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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-12-09 15:12:33 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-12-09 15:12:33 -0800
commitd48f782e4fb20dc7ec935ca0ca41ae31e4a69362 (patch)
tree482270b85d4ab9b1284e07e4cb439b4dc7af919f /kernel
parent8586ca8a214471e4573d76356aabe890bfecdc8a (diff)
parent35cc3cefc4de90001c9137e2d01dd9d06b11acfb (diff)
downloadlinux-d48f782e4fb20dc7ec935ca0ca41ae31e4a69362.tar.bz2
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: "A decent batch of fixes here. I'd say about half are for problems that have existed for a while, and half are for new regressions added in the 4.20 merge window. 1) Fix 10G SFP phy module detection in mvpp2, from Baruch Siach. 2) Revert bogus emac driver change, from Benjamin Herrenschmidt. 3) Handle BPF exported data structure with pointers when building 32-bit userland, from Daniel Borkmann. 4) Memory leak fix in act_police, from Davide Caratti. 5) Check RX checksum offload in RX descriptors properly in aquantia driver, from Dmitry Bogdanov. 6) SKB unlink fix in various spots, from Edward Cree. 7) ndo_dflt_fdb_dump() only works with ethernet, enforce this, from Eric Dumazet. 8) Fix FID leak in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel. 9) IOTLB locking fix in vhost, from Jean-Philippe Brucker. 10) Fix SKB truesize accounting in ipv4/ipv6/netfilter frag memory limits otherwise namespace exit can hang. From Jiri Wiesner. 11) Address block parsing length fixes in x25 from Martin Schiller. 12) IRQ and ring accounting fixes in bnxt_en, from Michael Chan. 13) For tun interfaces, only iface delete works with rtnl ops, enforce this by disallowing add. From Nicolas Dichtel. 14) Use after free in liquidio, from Pan Bian. 15) Fix SKB use after passing to netif_receive_skb(), from Prashant Bhole. 16) Static key accounting and other fixes in XPS from Sabrina Dubroca. 17) Partially initialized flow key passed to ip6_route_output(), from Shmulik Ladkani. 18) Fix RTNL deadlock during reset in ibmvnic driver, from Thomas Falcon. 19) Several small TCP fixes (off-by-one on window probe abort, NULL deref in tail loss probe, SNMP mis-estimations) from Yuchung Cheng" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (93 commits) net/sched: cls_flower: Reject duplicated rules also under skip_sw bnxt_en: Fix _bnxt_get_max_rings() for 57500 chips. bnxt_en: Fix NQ/CP rings accounting on the new 57500 chips. bnxt_en: Keep track of reserved IRQs. bnxt_en: Fix CNP CoS queue regression. net/mlx4_core: Correctly set PFC param if global pause is turned off. Revert "net/ibm/emac: wrong bit is used for STA control" neighbour: Avoid writing before skb->head in neigh_hh_output() ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options tcp: lack of available data can also cause TSO defer ipv6: sr: properly initialize flowi6 prior passing to ip6_route_output mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Fix VLAN device deletion via ioctl mlxsw: spectrum_router: Relax GRE decap matching check mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Avoid leaking FID's reference count mlxsw: spectrum_nve: Remove easily triggerable warnings ipv4: ipv6: netfilter: Adjust the frag mem limit when truesize changes sctp: frag_point sanity check tcp: fix NULL ref in tail loss probe tcp: Do not underestimate rwnd_limited net: use skb_list_del_init() to remove from RX sublists ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/btf.c82
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c103
2 files changed, 171 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index ee4c82667d65..4da543d6bea2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/types.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -426,6 +427,30 @@ static bool btf_name_offset_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
offset < btf->hdr.str_len;
}
+/* Only C-style identifier is permitted. This can be relaxed if
+ * necessary.
+ */
+static bool btf_name_valid_identifier(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
+{
+ /* offset must be valid */
+ const char *src = &btf->strings[offset];
+ const char *src_limit;
+
+ if (!isalpha(*src) && *src != '_')
+ return false;
+
+ /* set a limit on identifier length */
+ src_limit = src + KSYM_NAME_LEN;
+ src++;
+ while (*src && src < src_limit) {
+ if (!isalnum(*src) && *src != '_')
+ return false;
+ src++;
+ }
+
+ return !*src;
+}
+
static const char *btf_name_by_offset(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
{
if (!offset)
@@ -1143,6 +1168,22 @@ static int btf_ref_type_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* typedef type must have a valid name, and other ref types,
+ * volatile, const, restrict, should have a null name.
+ */
+ if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) == BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF) {
+ if (!t->name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (t->name_off) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
return 0;
@@ -1300,6 +1341,13 @@ static s32 btf_fwd_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* fwd type must have a valid name */
+ if (!t->name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
return 0;
@@ -1356,6 +1404,12 @@ static s32 btf_array_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* array type should not have a name */
+ if (t->name_off) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (btf_type_vlen(t)) {
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "vlen != 0");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1532,6 +1586,13 @@ static s32 btf_struct_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* struct type either no name or a valid one */
+ if (t->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
last_offset = 0;
@@ -1543,6 +1604,12 @@ static s32 btf_struct_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* struct member either no name or a valid one */
+ if (member->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(btf, member->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_member(env, t, member, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
/* A member cannot be in type void */
if (!member->type || !BTF_TYPE_ID_VALID(member->type)) {
btf_verifier_log_member(env, t, member,
@@ -1730,6 +1797,13 @@ static s32 btf_enum_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* enum type either no name or a valid one */
+ if (t->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < nr_enums; i++) {
@@ -1739,6 +1813,14 @@ static s32 btf_enum_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* enum member must have a valid name */
+ if (!enums[i].name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(btf, enums[i].name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+
btf_verifier_log(env, "\t%s val=%d\n",
btf_name_by_offset(btf, enums[i].name_off),
enums[i].val);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6dd419550aba..fc760d00a38c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
+#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \
@@ -3751,6 +3752,79 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
}
}
+/* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;"
+ * and return:
+ * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
+ * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
+ * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value range [0,10]
+ */
+static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
+{
+ if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg))
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case BPF_JEQ:
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
+ return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
+ break;
+ case BPF_JNE:
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
+ return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGT:
+ if (reg->umin_value > val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umax_value <= val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSGT:
+ if (reg->smin_value > (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JLT:
+ if (reg->umax_value < val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umin_value >= val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSLT:
+ if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smin_value >= (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGE:
+ if (reg->umin_value >= val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umax_value < val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSGE:
+ if (reg->smin_value >= (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JLE:
+ if (reg->umax_value <= val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umin_value > val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSLE:
+ if (reg->smax_value <= (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smin_value > (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
* variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
* simply doing a BPF_K check.
@@ -4152,21 +4226,15 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
- /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
- if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
- (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
- dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
- tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) {
- if ((opcode == BPF_JEQ && dst_reg->var_off.value == insn->imm) ||
- (opcode == BPF_JNE && dst_reg->var_off.value != insn->imm)) {
- /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
- * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
- */
+ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ int pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
+
+ if (pred == 1) {
+ /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
- } else {
- /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
- * only follow fall-through branch, since
+ } else if (pred == 0) {
+ /* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
@@ -4980,7 +5048,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
- int i, j, err;
+ int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
if (!sl)
@@ -5007,8 +5075,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
return 1;
}
sl = sl->next;
+ states_cnt++;
}
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
+ return 0;
+
/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
* technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
* but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
@@ -5148,6 +5220,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();