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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-11-01 11:36:35 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-11-01 11:36:35 -0700 |
commit | cd3e8ea847eea97095aa01de3d12674d35fd0199 (patch) | |
tree | 309b8c609c7f8f606169405d91c6b77f9feacaa7 /Documentation/filesystems | |
parent | 19901165d90fdca1e57c9baa0d5b4c63d15c476a (diff) | |
parent | b7e072f9b77f4c516df96e0c22ec09f8b2e76ba1 (diff) | |
download | linux-cd3e8ea847eea97095aa01de3d12674d35fd0199.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers:
"Some cleanups for fs/crypto/:
- Allow 256-bit master keys with AES-256-XTS
- Improve documentation and comments
- Remove unneeded field fscrypt_operations::max_namelen"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt:
fscrypt: improve a few comments
fscrypt: allow 256-bit master keys with AES-256-XTS
fscrypt: improve documentation for inline encryption
fscrypt: clean up comments in bio.c
fscrypt: remove fscrypt_operations::max_namelen
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/filesystems')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 83 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst index 0eb799d9d05a..4d5d50dca65c 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst @@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ Side-channel attacks fscrypt is only resistant to side-channel attacks, such as timing or electromagnetic attacks, to the extent that the underlying Linux -Cryptographic API algorithms are. If a vulnerable algorithm is used, -such as a table-based implementation of AES, it may be possible for an -attacker to mount a side channel attack against the online system. -Side channel attacks may also be mounted against applications -consuming decrypted data. +Cryptographic API algorithms or inline encryption hardware are. If a +vulnerable algorithm is used, such as a table-based implementation of +AES, it may be possible for an attacker to mount a side channel attack +against the online system. Side channel attacks may also be mounted +against applications consuming decrypted data. Unauthorized file access ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ @@ -176,11 +176,11 @@ Master Keys Each encrypted directory tree is protected by a *master key*. Master keys can be up to 64 bytes long, and must be at least as long as the -greater of the key length needed by the contents and filenames -encryption modes being used. For example, if AES-256-XTS is used for -contents encryption, the master key must be 64 bytes (512 bits). Note -that the XTS mode is defined to require a key twice as long as that -required by the underlying block cipher. +greater of the security strength of the contents and filenames +encryption modes being used. For example, if any AES-256 mode is +used, the master key must be at least 256 bits, i.e. 32 bytes. A +stricter requirement applies if the key is used by a v1 encryption +policy and AES-256-XTS is used; such keys must be 64 bytes. To "unlock" an encrypted directory tree, userspace must provide the appropriate master key. There can be any number of master keys, each @@ -1135,6 +1135,50 @@ where applications may later write sensitive data. It is recommended that systems implementing a form of "verified boot" take advantage of this by validating all top-level encryption policies prior to access. +Inline encryption support +========================= + +By default, fscrypt uses the kernel crypto API for all cryptographic +operations (other than HKDF, which fscrypt partially implements +itself). The kernel crypto API supports hardware crypto accelerators, +but only ones that work in the traditional way where all inputs and +outputs (e.g. plaintexts and ciphertexts) are in memory. fscrypt can +take advantage of such hardware, but the traditional acceleration +model isn't particularly efficient and fscrypt hasn't been optimized +for it. + +Instead, many newer systems (especially mobile SoCs) have *inline +encryption hardware* that can encrypt/decrypt data while it is on its +way to/from the storage device. Linux supports inline encryption +through a set of extensions to the block layer called *blk-crypto*. +blk-crypto allows filesystems to attach encryption contexts to bios +(I/O requests) to specify how the data will be encrypted or decrypted +in-line. For more information about blk-crypto, see +:ref:`Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst <inline_encryption>`. + +On supported filesystems (currently ext4 and f2fs), fscrypt can use +blk-crypto instead of the kernel crypto API to encrypt/decrypt file +contents. To enable this, set CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT=y in +the kernel configuration, and specify the "inlinecrypt" mount option +when mounting the filesystem. + +Note that the "inlinecrypt" mount option just specifies to use inline +encryption when possible; it doesn't force its use. fscrypt will +still fall back to using the kernel crypto API on files where the +inline encryption hardware doesn't have the needed crypto capabilities +(e.g. support for the needed encryption algorithm and data unit size) +and where blk-crypto-fallback is unusable. (For blk-crypto-fallback +to be usable, it must be enabled in the kernel configuration with +CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK=y.) + +Currently fscrypt always uses the filesystem block size (which is +usually 4096 bytes) as the data unit size. Therefore, it can only use +inline encryption hardware that supports that data unit size. + +Inline encryption doesn't affect the ciphertext or other aspects of +the on-disk format, so users may freely switch back and forth between +using "inlinecrypt" and not using "inlinecrypt". + Implementation details ====================== @@ -1184,6 +1228,13 @@ keys`_ and `DIRECT_KEY policies`_. Data path changes ----------------- +When inline encryption is used, filesystems just need to associate +encryption contexts with bios to specify how the block layer or the +inline encryption hardware will encrypt/decrypt the file contents. + +When inline encryption isn't used, filesystems must encrypt/decrypt +the file contents themselves, as described below: + For the read path (->readpage()) of regular files, filesystems can read the ciphertext into the page cache and decrypt it in-place. The page lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the @@ -1197,18 +1248,6 @@ buffer. Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, already use temporary buffers regardless of encryption. Other filesystems, such as ext4 and F2FS, have to allocate bounce pages specially for encryption. -Fscrypt is also able to use inline encryption hardware instead of the -kernel crypto API for en/decryption of file contents. When possible, -and if directed to do so (by specifying the 'inlinecrypt' mount option -for an ext4/F2FS filesystem), it adds encryption contexts to bios and -uses blk-crypto to perform the en/decryption instead of making use of -the above read/write path changes. Of course, even if directed to -make use of inline encryption, fscrypt will only be able to do so if -either hardware inline encryption support is available for the -selected encryption algorithm or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK -is selected. If neither is the case, fscrypt will fall back to using -the above mentioned read/write path changes for en/decryption. - Filename hashing and encoding ----------------------------- |