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2015-11-10Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netLinus Torvalds3-9/+10
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet. 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet. 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code, from Rasmus Villemoes. 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich. 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard. 6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet. 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd Bergmann. 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong. 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak. 10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6 counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca. 11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from Francesco Ruggeri. 12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes, from Jarod Wilson. 13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits) Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled" bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE net: fix a race in dst_release() net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free. net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read() mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put" bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure ...
2015-11-08smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helperEric Dumazet1-4/+7
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not available for request sockets. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-08net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()Eric Dumazet2-15/+3
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd0895330 ("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()") so that we can use it other contexts. Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-06mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIMMel Gorman1-1/+1
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing __GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing them prevents it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds25-183/+393
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
2015-11-05selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()Eric Dumazet1-4/+14
In commit e446f9dfe17b ("net: synack packets can be attached to request sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security access. Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it. Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of duplicating the logic. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-01Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2-2/+7
2015-10-23Merge tag 'keys-next-20151021' of ↵James Morris13-75/+84
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
2015-10-22Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris5-45/+36
into next
2015-10-22apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependencyArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a link error: security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash': integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update' security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash': integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash' This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other subsystems do. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-10-21selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_structSangwoo1-2/+6
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup. But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64. This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()). So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size) is increased exponentially. E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count --------------------------------------------------------------- 770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032 At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each file_security_struct Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed extra subject prefix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be staticGeliang Tang1-1/+1
Fixes the following sparse warning: security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use sprintf return valueRasmus Villemoes1-4/+1
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()Rasmus Villemoes1-7/+1
This is much simpler. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()Rasmus Villemoes1-2/+2
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()Rasmus Villemoes1-1/+1
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's no point in casting away the const qualifier of value. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sidRasmus Villemoes4-25/+20
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test for scontext_len being zero hint at that). Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen() call and fix all callers. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate callJeff Vander Stoep1-1/+2
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate() and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set) are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases the open permission has already been checked during file open and therefore does not need to be repeated. Commit 95dbf739313f ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls") fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files without the open permission, even when they receive an already open file. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE defaultPaul Moore1-2/+2
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux performs access control checking on the actual memory protections used by the kernel and not those requested by the application. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells13-67/+82
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members usedInsu Yun1-1/+1
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for duplication and validation seems better. Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: use kvfree() in add_keyGeliang Tang1-7/+1
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21Merge branch 'smack-for-4.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris4-47/+238
into next
2015-10-20Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
2015-10-19Smack: limited capability for changing process labelZbigniew Jasinski4-41/+229
This feature introduces new kernel interface: - <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism. List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset. Changes in v2: * use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write * added missing description in security/Smack.txt Changes in v3: * squashed into one commit Changes in v4: * switch from global list to per-task list * since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it Changes in v5: * change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which replace the previous list upon write Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-19KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyringDavid Howells1-0/+3
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with keyring metadata. Now the kernel gives an error: request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chipsJarkko Sakkinen1-3/+33
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips. We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed storage root key inside TPM2 chips. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (on TPM 1.2) Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Tested-by: Kevin Strasser <kevin.strasser@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.hJarkko Sakkinen1-11/+0
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-17Merge branch 'master' of ↵Pablo Neira Ayuso1-4/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a78 ("bridge: Remove br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's net-next tree. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
2015-10-16netfilter: remove hook owner refcountingFlorian Westphal2-7/+0
since commit 8405a8fff3f8 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded. So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-10-15KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyringDavid Howells1-2/+4
The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
2015-10-11net: synack packets can be attached to request socketsEric Dumazet1-4/+8
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer (Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket) Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-09Smack: pipefs fix in smack_d_instantiateRoman Kubiak1-0/+3
This fix writes the task label when smack_d_instantiate is called, before the label of the superblock was written on the pipe's inode. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09Smack: Minor initialisation improvementJosé Bollo2-3/+3
This change has two goals: - delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until it will be really effective - ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled' is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c) Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09smack: smk_ipv6_port_list should be staticGeliang Tang1-1/+1
Fixes the following sparse warning: security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09Smack: fix a NULL dereference in wrong smack_import_entry() usageLukasz Pawelczyk1-2/+2
'commit e774ad683f42 ("smack: pass error code through pointers")' made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that. This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in 'commit 21abb1ec414c ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")' echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host (this should return EINVAL, it doesn't) cat /smack/ipv6host (derefences 0x000a) Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates on the IMA trusted keyringDmitry Kasatkin1-1/+1
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a trusted key on the system keyring. This patch removes the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+ Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-10-02Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-4/+4
Conflicts: net/dsa/slave.c net/dsa/slave.c simply had overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-26Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-1/+1
Conflicts: net/ipv4/arp.c The net/ipv4/arp.c conflict was one commit adding a new local variable while another commit was deleting one. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-25KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by nameDavid Howells1-4/+4
There appears to be a race between: (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0 (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up). Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data - including key->security. Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-09-18netfilter: Pass priv instead of nf_hook_ops to netfilter hooksEric W. Biederman2-7/+7
Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops. That is all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-09-17Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RCU fix from Ingo Molnar: "Fix a false positive warning" * 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition
2015-09-12Merge branch 'for-mingo' of ↵Ingo Molnar1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/urgent Pull RCU fix from Paul E. McKenney, fixing an inverted RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-10mm: mark most vm_operations_struct constKirill A. Shutemov1-1/+1
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct structs should be constant. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds20-362/+1732
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea. ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora ** - Smack - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data - SELinux: - add ioctl whitelisting (see http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf) - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change - Seccomp: - add ptrace options for suspend/resume" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits) PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore modsign: Handle signing key in source tree modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key Move certificate handling to its own directory sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer PKCS#7: Check content type and versions MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved ...
2015-09-04fs: create and use seq_show_option for escapingKees Cook1-1/+1
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISEAndy Lutomirski1-1/+2
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding capabilities to their ambient set. For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than just disabling setting previously cleared bits. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04capabilities: ambient capabilitiesAndy Lutomirski2-10/+93
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <cap-ng.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-03security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() conditionPaul E. McKenney1-1/+1
f78f5b90c4ff ("rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()") introduced a bug by incorrectly inverting the condition when moving from rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(). This commit therefore fixes the inversion. Reported-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
2015-09-01Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start implementing executable files, as the there are application today that are only secure because such files do not exist. It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from /proc/<pid>/ns/*. It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel. Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application, by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup. The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch. and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0. userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing. unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.