diff options
| author | Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com> | 2019-12-11 12:47:50 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2020-01-27 19:59:42 +0100 |
| commit | 125ffc5e0a56a3eded608dc51e09d5ebf72cf652 (patch) | |
| tree | 3f6dafa71f5d0e850d598e7bb2471876d2f89469 /arch/x86 | |
| parent | 6ec4c5eee1750d5d17951c4e1960d953376a0dda (diff) | |
| download | linux-125ffc5e0a56a3eded608dc51e09d5ebf72cf652.tar.bz2 | |
KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(). When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value. Using constants
prevents the attack.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 2d4faefe8dd4..20c0cbdff1be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -5195,16 +5195,28 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len) ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6; break; case 0x26: /* ES override */ + has_seg_override = true; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_ES; + break; case 0x2e: /* CS override */ + has_seg_override = true; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_CS; + break; case 0x36: /* SS override */ + has_seg_override = true; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_SS; + break; case 0x3e: /* DS override */ has_seg_override = true; - ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS; break; case 0x64: /* FS override */ + has_seg_override = true; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_FS; + break; case 0x65: /* GS override */ has_seg_override = true; - ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7; + ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_GS; break; case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */ if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) |