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authorJia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn>2020-05-30 16:42:08 +0200
committerMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>2020-06-23 15:09:43 +0200
commit6499a0db9b0f1e903d52f8244eacc1d4be00eea2 (patch)
treee5c4c00e9129804e6cedd597c1792998926283d2
parentbc76369b89bbbbd01b2a3852287ea8092b59d012 (diff)
downloadlinux-6499a0db9b0f1e903d52f8244eacc1d4be00eea2.tar.bz2
media: pci: ttpci: av7110: fix possible buffer overflow caused by bad DMA value in debiirq()
The value av7110->debi_virt is stored in DMA memory, and it is assigned to data, and thus data[0] can be modified at any time by malicious hardware. In this case, "if (data[0] < 2)" can be passed, but then data[0] can be changed into a large number, which may cause buffer overflow when the code "av7110->ci_slot[data[0]]" is used. To fix this possible bug, data[0] is assigned to a local variable, which replaces the use of data[0]. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c5
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c b/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
index d0cdee1c6eb0..bf36b1e22b63 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
@@ -406,14 +406,15 @@ static void debiirq(unsigned long cookie)
case DATA_CI_GET:
{
u8 *data = av7110->debi_virt;
+ u8 data_0 = data[0];
- if ((data[0] < 2) && data[2] == 0xff) {
+ if (data_0 < 2 && data[2] == 0xff) {
int flags = 0;
if (data[5] > 0)
flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT;
if (data[5] > 5)
flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY;
- av7110->ci_slot[data[0]].flags = flags;
+ av7110->ci_slot[data_0].flags = flags;
} else
ci_get_data(&av7110->ci_rbuffer,
av7110->debi_virt,