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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-09 12:52:25 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-09 12:52:25 -0700
commitdd3e4012dd360873f95bbe7fe2eb65d951781803 (patch)
treeb7a705c5cbabe0392fb6679987bec2943de4130e /arch
parentb741596468b010af2846b75f5e75a842ce344a6e (diff)
parentbc908e091b3264672889162733020048901021fb (diff)
downloadlinux-dd3e4012dd360873f95bbe7fe2eb65d951781803.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: "A bunch of things accumulated for x86 in the last two weeks: - Fix guest vtime accounting so that ticks happening while the guest is running can also be accounted to it. Along with a consolidation to the guest-specific context tracking helpers. - Provide for the host NMI handler running after a VMX VMEXIT to be able to run on the kernel stack correctly. - Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX when RDPID is supported and not RDTSCP (virt relevant - real hw supports both) - A code generation improvement to TASK_SIZE_MAX through the use of alternatives - The usual misc and related cleanups and improvements" * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: KVM: x86: Consolidate guest enter/exit logic to common helpers context_tracking: KVM: Move guest enter/exit wrappers to KVM's domain context_tracking: Consolidate guest enter/exit wrappers sched/vtime: Move guest enter/exit vtime accounting to vtime.h sched/vtime: Move vtime accounting external declarations above inlines KVM: x86: Defer vtime accounting 'til after IRQ handling context_tracking: Move guest exit vtime accounting to separate helpers context_tracking: Move guest exit context tracking to separate helpers KVM/VMX: Invoke NMI non-IST entry instead of IST entry x86/cpu: Remove write_tsc() and write_rdtscp_aux() wrappers x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported x86/resctrl: Fix init const confusion x86: Delete UD0, UD1 traces x86/smpboot: Remove duplicate includes x86/cpu: Use alternative to generate the TASK_SIZE_MAX constant
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c39
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c55
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.h45
13 files changed, 131 insertions, 120 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
index 297fa12e7e27..84b87538a15d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
@@ -7,18 +7,9 @@
/*
* Despite that some emulators terminate on UD2, we use it for WARN().
- *
- * Since various instruction decoders/specs disagree on the encoding of
- * UD0/UD1.
*/
-
-#define ASM_UD0 ".byte 0x0f, 0xff" /* + ModRM (for Intel) */
-#define ASM_UD1 ".byte 0x0f, 0xb9" /* + ModRM */
#define ASM_UD2 ".byte 0x0f, 0x0b"
-
-#define INSN_UD0 0xff0f
#define INSN_UD2 0x0b0f
-
#define LEN_UD2 2
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index e35e342673c7..73d45b0dfff2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -588,6 +588,21 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_MC, xenpv_exc_machine_check);
#endif
/* NMI */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+/*
+ * Special NOIST entry point for VMX which invokes this on the kernel
+ * stack. asm_exc_nmi() requires an IST to work correctly vs. the NMI
+ * 'executing' marker.
+ *
+ * On 32bit this just uses the regular NMI entry point because 32-bit does
+ * not have ISTs.
+ */
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY(X86_TRAP_NMI, exc_nmi_noist);
+#else
+#define asm_exc_nmi_noist asm_exc_nmi
+#endif
+
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_NMI(X86_TRAP_NMI, exc_nmi);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_NMI, xenpv_exc_nmi);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index e16cccdd0420..a3f87f1015d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -324,10 +324,6 @@ static inline int wrmsrl_safe(u32 msr, u64 val)
return wrmsr_safe(msr, (u32)val, (u32)(val >> 32));
}
-#define write_tsc(low, high) wrmsr(MSR_IA32_TSC, (low), (high))
-
-#define write_rdtscp_aux(val) wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, (val), 0)
-
struct msr *msrs_alloc(void);
void msrs_free(struct msr *msrs);
int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
index 939b1cff4a7b..ca840fec7776 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
@@ -56,6 +56,39 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+/*
+ * User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range.
+ * There are a few constraints that determine this:
+ *
+ * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
+ * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
+ * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
+ * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything
+ * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
+ *
+ * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
+ * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
+ * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
+ * bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the
+ * Intel problem.
+ *
+ * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
+ */
+static inline unsigned long task_size_max(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ret;
+
+ alternative_io("movq %[small],%0","movq %[large],%0",
+ X86_FEATURE_LA57,
+ "=r" (ret),
+ [small] "i" ((1ul << 47)-PAGE_SIZE),
+ [large] "i" ((1ul << 56)-PAGE_SIZE));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL */
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 64297eabad63..a8d4ad856568 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -55,30 +55,13 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
#define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT (pgtable_l5_enabled() ? 56 : 47)
+/* See task_size_max() in <asm/page_64.h> */
#else
#define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT 47
+#define task_size_max() ((_AC(1,UL) << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
#endif
-/*
- * User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range.
- * There are a few constraints that determine this:
- *
- * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
- * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
- * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
- * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything
- * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
- *
- * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
- * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
- * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
- * bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the
- * Intel problem.
- *
- * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((_AC(1,UL) << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX task_size_max()
#define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
/* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 6bdb69a9a7dc..a1b756c49a93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1851,8 +1851,8 @@ static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
struct desc_struct d = { };
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
- write_rdtscp_aux(cpudata);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+ wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata, 0);
/* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
d.limit0 = cpudata;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index dbeaa8409313..f07c10b87a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ unsigned int resctrl_cqm_threshold;
static const struct mbm_correction_factor_table {
u32 rmidthreshold;
u64 cf;
-} mbm_cf_table[] __initdata = {
+} mbm_cf_table[] __initconst = {
{7, CF(1.000000)},
{15, CF(1.000000)},
{15, CF(0.969650)},
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index bf250a339655..2ef961cf4cfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -524,6 +524,16 @@ nmi_restart:
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi_noist)
+{
+ exc_nmi(regs);
+}
+#endif
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asm_exc_nmi_noist);
+#endif
+
void stop_nmi(void)
{
ignore_nmis++;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 7ffb0cf3f997..0ad5214f598a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -1865,9 +1865,6 @@ static bool slv_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq)
return true;
}
-#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
-#include <asm/intel-family.h>
-
#define X86_MATCH(model) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
INTEL_FAM6_##model, X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, NULL)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 9790c73f2a32..b649f92287a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3710,25 +3710,7 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
unsigned long vmcb_pa = svm->current_vmcb->pa;
- /*
- * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is
- * interrupts disabled when this is invoked. Also tell RCU about
- * it. This is the same logic as for exit_to_user_mode().
- *
- * This ensures that e.g. latency analysis on the host observes
- * guest mode as interrupt enabled.
- *
- * guest_enter_irqoff() informs context tracking about the
- * transition to guest mode and if enabled adjusts RCU state
- * accordingly.
- */
- instrumentation_begin();
- trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
- lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0);
- instrumentation_end();
-
- guest_enter_irqoff();
- lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0);
+ kvm_guest_enter_irqoff();
if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(vmcb_pa);
@@ -3748,24 +3730,7 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmload(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
}
- /*
- * VMEXIT disables interrupts (host state), but tracing and lockdep
- * have them in state 'on' as recorded before entering guest mode.
- * Same as enter_from_user_mode().
- *
- * guest_exit_irqoff() restores host context and reinstates RCU if
- * enabled and required.
- *
- * This needs to be done before the below as native_read_msr()
- * contains a tracepoint and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() calls
- * into world and some more.
- */
- lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
- guest_exit_irqoff();
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
- instrumentation_end();
+ kvm_guest_exit_irqoff();
}
static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index cbe0cdade38a..d000cddbd734 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/idtentry.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/kexec.h>
@@ -6415,18 +6416,17 @@ static void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
-static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 intr_info)
+static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long entry)
{
- unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
-
kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu);
- vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(gate_offset(desc));
+ vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(entry);
kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
}
static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
+ const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
@@ -6437,18 +6437,20 @@ static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
else if (is_nmi(intr_info))
- handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu, intr_info);
+ handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu, nmi_entry);
}
static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+ unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+ gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
if (WARN_ONCE(!is_external_intr(intr_info),
"KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
return;
- handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, intr_info);
+ handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, gate_offset(desc));
}
static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -6662,25 +6664,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
- /*
- * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is
- * interrupts disabled when this is invoked. Also tell RCU about
- * it. This is the same logic as for exit_to_user_mode().
- *
- * This ensures that e.g. latency analysis on the host observes
- * guest mode as interrupt enabled.
- *
- * guest_enter_irqoff() informs context tracking about the
- * transition to guest mode and if enabled adjusts RCU state
- * accordingly.
- */
- instrumentation_begin();
- trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
- lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0);
- instrumentation_end();
-
- guest_enter_irqoff();
- lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0);
+ kvm_guest_enter_irqoff();
/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
@@ -6696,24 +6680,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
- /*
- * VMEXIT disables interrupts (host state), but tracing and lockdep
- * have them in state 'on' as recorded before entering guest mode.
- * Same as enter_from_user_mode().
- *
- * guest_exit_irqoff() restores host context and reinstates RCU if
- * enabled and required.
- *
- * This needs to be done before the below as native_read_msr()
- * contains a tracepoint and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() calls
- * into world and some more.
- */
- lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
- guest_exit_irqoff();
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
- instrumentation_end();
+ kvm_guest_exit_irqoff();
}
static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index cebdaa1e3cf5..6eda2834fc05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9315,6 +9315,15 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
local_irq_disable();
kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+ /*
+ * Wait until after servicing IRQs to account guest time so that any
+ * ticks that occurred while running the guest are properly accounted
+ * to the guest. Waiting until IRQs are enabled degrades the accuracy
+ * of accounting via context tracking, but the loss of accuracy is
+ * acceptable for all known use cases.
+ */
+ vtime_account_guest_exit();
+
if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
s64 delta = vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.advance_expire_delta;
if (delta != S64_MIN) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 8ddd38146525..521f74e5bbf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -8,6 +8,51 @@
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+static __always_inline void kvm_guest_enter_irqoff(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is
+ * interrupts disabled when this is invoked. Also tell RCU about
+ * it. This is the same logic as for exit_to_user_mode().
+ *
+ * This ensures that e.g. latency analysis on the host observes
+ * guest mode as interrupt enabled.
+ *
+ * guest_enter_irqoff() informs context tracking about the
+ * transition to guest mode and if enabled adjusts RCU state
+ * accordingly.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
+ lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0);
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ guest_enter_irqoff();
+ lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_guest_exit_irqoff(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * VMEXIT disables interrupts (host state), but tracing and lockdep
+ * have them in state 'on' as recorded before entering guest mode.
+ * Same as enter_from_user_mode().
+ *
+ * context_tracking_guest_exit() restores host context and reinstates
+ * RCU if enabled and required.
+ *
+ * This needs to be done immediately after VM-Exit, before any code
+ * that might contain tracepoints or call out to the greater world,
+ * e.g. before x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host().
+ */
+ lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
+ context_tracking_guest_exit();
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
#define KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK(consistency_check) \
({ \
bool failed = (consistency_check); \