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authorKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>2019-04-12 17:50:58 -0400
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2019-04-17 20:59:23 +0200
commite2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b (patch)
treee79e7576aa0ee562943ab11f9a678062af20fb15 /arch
parentcae5ec342645746d617dd420d206e1588d47768a (diff)
downloadlinux-e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b.tar.bz2
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not* affected by the other two MDS issues. For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to mitigate SMT. However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should not report that SMT is mitigated: $cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Vulnerable; SMT mitigated But rather: Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0642505dda69..6b8a55c7cebc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1204,7 +1204,8 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
- sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled");
+ (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+ sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
}
return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],