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2015-04-26Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-24/+24
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro: "d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems fs/9p: fix readdir() VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
2015-04-15VFS: security/: d_inode() annotationsDavid Howells1-1/+1
... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than working with dentries given to it. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-04-15VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotationsDavid Howells1-23/+23
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-04-15Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-19/+228
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights for this window: - improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley - addition of an unconfined label to Smack - Smack documentation update - TPM driver updates" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits) lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h selinux: increase avtab max buckets selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat() selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment Smack: Updates for Smack documentation tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy. tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy ...
2015-04-15Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds1-6/+2
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt. 2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli. 3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave, from Madhu Challa. 4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck. 5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel Borkmann. 6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25, rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman. 7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman. 8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck. 9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation, from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty table, we expand the table much more sanely. 10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric Biederman. 11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov. 12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed underneath. From Eric Dumazet. 13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk. 14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From Hannes Frederic Sowa. 15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic Sowa. 16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard Cochran. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits) fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2 fm10k: corrected VF multicast update fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses fm10k: start service timer on probe fm10k: fix function header comment fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid fm10k: fix unused warnings ...
2015-04-11Merge branch 'for-davem' into for-nextAl Viro1-6/+2
2015-04-11switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path *Al Viro1-8/+5
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-04-04netfilter: Make nf_hookfn use nf_hook_state.David S. Miller1-6/+2
Pass the nf_hook_state all the way down into the hook functions themselves. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-23smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.cPaul Gortmaker1-1/+0
In commit 00f84f3f2e9d088f06722f4351d67f5f577abe22 ("Smack: Make the syslog control configurable") this mutex was added, but the rest of the final commit never actually made use of it, resulting in: In file included from include/linux/mutex.h:29:0, from include/linux/notifier.h:13, from include/linux/memory_hotplug.h:6, from include/linux/mmzone.h:821, from include/linux/gfp.h:5, from include/linux/slab.h:14, from include/linux/security.h:27, from security/smack/smackfs.c:21: security/smack/smackfs.c:63:21: warning: ‘smack_syslog_lock’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable] static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock); ^ A git grep shows no other instances/references to smack_syslog_lock. Delete it, assuming that the mutex addition was just a leftover from an earlier work in progress version of the change. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2015-03-23Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup modeCasey Schaufler4-17/+182
I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release. I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a general "permissive mode". So don't ask again. Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns, and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the abuse potential. Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for debugging, but that's about it. A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially. If either the subject or object label of an access check matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console message are generated. The audit record "request" string is marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the request was granted because of an unconfined label. The fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure" object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of using an unconfined label may still cause concern after a reboot. So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application developers seem incapable of living without it I have given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but in the end it's still a chain saw. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-03-23Smack: getting the Smack security context of keysJosé Bollo1-0/+31
With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM side part of the system call keyctl with the action code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY. It is now possible to get the context of, for example, the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s". The original patch has been modified for merge. Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-03-23Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socketMarcin Lis1-1/+15
This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are omitted. Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
2015-02-22Smack: Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inodeDavid Howells1-2/+2
Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in Smack to get rid of direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-02-11Smack: secmark connectionsCasey Schaufler1-0/+16
If the secmark is available us it on connection as well as packet delivery. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-01-23Smack: Repair netfilter dependencyCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
On 1/23/2015 8:20 AM, Jim Davis wrote: > Building with the attached random configuration file, > > security/smack/smack_netfilter.c: In function ‘smack_ipv4_output’: > security/smack/smack_netfilter.c:55:6: error: ‘struct sk_buff’ has no > member named ‘secmark’ > skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; > ^ > make[2]: *** [security/smack/smack_netfilter.o] Error 1 The existing Makefile used the wrong configuration option to determine if smack_netfilter should be built. This sets it right. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-01-21smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callersAndrey Ryabinin2-11/+23
We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode(). task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack. task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock. Mainly task_security() used this way: smk_of_task(task_security(p)) Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct and do this under RCU read lock. Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it. KASan's report for this: AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110 smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150 security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54 proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370 SyS_write+0x5c/0x94 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48 INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564 kfree+0x270/0x290 smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998 __do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc do_softirq+0x94/0xf4 irq_exit+0xbc/0x120 handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134 gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac __irq_svc+0x44/0x78 _raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48 sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8 sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0 vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080 INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null) Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb .... Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1 Backtrace: [<c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<c0023dec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140 [<c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06d6d7c>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) [<c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c01c1d50>] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144) [<c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<c01c1e88>] (object_err+0x3c/0x44) r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600 [<c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<c01cac18>] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538) r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7 [<c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<c01c9430>] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8) [<c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<c031e168>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70) r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000 [<c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<c031af64>] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44) r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780 [<c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<c023d614>] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178) r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124 [<c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<c01db98c>] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4) r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148 [<c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<c01deec8>] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108) [<c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<c01dff04>] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648) [<c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<c01e1458>] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88) [<c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<c01ccb28>] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198) r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000 [<c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<c01ccc00>] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34) [<c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<c001db80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) Read of size 4 by thread T834: Memory state around the buggy address: c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2015-01-20smack: Add missing logging in bidirectional UDS connect checkRafal Krypa1-1/+1
During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support. The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
2015-01-20Smack: secmark support for netfilterCasey Schaufler5-8/+196
Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are cases where it would be handy. As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better. The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they do for SELinux. All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented by Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-01-20Smack: Rework file hooksCasey Schaufler1-21/+19
This is one of those cases where you look at code you did years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking. There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers, and most of them really want the security data from the inode. Some, however, really want the security context that the process had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss. This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for different reasons. Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-01-19smack: Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typoZbigniew Jasinski1-1/+3
The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN. Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
2015-01-19smack: introduce a special case for tmpfs in smack_d_instantiate()Łukasz Stelmach1-2/+14
Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake dentries which make them look like root directories and not get the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files. Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@samsung.com>
2015-01-19smack: fix logic in smack_inode_init_security functionLukasz Pawelczyk1-3/+2
In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len" not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
2015-01-19smack: miscellaneous small fixes in function commentsLukasz Pawelczyk1-5/+9
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
2014-12-14Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-12/+18
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack, SELinux, and integrity code. The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading keys from rootfs before init is call is also added" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: Remove security_ops extern security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack() VFS: refactor vfs_read() ima: require signature based appraisal integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file() Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields() ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields() ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero ima: added error messages to template-related functions ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines ima: no need to allocate entry for comment ima: report policy load status ima: use path names cache ...
2014-11-21security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()Andrey Ryabinin1-4/+3
Setting smack label on file (e.g. 'attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "test" test') triggered following spew on the kernel with KASan applied: ================================================================== BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in strncpy+0x28/0x60 at addr ffff8800059ad064 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kasan error ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Slab 0xffffea0000166b40 objects=128 used=7 fp=0xffff8800059ad080 flags=0x4000000000000080 INFO: Object 0xffff8800059ad060 @offset=96 fp=0xffff8800059ad080 Bytes b4 ffff8800059ad050: a0 df 9a 05 00 88 ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ Object ffff8800059ad060: 74 65 73 74 6b 6b 6b a5 testkkk. Redzone ffff8800059ad068: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ Padding ffff8800059ad078: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ CPU: 0 PID: 528 Comm: attr Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff8800059ad064 ffffffff81534cf2 ffff880005a5bc40 ffffffff8112fe1a 0000000100800006 0000000f059ad060 ffff880006000f90 0000000000000296 ffffea0000166b40 ffffffff8107ca97 ffff880005891060 Call Trace: ? dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) ? kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:102 mm/kasan/report.c:178) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __asan_load1 (mm/kasan/kasan.h:50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:248 mm/kasan/kasan.c:358) ? strncpy (lib/string.c:121) ? strncpy (lib/string.c:121) ? smk_parse_smack (security/smack/smack_access.c:457) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343) ? smk_import_entry (security/smack/smack_access.c:514) ? smack_inode_setxattr (security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1093 (discriminator 1)) ? security_inode_setxattr (security/security.c:602) ? vfs_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:134) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:343) ? setxattr (fs/xattr.c:360) ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __percpu_counter_add (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 lib/percpu_counter.c:90) ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2606) ? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:2651) ? __mnt_want_write (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 fs/namespace.c:359) ? path_setxattr (fs/xattr.c:380) ? SyS_lsetxattr (fs/xattr.c:397) ? system_call_fastpath (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:423) Read of size 1 by task attr: Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8800059ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800059acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800059acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8800059ad000: 00 fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc ^ ffff8800059ad080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8800059ad100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8800059ad180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== strncpy() copies one byte more than the source string has. Fix this by passing the correct length to strncpy(). Now we can remove initialization of the last byte in 'smack' string because kzalloc() already did this for us. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
2014-11-19assorted conversions to %p[dD]Al Viro1-4/+4
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-31Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smackRohit1-3/+10
The patch use kmem_cache to allocate/free inode_smack since they are alloced in high volumes making it a perfect case for kmem_cache. As per analysis, 24 bytes of memory is wasted per allocation due to internal fragmentation. With kmem_cache, this can be avoided. Accounting of memory allocation is below : total slack net count-alloc/free caller Before (with kzalloc) 1919872 719952 1919872 29998/0 new_inode_smack+0x14 After (with kmem_cache) 1201680 0 1201680 30042/0 new_inode_smack+0x18 >From above data, we found that 719952 bytes(~700 KB) of memory is saved on allocation of 29998 smack inodes. Signed-off-by: Rohit <rohit.kr@samsung.com>
2014-10-28Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labelsCasey Schaufler1-5/+5
The lock access mode allows setting a read lock on a file for with the process has only read access. The floor label is defined to make it easy to have the basic system installed such that everyone can read it. Once there's a desire to read lock (rationally or otherwise) a floor file a rule needs to get set. This happens all the time, so make the floor label a little bit more special and allow everyone lock access, too. By implication, give processes with the hat label (hat can read everything) lock access as well. This reduces clutter in the Smack rule set. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-10-12Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-274/+520
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris. Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) integrity: do zero padding of the key id KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer selinux: normalize audit log formatting selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm() KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID ima: detect violations for mmaped files ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement ima: added ima_policy_flag variable ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate() ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init() PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling ...
2014-09-09security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void returnJeff Layton1-2/+1
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and __f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the callers. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2014-08-29Make Smack operate on smack_known struct where it still used char*Lukasz Pawelczyk4-255/+233
Smack used to use a mix of smack_known struct and char* throughout its APIs and implementation. This patch unifies the behaviour and makes it store and operate exclusively on smack_known struct pointers when managing labels. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> Conflicts: security/smack/smack_access.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c
2014-08-29Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typoLukasz Pawelczyk1-2/+2
The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access between two labels. Due to a typo the second check was incorrect. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
2014-08-29Small fixes in comments describing function parametersLukasz Pawelczyk1-9/+9
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
2014-08-28Smack: Bring-up access modeCasey Schaufler5-27/+294
People keep asking me for permissive mode, and I keep saying "no". Permissive mode is wrong for more reasons than I can enumerate, but the compelling one is that it's once on, never off. Nonetheless, there is an argument to be made for running a process with lots of permissions, logging which are required, and then locking the process down. There wasn't a way to do that with Smack, but this provides it. The notion is that you start out by giving the process an appropriate Smack label, such as "ATBirds". You create rules with a wide range of access and the "b" mode. On Tizen it might be: ATBirds System rwxalb ATBirds User rwxalb ATBirds _ rwxalb User ATBirds wb System ATBirds wb Accesses that fail will generate audit records. Accesses that succeed because of rules marked with a "b" generate log messages identifying the rule, the program and as much object information as is convenient. When the system is properly configured and the programs brought in line with the labeling scheme the "b" mode can be removed from the rules. When the system is ready for production the facility can be configured out. This provides the developer the convenience of permissive mode without creating a system that looks like it is enforcing a policy while it is not. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-08-25Smack: Fix setting label on successful file openMarcin Niesluchowski1-1/+3
While opening with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE file label is not set. Other calls may access it after CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is dropped from process. Signed-off-by: Marcin Niesluchowski <m.niesluchow@samsung.com>
2014-08-08Smack: remove unneeded NULL-termination from securtity labelKonstantin Khlebnikov1-3/+3
Values of extended attributes are stored as binary blobs. NULL-termination of them isn't required. It just wastes disk space and confuses command-line tools like getfattr because they have to print that zero byte at the end. This patch removes terminating zero byte from initial security label in smack_inode_init_security and cuts it out in function smack_inode_getsecurity which is used by syscall getxattr. This change seems completely safe, because function smk_parse_smack ignores everything after first zero byte. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
2014-08-08Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panicKonstantin Khlebnikov2-3/+3
Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them. This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels: # attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp: # python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack() which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
2014-08-08Smack: fix behavior of smack_inode_listsecurityKonstantin Khlebnikov1-5/+4
Security operation ->inode_listsecurity is used for generating list of available extended attributes for syscall listxattr. Currently it's used only in nfs4 or if filesystem doesn't provide i_op->listxattr. The list is the set of NULL-terminated names, one after the other. This method must include zero byte at the and into result. Also this function must return length even if string does not fit into output buffer or it is NULL, see similar method in selinux and man listxattr. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
2014-08-02Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris3-17/+14
2014-08-01netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structsPaul Moore3-13/+13
Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*" which improves things greatly. There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-08-01netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functionsPaul Moore1-4/+1
The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we probably shouldn't allow. At some point this "worked", but that was likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted by yours truly). This patch corrects these problems by basically gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code. Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it replaces. One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap. NetLabel will automatically allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-08-01netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bitPaul Moore1-1/+1
The NetLabel category (catmap) functions have a problem in that they assume categories will be set in an increasing manner, e.g. the next category set will always be larger than the last. Unfortunately, this is not a valid assumption and could result in problems when attempting to set categories less than the startbit in the lowest catmap node. In some cases kernel panics and other nasties can result. This patch corrects the problem by checking for this and allocating a new catmap node instance and placing it at the front of the list. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-05-20Merge branch 'smack-for-3.16' of git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel ↵James Morris4-73/+297
into next
2014-05-06Warning in scanf string typingToralf Förster1-1/+1
This fixes a warning about the mismatch of types between the declared unsigned and integer. Signed-off-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
2014-04-30Smack: Label cgroup files for systemdCasey Schaufler1-12/+18
The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to properly use extented attributes. This patch makes files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by a system running Smack and systemd. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-04-23Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3Casey Schaufler1-3/+16
Smack believes that many of the operatons that can be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations. The fstat and lseek system calls are examples. An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open if the task doesn't have read access even if it has write access and the file is being opened write only. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-04-11Smack: bidirectional UDS connect checkCasey Schaufler2-23/+27
Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the other way around. This change adds a check that the other end can write to the connecting process. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-04-11Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attributeCasey Schaufler1-6/+19
Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute from a directory does not result in the directory transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have been broken out, too. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-04-11SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattrJosé Bollo1-1/+3
The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name. The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0 to set an empty attribute value. The systematic call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC! The problem can be produced easily by issuing the command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt when SMACK is active. Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this patch is correcting the behaviour because the function smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0). It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash with garbage values coming from any extended attribute write. Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47 Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
2014-04-11bugfix patch for SMACKPankaj Kumar1-2/+2
1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute. 2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned. Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>