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authorMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>2017-08-25 16:50:15 +0100
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-08-26 09:20:33 +0200
commitccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8 (patch)
treeb1791e31decb96c4fad4cd24b6b9dce5a351d2eb /drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
parent3cb9bc85029f2ceb7a5babadcab445c7cb861da8 (diff)
downloadlinux-ccc829ba3624beb9a703fc995d016b836d9eead8.tar.bz2
efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation
If a machine is reset while secrets are present in RAM, it may be possible for code executed after the reboot to extract those secrets from untouched memory. The Trusted Computing Group specified a mechanism for requesting that the firmware clear all RAM on reset before booting another OS. This is done by setting the MemoryOverwriteRequestControl variable at startup. If userspace can ensure that all secrets are removed as part of a controlled shutdown, it can reset this variable to 0 before triggering a hardware reboot. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170825155019.6740-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index 8181ac179d14..1cb2d1c070c3 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -192,6 +192,9 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
goto fail_free_cmdline;
}
+ /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
+ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
+
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
/*