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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-06-11 15:44:45 -1000
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-06-11 15:44:45 -1000
commitaa7235483a838be79b7c22a86b0dc4cb12ee5dd6 (patch)
treed89a5978232e8dfaf47953a1b7d9ce7599b892b0 /kernel
parent4d8f5f91b8a608980b173ef3382913c7405f82c3 (diff)
parentf6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f (diff)
downloadlinux-aa7235483a838be79b7c22a86b0dc4cb12ee5dd6.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull ptrace fixes from Eric Biederman: "This is just two very minor fixes: - prevent ptrace from reading unitialized kernel memory found twice by syzkaller - restore a missing smp_rmb in ptrace_may_access and add comment tp it so it is not removed by accident again. Apologies for being a little slow about getting this to you, I am still figuring out how to develop with a little baby in the house" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access() signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c9
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c20
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e74ffdc98a92..c73a87a4df13 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -446,6 +446,15 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
+ /*
+ * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable,
+ * the dumpability change must become visible before
+ * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access()
+ * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it
+ * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped
+ * privileges without becoming nondumpable).
+ * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access().
+ */
smp_wmb();
}
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 5710d07e67cf..8456b6e2205f 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -324,6 +324,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
+ /*
+ * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable (through a syscall
+ * like setresuid()) while we are trying to access it, we must ensure
+ * that the dumpability is read after the credentials; otherwise,
+ * we may be able to attach to a task that we shouldn't be able to
+ * attach to (as if the task had dropped privileges without becoming
+ * nondumpable).
+ * Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
@@ -705,6 +715,10 @@ static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child,
if (arg.nr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Ensure arg.off fits in an unsigned long */
+ if (arg.off > ULONG_MAX)
+ return 0;
+
if (arg.flags & PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED)
pending = &child->signal->shared_pending;
else
@@ -712,18 +726,20 @@ static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child,
for (i = 0; i < arg.nr; ) {
kernel_siginfo_t info;
- s32 off = arg.off + i;
+ unsigned long off = arg.off + i;
+ bool found = false;
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) {
if (!off--) {
+ found = true;
copy_siginfo(&info, &q->info);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
- if (off >= 0) /* beyond the end of the list */
+ if (!found) /* beyond the end of the list */
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT