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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2022-11-25 14:06:17 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> | 2022-11-30 15:33:48 -0800 |
| commit | c67cae551f0df80421b5703ee56ff5e2fe9c4de6 (patch) | |
| tree | cc1878eacd432087d36231fd8669971a5e963c70 /kernel/bpf | |
| parent | 996c060e2bb90e5caef42849846b56da21ea88d9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-c67cae551f0df80421b5703ee56ff5e2fe9c4de6.tar.bz2 | |
bpf: Tighten ptr_to_btf_id checks.
The networking programs typically don't require CAP_PERFMON, but through kfuncs
like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() they can access memory through PTR_TO_BTF_ID. In
such case enforce CAP_PERFMON.
Also make sure that only GPL programs can access kernel data structures.
All kfuncs require GPL already.
Also remove allow_ptr_to_map_access. It's the same as allow_ptr_leaks and
different name for the same check only causes confusion.
Fixes: fd264ca02094 ("bpf: Add a kfunc to type cast from bpf uapi ctx to kernel ctx")
Fixes: 50c6b8a9aea2 ("selftests/bpf: Add a test for btf_type_tag "percpu"")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221125220617.26846-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 4e7f1d085e53..d0ecc0b18b20 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4703,6 +4703,18 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 btf_id; int ret; + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + verbose(env, + "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", + tname); + return -EPERM; + } + if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { + verbose(env, + "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", + tname); + return -EINVAL; + } if (off < 0) { verbose(env, "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", @@ -4823,9 +4835,9 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); - if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) { + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { verbose(env, - "%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", + "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", tname); return -EPERM; } @@ -16679,7 +16691,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); - env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(); env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); |