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author | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2020-06-11 15:17:57 +0200 |
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committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2020-06-11 15:17:57 +0200 |
commit | f77d26a9fc525286bcef3d4f98b52e17482cf49c (patch) | |
tree | 6b179c9aa84787773cb601a14a64255e2912154b /kernel/panic.c | |
parent | b6bea24d41519e8c31e4798f1c1a3f67e540c5d0 (diff) | |
parent | f0178fc01fe46bab6a95415f5647d1a74efcad1b (diff) | |
download | linux-f77d26a9fc525286bcef3d4f98b52e17482cf49c.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'x86/entry' into ras/core
to fixup conflicts in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c so MCE specific follow
up patches can be applied without creating a horrible merge conflict
afterwards.
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/panic.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 49 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index b69ee9e76cb2..e2157ca387c8 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100 #define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18 +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +/* + * Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event? + * Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl. + */ +unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace; +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE; static unsigned long tainted_mask = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0; @@ -44,6 +52,8 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers; int panic_on_warn __read_mostly; +unsigned long panic_on_taint; +bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false; int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout); @@ -434,6 +444,11 @@ void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); + + if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) { + panic_on_taint = 0; + panic("panic_on_taint set ..."); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); @@ -515,6 +530,9 @@ void oops_enter(void) /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */ debug_locks_off(); do_oops_enter_exit(); + + if (sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace) + trigger_all_cpu_backtrace(); } /* @@ -662,10 +680,12 @@ device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs); * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value */ -__visible void __stack_chk_fail(void) +__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void) { + instrumentation_begin(); panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB", __builtin_return_address(0)); + instrumentation_end(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail); @@ -686,3 +706,30 @@ static int __init oops_setup(char *s) return 0; } early_param("oops", oops_setup); + +static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s) +{ + char *taint_str; + + if (!s) + return -EINVAL; + + taint_str = strsep(&s, ","); + if (kstrtoul(taint_str, 16, &panic_on_taint)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* make sure panic_on_taint doesn't hold out-of-range TAINT flags */ + panic_on_taint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX; + + if (!panic_on_taint) + return -EINVAL; + + if (s && !strcmp(s, "nousertaint")) + panic_on_taint_nousertaint = true; + + pr_info("panic_on_taint: bitmask=0x%lx nousertaint_mode=%sabled\n", + panic_on_taint, panic_on_taint_nousertaint ? "en" : "dis"); + + return 0; +} +early_param("panic_on_taint", panic_on_taint_setup); |