -#include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/coredump.h> @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * to a task_struct (other than @usage). */ struct seccomp_filter { - atomic_t usage; + refcount_t usage; struct seccomp_filter *prev; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) return ERR_PTR(ret); } - atomic_set(&sfilter->usage, 1); + refcount_set(&sfilter->usage, 1); return sfilter; } @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!orig) return; /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */ - atomic_inc(&orig->usage); + refcount_inc(&orig->usage); } static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter) @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */ - while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { + while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig; orig = orig->prev; seccomp_filter_free(freeme); @@ -641,11 +641,12 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: - default: { - siginfo_t info; + default: audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action); /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */ if (get_nr_threads(current) == 1) { + siginfo_t info; + /* Show the original registers in the dump. */ syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current)); /* Trigger a manual coredump since do_exit skips it. */ @@ -654,7 +655,6 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, } do_exit(SIGSYS); } - } unreachable(); |