diff options
| author | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2022-10-27 17:59:07 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2022-11-09 18:06:35 +0000 |
| commit | 9beccca0984022a844850e32f0d7dd80d4a225de (patch) | |
| tree | f9a9128498d40dee1958e15b212707872f039e38 | |
| parent | 68c76ad4a9571a2b603665c85cf8229bcf04982a (diff) | |
| download | linux-9beccca0984022a844850e32f0d7dd80d4a225de.tar.bz2 | |
scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks
In order to allow arches to use code patching to conditionally emit the
shadow stack pushes and pops, rather than always taking the performance
hit even on CPUs that implement alternatives such as stack pointer
authentication on arm64, add a Kconfig symbol that can be set by the
arch to omit the SCS codegen itself, without otherwise affecting how
support code for SCS and compiler options (for register reservation, for
instance) are emitted.
Also, add a static key and some plumbing to omit the allocation of
shadow call stack for dynamic SCS configurations if SCS is disabled at
runtime.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027155908.1940624-3-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/scs.h | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/scs.c | 14 |
4 files changed, 39 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -966,8 +966,10 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --gc-sections endif ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +ifndef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS CC_FLAGS_SCS := -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) +endif export CC_FLAGS_SCS endif diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 8f138e580d1a..072a1b39e3af 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -651,6 +651,13 @@ config SHADOW_CALL_STACK reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. +config DYNAMIC_SCS + bool + help + Set by the arch code if it relies on code patching to insert the + shadow call stack push and pop instructions rather than on the + compiler. + config LTO bool help diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h index 18122d9e17ff..4ab5bdc898cf 100644 --- a/include/linux/scs.h +++ b/include/linux/scs.h @@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) return sz >= SCS_SIZE - 1 || READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC; } +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled); + +static inline bool scs_is_dynamic(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS)) + return false; + return static_branch_likely(&dynamic_scs_enabled); +} + +static inline bool scs_is_enabled(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS)) + return true; + return scs_is_dynamic(); +} + #else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */ static inline void *scs_alloc(int node) { return NULL; } @@ -62,6 +78,8 @@ static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {} static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; } static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {} static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; } +static inline bool scs_is_enabled(void) { return false; } +static inline bool scs_is_dynamic(void) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */ diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c index b7e1b096d906..d7809affe740 100644 --- a/kernel/scs.c +++ b/kernel/scs.c @@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/vmstat.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled); +#endif + static void __scs_account(void *s, int account) { struct page *scs_page = vmalloc_to_page(s); @@ -101,14 +105,20 @@ static int scs_cleanup(unsigned int cpu) void __init scs_init(void) { + if (!scs_is_enabled()) + return; cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "scs:scs_cache", NULL, scs_cleanup); } int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { - void *s = scs_alloc(node); + void *s; + if (!scs_is_enabled()) + return 0; + + s = scs_alloc(node); if (!s) return -ENOMEM; @@ -148,7 +158,7 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { void *s = task_scs(tsk); - if (!s) + if (!scs_is_enabled() || !s) return; WARN(task_scs_end_corrupted(tsk), |