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| author | Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> | 2019-12-09 18:12:14 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-01-15 14:11:02 +0000 |
| commit | 3e6c69a058deaa50d33c3dac36cde80b4ce590e8 (patch) | |
| tree | 48e575bceafa45f0555586629c735419c6e50ba6 /arch/arm64/kernel | |
| parent | 46cf053efec6a3a5f343fead837777efe8252a46 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3e6c69a058deaa50d33c3dac36cde80b4ce590e8.tar.bz2 | |
arm64: Add initial support for E0PD
Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) is used to mitigate some speculation
based security issues by ensuring that the kernel is not mapped when
userspace is running but this approach is expensive and is incompatible
with SPE. E0PD, introduced in the ARMv8.5 extensions, provides an
alternative to this which ensures that accesses from userspace to the
kernel's half of the memory map to always fault with constant time,
preventing timing attacks without requiring constant unmapping and
remapping or preventing legitimate accesses.
Currently this feature will only be enabled if all CPUs in the system
support E0PD, if some CPUs do not support the feature at boot time then
the feature will not be enabled and in the unlikely event that a late
CPU is the first CPU to lack the feature then we will reject that CPU.
This initial patch does not yet integrate with KPTI, this will be dealt
with in followup patches. Ideally we could ensure that by default we
don't use KPTI on CPUs where E0PD is present.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
[will: Fixed typo in Kconfig text]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 04cf64e9f0c9..9d578e720168 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = { }; static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr2[] = { + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_E0PD_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_FWB_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0), @@ -1251,6 +1252,14 @@ static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) } #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD +static void cpu_enable_e0pd(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) +{ + if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_E0PD)) + sysreg_clear_set(tcr_el1, 0, TCR_E0PD1); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD */ + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI static bool enable_pseudo_nmi; @@ -1567,6 +1576,19 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .min_field_value = 1, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD + { + .desc = "E0PD", + .capability = ARM64_HAS_E0PD, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, + .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, + .field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR2_E0PD_SHIFT, + .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .min_field_value = 1, + .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, + }, +#endif {}, }; |