diff options
author | Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> | 2017-10-11 12:10:14 -0700 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-11-08 15:16:36 -0500 |
commit | f00d79750712511d0a83c108eea0d44b680a915f (patch) | |
tree | f0bdb9499c9e6b7bb7c37ace6b70d25bc5035ac5 /Documentation/ABI | |
parent | 096b85464832d2a7bd7bd6d4db2fafed2ab77244 (diff) | |
download | linux-f00d79750712511d0a83c108eea0d44b680a915f.tar.bz2 |
EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded
EVM will only perform validation once a key has been loaded. This key
may either be a symmetric trusted key (for HMAC validation and creation)
or the public half of an asymmetric key (for digital signature
validation). The /sys/kernel/security/evm interface allows userland to
signal that a symmetric key has been loaded, but does not allow userland
to signal that an asymmetric public key has been loaded.
This patch extends the interface to permit userspace to pass a bitmask
of loaded key types. It also allows userspace to block loading of a
symmetric key in order to avoid a compromised system from being able to
load an additional key type later.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 47 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 8374d4557e5d..a0bbccb00736 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -7,17 +7,36 @@ Description: HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. - EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it - with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. - The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until - EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully - loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM - can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but - returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM - should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done - in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part - of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and - loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to: - Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. (A sample dracut - patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables - EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.) + EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is + an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a + trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key + Retention System. The second is a digital signature + generated either locally or remotely using an + asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's + keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by + echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm: + + 1: enable HMAC validation and creation + 2: enable digital signature validation + 3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC + creation + + Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or + if bit 32 is set: + + echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm + + will enable digital signature validation and block + further writes to <securityfs>/evm. + + Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the + 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. + Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early + as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, + which has already been measured as part of the trusted + boot. For more information on creating and loading + existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to: + Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. Both dracut + (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via + core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot + time. |