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2022-03-24kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_alloc_pages into post_alloc_hookAndrey Konovalov1-1/+1
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in post_alloc_hook() is scattered across two locations: kasan_alloc_pages() hook for HW_TAGS KASAN and post_alloc_hook() itself. This is confusing. This and a few following patches combine the code from these two locations. Along the way, these patches do a step-by-step restructure the many performed checks to make them easier to follow. Replace the only caller of kasan_alloc_pages() with its implementation. As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled, moving the code does no functional changes. Also move init and init_tags variables definitions out of kasan_has_integrated_init() clause in post_alloc_hook(), as they have the same values regardless of what the if condition evaluates to. This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the following patches easier to follow. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ac7e0b30f5cbb177ec363ddd7878a3141289592.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-24kasan, page_alloc: merge kasan_free_pages into free_pages_prepareAndrey Konovalov1-1/+1
Currently, the code responsible for initializing and poisoning memory in free_pages_prepare() is scattered across two locations: kasan_free_pages() for HW_TAGS KASAN and free_pages_prepare() itself. This is confusing. This and a few following patches combine the code from these two locations. Along the way, these patches also simplify the performed checks to make them easier to follow. Replaces the only caller of kasan_free_pages() with its implementation. As kasan_has_integrated_init() is only true when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled, moving the code does no functional changes. This patch is not useful by itself but makes the simplifications in the following patches easier to follow. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/303498d15840bb71905852955c6e2390ecc87139.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-22lib/stackdepot: always do filter_irq_stacks() in stack_depot_save()Marco Elver1-1/+0
The non-interrupt portion of interrupt stack traces before interrupt entry is usually arbitrary. Therefore, saving stack traces of interrupts (that include entries before interrupt entry) to stack depot leads to unbounded stackdepot growth. As such, use of filter_irq_stacks() is a requirement to ensure stackdepot can efficiently deduplicate interrupt stacks. Looking through all current users of stack_depot_save(), none (except KASAN) pass the stack trace through filter_irq_stacks() before passing it on to stack_depot_save(). Rather than adding filter_irq_stacks() to all current users of stack_depot_save(), it became clear that stack_depot_save() should simply do filter_irq_stacks(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211130095727.2378739-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-06mm/kasan: Convert to struct folio and struct slabMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-10/+13
KASAN accesses some slab related struct page fields so we need to convert it to struct slab. Some places are a bit simplified thanks to kasan_addr_to_slab() encapsulating the PageSlab flag check through virt_to_slab(). When resolving object address to either a real slab or a large kmalloc, use struct folio as the intermediate type for testing the slab flag to avoid unnecessary implicit compound_head(). [ vbabka@suse.cz: use struct folio, adjust to differences in previous patches ] Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Tested-by: Hyeongogn Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
2022-01-06mm: Convert struct page to struct slab in functions used by other subsystemsVlastimil Babka1-2/+2
KASAN, KFENCE and memcg interact with SLAB or SLUB internals through functions nearest_obj(), obj_to_index() and objs_per_slab() that use struct page as parameter. This patch converts it to struct slab including all callers, through a coccinelle semantic patch. // Options: --include-headers --no-includes --smpl-spacing include/linux/slab_def.h include/linux/slub_def.h mm/slab.h mm/kasan/*.c mm/kfence/kfence_test.c mm/memcontrol.c mm/slab.c mm/slub.c // Note: needs coccinelle 1.1.1 to avoid breaking whitespace @@ @@ -objs_per_slab_page( +objs_per_slab( ... ) { ... } @@ @@ -objs_per_slab_page( +objs_per_slab( ... ) @@ identifier fn =~ "obj_to_index|objs_per_slab"; @@ fn(..., - const struct page *page + const struct slab *slab ,...) { <... ( - page_address(page) + slab_address(slab) | - page + slab ) ...> } @@ identifier fn =~ "nearest_obj"; @@ fn(..., - struct page *page + const struct slab *slab ,...) { <... ( - page_address(page) + slab_address(slab) | - page + slab ) ...> } @@ identifier fn =~ "nearest_obj|obj_to_index|objs_per_slab"; expression E; @@ fn(..., ( - slab_page(E) + E | - virt_to_page(E) + virt_to_slab(E) | - virt_to_head_page(E) + virt_to_slab(E) | - page + page_slab(page) ) ,...) Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> Cc: <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>
2021-11-06kasan: fix tag for large allocations when using CONFIG_SLABMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-1/+1
If an object is allocated on a tail page of a multi-page slab, kasan will get the wrong tag because page->s_mem is NULL for tail pages. I'm not quite sure what the user-visible effect of this might be. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211001024105.3217339-1-willy@infradead.org Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c6a ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode") Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-06kasan: common: provide can_alloc in kasan_save_stack()Marco Elver1-3/+3
Add another argument, can_alloc, to kasan_save_stack() which is passed as-is to __stack_depot_save(). No functional change intended. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210913112609.2651084-5-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Cc: Vinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org> Cc: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds1-0/+6
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "191 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: kthread, ia64, scripts, ntfs, squashfs, ocfs2, kernel/watchdog, and mm (gup, pagealloc, slab, slub, kmemleak, dax, debug, pagecache, gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, bootmem, dma, tracing, vmalloc, kasan, initialization, pagealloc, and memory-failure)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (191 commits) mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page() mm,hwpoison: send SIGBUS with error virutal address mm/page_alloc: split pcp->high across all online CPUs for cpuless nodes mm/page_alloc: allow high-order pages to be stored on the per-cpu lists mm: replace CONFIG_FLAT_NODE_MEM_MAP with CONFIG_FLATMEM mm: replace CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES with CONFIG_NUMA docs: remove description of DISCONTIGMEM arch, mm: remove stale mentions of DISCONIGMEM mm: remove CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM m68k: remove support for DISCONTIGMEM arc: remove support for DISCONTIGMEM arc: update comment about HIGHMEM implementation alpha: remove DISCONTIGMEM and NUMA mm/page_alloc: move free_the_page mm/page_alloc: fix counting of managed_pages mm/page_alloc: improve memmap_pages dbg msg mm: drop SECTION_SHIFT in code comments mm/page_alloc: introduce vm.percpu_pagelist_high_fraction mm/page_alloc: limit the number of pages on PCP lists when reclaim is active mm/page_alloc: scale the number of pages that are batch freed ...
2021-06-29kasan: allow architectures to provide an outline readiness checkDaniel Axtens1-0/+3
Allow architectures to define a kasan_arch_is_ready() hook that bails out of any function that's about to touch the shadow unless the arch says that it is ready for the memory to be accessed. This is fairly uninvasive and should have a negligible performance penalty. This will only work in outline mode, so an arch must specify ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE if it requires this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-3-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29mm/slub, kunit: add a KUnit test for SLUB debugging functionalityOliver Glitta1-0/+3
SLUB has resiliency_test() function which is hidden behind #ifdef SLUB_RESILIENCY_TEST that is not part of Kconfig, so nobody runs it. KUnit should be a proper replacement for it. Try changing byte in redzone after allocation and changing pointer to next free node, first byte, 50th byte and redzone byte. Check if validation finds errors. There are several differences from the original resiliency test: Tests create own caches with known state instead of corrupting shared kmalloc caches. The corruption of freepointer uses correct offset, the original resiliency test got broken with freepointer changes. Scratch changing random byte test, because it does not have meaning in this form where we need deterministic results. Add new option CONFIG_SLUB_KUNIT_TEST in Kconfig. Tests next_pointer, first_word and clobber_50th_byte do not run with KASAN option on. Because the test deliberately modifies non-allocated objects. Use kunit_resource to count errors in cache and silence bug reports. Count error whenever slab_bug() or slab_fix() is called or when the count of pages is wrong. [glittao@gmail.com: remove unused function test_exit(), from SLUB KUnit test] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210512140656.12083-1-glittao@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export kasan_enable/disable_current to modules] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511150734.3492-2-glittao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-04kasan: use separate (un)poison implementation for integrated initPeter Collingbourne1-2/+2
Currently with integrated init page_alloc.c needs to know whether kasan_alloc_pages() will zero initialize memory, but this will start becoming more complicated once we start adding tag initialization support for user pages. To avoid page_alloc.c needing to know more details of what integrated init will do, move the unpoisoning logic for integrated init into the HW tags implementation. Currently the logic is identical but it will diverge in subsequent patches. For symmetry do the same for poisoning although this logic will be unaffected by subsequent patches. Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I2c550234c6c4a893c48c18ff0c6ce658c7c67056 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210602235230.3928842-3-pcc@google.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2021-04-30kasan, mm: integrate slab init_on_free with HW_TAGSAndrey Konovalov1-6/+7
This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for slab memory when init_on_free is enabled. With this change, memory initialization memset() is no longer called when both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_free are enabled. Instead, memory is initialized in KASAN runtime. For SLUB, the memory initialization memset() is moved into slab_free_hook() that currently directly follows the initialization loop. A new argument is added to slab_free_hook() that indicates whether to initialize the memory or not. To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be caused by future changes, both KASAN hook and initialization memset() are put together and a warning comment is added. Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_free is enabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/190fd15c1886654afdec0d19ebebd5ade665b601.1615296150.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30kasan, mm: integrate slab init_on_alloc with HW_TAGSAndrey Konovalov1-2/+2
This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for slab memory when init_on_alloc is enabled. With this change, memory initialization memset() is no longer called when both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_alloc are enabled. Instead, memory is initialized in KASAN runtime. The memory initialization memset() is moved into slab_post_alloc_hook() that currently directly follows the initialization loop. A new argument is added to slab_post_alloc_hook() that indicates whether to initialize the memory or not. To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be caused by future changes, both KASAN hook and initialization memset() are put together and a warning comment is added. Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_alloc is enabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c1292aeb5d519da221ec74a0684a949b027d7720.1615296150.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30kasan, mm: integrate page_alloc init with HW_TAGSAndrey Konovalov1-4/+4
This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for page_alloc memory when init_on_alloc/free is enabled. With this change, kernel_init_free_pages() is no longer called when both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_alloc/free are enabled. Instead, memory is initialized in KASAN runtime. To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be caused by future changes, both KASAN and kernel_init_free_pages() hooks are put together and a warning comment is added. This patch changes the order in which memory initialization and page poisoning hooks are called. This doesn't lead to any side-effects, as whenever page poisoning is enabled, memory initialization gets disabled. Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_alloc/free is enabled. [andreyknvl@google.com: fix for "integrate page_alloc init with HW_TAGS"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/65b6028dea2e9a6e8e2cb779b5115c09457363fc.1617122211.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e77f0d5b1b20658ef0b8288625c74c2b3690e725.1615296150.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30kasan: init memory in kasan_(un)poison for HW_TAGSAndrey Konovalov1-14/+14
This change adds an argument to kasan_poison() and kasan_unpoison() that allows initializing memory along with setting the tags for HW_TAGS. Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization will improve HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_alloc/free is enabled. This change doesn't integrate memory initialization with KASAN, this is done is subsequent patches in this series. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3054314039fa64510947e674180d675cab1b4c41.1615296150.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-16kasan: remove redundant config optionWalter Wu1-1/+1
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1]. When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n. This patch fixes the following compilation warning: include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu] Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Fixes: d9b571c885a8 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan: inline HW_TAGS helper functionsAndrey Konovalov1-6/+7
Mark all static functions in common.c and kasan.h that are used for hardware tag-based KASAN as inline to avoid unnecessary function calls. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c94a2af0657f2b95b9337232339ff5ffa643ab5.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan: ensure poisoning size alignmentAndrey Konovalov1-3/+6
A previous changes d99f6a10c161 ("kasan: don't round_up too much") attempted to simplify the code by adding a round_up(size) call into kasan_poison(). While this allows to have less round_up() calls around the code, this results in round_up() being called multiple times. This patch removes round_up() of size from kasan_poison() and ensures that all callers round_up() the size explicitly. This patch also adds WARN_ON() alignment checks for address and size to kasan_poison() and kasan_unpoison(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3ffe8d4a246ae67a8b5e91f65bf98cd7cba9d7b9.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan, mm: optimize krealloc poisoningAndrey Konovalov1-2/+10
Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc() repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer. This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented __ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos() is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone. For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead of unpoisoning it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9bef90327c9cb109d736c40115684fd32f49e6b0.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan: unify large kfree checksAndrey Konovalov1-10/+26
Unify checks in kasan_kfree_large() and in kasan_slab_free_mempool() for large allocations as it's done for small kfree() allocations. With this change, kasan_slab_free_mempool() starts checking that the first byte of the memory that's being freed is accessible. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/14ffc4cd867e0b1ed58f7527e3b748a1b4ad08aa.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan: clean up setting free info in kasan_slab_freeAndrey Konovalov1-4/+2
Put kasan_stack_collection_enabled() check and kasan_set_free_info() calls next to each other. The way this was previously implemented was a minor optimization that relied of the the fact that kasan_stack_collection_enabled() is always true for generic KASAN. The confusion that this brings outweights saving a few instructions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f838e249be5ab5810bf54a36ef5072cfd80e2da7.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan: optimize large kmalloc poisoningAndrey Konovalov1-5/+15
Similarly to kasan_kmalloc(), kasan_kmalloc_large() doesn't need to unpoison the object as it as already unpoisoned by alloc_pages() (or by ksize() for krealloc()). This patch changes kasan_kmalloc_large() to only poison the redzone. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/33dee5aac0e550ad7f8e26f590c9b02c6129b4a3.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoningAndrey Konovalov1-31/+62
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object, which is unnecessary. This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations: kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only poisons the redzone. For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts: kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then kasan_poison() poisons the rest. This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end. With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kasan, mm: don't save alloc stacks twiceAndrey Konovalov1-4/+14
Patch series "kasan: optimizations and fixes for HW_TAGS", v4. This patchset makes the HW_TAGS mode more efficient, mostly by reworking poisoning approaches and simplifying/inlining some internal helpers. With this change, the overhead of HW_TAGS annotations excluding setting and checking memory tags is ~3%. The performance impact caused by tags will be unknown until we have hardware that supports MTE. As a side-effect, this patchset speeds up generic KASAN by ~15%. This patch (of 13): Currently KASAN saves allocation stacks in both kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc() annotations. This patch changes KASAN to save allocation stacks for slab objects from kmalloc caches in kasan_kmalloc() only, and stacks for other slab objects in kasan_slab_alloc() only. This change requires ____kasan_kmalloc() knowing whether the object belongs to a kmalloc cache. This is implemented by adding a flag field to the kasan_info structure. That flag is only set for kmalloc caches via a new kasan_cache_create_kmalloc() annotation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7c673ebca8d00f40a7ad6f04ab9a2bddeeae2097.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASANAlexander Potapenko1-0/+6
Make KFENCE compatible with KASAN. Currently this helps test KFENCE itself, where KASAN can catch potential corruptions to KFENCE state, or other corruptions that may be a result of freepointer corruptions in the main allocators. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: merge fixup] [andreyknvl@google.com: untag addresses for KFENCE] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9dc196006921b191d25d10f6e611316db7da2efc.1611946152.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103175841.3495947-7-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joern Engel <joern@purestorage.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-24kasan: fix bug detection via ksize for HW_TAGS modeAndrey Konovalov1-1/+10
The currently existing kasan_check_read/write() annotations are intended to be used for kernel modules that have KASAN compiler instrumentation disabled. Thus, they are only relevant for the software KASAN modes that rely on compiler instrumentation. However there's another use case for these annotations: ksize() checks that the object passed to it is indeed accessible before unpoisoning the whole object. This is currently done via __kasan_check_read(), which is compiled away for the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation. This leads to KASAN missing detecting some memory corruptions. Provide another annotation called kasan_check_byte() that is available for all KASAN modes. As the implementation rename and reuse kasan_check_invalid_free(). Use this new annotation in ksize(). To avoid having ksize() as the top frame in the reported stack trace pass _RET_IP_ to __kasan_check_byte(). Also add a new ksize_uaf() test that checks that a use-after-free is detected via ksize() itself, and via plain accesses that happen later. Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iaabf771881d0f9ce1b969f2a62938e99d3308ec5 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f32ad74a60b28d8402482a38476f02bb7600f620.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-24kasan: prefix global functions with kasan_Andrey Konovalov1-24/+23
Patch series "kasan: HW_TAGS tests support and fixes", v4. This patchset adds support for running KASAN-KUnit tests with the hardware tag-based mode and also contains a few fixes. This patch (of 15): There's a number of internal KASAN functions that are used across multiple source code files and therefore aren't marked as static inline. To avoid littering the kernel function names list with generic function names, prefix all such KASAN functions with kasan_. As a part of this change: - Rename internal (un)poison_range() to kasan_(un)poison() (no _range) to avoid name collision with a public kasan_unpoison_range(). - Rename check_memory_region() to kasan_check_range(), as it's a more fitting name. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I719cc93483d4ba288a634dba80ee6b7f2809cd26 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/13777aedf8d3ebbf35891136e1f2287e2f34aaba.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadataAndrey Konovalov1-0/+11
The reason cache merging is disabled with KASAN is because KASAN puts its metadata right after the allocated object. When the merged caches have slightly different sizes, the metadata ends up in different places, which KASAN doesn't support. It might be possible to adjust the metadata allocation algorithm and make it friendly to the cache merging code. Instead this change takes a simpler approach and allows merging caches when no metadata is present. Which is the case for hardware tag-based KASAN with kasan.mode=prod. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/37497e940bfd4b32c0a93a702a9ae4cf061d5392.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia114847dfb2244f297d2cb82d592bf6a07455dba Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fitAndrey Konovalov1-42/+74
KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_largeAndrey Konovalov1-1/+1
Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c8380fe0332a3bcc720fe29f1e0bef2e2974416.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I1334dffb69b87d7986fab88a1a039cc3ea764725 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag callsAndrey Konovalov1-6/+7
set_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/121eeab245f98555862b289d2ba9269c868fbbcf.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I18905ca78fb4a3d60e1a34a4ca00247272480438 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: don't round_up too muchAndrey Konovalov1-6/+2
For hardware tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from the common code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/47b232474f1f89dc072aeda0fa58daa6efade377.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib397128fac6eba874008662b4964d65352db4aa4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, mm: rename kasan_poison_kfreeAndrey Konovalov1-17/+23
Rename kasan_poison_kfree() to kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does. Also add a comment that explains the PageSlab() check. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/141675fb493555e984c5dca555e9d9f768c7bbaa.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I5026f87364e556b506ef1baee725144bb04b8810 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, mm: check kasan_enabled in annotationsAndrey Konovalov1-28/+28
Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f90e3c0aa840dbb4833367c2335193299f69023.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I2589451d3c96c97abbcbf714baabe6161c6f153e Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parametersAndrey Konovalov1-5/+17
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modesAndrey Konovalov1-3/+3
Using kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code, this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function. Also remove the now unneeded reset_tag() internal KASAN macro and use kasan_reset_tag() instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6940383a3a9dfb416134d338d8fac97a9ebb8686.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I4d2061acfe91d480a75df00b07c22d8494ef14b5 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stackAndrey Konovalov1-9/+3
There's no need for __kasan_unpoison_stack() helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes unneeded arithmetic. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93e78948704a42ea92f6248ff8a725613d721161.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ie5ba549d445292fe629b4a96735e4034957bcc50 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACKAndrey Konovalov1-0/+2
There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables. There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled. Note, that CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is an option that is currently always defined when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled, and therefore has to be tested with #if instead of #ifdef. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d09dd3f8abb388da397fd11598c5edeaa83fe559.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If8a891e9fe01ea543e00b576852685afec0887e3 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: introduce set_alloc_infoAndrey Konovalov1-1/+6
Add set_alloc_info() helper and move kasan_set_track() into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2393e8f1e311a70fc3aaa2196461b6acdee7d21.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I0316193cbb4ecc9b87b7c2eee0dd79f8ec908c1a Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: rename get_alloc/free_infoAndrey Konovalov1-8/+8
Rename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion with kasan_set_free_info(). No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/27b7c036b754af15a2839e945f6d8bfce32b4c2f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib6e4ba61c8b12112b403d3479a9799ac8fff8de1 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: simplify quarantine_put call siteAndrey Konovalov1-1/+1
Patch series "kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode", v4. === Overview Hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This patchset adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features, as well as provides some initial optimizations for running KASAN in production. There's another planned patchset what will further optimize hardware tag-based KASAN, provide proper benchmarking and tests, and will fully enable tag-based KASAN for production use. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters. kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable stacks collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative. === Benchmarks For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. There's an upcoming patchset which will optimize KASAN further and include more detailed benchmarking results. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and is therefore irrelevant). KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n. kasan.mode=prod (manually excluding tagging) introduces 3% of performance and no memory impact (except memory used by hardware to store tags) compared to kasan.mode=off. kasan.mode=full has about 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection. === Notes This patchset is available here: https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-boot-mte-v4 This patchset is based on v11 of "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64" patchset [1]. For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires: 1. QEMU built from master [6] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run). 2. GCC version 10. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com/T/#t [2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety [3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf [4] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Security%20analysis%20of%20memory%20tagging.pdf [5] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [6] https://github.com/qemu/qemu === Tags Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> This patch (of 19): Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/312d0a3ef92cc6dc4fa5452cbc1714f9393ca239.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iab0f04e7ebf8d83247024b7190c67c3c34c7940f Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtimeAndrey Konovalov1-8/+7
Provide implementation of KASAN functions required for the hardware tag-based mode. Those include core functions for memory and pointer tagging (tags_hw.c) and bug reporting (report_tags_hw.c). Also adapt common KASAN code to support the new mode. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfd0fbede579a6b66755c98c88c108e54f9c56bf.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth for software modesAndrey Konovalov1-0/+2
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't use kasan_depth. Only define and use it when one of the software KASAN modes are enabled. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e16f15aeda90bc7fb4dfc2e243a14b74cc5c8219.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: hide invalid free check implementationAndrey Konovalov1-18/+1
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. For software KASAN modes the check is based on the value in the shadow memory. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow, so hide the implementation of the check in check_invalid_free(). Also simplify the code for software tag-based mode. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d01534a4b977f97d87515dc590e6348e1406de81.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: split out shadow.c from common.cAndrey Konovalov1-485/+1
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Move all shadow-related code to shadow.c, which is only enabled for software KASAN modes that use shadow memory. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/17d95cfa7d5cf9c4fcd9bf415f2a8dea911668df.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*Andrey Konovalov1-19/+20
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry: 8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for hardware tag-based mode. Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK. Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939b5754e47f528a6e6a6f28ffc5815d8d128033.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_rangeAndrey Konovalov1-22/+27
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Rename external annotation kasan_unpoison_shadow() to kasan_unpoison_range(), and introduce internal functions (un)poison_range() (without kasan_ prefix). Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fccdcaa13dc6b2211bf363d6c6d499279a54fe3a.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: group vmalloc codeAndrey Konovalov1-38/+40
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. Group all vmalloc-related function declarations in include/linux/kasan.h, and their implementations in mm/kasan/common.c. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/80a6fdd29b039962843bd6cf22ce2643a7c8904e.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headersAndrey Konovalov1-5/+0
Patch series "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64", v11. This patchset adds a new hardware tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. The new mode is similar to the existing software tag-based KASAN, but relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging (instead of shadow memory and compiler instrumentation). This patchset is co-developed and tested by Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>. This patchset is available here: https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-mte-v11 For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires: 1. QEMU built from master [4] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run). 2. GCC version 10. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety [3] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux for-next/mte [4] https://github.com/qemu/qemu ====== Overview The underlying ideas of the approach used by hardware tag-based KASAN are: 1. By relying on the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, pointer tags are stored in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. With the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) arm64 CPU feature, memory tags for kernel memory allocations are stored in a dedicated memory not accessible via normal instuctions. 3. On each memory allocation, a random tag is generated, embedded it into the returned pointer, and the corresponding memory is tagged with the same tag value. 4. With MTE the CPU performs a check on each memory access to make sure that the pointer tag matches the memory tag. 5. On a tag mismatch the CPU generates a tag fault, and a KASAN report is printed. Same as other KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN is intended as a debugging feature at this point. ====== Rationale There are two main reasons for this new hardware tag-based mode: 1. Previously implemented software tag-based KASAN is being successfully used on dogfood testing devices due to its low memory overhead (as initially planned). The new hardware mode keeps the same low memory overhead, and is expected to have significantly lower performance impact, due to the tag checks being performed by the hardware. Therefore the new mode can be used as a better alternative in dogfood testing for hardware that supports MTE. 2. The new mode lays the groundwork for the planned in-kernel MTE-based memory corruption mitigation to be used in production. ====== Technical details Considering the implementation perspective, hardware tag-based KASAN is almost identical to the software mode. The key difference is using MTE for assigning and checking tags. Compared to the software mode, the hardware mode uses 4 bits per tag, as dictated by MTE. Pointer tags are stored in bits [56:60), the top 4 bits have the normal value 0xF. Having less distict tags increases the probablity of false negatives (from ~1/256 to ~1/16) in certain cases. Only synchronous exceptions are set up and used by hardware tag-based KASAN. ====== Benchmarks Note: all measurements have been performed with software emulation of Memory Tagging Extension, performance numbers for hardware tag-based KASAN on the actual hardware are expected to be better. Boot time [1]: * 2.8 sec for clean kernel * 5.7 sec for hardware tag-based KASAN * 11.8 sec for software tag-based KASAN * 11.6 sec for generic KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [2]: * 7.0 kb for clean kernel * 9.7 kb for hardware tag-based KASAN * 9.7 kb for software tag-based KASAN * 41.3 kb for generic KASAN Measurements have been performed with: * defconfig-based configs * Manually built QEMU master * QEMU arguments: -machine virt,mte=on -cpu max * CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE disabled * CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled * clang-10 as the compiler and gcc-10 as the assembler [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Notes The cover letter for software tag-based KASAN patchset can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0116523cfffa62aeb5aa3b85ce7419f3dae0c1b8 ===== Tags Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> This patch (of 41): Don't mention "GNU General Public License version 2" text explicitly, as it's already covered by the SPDX-License-Identifier. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6ea9f5f4aa9dbbffa0d0c0a780b37699a4531034.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07kasan: remove kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()Vincenzo Frascino1-15/+0
kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to() is defined in kasan code but never used. The function was introduced as part of the commit: commit 9f7d416c36124667 ("kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN") ... where it was necessary because x86's jprobe_return() would leave stale shadow on the stack, and was an oddity in that regard. Since then, jprobes were removed entirely, and as of commit: commit 80006dbee674f9fa ("kprobes/x86: Remove jprobe implementation") ... there have been no callers of this function. Remove the declaration and the implementation. Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200706143505.23299-1-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>