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author | James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> | 2012-05-21 12:17:30 +0100 |
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committer | James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> | 2012-05-21 12:17:30 +0100 |
commit | e34693336564f02b3e2cc09d8b872aef22a154e9 (patch) | |
tree | 09f51f10f9406042f9176e39b4dc8de850ba712e /drivers/firmware/efivars.c | |
parent | 76b311fdbdd2e16e5d39cd496a67aa1a1b948914 (diff) | |
parent | de2eb4d5c5c25e8fb75d1e19092f24b83cb7d8d5 (diff) | |
download | linux-e34693336564f02b3e2cc09d8b872aef22a154e9.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'isci-for-3.5' into misc
isci update for 3.5
1/ Rework remote-node-context (RNC) handling for proper management of
the silicon state machine in error handling and hot-plug conditions.
Further details below, suffice to say if the RNC is mismanaged the
silicon state machines may lock up.
2/ Refactor the initialization code to be reused for suspend/resume support
3/ Miscellaneous bug fixes to address discovery issues and hardware
compatibility.
RNC rework details from Jeff Skirvin:
In the controller, devices as they appear on a SAS domain (or
direct-attached SATA devices) are represented by memory structures known
as "Remote Node Contexts" (RNCs). These structures are transferred from
main memory to the controller using a set of register commands; these
commands include setting up the context ("posting"), removing the
context ("invalidating"), and commands to control the scheduling of
commands and connections to that remote device ("suspensions" and
"resumptions"). There is a similar path to control RNC scheduling from
the protocol engine, which interprets the results of command and data
transmission and reception.
In general, the controller chooses among non-suspended RNCs to find one
that has work requiring scheduling the transmission of command and data
frames to a target. Likewise, when a target tries to return data back
to the initiator, the state of the RNC is used by the controller to
determine how to treat the incoming request. As an example, if the RNC
is in the state "TX/RX Suspended", incoming SSP connection requests from
the target will be rejected by the controller hardware. When an RNC is
"TX Suspended", it will not be selected by the controller hardware to
start outgoing command or data operations (with certain priority-based
exceptions).
As mentioned above, there are two sources for management of the RNC
states: commands from driver software, and the result of transmission
and reception conditions of commands and data signaled by the controller
hardware. As an example of the latter, if an outgoing SSP command ends
with a OPEN_REJECT(BAD_DESTINATION) status, the RNC state will
transition to the "TX Suspended" state, and this is signaled by the
controller hardware in the status to the completion of the pending
command as well as signaled in a controller hardware event. Examples of
the former are included in the patch changelogs.
Driver software is required to suspend the RNC in a "TX/RX Suspended"
condition before any outstanding commands can be terminated. Failure to
guarantee this can lead to a complete hardware hang condition. Earlier
versions of the driver software did not guarantee that an RNC was
correctly managed before I/O termination, and so operated in an unsafe
way.
Further, the driver performed unnecessary contortions to preserve the
remote device command state and so was more complicated than it needed
to be. A simplifying driver assumption is that once an I/O has entered
the error handler path without having completed in the target, the
requirement on the driver is that all use of the sas_task must end.
Beyond that, recovery of operation is dependent on libsas and other
components to reset, rediscover and reconfigure the device before normal
operation can restart. In the driver, this simplifying assumption meant
that the RNC management could be reduced to entry into the suspended
state, terminating the targeted I/O request, and resuming the RNC as
needed for device-specific management such as an SSP Abort Task or LUN
Reset Management request.
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware/efivars.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 196 |
1 files changed, 196 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c index d25599f2a3f8..47408e802ab6 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c @@ -191,6 +191,190 @@ utf16_strncmp(const efi_char16_t *a, const efi_char16_t *b, size_t len) } } +static bool +validate_device_path(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, + unsigned long len) +{ + struct efi_generic_dev_path *node; + int offset = 0; + + node = (struct efi_generic_dev_path *)buffer; + + if (len < sizeof(*node)) + return false; + + while (offset <= len - sizeof(*node) && + node->length >= sizeof(*node) && + node->length <= len - offset) { + offset += node->length; + + if ((node->type == EFI_DEV_END_PATH || + node->type == EFI_DEV_END_PATH2) && + node->sub_type == EFI_DEV_END_ENTIRE) + return true; + + node = (struct efi_generic_dev_path *)(buffer + offset); + } + + /* + * If we're here then either node->length pointed past the end + * of the buffer or we reached the end of the buffer without + * finding a device path end node. + */ + return false; +} + +static bool +validate_boot_order(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, + unsigned long len) +{ + /* An array of 16-bit integers */ + if ((len % 2) != 0) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool +validate_load_option(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, + unsigned long len) +{ + u16 filepathlength; + int i, desclength = 0, namelen; + + namelen = utf16_strnlen(var->VariableName, sizeof(var->VariableName)); + + /* Either "Boot" or "Driver" followed by four digits of hex */ + for (i = match; i < match+4; i++) { + if (var->VariableName[i] > 127 || + hex_to_bin(var->VariableName[i] & 0xff) < 0) + return true; + } + + /* Reject it if there's 4 digits of hex and then further content */ + if (namelen > match + 4) + return false; + + /* A valid entry must be at least 8 bytes */ + if (len < 8) + return false; + + filepathlength = buffer[4] | buffer[5] << 8; + + /* + * There's no stored length for the description, so it has to be + * found by hand + */ + desclength = utf16_strsize((efi_char16_t *)(buffer + 6), len - 6) + 2; + + /* Each boot entry must have a descriptor */ + if (!desclength) + return false; + + /* + * If the sum of the length of the description, the claimed filepath + * length and the original header are greater than the length of the + * variable, it's malformed + */ + if ((desclength + filepathlength + 6) > len) + return false; + + /* + * And, finally, check the filepath + */ + return validate_device_path(var, match, buffer + desclength + 6, + filepathlength); +} + +static bool +validate_uint16(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, + unsigned long len) +{ + /* A single 16-bit integer */ + if (len != 2) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool +validate_ascii_string(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, + unsigned long len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (buffer[i] > 127) + return false; + + if (buffer[i] == 0) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +struct variable_validate { + char *name; + bool (*validate)(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *data, + unsigned long len); +}; + +static const struct variable_validate variable_validate[] = { + { "BootNext", validate_uint16 }, + { "BootOrder", validate_boot_order }, + { "DriverOrder", validate_boot_order }, + { "Boot*", validate_load_option }, + { "Driver*", validate_load_option }, + { "ConIn", validate_device_path }, + { "ConInDev", validate_device_path }, + { "ConOut", validate_device_path }, + { "ConOutDev", validate_device_path }, + { "ErrOut", validate_device_path }, + { "ErrOutDev", validate_device_path }, + { "Timeout", validate_uint16 }, + { "Lang", validate_ascii_string }, + { "PlatformLang", validate_ascii_string }, + { "", NULL }, +}; + +static bool +validate_var(struct efi_variable *var, u8 *data, unsigned long len) +{ + int i; + u16 *unicode_name = var->VariableName; + + for (i = 0; variable_validate[i].validate != NULL; i++) { + const char *name = variable_validate[i].name; + int match; + + for (match = 0; ; match++) { + char c = name[match]; + u16 u = unicode_name[match]; + + /* All special variables are plain ascii */ + if (u > 127) + return true; + + /* Wildcard in the matching name means we've matched */ + if (c == '*') + return variable_validate[i].validate(var, + match, data, len); + + /* Case sensitive match */ + if (c != u) + break; + + /* Reached the end of the string while matching */ + if (!c) + return variable_validate[i].validate(var, + match, data, len); + } + } + + return true; +} + static efi_status_t get_var_data_locked(struct efivars *efivars, struct efi_variable *var) { @@ -324,6 +508,12 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) return -EINVAL; } + if ((new_var->Attributes & ~EFI_VARIABLE_MASK) != 0 || + validate_var(new_var, new_var->Data, new_var->DataSize) == false) { + printk(KERN_ERR "efivars: Malformed variable content\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + spin_lock(&efivars->lock); status = efivars->ops->set_variable(new_var->VariableName, &new_var->VendorGuid, @@ -626,6 +816,12 @@ static ssize_t efivar_create(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; + if ((new_var->Attributes & ~EFI_VARIABLE_MASK) != 0 || + validate_var(new_var, new_var->Data, new_var->DataSize) == false) { + printk(KERN_ERR "efivars: Malformed variable content\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + spin_lock(&efivars->lock); /* |