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The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'
This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
"Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module
lock doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual
suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
appended too"
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
module: add per-module param_lock
module: make perm const
params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
...
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Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.
In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.
Test compiled on x86_64 against:
* allnoconfig
* allmodconfig
* allyesconfig
@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Use d_is_positive(dentry) or d_is_negative(dentry) rather than testing
dentry->d_inode as the dentry may cover another layer that has an inode when
the top layer doesn't or may hold a 0,0 chardev that's actually a whiteout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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mediated_filesystem() should use dentry->d_sb not dentry->d_inode->i_sb and
should avoid file_inode() also since it is really dealing with the path.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Make it clear this is about kernel_param_ops, not kernel_param (which
will soon have a flags field of its own). No functional changes.
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jon.mason@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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too many places open-code it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
taking over as maintainer of that code.
Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"
and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:
"Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits
and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
do that too.
(1) Keyring capacity expansion.
KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
Add a generic associative array implementation.
KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses
a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
the cause.
Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
struct into the key struct for this purpose.
I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code.
I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the
radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.
So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by
type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
the target key.
I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
also. FS-Cache might, for example.
(2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.
KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
addition or linkage of trusted keys.
Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be
loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system
keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
thus be added into the master keyring.
Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.
(3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.
X.509: Remove certificate date checks
It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
loaded - so just remove those checks.
(4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.
KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate
The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.
(5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more
easily.
To make this work, two things were needed:
(a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.
The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
happens), so neither of these places is suitable.
I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their
persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user
doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos
tokens it held are then also gc'd.
(b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).
The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge
tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we
slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits)
KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Smack: Ptrace access check mode
ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
...
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Unless task == current ptrace_parent(task) is not safe even under
rcu_read_lock() and most of the current users are not right.
So may_change_ptraced_domain(task) looks wrong as well. However it
is always called with task == current so the code is actually fine.
Remove this argument to make this fact clear.
Note: perhaps we should simply kill ptrace_parent(), it buys almost
nothing. And it is obviously racy, perhaps this should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The reporting of the parent task info is a vestage from old versions of
apparmor. The need for this information was removed by unique null-
profiles before apparmor was upstreamed so remove this info from logging.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Now that aa_capabile no longer sets the task field it can be removed
and the lsm_audit version of the field can be used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1235977
The profile introspection seq file has a locking bug when policy is viewed
from a virtual root (task in a policy namespace), introspection from the
real root is not affected.
The test for root
while (parent) {
is correct for the real root, but incorrect for tasks in a policy namespace.
This allows the task to walk backup the policy tree past its virtual root
causing it to be unlocked before the virtual root should be in the p_stop
fn.
This results in the following lockdep back trace:
[ 78.479744] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
[ 78.479792] 3.11.0-11-generic #17 Not tainted
[ 78.479838] -------------------------------------
[ 78.479885] grep/2223 is trying to release lock (&ns->lock) at:
[ 78.479952] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480002] but there are no more locks to release!
[ 78.480037]
[ 78.480037] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 78.480037] 1 lock held by grep/2223:
[ 78.480037] #0: (&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812111bd>] seq_read+0x3d/0x3d0
[ 78.480037]
[ 78.480037] stack backtrace:
[ 78.480037] CPU: 0 PID: 2223 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.11.0-11-generic #17
[ 78.480037] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763d60 ffffffff817b97ef ffff8800189d2190
[ 78.480037] ffff880007763d88 ffffffff810e1c6e ffff88001f044730 ffff8800189d2190
[ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763e00 ffffffff810e5bd6 0000000724fe56b7
[ 78.480037] Call Trace:
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817b97ef>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e1c6e>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0xee/0x100
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5bd6>] lock_release_non_nested+0x226/0x300
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2fe>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xce/0x180
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5d5c>] lock_release+0xac/0x310
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2b3>] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x83/0x180
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81376c91>] p_stop+0x51/0x90
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81211408>] seq_read+0x288/0x3d0
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811e9d9e>] vfs_read+0x9e/0x170
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811ea8cc>] SyS_read+0x4c/0xa0
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817ccc9d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1235523
This fixes the following kmemleak trace:
unreferenced object 0xffff8801e8c35680 (size 32):
comm "apparmor_parser", pid 691, jiffies 4294895667 (age 13230.876s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 d3 4e b5 ac 6d f4 ed 3f cb ee 48 1c fd 40 cf ..N..m..?..H..@.
5b cc e9 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff817a97ee>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811ca9f3>] __kmalloc+0x103/0x290
[<ffffffff8138acbc>] aa_calc_profile_hash+0x6c/0x150
[<ffffffff8138074d>] aa_unpack+0x39d/0xd50
[<ffffffff8137eced>] aa_replace_profiles+0x3d/0xd80
[<ffffffff81376937>] profile_replace+0x37/0x50
[<ffffffff811e9f2d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0
[<ffffffff811ea96c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
[<ffffffff817ccb1d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The recent 3.12 pull request for apparmor was missing a couple rcu _protected
access modifiers. Resulting in the follow suspicious RCU usage
[ 29.804534] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
[ 29.804539] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted
[ 29.804541] -------------------------------
[ 29.804545] security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 29.804548]
[ 29.804548] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 29.804548]
[ 29.804553]
[ 29.804553] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 29.804558] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268:
[ 29.804560] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29
[ 29.804576] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c
[ 29.804589]
[ 29.804589] stack backtrace:
[ 29.804595] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5
[ 29.804599] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010
[ 29.804602] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d90 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540
[ 29.804611] ffff8800b95a1dc0 ffffffff81087439 ffff880138cc3a18 ffff880138cc3a18
[ 29.804619] ffff8800b9464a90 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1df0 ffffffff811f5084
[ 29.804628] Call Trace:
[ 29.804636] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
[ 29.804642] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105
[ 29.804649] [<ffffffff811f5084>] __aa_update_replacedby+0x53/0x7f
[ 29.804655] [<ffffffff811f5408>] __replace_profile+0x11f/0x1ed
[ 29.804661] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c
[ 29.804668] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c
[ 29.804674] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113
[ 29.804680] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a
[ 29.804687] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 29.804691]
[ 29.804694] ===============================
[ 29.804697] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
[ 29.804700] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted
[ 29.804703] -------------------------------
[ 29.804706] security/apparmor/policy.c:566 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 29.804709]
[ 29.804709] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 29.804709]
[ 29.804714]
[ 29.804714] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 29.804718] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268:
[ 29.804721] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29
[ 29.804733] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c
[ 29.804744]
[ 29.804744] stack backtrace:
[ 29.804750] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5
[ 29.804753] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010
[ 29.804756] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d80 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540
[ 29.804764] ffff8800b95a1db0 ffffffff81087439 ffff8800b95b02b0 0000000000000000
[ 29.804772] ffff8800b9efba08 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1dd0 ffffffff811f4f94
[ 29.804779] Call Trace:
[ 29.804786] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
[ 29.804791] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105
[ 29.804798] [<ffffffff811f4f94>] aa_free_replacedby_kref+0x4d/0x62
[ 29.804804] [<ffffffff811f4f47>] ? aa_put_namespace+0x17/0x17
[ 29.804810] [<ffffffff811f4f0b>] kref_put+0x36/0x40
[ 29.804816] [<ffffffff811f5423>] __replace_profile+0x13a/0x1ed
[ 29.804822] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c
[ 29.804829] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c
[ 29.804835] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113
[ 29.804840] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a
[ 29.804847] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: miles.lane@gmail.com
CC: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Use the shash interface, rather than the hash interface, when hashing
AppArmor profiles. The shash interface does not use scatterlists and it
is a better fit for what AppArmor needs.
This fixes a kernel paging BUG when aa_calc_profile_hash() is passed a
buffer from vmalloc(). The hash interface requires callers to handle
vmalloc() buffers differently than what AppArmor was doing. Due to
vmalloc() memory not being physically contiguous, each individual page
behind the buffer must be assigned to a scatterlist with sg_set_page()
and then the scatterlist passed to crypto_hash_update().
The shash interface does not have that limitation and allows vmalloc()
and kmalloc() buffers to be handled in the same manner.
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1216294/
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62261
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Nothing major for this kernel, just maintenance updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module
apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interface
apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces
apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c
apparmor: rework namespace free path
apparmor: update how unconfined is handled
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once
apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interface
apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabled
apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc()
Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytes
Smack: network label match fix
security: smack: add a hash table to quicken smk_find_entry()
security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list()
xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".
...
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The apparmor module parameters for param_ops_aabool and
param_ops_aalockpolicy are both based off of the param_ops_bool,
and can handle a NULL value passed in as val. Have it enable the
new KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARGS flag to allow the parameters to be set
without having to state "=y" or "=1".
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Provide userspace the ability to introspect a sha1 hash value for each
profile currently loaded.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Add the dynamic namespace relative profiles file to the interace, to allow
introspection of loaded profiles and their modes.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
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Add the ability to take in and report a human readable profile attachment
string for profiles so that attachment specifications can be easily
inspected.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information.
The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed
when the profile or namespace is removed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing
loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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namespaces now completely use the unconfined profile to track the
refcount and rcu freeing cycle. So rework the code to simplify (track
everything through the profile path right up to the end), and move the
rcu_head from policy base to profile as the namespace no longer needs
it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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ns->unconfined is being used read side without locking, nor rcu but is
being updated when a namespace is removed. This works for the root ns
which is never removed but has a race window and can cause failures when
children namespaces are removed.
Also ns and ns->unconfined have a circular refcounting dependency that
is problematic and must be broken. Currently this is done incorrectly
when the namespace is destroyed.
Fix this by forward referencing unconfined via the replacedby infrastructure
instead of directly updating the ns->unconfined pointer.
Remove the circular refcount dependency by making the ns and its unconfined
profile share the same refcount.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation
and lookup to handle task replacement.
Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned
in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling
this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result
in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail
resulting in inconsistent policy.
Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement
either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Add a policy directory to features to contain features that can affect
policy compilation but do not affect mediation. Eg of such features would
be types of dfa compression supported, etc.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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This is a follow-up to commit b5b3ee6c "apparmor: no need to delay vfree()".
Since vmalloc() will do "size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);",
we don't need to check for "size >= sizeof(struct work_struct)".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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vfree() can be called from interrupt contexts now
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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currently apparmor name parsing is only correctly handling
:<NS>:<profile>
but
:<NS>://<profile>
is also a valid form and what is exported to userspace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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the exec file isn't processing its command arg. It should only set be
responding to a command of exec.
Also cleanup setprocattr some more while we are at it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Fix a couple of warning reported by sparse
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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smatch reports
error: potential NULL dereference 'ns'.
this can not actually occur because it relies on aa_split_fqname setting
both ns_name and name as null but ns_name will actually always have a
value in this case.
so remove the unnecessary if (ns_name) conditional that is resulting
in the false positive further down.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The audit type table is missing a comma so that KILLED comes out as
KILLEDAUTO.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
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The top 8 bits of the base field have never been used, in fact can't
be used, by the current 'dfa16' format. However they will be used in the
future as flags, so mask them off when using base as an index value.
Note: the use of the top 8 bits, without masking is trapped by the verify
checks that base entries are within the size bounds.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
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Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used
in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
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