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authorMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>2020-09-18 14:08:54 +0100
committerWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>2020-09-29 16:08:17 +0100
commitd63d975a71b332df36cc802e6e77a462af6b9fef (patch)
tree6d9260546f2c21449a646437c281c74001765b15
parent7311467702710cc30ac4e3a6c6670a766e7667f9 (diff)
downloadlinux-d63d975a71b332df36cc802e6e77a462af6b9fef.tar.bz2
KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
Convert the KVM WA2 code to using the Spectre infrastructure, making the code much more readable. It also allows us to take SSBS into account for the mitigation. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c19
3 files changed, 30 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index b1bd2f4cd3e0..9b90a701462c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void)
* at EL2.
*/
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) &&
- arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) {
+ arm64_get_spectre_v4_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) {
kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__kvm_enable_ssbs);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
index 69e023dfafce..9824025ccc5c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
@@ -36,13 +36,24 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
break;
case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
- switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
- case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
- case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
+ switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) {
+ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
break;
- case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
- case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
- case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+ /*
+ * SSBS everywhere: Indicate no firmware
+ * support, as the SSBS support will be
+ * indicated to the guest and the default is
+ * safe.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, expose a permanent mitigation
+ * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the
+ * guest stays protected.
+ */
+ if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+ break;
+ fallthrough;
+ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
break;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
index 87e6e3818fb5..db4056ecccfd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
@@ -435,14 +435,19 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
}
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL;
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
- switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
- case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
- case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
- case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+ switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) {
+ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+ /*
+ * As for the hypercall discovery, we pretend we
+ * don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at
+ * all times.
+ */
+ if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+ return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
+ fallthrough;
+ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED;
- case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
- case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
- default:
+ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
}
}