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ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-03-19
1) Delete duplicated functions that calls same xfrm_api_check.
From Leon Romanovsky.
2) Align userland API of the default policy structure to the
internal structures. From Nicolas Dichtel.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This is a follow up of commit f8d858e607b2 ("xfrm: make user policy API
complete"). The goal is to align userland API to the internal structures.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because ID
0 was meant to be used for configuring the policy/state without
matching for a specific interface (e.g., Cilium is affected, see
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789 and
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/19019).
Signed-off-by: Kai Lueke <kailueke@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This patch enables distinguishing SAs and SPs based on if_id during
the xfrm_migrate flow. This ensures support for xfrm interfaces
throughout the SA/SP lifecycle.
When there are multiple existing SPs with the same direction,
the same xfrm_selector and different endpoint addresses,
xfrm_migrate might fail with ENODATA.
Specifically, the code path for performing xfrm_migrate is:
Stage 1: find policy to migrate with
xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)
Stage 2: find and update state(s) with
xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net)
Stage 3: update endpoint address(es) of template(s) with
xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate)
Currently "Stage 1" always returns the first xfrm_policy that
matches, and "Stage 3" looks for the xfrm_tmpl that matches the
old endpoint address. Thus if there are multiple xfrm_policy
with same selector, direction, type and net, "Stage 1" might
rertun a wrong xfrm_policy and "Stage 3" will fail with ENODATA
because it cannot find a xfrm_tmpl with the matching endpoint
address.
The fix is to allow userspace to pass an if_id and add if_id
to the matching rule in Stage 1 and Stage 2 since if_id is a
unique ID for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state. For compatibility,
if_id will only be checked if the attribute is set.
Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1668886
Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Merge in fixes directly in prep for the 5.17 merge window.
No conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-01-06
1) Fix some clang_analyzer warnings about never read variables.
From luo penghao.
2) Check for pols[0] only once in xfrm_expand_policies().
From Jean Sacren.
3) The SA curlft.use_time was updated only on SA cration time.
Update whenever the SA is used. From Antony Antony
4) Add support for SM3 secure hash.
From Xu Jia.
5) Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm.
From Xu Jia.
6) Add a rate limit for SA mapping change messages.
From Antony Antony.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sock.h is pretty heavily used (5k objects rebuilt on x86 after
it's touched). We can drop the include of filter.h from it and
add a forward declaration of struct sk_filter instead.
This decreases the number of rebuilt objects when bpf.h
is touched from ~5k to ~1k.
There's a lot of missing includes this was masking. Primarily
in networking tho, this time.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211229004913.513372-1-kuba@kernel.org
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Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING,
when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP
encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet
with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change
message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener.
Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space.
The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or
updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds.
v1->v2 change:
update xfrm_sa_len()
v2->v3 changes:
use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state
fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present
Co-developed-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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xfrm ineterface does not allow xfrm if_id = 0
fail to create or update xfrm state and policy.
With this commit:
ip xfrm policy add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 dir out if_id 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
ip xfrm state add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 proto esp spi 1 \
reqid 1 mode tunnel aead 'rfc4106(gcm(aes))' \
0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 if_id 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
v1->v2 change:
- add Fixes: tag
Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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copy_user_offload() will actually push a struct struct xfrm_user_offload,
which is different than (struct xfrm_state *)->xso
(struct xfrm_state_offload)
Fixes: d77e38e612a01 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull overflow updates from Kees Cook:
"The end goal of the current buffer overflow detection work[0] is to
gain full compile-time and run-time coverage of all detectable buffer
overflows seen via array indexing or memcpy(), memmove(), and
memset(). The str*() family of functions already have full coverage.
While much of the work for these changes have been on-going for many
releases (i.e. 0-element and 1-element array replacements, as well as
avoiding false positives and fixing discovered overflows[1]), this
series contains the foundational elements of several related buffer
overflow detection improvements by providing new common helpers and
FORTIFY_SOURCE changes needed to gain the introspection required for
compiler visibility into array sizes. Also included are a handful of
already Acked instances using the helpers (or related clean-ups), with
many more waiting at the ready to be taken via subsystem-specific
trees[2].
The new helpers are:
- struct_group() for gaining struct member range introspection
- memset_after() and memset_startat() for clearing to the end of
structures
- DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for using flex arrays in unions or alone in
structs
Also included is the beginning of the refactoring of FORTIFY_SOURCE to
support memcpy() introspection, fix missing and regressed coverage
under GCC, and to prepare to fix the currently broken Clang support.
Finishing this work is part of the larger series[0], but depends on
all the false positives and buffer overflow bug fixes to have landed
already and those that depend on this series to land.
As part of the FORTIFY_SOURCE refactoring, a set of both a
compile-time and run-time tests are added for FORTIFY_SOURCE and the
mem*()-family functions respectively. The compile time tests have
found a legitimate (though corner-case) bug[6] already.
Please note that the appearance of "panic" and "BUG" in the
FORTIFY_SOURCE refactoring are the result of relocating existing code,
and no new use of those code-paths are expected nor desired.
Finally, there are two tree-wide conversions for 0-element arrays and
flexible array unions to gain sane compiler introspection coverage
that result in no known object code differences.
After this series (and the changes that have now landed via netdev and
usb), we are very close to finally being able to build with
-Warray-bounds and -Wzero-length-bounds.
However, due corner cases in GCC[3] and Clang[4], I have not included
the last two patches that turn on these options, as I don't want to
introduce any known warnings to the build. Hopefully these can be
solved soon"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210818060533.3569517-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [0]
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/log/?qt=grep&q=FORTIFY_SOURCE [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202108220107.3E26FE6C9C@keescook/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3ab153ec-2798-da4c-f7b1-81b0ac8b0c5b@roeck-us.net/ [3]
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51682 [4]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202109051257.29B29745C0@keescook/ [5]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211020200039.170424-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [6]
* tag 'overflow-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (30 commits)
fortify: strlen: Avoid shadowing previous locals
compiler-gcc.h: Define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ under hwaddress sanitizer
treewide: Replace 0-element memcpy() destinations with flexible arrays
treewide: Replace open-coded flex arrays in unions
stddef: Introduce DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() helper
btrfs: Use memset_startat() to clear end of struct
string.h: Introduce memset_startat() for wiping trailing members and padding
xfrm: Use memset_after() to clear padding
string.h: Introduce memset_after() for wiping trailing members/padding
lib: Introduce CONFIG_MEMCPY_KUNIT_TEST
fortify: Add compile-time FORTIFY_SOURCE tests
fortify: Allow strlen() and strnlen() to pass compile-time known lengths
fortify: Prepare to improve strnlen() and strlen() warnings
fortify: Fix dropped strcpy() compile-time write overflow check
fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support
fortify: Move remaining fortify helpers into fortify-string.h
lib/string: Move helper functions out of string.c
compiler_types.h: Remove __compiletime_object_size()
cm4000_cs: Use struct_group() to zero struct cm4000_dev region
can: flexcan: Use struct_group() to zero struct flexcan_regs regions
...
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In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memset(), avoid intentionally writing across
neighboring fields.
Clear trailing padding bytes using the new helper so that memset()
doesn't get confused about writing "past the end" of the last struct
member. There is no change to the resulting machine code.
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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As stated in the comment above xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(), rcu read lock must
be held before calling this function.
Reported-by: syzbot+3d9866419b4aa8f985d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 703b94b93c19 ("xfrm: notify default policy on update")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This configuration knob is very sensible, it should be notified when
changing.
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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>From a userland POV, this API was based on some magic values:
- dirmask and action were bitfields but meaning of bits
(XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_*) are not exported;
- action is confusing, if a bit is set, does it mean drop or accept?
Let's try to simplify this uapi by using explicit field and macros.
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Syzbot hit shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_get_default. The problem was in
missing validation check for user data.
up->dirmask comes from user-space, so we need to check if this value
is less than XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX to avoid shift-out-of-bounds bugs.
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b2be9dd8ca6f6c73ee2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2021-08-27
1) Remove an unneeded extra variable in esp4 esp_ssg_unref.
From Corey Minyard.
2) Add a configuration option to change the default behaviour
to block traffic if there is no matching policy.
Joint work with Christian Langrock and Antony Antony.
3) Fix a shift-out-of-bounce bug reported from syzbot.
From Pavel Skripkin.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We need to check up->dirmask to avoid shift-out-of-bounce bug,
since up->dirmask comes from userspace.
Also, added XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX constant to uapi to inform
user-space that up->dirmask has maximum possible value
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9cd5837a045bbee5b810@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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As the default we assume the traffic to pass, if we have no
matching IPsec policy. With this patch, we have a possibility to
change this default from allow to block. It can be configured
via netlink. Each direction (input/output/forward) can be
configured separately. With the default to block configuered,
we need allow policies for all packet flows we accept.
We do not use default policy lookup for the loopback device.
v1->v2
- fix compiling when XFRM is disabled
- Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Christian Langrock <christian.langrock@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Langrock <christian.langrock@secunet.com>
Co-developed-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Syzbot reported memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg(). The
problem was is non-freed skb's frag_list.
In skb_release_all() skb_release_data() will be called only
in case of skb->head != NULL, but netlink_skb_destructor()
sets head to NULL. So, allocated frag_list skb should be
freed manualy, since consume_skb() won't take care of it
Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fb347cf82c73a90efcca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2021-06-23
1) Don't return a mtu smaller than 1280 on IPv6 pmtu discovery.
From Sabrina Dubroca
2) Fix seqcount rcu-read side in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype
for the PREEMPT_RT case. From Varad Gautam.
3) Remove a repeated declaration of xfrm_parse_spi.
From Shaokun Zhang.
4) IPv4 beet mode can't handle fragments, but IPv6 does.
commit 68dc022d04eb ("xfrm: BEET mode doesn't support
fragments for inner packets") handled IPv4 and IPv6
the same way. Relax the check for IPv6 because fragments
are possible here. From Xin Long.
5) Memory allocation failures are not reported for
XFRMA_ENCAP and XFRMA_COADDR in xfrm_state_construct.
Fix this by moving both cases in front of the function.
6) Fix a missing initialization in the xfrm offload fallback
fail case for bonding devices. From Ayush Sawal.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When memory allocation for XFRMA_ENCAP or XFRMA_COADDR fails,
the error will not be reported because the -ENOMEM assignment
to the err variable is overwritten before. Fix this by moving
these two in front of the function so that memory allocation
failures will be reported.
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Use the new exit_pre hook to NULL the netlink socket.
The net namespace core will do a synchronize_rcu() between the exit_pre
and exit/exit_batch handlers.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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s/wouldnt/wouldn\'t/
Signed-off-by: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When kalloc or kmemdup failed, should return ENOMEM rather than ENOBUF.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
or dumpall sa.
Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time.
e.g. when enabled:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none integrity [confidentiality]
ip xfrm state
src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100
proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96
note: the aead secret is redacted.
Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
v1->v2
- add size checks before memset calls
v2->v3
- replace spaces with tabs for consistency
v3->v4
- use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting
v4->v5
- remove kconfig option
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Provide the user-to-kernel translator under XFRM_USER_COMPAT, that
creates for 32-bit xfrm-user message a 64-bit translation.
The translation is afterwards reused by xfrm_user code just as if
userspace had sent 64-bit message.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Currently nlmsg_unicast() is used by functions that dump structures that
can be different in size for compat tasks, see dump_one_state() and
dump_one_policy().
The following nlmsg_unicast() users exist today in xfrm:
Function | Message can be different
| in size on compat
-------------------------------------------|------------------------------
xfrm_get_spdinfo() | N
xfrm_get_sadinfo() | N
xfrm_get_sa() | Y
xfrm_alloc_userspi() | Y
xfrm_get_policy() | Y
xfrm_get_ae() | N
Besides, dump_one_state() and dump_one_policy() can be used by filtered
netlink dump for XFRM_MSG_GETSA, XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY.
Just as for xfrm multicast, allocate frag_list for compat skb journey
down to recvmsg() which will give user the desired skb according to
syscall bitness.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Provide the kernel-to-user translator under XFRM_USER_COMPAT, that
creates for 64-bit xfrm-user message a 32-bit translation and puts it
in skb's frag_list. net/compat.c layer provides MSG_CMSG_COMPAT to
decide if the message should be taken from skb or frag_list.
(used by wext-core which has also an ABI difference)
Kernel sends 64-bit xfrm messages to the userspace for:
- multicast (monitor events)
- netlink dumps
Wire up the translator to xfrm_nlmsg_multicast().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
it would take 'priority' to make a policy unique, and allow duplicated
policies with different 'priority' to be added, which is not expected
by userland, as Tobias reported in strongswan.
To fix this duplicated policies issue, and also fix the issue in
commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
when doing add/del/get/update on user interfaces, this patch is to change
to look up a policy with both mark and mask by doing:
mark.v == pol->mark.v && mark.m == pol->mark.m
and leave the check:
(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v
for tx/rx path only.
As the userland expects an exact mark and mask match to manage policies.
v1->v2:
- make xfrm_policy_mark_match inline and fix the changelog as
Tobias suggested.
Fixes: 295fae568885 ("xfrm: Allow user space manipulation of SPD mark")
Fixes: ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list")
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Tested-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Without doing verify_sec_ctx_len() check in xfrm_add_acquire(), it may be
out-of-bounds to access uctx->ctx_str with uctx->ctx_len, as noticed by
syz:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430
Read of size 768 at addr ffff8880123be9b4 by task syz-executor.1/11650
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x16e
print_address_description.cold.3+0x9/0x23b
kasan_report.cold.4+0x64/0x95
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430
security_xfrm_policy_alloc+0x5c/0xb0
xfrm_policy_construct+0x2b1/0x650
xfrm_add_acquire+0x21d/0xa10
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6f0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90
netlink_unicast+0x50e/0x6a0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd40
sock_sendmsg+0x133/0x170
___sys_sendmsg+0x834/0x9a0
__sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x660
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
So fix it by adding the missing verify_sec_ctx_len check there.
Fixes: 980ebd25794f ("[IPSEC]: Sync series - acquire insert")
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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It's not sufficient to do 'uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) +
uctx->ctx_len)' check only, as uctx->len may be greater than nla_len(rt),
in which case it will cause slab-out-of-bounds when accessing uctx->ctx_str
later.
This patch is to fix it by return -EINVAL when uctx->len > nla_len(rt).
Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2019-07-05
1) Fix xfrm selector prefix length validation for
inter address family tunneling.
From Anirudh Gupta.
2) Fix a memleak in pfkey.
From Jeremy Sowden.
3) Fix SA selector validation to allow empty selectors again.
From Nicolas Dichtel.
4) Select crypto ciphers for xfrm_algo, this fixes some
randconfig builds. From Arnd Bergmann.
5) Remove a duplicated assignment in xfrm_bydst_resize.
From Cong Wang.
6) Fix a hlist corruption on hash rebuild.
From Florian Westphal.
7) Fix a memory leak when creating xfrm interfaces.
From Nicolas Dichtel.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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After commit b38ff4075a80, the following command does not work anymore:
$ ip xfrm state add src 10.125.0.2 dst 10.125.0.1 proto esp spi 34 reqid 1 \
mode tunnel enc 'cbc(aes)' 0xb0abdba8b782ad9d364ec81e3a7d82a1 auth-trunc \
'hmac(sha1)' 0xe26609ebd00acb6a4d51fca13e49ea78a72c73e6 96 flag align4
In fact, the selector is not mandatory, allow the user to provide an empty
selector.
Fixes: b38ff4075a80 ("xfrm: Fix xfrm sel prefix length validation")
CC: Anirudh Gupta <anirudh.gupta@sophos.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Family of src/dst can be different from family of selector src/dst.
Use xfrm selector family to validate address prefix length,
while verifying new sa from userspace.
Validated patch with this command:
ip xfrm state add src 1.1.6.1 dst 1.1.6.2 proto esp spi 4260196 \
reqid 20004 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \
0x1111016400000000000000000000000044440001 128 \
sel src 1011:1:4::2/128 sel dst 1021:1:4::2/128 dev Port5
Fixes: 07bf7908950a ("xfrm: Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector.")
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Gupta <anirudh.gupta@sophos.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Three trivial overlapping conflicts.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This reverts commit f10e0010fae8174dc20bdc872bcaa85baa925cb7.
This commit was just wrong. It caused a lot of
syzbot warnings, so just revert it.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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For rcu protected pointers, we'd better add '__rcu' for them.
Once added '__rcu' tag for rcu protected pointer, the sparse tool reports
warnings.
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1198:39: sparse: expected struct sock *sk
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1198:39: sparse: got struct sock [noderef] <asn:4> *nlsk
[...]
So introduce a new wrapper function of nlmsg_unicast to handle type
conversions.
This patch also fixes a direct access of a rcu protected socket.
Fixes: be33690d8fcf("[XFRM]: Fix aevent related crash")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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UBSAN report this:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]'
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4
0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80
ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164
[<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382
[<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289
[<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309
[<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243
[<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline]
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401
[<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273
[<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline]
[<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline]
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926
[<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735
<EOI> [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52
[<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline]
[<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446
[<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437
[<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299
[<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245
The issue is triggered as this:
xfrm_add_policy
-->verify_newpolicy_info //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX
//In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check.
-->xfrm_policy_construct //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer
-->xfrm_policy_insert
--> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2
--> xfrm_gen_index //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6
then xfrm_policy_timer be fired
xfrm_policy_timer
--> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6
--> xfrm_policy_delete
--> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access
Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is
valid, to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: e682adf021be ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
xfrm_state_put() moves struct xfrm_state to the GC list
and schedules the GC work to clean it up. On net exit call
path, xfrm_state_flush() is called to clean up and
xfrm_flush_gc() is called to wait for the GC work to complete
before exit.
However, this doesn't work because one of the ->destructor(),
ipcomp_destroy(), schedules the same GC work again inside
the GC work. It is hard to wait for such a nested async
callback. This is also why syzbot still reports the following
warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351 xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit+0x2cb/0x500 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351
...
ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xb0/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x51d/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
process_one_work+0xd0c/0x1ce0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x143/0x14a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
In fact, it is perfectly fine to bypass GC and destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit call path, because it is in process context
and doesn't need a work struct to do any blocking work.
This patch introduces xfrm_state_put_sync() which simply bypasses
GC, and lets its callers to decide whether to use this synchronous
version. On net exit path, xfrm_state_fini() and
xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit() use it. And, as ipcomp_destroy() itself is
blocking, it can use xfrm_state_put_sync() directly too.
Also rename xfrm_state_gc_destroy() to ___xfrm_state_destroy() to
reflect this change.
Fixes: b48c05ab5d32 ("xfrm: Fix warning in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit.")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e9aebef558e3ed673934@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
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The check assumes that in transport mode, the first templates family
must match the address family of the policy selector.
Syzkaller managed to build a template using MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION,
with ipv4-in-ipv6 chain, leading to following splat:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888063e57aa0 by task a.out/2050
xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x100/0x1d0
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x108/0x1000 [..]
Problem is that addresses point into flowi4 struct, but xfrm_state_find
treats them as being ipv6 because it uses templ->encap_family is used
(AF_INET6 in case of reproducer) rather than family (AF_INET).
This patch inverts the logic: Enforce 'template family must match
selector' EXCEPT for tunnel and BEET mode.
In BEET and Tunnel mode, xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one will have remote/local
address pointers changed to point at the addresses found in the template,
rather than the flowi ones, so no oob read will occur.
Reported-by: 3ntr0py1337@gmail.com
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2018-12-18
1) Fix error return code in xfrm_output_one()
when no dst_entry is attached to the skb.
From Wei Yongjun.
2) The xfrm state hash bucket count reported to
userspace is off by one. Fix from Benjamin Poirier.
3) Fix NULL pointer dereference in xfrm_input when
skb_dst_force clears the dst_entry.
4) Fix freeing of xfrm states on acquire. We use a
dedicated slab cache for the xfrm states now,
so free it properly with kmem_cache_free.
From Mathias Krause.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 565f0fa902b6 ("xfrm: use a dedicated slab cache for struct
xfrm_state") moved xfrm state objects to use their own slab cache.
However, it missed to adapt xfrm_user to use this new cache when
freeing xfrm states.
Fix this by introducing and make use of a new helper for freeing
xfrm_state objects.
Fixes: 565f0fa902b6 ("xfrm: use a dedicated slab cache for struct xfrm_state")
Reported-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Now that in_compat_syscall() is consistent on all architectures and does
not longer report true on native i686, the workarounds (ifdeffery and
helpers) can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-3-dima@arista.com
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Make sure extack is passed to nlmsg_parse where easy to do so.
Most of these are dump handlers and leveraging the extack in
the netlink_callback.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2018-10-01
1) Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector,
otherwise we may hit undefined behaviour in the
address matching functions if the prefix is too
big for the given address family.
2) Fix skb leak on local message size errors.
From Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo.
3) We currently reset the transport header back to the network
header after a transport mode transformation is applied. This
leads to an incorrect transport header when multiple transport
mode transformations are applied. Reset the transport header
only after all transformations are already applied to fix this.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
4) We only support one offloaded xfrm, so reset crypto_done after
the first transformation in xfrm_input(). Otherwise we may call
the wrong input method for subsequent transformations.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
5) Fix NULL pointer dereference when skb_dst_force clears the dst_entry.
skb_dst_force does not really force a dst refcount anymore, it might
clear it instead. xfrm code did not expect this, add a check to not
dereference skb_dst() if it was cleared by skb_dst_force.
6) Validate xfrm template mode, otherwise we can get a stack-out-of-bounds
read in xfrm_state_find. From Sean Tranchetti.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
XFRM mode parameters passed as part of the user templates
in the IP_XFRM_POLICY are never properly validated. Passing
values other than valid XFRM modes can cause stack-out-of-bounds
reads to occur later in the XFRM processing:
[ 140.535608] ================================================================
[ 140.543058] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x17e4/0x1cc4
[ 140.550306] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0238a7a58 by task repro/5148
[ 140.557369]
[ 140.558927] Call trace:
[ 140.558936] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x388
[ 140.558940] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 140.558946] __dump_stack+0x24/0x2c
[ 140.558949] dump_stack+0x8c/0xd0
[ 140.558956] print_address_description+0x74/0x234
[ 140.558960] kasan_report+0x240/0x264
[ 140.558963] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x2c/0x38
[ 140.558967] xfrm_state_find+0x17e4/0x1cc4
[ 140.558971] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x40c/0x1fb8
[ 140.558975] xfrm_lookup+0x238/0x1444
[ 140.558977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x48/0x11c
[ 140.558984] ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xc4
[ 140.558991] raw_sendmsg+0xa74/0x266c
[ 140.558996] inet_sendmsg+0x258/0x3b0
[ 140.559002] sock_sendmsg+0xbc/0xec
[ 140.559005] SyS_sendto+0x3a8/0x5a8
[ 140.559008] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
[ 140.559009]
[ 140.592245] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 140.597981] page_owner info is not active (free page?)
[ 140.603267]
[ 140.653503] ================================================================
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|