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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-23 09:46:16 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-23 09:46:16 -0700
commit032c7ed958174957a4d6eac61806f66e1123d815 (patch)
tree0468862c64b825b437181700f2e9ba2870a83b1c /arch/arm64/kernel
parentf9893351acaecf0a414baf9942b48d5bb5c688c6 (diff)
parent66dd3474702aa98d5844367e1577cdad78ef7c65 (diff)
downloadlinux-032c7ed958174957a4d6eac61806f66e1123d815.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull more arm64 updates from Will Deacon: "A small selection of further arm64 fixes and updates. Most of these are fixes that came in during the merge window, with the exception of the HAVE_MOVE_PMD mremap() speed-up which we discussed back in 2018 and somehow forgot to enable upstream. - Improve performance of Spectre-v2 mitigation on Falkor CPUs (if you're lucky enough to have one) - Select HAVE_MOVE_PMD. This has been shown to improve mremap() performance, which is used heavily by the Android runtime GC, and it seems we forgot to enable this upstream back in 2018. - Ensure linker flags are consistent between LLVM and BFD - Fix stale comment in Spectre mitigation rework - Fix broken copyright header - Fix KASLR randomisation of the linear map - Prevent arm64-specific prctl()s from compat tasks (return -EINVAL)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20181108181201.88826-3-joelaf@google.com/ * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: arm64: proton-pack: Update comment to reflect new function name arm64: spectre-v2: Favour CPU-specific mitigation at EL2 arm64: link with -z norelro regardless of CONFIG_RELOCATABLE arm64: Fix a broken copyright header in gen_vdso_offsets.sh arm64: mremap speedup - Enable HAVE_MOVE_PMD arm64: mm: use single quantity to represent the PA to VA translation arm64: reject prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS) on compat tasks
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c40
-rwxr-xr-xarch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh2
4 files changed, 26 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
index a6d688c10745..062b21f30f94 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ int sve_set_current_vl(unsigned long arg)
vl = arg & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK;
flags = arg & ~vl;
- if (!system_supports_sve())
+ if (!system_supports_sve() || is_compat_task())
return -EINVAL;
ret = sve_set_vector_length(current, vl, flags);
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int sve_set_current_vl(unsigned long arg)
/* PR_SVE_GET_VL */
int sve_get_current_vl(void)
{
- if (!system_supports_sve())
+ if (!system_supports_sve() || is_compat_task())
return -EINVAL;
return sve_prctl_status(0);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
index 1e77736a4f66..adb955fd9bdd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)
if (!system_supports_address_auth() && !system_supports_generic_auth())
return -EINVAL;
+ if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(tsk)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!arg) {
ptrauth_keys_init_user(keys);
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
index 68b710f1b43f..25f3c80b5ffe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
* - Mitigated in hardware and advertised by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2.
* - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list".
* - Mitigated in software by firmware.
- * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel.
+ * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel and a
+ * firmware call at EL2.
* - Vulnerable.
*
* It's not unlikely for different CPUs in a big.LITTLE system to fall into
@@ -204,8 +205,8 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn)
__SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ;
/*
- * detect_harden_bp_fw() passes NULL for the hyp_vecs start/end if
- * we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work.
+ * Vinz Clortho takes the hyp_vecs start/end "keys" at
+ * the door when we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work.
*/
if (!is_hyp_mode_available()) {
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
@@ -259,6 +260,16 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitisation(void)
: "=&r" (tmp));
}
+static bp_hardening_cb_t spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb(void)
+{
+ u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
+ if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) &&
+ ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return qcom_link_stack_sanitisation;
+}
+
static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void)
{
bp_hardening_cb_t cb;
@@ -284,26 +295,15 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void)
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
+ /*
+ * Prefer a CPU-specific workaround if it exists. Note that we
+ * still rely on firmware for the mitigation at EL2.
+ */
+ cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb() ?: cb;
install_bp_hardening_cb(cb);
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
-static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation(void)
-{
- u32 midr;
-
- if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off())
- return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
-
- midr = read_cpuid_id();
- if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) &&
- ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
- return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
-
- install_bp_hardening_cb(qcom_link_stack_sanitisation);
- return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
-}
-
void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
{
enum mitigation_state state;
@@ -313,8 +313,6 @@ void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state();
if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
state = spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation();
- if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
- state = spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation();
update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v2_state, state);
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh
index 0664acaf61ff..8b806eacd0a6 100755
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Doing this inside the Makefile will break the $(filter-out) function,
# causing Kbuild to rebuild the vdso-offsets header file every time.
#
-# Author: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com
+# Author: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
#
LC_ALL=C