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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-31 14:51:34 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-31 14:51:34 -0700 |
commit | 478f74a3d8085076dfcb481aa9361b808a6aae94 (patch) | |
tree | 9392ad6d7fe8dce797c3ea16fcec3c453348938d /drivers | |
parent | 354b8bf222ee15bf9aac3d870ba8e0880dd9bc8d (diff) | |
parent | 1754abb3e7583c570666fa1e1ee5b317e88c89a0 (diff) | |
download | linux-478f74a3d8085076dfcb481aa9361b808a6aae94.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:
- If a hardware random number generator passes a sufficiently large
chunk of entropy to random.c during early boot, we now skip the
"fast_init" business and let it initialize the RNG.
This makes CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y actually useful.
- We already have the command line `random.trust_cpu=0/1` option for
RDRAND, which let distros enable CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y while
placating concerns of more paranoid users.
Now we add `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` so that distros can
similarly enable CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y.
- Re-add a comment that got removed by accident in the recent revert.
- Add the spec-compliant ACPI CID for vmgenid, which Microsoft added to
the vmgenid spec at Ard's request during earlier review.
- Restore build-time randomness via the latent entropy plugin, which
was lost when we transitioned to using a hash function.
* tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init
virt: vmgenid: recognize new CID added by Hyper-V
random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding
random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/Kconfig | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/virt/vmgenid.c | 1 |
3 files changed, 20 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig index 740811893c57..55f48375e3fe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig @@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that - only mixes the entropy pool. + only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with + "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". endmenu diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 66ce7c03a142..1d8242969751 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -224,9 +224,10 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void * * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to - * a read from /dev/urandom. The integer family of functions may be - * higher performance for one-off random integers, because they do a - * bit of buffering. + * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of + * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, + * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding + * until the buffer is emptied. * *********************************************************************/ @@ -948,11 +949,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force) **********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); } +static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg) +{ + return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader); +} early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu); +early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader); /* * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts @@ -968,6 +975,11 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) + static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; + _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); +#endif + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { @@ -1128,7 +1140,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { - if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) { size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); count -= ret; @@ -1160,7 +1172,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); */ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) + if (trust_bootloader) add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8); else add_device_randomness(buf, size); diff --git a/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c index 0ae1a39f2e28..a1c467a0e9f7 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c +++ b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void vmgenid_notify(struct acpi_device *device, u32 event) } static const struct acpi_device_id vmgenid_ids[] = { + { "VMGENCTR", 0 }, { "VM_GEN_COUNTER", 0 }, { } }; |