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authorMatthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>2019-08-19 17:18:01 -0700
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2019-08-19 21:54:16 -0700
commit29d3c1c8dfe752c01b7115ecd5a3142b232a38e1 (patch)
tree9a42db9e64c08db645dcf9689344d4f718b4d518
parentb0c8fdc7fdb77586c3d1937050925b960743306e (diff)
downloadlinux-29d3c1c8dfe752c01b7115ecd5a3142b232a38e1.tar.bz2
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h9
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c50
5 files changed, 71 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 00036d2f57c3..8e2f324fb901 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -129,4 +129,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 43109ef4d6bf..7f4a618fc8c1 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -208,7 +208,15 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
return ret;
}
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+ /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
+ * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
+ * down.
+ */
+ if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
+ security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return 0;
/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
* signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ca10917b5f89..874bd77d3b91 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
u64 count;
};
+extern const int read_idmap[];
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
#else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1cffda4412b7..1747bc7bcb60 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
return 0;
}
-static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 7b53f2ca58e2..b8773f05f9da 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1339,3 +1339,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
+ * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
+ * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
+ * loading additional keys.
+ */
+bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ bool found = false;
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+
+ if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+ return false;
+
+ func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
+ * match the func we're looking for
+ */
+ if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
+ * hash.
+ */
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
+ found = true;
+
+ /*
+ * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
+ * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
+ * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return found;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */