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2016-05-17Merge branch 'ovl-fixes' into for-linusAl Viro1-2/+2
Backmerge to resolve a conflict in ovl_lookup_real(); "ovl_lookup_real(): use lookup_one_len_unlocked()" instead, but it was too late in the cycle to rebase.
2016-05-04ima: fix the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration orderingMimi Zohar1-2/+2
This patch fixes the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration ordering used for displaying the IMA policy. Fixes: d9ddf077bb85 ("ima: support for kexec image and initramfs") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-11->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate argumentsAl Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-10don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sbAl Viro1-2/+2
... and neither can ever be NULL Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-17Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds14-158/+409
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor fixes scattered across the subsystem. IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured and appraised" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits) X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy() certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime X.509: Support leap seconds Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64() X.509: Fix leap year handling again PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want' firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg() KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume ima: require signed IMA policy ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself ima: load policy using path ...
2016-03-04Merge tag 'keys-next-20160303' of ↵James Morris3-11/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
2016-03-03X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enumDavid Howells2-4/+5
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layerDavid Howells1-0/+1
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type. To make this work, the following changes have been made: (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the padding and returns just the message hash. (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this, and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present. (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does and and has been merged into public_key.c. (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead. Thoughts: (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates registered that share most of the code? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-02-21ima: require signed IMA policyMimi Zohar1-0/+7
Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added. v1: - initialize the policy flag - include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itselfMimi Zohar4-3/+24
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself. Changelog v4: - use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the branches - Dmitry - Use the id mapping - Dmitry Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21ima: load policy using pathDmitry Kasatkin1-2/+43
We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents of the policy directly in, as follows: cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file signature if it has one. This patch adds support to load the IMA policy with a given path as follows: echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy Changelog v4+: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers v3: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch v2: - after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read() to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi) - Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-21ima: support for kexec image and initramfsMimi Zohar3-7/+27
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined. Example policy rules: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy. Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks enum kernel_read_file_id { ... READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_MAX_ID enum ima_hooks { ... KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file eg: enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID, MMAP_CHECK, In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we would need to specify a struct containing a union. struct caller_id { union { enum ima_hooks func_id; enum kernel_read_file_id read_id; }; }; Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id, perhaps changing the enumeration name. For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks. Changelog v4: - replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks id mapping array - Dmitry - renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
2016-02-21ima: remove firmware and module specific cached status infoMimi Zohar5-39/+28
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file. This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel versionMimi Zohar1-22/+13
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to measure/appraise signed kernel modules. The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file() security hook. This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security call. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2016-02-21security: define kernel_read_file hookMimi Zohar1-0/+16
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-02-21firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel versionMimi Zohar1-11/+10
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook, IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy. Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once. This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call. Changelog v4+: - revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky v3: - remove kernel_fw_from_file hook - use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis v2: - reordered and squashed firmware patches - fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2016-02-20ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memoryMimi Zohar6-14/+51
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by the normal IMA policy based processing. Changelog v5: - fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL v3: - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file() v1: - split patch Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18ima: calculate the hash of a buffer using aynchronous hash(ahash)Mimi Zohar1-2/+73
Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18ima: provide buffer hash calculation functionDmitry Kasatkin2-0/+49
This patch provides convenient buffer hash calculation function. Changelog v3: - fix while hash calculation - Dmitry v1: - rewrite to support loff_t sized buffers - Mimi (based on Fenguang Wu's testing) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-18ima: use "ima_hooks" enum as function argumentMimi Zohar5-27/+37
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18ima: refactor ima_policy_show() to display "ima_hooks" rulesMimi Zohar1-27/+36
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18ima: separate 'security.ima' reading functionality from collectDmitry Kasatkin8-40/+33
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-18integrity: convert digsig to akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2-7/+4
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-12EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisonsRyan Ware1-1/+2
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-02-10KEYS: CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an optionDavid Howells1-1/+0
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in userspace). The defconfig references were removed with: perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \ `git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y` and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-08IMA: fix non-ANSI declaration of ima_check_policy()Colin Ian King1-1/+1
ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file security/integrity/ima/ima.h Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-01-22wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro1-4/+4
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-17Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds17-76/+575
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
2016-01-04fix the leak in integrity_read_file()Al Viro1-5/+6
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-03ima: ima_write_policy() limit lockingPetko Manolov1-9/+9
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long. We only need it around ima_parse_add_rule(). Changelog: - The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-24IMA: policy can be updated zero timesSasha Levin3-0/+14
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the policy would be updated at least once. If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which means that invalid memory will be accessed. Changelog: - Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15security/integrity: make ima/ima_mok.c explicitly non-modularPaul Gortmaker1-3/+2
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is: ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings" ...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone. Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only. Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15ima: update appraise flags after policy update completesMimi Zohar1-2/+5
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
2015-12-15IMA: prevent keys on the .ima_blacklist from being removedMimi Zohar1-0/+2
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace from removing keys from the keyring. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policyPetko Manolov4-8/+253
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov4-0/+87
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15IMA: policy can now be updated multiple timesPetko Manolov3-28/+75
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue. The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced. IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does list splice in RCU manner. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15evm: EVM_LOAD_X509 depends on EVMArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error: security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys': digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509' This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when CONFIG_EVM is set as well. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 2ce523eb8976 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15evm: reset EVM status when file attributes changeDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+13
The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr(). When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example, after setting a digital signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the iint->flags that there is an EVM signature. This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN state. Changes in v2: * Flag setting moved to EVM layer Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15evm: provide a function to set the EVM key from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin2-14/+46
A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process. This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key directly without using the KEY subsystem. Changes in v4: * kernel-doc style for evm_set_key Changes in v3: * error reporting moved to evm_set_key * EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key * added bitop to prevent key setting race Changes in v2: * use size_t for key size instead of signed int * provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h> * provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loadedDmitry Kasatkin4-3/+14
In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process, evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Previously non-zero indicated that the HMAC key was loaded. When EVM loads the X509 before calling 'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start signature based verification. This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded. Changes in v3: * print error message if key is not set Changes in v2: * EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC * EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509 Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15evm: load an x509 certificate from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin4-0/+33
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring. Changes in v4: * Patch description updated Changes in v3: * Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used directly. Changes in v2: * default key patch changed to /etc/keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-11-23integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyringDmitry Kasatkin7-22/+35
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring. This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring(). Changes in v3: * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper. * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Changes in v2: * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-11-06mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIMMel Gorman1-1/+1
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing __GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing them prevents it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells1-1/+1
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-09integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates on the IMA trusted keyringDmitry Kasatkin1-1/+1
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a trusted key on the system keyring. This patch removes the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+ Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-07-01Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux Pull module updates from Rusty Russell: "Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module lock doing that too. A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too" * tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits) modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS. rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() module: add per-module param_lock module: make perm const params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes. modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'. kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks module: Rework module_addr_{min,max} module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup() module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch() ...
2015-06-16ima: update builtin policiesMimi Zohar1-9/+56
This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read" mode bit set (eg. read, read-write). Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing users. Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy. [The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's "ima: added new policy type exec" patch.] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2015-06-16ima: extend "mask" policy matching supportMimi Zohar1-5/+15
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask" option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2015-06-16ima: add support for new "euid" policy conditionMimi Zohar1-4/+23
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures files with the specified uid or suid. Changelog: - fixed checkpatch.pl warnings - fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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