Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read;
key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later. Hence this
assignment is redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was
explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to
dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards. This
is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring.
This change is useful because we'll be making
construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't
want to have to handle that error here for no reason.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we
don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems
with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems
like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking
to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly
if it isn't.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
Small overlapping change conflict ('net' changed a line,
'net-next' added a line right afterwards) in flexcan.c
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains,
the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c
are no longer needed. This commit therefore removes them.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor bugfix from John Johansen:
"Fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook marked for stable"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook
|
|
Only IPSEC routes have a non-NULL dst->child pointer. And IPSEC
routes are identified by a non-NULL dst->xfrm pointer.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in
security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the
SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without
NUL terminators into the strcmp() function.
We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux
policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and
explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this
protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context
copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core().
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-By: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
|
|
The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge
conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in
a union instead of a struct.
For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by
commit 651e28c5537a ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data
was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug
was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the
testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah
E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with
different oopes, the smaller of which is included below).
Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and
noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it.
[ 76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0
[ 76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb
btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables
xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw
iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher
nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
[ 76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted
4.14.0-f1-dirty #135
[ 76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio
9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015
[ 76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000
[ 76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI:
ffff9c7a9493d800
[ 76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09:
ffffa09b02a4fc46
[ 76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12:
ffffa09b02a4fd40
[ 76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178646] FS: 00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 76.178648] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[ 76.178652] Call Trace:
[ 76.178660] common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780
[ 76.178665] ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90
[ 76.178669] ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178672] aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178675] profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0
[ 76.178679] aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0
[ 76.178686] apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120
[ 76.178690] security_task_kill+0x44/0x60
[ 76.178695] group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60
[ 76.178699] kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60
[ 76.178703] SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180
[ 76.178707] ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0
[ 76.178712] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
[ 76.178716] ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90
[ 76.178720] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0
[ 76.178723] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
[ 76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000003e
[ 76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX:
00007f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
000000000000263b
[ 76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b
42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd
00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35
[ 76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08
[ 76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]---
Fixes: cd1dbf76b23d ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Reported-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Reported-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org>
Tested-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Tested-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.
The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.
Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.
The script to do this was:
# places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
# touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
# there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
# the list of MS_... constants
SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
ACTIVE NOUSER"
SED_PROG=
for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done
# we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
# with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')
for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup().
A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and
the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related
code.
- Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code
- Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that
file completely
- Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment
treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts
timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros
timer: Pass function down to initialization routines
timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros
timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument
timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally
Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci
timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface
timer: Remove init_timer() interface
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field)
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup()
treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer()
treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys update from James Morris:
"There's nothing too controversial here:
- Doc fix for keyctl_read().
- time_t -> time64_t replacement.
- Set the module licence on things to prevent tainting"
* 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent tainting
security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"No features this time, just minor cleanups and bug fixes.
Cleanups:
- fix spelling mistake: "resoure" -> "resource"
- remove unused redundant variable stop
- Fix bool initialization/comparison
Bug Fixes:
- initialized returned struct aa_perms
- fix leak of null profile name if profile allocation fails
- ensure that undecidable profile attachments fail
- fix profile attachment for special unconfined profiles
- fix locking when creating a new complain profile.
- fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-11-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns
apparmor: fix locking when creating a new complain profile.
apparmor: fix profile attachment for special unconfined profiles
apparmor: ensure that undecidable profile attachments fail
apparmor: fix leak of null profile name if profile allocation fails
apparmor: remove unused redundant variable stop
apparmor: Fix bool initialization/comparison
apparmor: initialized returned struct aa_perms
apparmor: fix spelling mistake: "resoure" -> "resource"
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next-keys
Merge keys subsystem changes from David Howells, for v4.15.
|
|
This changes all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks to use a struct timer_list
pointer instead of unsigned long. Since the data argument has already been
removed, none of these callbacks are using their argument currently, so
this renames the argument to "unused".
Done using the following semantic patch:
@match_define_timer@
declarer name DEFINE_TIMER;
identifier _timer, _callback;
@@
DEFINE_TIMER(_timer, _callback);
@change_callback depends on match_define_timer@
identifier match_define_timer._callback;
type _origtype;
identifier _origarg;
@@
void
-_callback(_origtype _origarg)
+_callback(struct timer_list *unused)
{ ... }
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of
the tree.
This fixes the lockdep Warning
[ 305.275177] ============================================
[ 305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted
[ 305.275180] --------------------------------------------
[ 305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 305.275182] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275187]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 305.275187] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0
[ 305.275190]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 305.275191] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 305.275192] CPU0
[ 305.275193] ----
[ 305.275193] lock(&ns->lock);
[ 305.275194] lock(&ns->lock);
[ 305.275195]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 305.275196] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339:
[ 305.275198] #0: (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0
[ 305.275202] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0
[ 305.275205]
stack backtrace:
[ 305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320
[ 305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 305.275209] Call Trace:
[ 305.275212] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb
[ 305.275214] __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460
[ 305.275216] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275218] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540
[ 305.275219] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540
[ 305.275221] lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0
[ 305.275223] ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0
[ 305.275224] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275227] __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920
[ 305.275228] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275230] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190
[ 305.275231] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275233] ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0
[ 305.275234] ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10
[ 305.275236] ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60
[ 305.275238] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[ 305.275240] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[ 305.275241] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[ 305.275243] aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0
[ 305.275245] aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30
[ 305.275247] ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90
[ 305.275250] policy_update+0xb9/0x380
[ 305.275252] profile_load+0x7e/0x90
[ 305.275254] __vfs_write+0x28/0x150
[ 305.275256] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80
[ 305.275257] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60
[ 305.275259] ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0
[ 305.275261] ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0
[ 305.275262] vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0
[ 305.275264] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190
[ 305.275266] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0
[ 305.275268] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
[ 305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74
[ 305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74
[ 305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10
[ 305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8
Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Break the per cpu buffer atomic section when creating a new null
complain profile. In learning mode this won't matter and we can
safely re-aquire the buffer.
This fixes the following lockdep BUG trace
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope audit[7152]: AVC apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="exec" profile="/usr/sbin/sssd" name="/usr/sbin/adcli" pid=7152 comm="sssd_be" requested_mask="x" denied_mask="x" fsuid=0 ouid=0 target="/usr/sbin/sssd//null-/usr/sbin/adcli"
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 7152, name: sssd_be
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: 1 lock held by sssd_be/7152:
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: #0: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){....}, at: [<ffffffff8182d53e>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x4e/0x100
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 7152 Comm: sssd_be Not tainted 4.14.0prahal+intel #150
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: Hardware name: LENOVO 20CDCTO1WW/20CDCTO1WW, BIOS GQET53WW (1.33 ) 09/15/2017
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: Call Trace:
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: dump_stack+0xb0/0x135
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x15b/0x15b
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? lockdep_print_held_locks+0xc4/0x130
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ___might_sleep+0x29c/0x320
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? rq_clock+0xf0/0xf0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: __might_sleep+0x95/0x190
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_new_null_profile+0x50a/0x960
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: __mutex_lock+0x13e/0x1a20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_new_null_profile+0x50a/0x960
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? save_stack+0x43/0xd0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13f/0x290
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1880/0x1880
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? profile_transition+0x932/0x2d40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? apparmor_bprm_set_creds+0x1479/0x1f70
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? security_bprm_set_creds+0x5a/0x80
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? prepare_binprm+0x366/0x980
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? do_execveat_common.isra.30+0x12a9/0x2350
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? SyS_execve+0x2c/0x40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x228/0x650
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? deactivate_slab.isra.62+0x49d/0x5e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? init_object+0x88/0x90
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ___slab_alloc+0x520/0x590
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ___slab_alloc+0x520/0x590
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_alloc_proxy+0xab/0x200
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? lock_downgrade+0x7e0/0x7e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? memcg_kmem_get_cache+0x970/0x970
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_alloc_proxy+0xab/0x200
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13f/0x290
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_alloc_proxy+0xab/0x200
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_alloc_proxy+0xab/0x200
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x22/0x30
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? vec_find+0xa0/0xa0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_label_init+0x6f/0x230
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? __label_insert+0x3e0/0x3e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13f/0x290
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_alloc_profile+0x58/0x200
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: aa_new_null_profile+0x50a/0x960
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_fqlookupn_profile+0xdc0/0xdc0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_compute_fperms+0x4b5/0x640
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? disconnect.isra.2+0x1b0/0x1b0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? aa_str_perms+0x8d/0xe0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: profile_transition+0x932/0x2d40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? up_read+0x1a/0x40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ext4_xattr_get+0x15c/0xaf0 [ext4]
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? x_table_lookup+0x190/0x190
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ext4_xattr_ibody_get+0x590/0x590 [ext4]
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ext4_xattr_security_get+0x1a/0x20 [ext4]
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? __vfs_getxattr+0x6d/0xa0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? get_vfs_caps_from_disk+0x114/0x720
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? tsc_resume+0x10/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? get_vfs_caps_from_disk+0x720/0x720
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? native_sched_clock_from_tsc+0x201/0x2b0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x170
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? find_held_lock+0x3c/0x1e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? rb_insert_color_cached+0x1660/0x1660
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: apparmor_bprm_set_creds+0x1479/0x1f70
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? handle_onexec+0x31d0/0x31d0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? tsc_resume+0x10/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? graph_lock+0xd0/0xd0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? tsc_resume+0x10/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x170
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x170
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? find_held_lock+0x3c/0x1e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: security_bprm_set_creds+0x5a/0x80
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: prepare_binprm+0x366/0x980
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? install_exec_creds+0x150/0x150
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? __might_fault+0x89/0xb0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? up_read+0x40/0x40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? get_user_arg_ptr.isra.18+0x2c/0x70
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? count.isra.20.constprop.32+0x7c/0xf0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: do_execveat_common.isra.30+0x12a9/0x2350
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? prepare_bprm_creds+0x100/0x100
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x22/0x30
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? deactivate_slab.isra.62+0x49d/0x5e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? init_object+0x88/0x90
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ___slab_alloc+0x520/0x590
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ___slab_alloc+0x520/0x590
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? memcg_kmem_get_cache+0x970/0x970
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? glob_match+0x730/0x730
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x225/0x280
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? getname_flags+0xb8/0x510
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? mm_fault_error+0x2e0/0x2e0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? getname_flags+0xf6/0x510
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? ptregs_sys_vfork+0x10/0x10
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: SyS_execve+0x2c/0x40
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: do_syscall_64+0x228/0x650
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x2f0/0x2f0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x167/0x2f0
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x220/0x220
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xda/0x220
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? perf_trace_sys_enter+0x1060/0x1060
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: ? __put_user_4+0x1c/0x30
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f9320f23637
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff783be338 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9320f23637
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: RDX: 0000558c35002a70 RSI: 0000558c3505bd10 RDI: 0000558c35018b90
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: RBP: 0000558c34b63ae8 R08: 0000558c3505bd10 R09: 0000000000000080
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: R10: 0000000000000095 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000001
nov. 14 14:09:09 cyclope kernel: R13: 0000558c35018b90 R14: 0000558c3505bd18 R15: 0000558c3505bd10
Fixes: 4227c333f65c ("apparmor: Move path lookup to using preallocated buffers")
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/173228
Reported-by: Alban Browaeys <prahal@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
It used to be that unconfined would never attach. However that is not
the case anymore as some special profiles can be marked as unconfined,
that are not the namespaces unconfined profile, and may have an
attachment.
Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Profiles that have an undecidable overlap in their attachments are
being incorrectly handled. Instead of failing to attach the first one
encountered is being used.
eg.
profile A /** { .. }
profile B /*foo { .. }
have an unresolvable longest left attachment, they both have an exact
match on / and then have an overlapping expression that has no clear
winner.
Currently the winner will be the profile that is loaded first which
can result in non-deterministic behavior. Instead in this situation
the exec should fail.
Fixes: 898127c34ec0 ("AppArmor: functions for domain transitions")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Fixes: d07881d2edb0 ("apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()")
Reported-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The boolean variable 'stop' is being set but never read. This
is a redundant variable and can be removed.
Cleans up clang warning: Value stored to 'stop' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
gcc-4.4 points out suspicious code in compute_mnt_perms, where
the aa_perms structure is only partially initialized before getting
returned:
security/apparmor/mount.c: In function 'compute_mnt_perms':
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.prompt' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.hide' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.cond' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.complain' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.stop' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.deny' is used uninitialized in this function
Returning or assigning partially initialized structures is a bit tricky,
in particular it is explicitly allowed in c99 to assign a partially
initialized structure to another, as long as only members are read that
have been initialized earlier. Looking at what various compilers do here,
the version that produced the warning copied uninitialized stack data,
while newer versions (and also clang) either set the other members to
zero or don't update the parts of the return buffer that are not modified
in the temporary structure, but they never warn about this.
In case of apparmor, it seems better to be a little safer and always
initialize the aa_perms structure. Most users already do that, this
changes the remaining ones, including the one instance that I got the
warning for.
Fixes: fa488437d0f9 ("apparmor: add mount mediation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Trivial fix to spelling mistake in comment and also with text in
audit_resource call.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
A few years ago the FSF moved and "59 Temple Place" is wrong. Having this
still in our source files feels old and unmaintained.
Let's take the license statement serious and not confuse users.
As https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html suggests, we replace the
postal address with "<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>" in the security
directory.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
point where the file descriptor is already opened.
This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
values, regardless of the current appraisal status.
For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
will be allowed afterwards.
Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
security.ima.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu:
"Summary of modules changes for the 4.15 merge window:
- treewide module_param_call() cleanup, fix up set/get function
prototype mismatches, from Kees Cook
- minor code cleanups"
* tag 'modules-for-v4.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
module: Do not paper over type mismatches in module_param_call()
treewide: Fix function prototypes for module_param_call()
module: Prepare to convert all module_param_call() prototypes
kernel/module: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in add_module_usage()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Seven SELinux patches for v4.15, although five of the seven are small
build fixes and cleanups.
Of the remaining two patches, the only one worth really calling out is
Eric's fix for the SELinux filesystem xattr set/remove code; the other
patch simply converts the SELinux hash table implementation to use
kmem_cache.
Eric's setxattr/removexattr tweak converts SELinux back to calling the
commoncap implementations when the xattr is not SELinux related. The
immediate win is to fixup filesystem capabilities in user namespaces,
but it makes things a bit saner overall; more information in the
commit description"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove extraneous initialization of slots_used and max_chain_len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to str
selinux: fix build warning
selinux: fix build warning by removing the unused sid variable
selinux: Perform both commoncap and selinux xattr checks
selinux: Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node
|
|
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Maintain the TCP retransmit queue using an rbtree, with 1GB
windows at 100Gb this really has become necessary. From Eric
Dumazet.
2) Multi-program support for cgroup+bpf, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Perform broadcast flooding in hardware in mv88e6xxx, from Andrew
Lunn.
4) Add meter action support to openvswitch, from Andy Zhou.
5) Add a data meta pointer for BPF accessible packets, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Namespace-ify almost all TCP sysctl knobs, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Turn on Broadcom Tags in b53 driver, from Florian Fainelli.
8) More work to move the RTNL mutex down, from Florian Westphal.
9) Add 'bpftool' utility, to help with bpf program introspection.
From Jakub Kicinski.
10) Add new 'cpumap' type for XDP_REDIRECT action, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
11) Support 'blocks' of transformations in the packet scheduler which
can span multiple network devices, from Jiri Pirko.
12) TC flower offload support in cxgb4, from Kumar Sanghvi.
13) Priority based stream scheduler for SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo
Leitner.
14) Thunderbolt networking driver, from Amir Levy and Mika Westerberg.
15) Add RED qdisc offloadability, and use it in mlxsw driver. From
Nogah Frankel.
16) eBPF based device controller for cgroup v2, from Roman Gushchin.
17) Add some fundamental tracepoints for TCP, from Song Liu.
18) Remove garbage collection from ipv6 route layer, this is a
significant accomplishment. From Wei Wang.
19) Add multicast route offload support to mlxsw, from Yotam Gigi"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2177 commits)
tcp: highest_sack fix
geneve: fix fill_info when link down
bpf: fix lockdep splat
net: cdc_ncm: GetNtbFormat endian fix
openvswitch: meter: fix NULL pointer dereference in ovs_meter_cmd_reply_start
netem: remove unnecessary 64 bit modulus
netem: use 64 bit divide by rate
tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control
net: Protect iterations over net::fib_notifier_ops in fib_seq_sum()
ipv6: set all.accept_dad to 0 by default
uapi: fix linux/tls.h userspace compilation error
usbnet: ipheth: prevent TX queue timeouts when device not ready
vhost_net: conditionally enable tx polling
uapi: fix linux/rxrpc.h userspace compilation errors
net: stmmac: fix LPI transitioning for dwmac4
atm: horizon: Fix irq release error
net-sysfs: trigger netlink notification on ifalias change via sysfs
openvswitch: Using kfree_rcu() to simplify the code
openvswitch: Make local function ovs_nsh_key_attr_size() static
openvswitch: Fix return value check in ovs_meter_cmd_features()
...
|
|
The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will
try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on
32bits systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover
we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t'
type variable.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
The 'struct key' will use 'time_t' which we try to remove in the
kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems.
Also the 'struct keyring_search_context' will use 'timespec' type
to record current time, which is also not year 2038 safe on 32bit
systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe for 'struct key', and replace 'timespec' with 'time64_t' for the
'struct keyring_search_context', since we only look at the the seconds
part of 'timespec' variable. Moreover we also change the codes where
using the 'time_t' and 'timespec', and we can get current time by
ktime_get_real_seconds() instead of current_kernel_time(), and use
'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable.
Especially in proc.c file, we have replaced 'unsigned long' and 'timespec'
type with 'u64' and 'time64_t' type to save the timeout value, which means
user will get one 'u64' type timeout value by issuing proc_keys_show()
function.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another big pile of changes:
- More year 2038 work from Arnd slowly reaching the point where we
need to think about the syscalls themself.
- A new timer function which allows to conditionally (re)arm a timer
only when it's either not running or the new expiry time is sooner
than the armed expiry time. This allows to use a single timer for
multiple timeout requirements w/o caring about the first expiry
time at the call site.
- A new NMI safe accessor to clock real time for the printk timestamp
work. Can be used by tracing, perf as well if required.
- A large number of timer setup conversions from Kees which got
collected here because either maintainers requested so or they
simply got ignored. As Kees pointed out already there are a few
trivial merge conflicts and some redundant commits which was
unavoidable due to the size of this conversion effort.
- Avoid a redundant iteration in the timer wheel softirq processing.
- Provide a mechanism to treat RTC implementations depending on their
hardware properties, i.e. don't inflict the write at the 0.5
seconds boundary which originates from the PC CMOS RTC to all RTCs.
No functional change as drivers need to be updated separately.
- The usual small updates to core code clocksource drivers. Nothing
really exciting"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (111 commits)
timers: Add a function to start/reduce a timer
pstore: Use ktime_get_real_fast_ns() instead of __getnstimeofday()
timer: Prepare to change all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks
netfilter: ipvs: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
scsi: qla2xxx: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/aoe: discover_timer: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
ide: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drbd: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mailbox: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
crypto: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: omap1: Fix error in automated timer conversion
ARM: footbridge: Fix typo in timer conversion
drivers/sgi-xp: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/memstick: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/macintosh: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
hwrng/xgene-rng: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
auxdisplay: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
sparc/led: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mips: ip22/32: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle are:
- Another attempt at enabling cross-release lockdep dependency
tracking (automatically part of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y), this time
with better performance and fewer false positives. (Byungchul Park)
- Introduce lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()/disabled() and convert
open-coded equivalents to lockdep variants. (Frederic Weisbecker)
- Add down_read_killable() and use it in the VFS's iterate_dir()
method. (Kirill Tkhai)
- Convert remaining uses of ACCESS_ONCE() to
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE(). Most of the conversion was Coccinelle
driven. (Mark Rutland, Paul E. McKenney)
- Get rid of lockless_dereference(), by strengthening Alpha atomics,
strengthening READ_ONCE() with smp_read_barrier_depends() and thus
being able to convert users of lockless_dereference() to
READ_ONCE(). (Will Deacon)
- Various micro-optimizations:
- better PV qspinlocks (Waiman Long),
- better x86 barriers (Michael S. Tsirkin)
- better x86 refcounts (Kees Cook)
- ... plus other fixes and enhancements. (Borislav Petkov, Juergen
Gross, Miguel Bernal Marin)"
* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (70 commits)
locking/x86: Use LOCK ADD for smp_mb() instead of MFENCE
rcu: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
netpoll: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/posix-cpu-timers: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
sched/clock, sched/cputime: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq_work: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq/timings: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
perf/core: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
x86: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
smp/core: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/hrtimer: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/nohz: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
workqueue: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq/softirqs: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
locking/lockdep: Add IRQs disabled/enabled assertion APIs: lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()/disabled()
locking/pvqspinlock: Implement hybrid PV queued/unfair locks
locking/rwlocks: Fix comments
x86/paravirt: Set up the virt_spin_lock_key after static keys get initialized
block, locking/lockdep: Assign a lock_class per gendisk used for wait_for_completion()
workqueue: Remove now redundant lock acquisitions wrt. workqueue flushes
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem integrity updates from James Morris:
"There is a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, preparatory code for
new functionality and new functionality.
Commit 26ddabfe96bb ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is
loaded") enabled EVM without loading a symmetric key, but was limited
to defining the x509 certificate pathname at build. Included in this
set of patches is the ability of enabling EVM, without loading the EVM
symmetric key, from userspace. New is the ability to prevent the
loading of an EVM symmetric key."
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Remove redundant conditional operator
ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
module: export module signature enforcement status
ima: fix hash algorithm initialization
EVM: Only complain about a missing HMAC key once
EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded
EVM: Include security.apparmor in EVM measurements
ima: call ima_file_free() prior to calling fasync
integrity: use kernel_read_file_from_path() to read x509 certs
ima: always measure and audit files in policy
ima: don't remove the securityfs policy file
vfs: fix mounting a filesystem with i_version
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"TPM (from Jarkko):
- essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
not distract each other as much as before
- /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
specified in the command header
- use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi
- otherwise mostly minor fixes.
Smack:
- base support for overlafs
Capabilities:
- BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.
TOMOYO:
- Y2038 timestamping fixes"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
Smack: Base support for overlayfs
MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
...
|
|
Simple cases of overlapping changes in the packet scheduler.
Must easier to resolve this time.
Which probably means that I screwed it up somehow.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
A non-zero value is converted to 1 when assigned to a bool variable, so the
conditional operator in is_ima_appraise_enabled is redundant.
The value of a comparison operator is either 1 or 0 so the conditional
operator in ima_inode_setxattr is redundant as well.
Confirmed that the patch is correct by comparing the object file from
before and after the patch. They are identical.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled
with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just
those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be
set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA
module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE.
This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of
module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE,
which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param).
Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <brdeoliv@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The hash_setup function always sets the hash_setup_done flag, even
when the hash algorithm is invalid. This prevents the default hash
algorithm defined as CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH from being used.
This patch sets hash_setup_done flag only for valid hash algorithms.
Fixes: e7a2ad7eb6f4 "ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash
algorithms"
Signed-off-by: Boshi Wang <wangboshi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
A system can validate EVM digital signatures without requiring an HMAC
key, but every EVM validation will generate a kernel error. Change this
so we only generate an error once.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
EVM will only perform validation once a key has been loaded. This key
may either be a symmetric trusted key (for HMAC validation and creation)
or the public half of an asymmetric key (for digital signature
validation). The /sys/kernel/security/evm interface allows userland to
signal that a symmetric key has been loaded, but does not allow userland
to signal that an asymmetric public key has been loaded.
This patch extends the interface to permit userspace to pass a bitmask
of loaded key types. It also allows userspace to block loading of a
symmetric key in order to avoid a compromised system from being able to
load an additional key type later.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Apparmor will be gaining support for security.apparmor labels, and it
would be helpful to include these in EVM validation now so appropriate
signatures can be generated even before full support is merged.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <John.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 and CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 options permit
loading x509 signed certificates onto the trusted keyrings without
verifying the x509 certificate file's signature.
This patch replaces the call to the integrity_read_file() specific
function with the common kernel_read_file_from_path() function.
To avoid verifying the file signature, this patch defines
READING_X509_CERTFICATE.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.
The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.
Note:
In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are
included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might
result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific
TPM PCR value. This patch not only adds file measurements that were
not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for
these files will be 0's.
As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot
to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the
IMA measurement list. Remote attestation servers should be able to
process these new measurement records, but might complain about
these unknown records.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
|
|
The securityfs policy file is removed unless additional rules can be
appended to the IMA policy (CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY), regardless as
to whether the policy is configured so that it can be displayed.
This patch changes this behavior, removing the securityfs policy file,
only if CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY is also not enabled.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|