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Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel. It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1]. And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported. There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.
This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC <
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow. It probably adds
performance penalty too.
Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.
While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting. This is also fixed now.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Building an arm64 allmodconfig kernel with clang results in over 140
warnings about overly large stack frames, the worst ones being:
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sitronix-st7789v.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 20224 bytes in function 'st7789v_prepare'
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/displays/panel-tpo-td028ttec1.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 13120 bytes in function 'td028ttec1_panel_enable'
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c:1395:1: error: stack frame size of 10048 bytes in function 'max3421_spi_thread'
drivers/net/wan/slic_ds26522.c:209:12: error: stack frame size of 9664 bytes in function 'slic_ds26522_probe'
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c:2434:5: error: stack frame size of 8832 bytes in function 'ccp_run_cmd'
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0367.c:1005:12: error: stack frame size of 7840 bytes in function 'stv0367ter_algo'
None of these happen with gcc today, and almost all of these are the
result of a single known issue in llvm. Hopefully it will eventually
get fixed with the clang-9 release.
In the meantime, the best idea I have is to turn off asan-stack for
clang-8 and earlier, so we can produce a kernel that is safe to run.
I have posted three patches that address the frame overflow warnings
that are not addressed by turning off asan-stack, so in combination with
this change, we get much closer to a clean allmodconfig build, which in
turn is necessary to do meaningful build regression testing.
It is still possible to turn on the CONFIG_ASAN_STACK option on all
versions of clang, and it's always enabled for gcc, but when
CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set, the option remains invisible, so
allmodconfig and randconfig builds (which are normally done with a
forced CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST) will still result in a mostly clean build.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190222222950.3997333-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This commit splits the current CONFIG_KASAN config option into two:
1. CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, that enables the generic KASAN mode (the one
that exists now);
2. CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, that enables the software tag-based KASAN mode.
The name CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is chosen as in the future we will have
another hardware tag-based KASAN mode, that will rely on hardware memory
tagging support in arm64.
With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS enabled, compiler options are changed to
instrument kernel files with -fsantize=kernel-hwaddress (except the ones
for which KASAN_SANITIZE := n is set).
Both CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS support both
CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE instrumentation modes.
This commit also adds empty placeholder (for now) implementation of
tag-based KASAN specific hooks inserted by the compiler and adjusts
common hooks implementation.
While this commit adds the CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS config option, this option
is not selectable, as it depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS, which we will
enable once all the infrastracture code has been added.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2550106eb8a68b10fefbabce820910b115aa853.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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By default 3-level paging is used when the kernel is compiled with
kasan support. Add 4-level paging option to support systems with more
then 3TB of physical memory and to cover 4-level paging specific code
with kasan as well.
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
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Building with KASAN and SLUB but without sysfs now results in a
build-time error:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for SLUB_DEBUG
Depends on [n]: SLUB [=y] && SYSFS [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- KASAN [=y] && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN [=y] && (SLUB [=y] || SLAB [=n] && !DEBUG_SLAB [=n]) && SLUB [=y]
mm/slub.c:4565:12: error: 'list_locations' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static int list_locations(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/slub.c:4406:13: error: 'validate_slab_cache' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static long validate_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
This disallows that broken configuration in Kconfig.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180709154019.1693026-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: dd275caf4a0d ("kasan: depend on CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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KASAN depends on having access to some of the accounting that SLUB_DEBUG
does; without it, there are immediate crashes [1]. So, the natural
thing to do is to make KASAN select SLUB_DEBUG.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHmME9rtoPwxUSnktxzKso14iuVCWT7BE_-_8PAC=pGw1iJnQg@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622154623.25388-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Fixes: f9e13c0a5a33 ("slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default
-fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can
easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g.
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out
into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack
frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An
earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with
KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1.
All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y
and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can
bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of
warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in
allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it
is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA
to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around
50 warnings on gcc-7.
I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another
follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures
to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN).
With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address
the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a
"noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation.
That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for
older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as
before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme
cases.
This reverts parts of commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable
-Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next
should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig
build:
3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN")
16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN")
Do we really need to backport this?
I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to
unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built
with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a
backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8. Most people are probably still on
older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their
distros.
The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code
that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not
cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was
added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug:
disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned
off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this
fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0.
I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames
larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that
all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are
already there).
Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was
originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that
turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now
worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from
v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at
least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed
upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should
be.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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For KASAN builds:
- switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
- change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
into the quarantine.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot
will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
structures in the allocated memory chunks.
IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once
KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add KASAN hooks to SLAB allocator.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It's recommended to have slub's user tracking enabled with CONFIG_KASAN,
because:
a) User tracking disables slab merging which improves
detecting out-of-bounds accesses.
b) User tracking metadata acts as redzone which also improves
detecting out-of-bounds accesses.
c) User tracking provides additional information about object.
This information helps to understand bugs.
Currently it is not enabled by default. Besides recompiling the kernel
with KASAN and reinstalling it, user also have to change the boot cmdline,
which is not very handy.
Enable slub user tracking by default with KASAN=y, since there is no good
reason to not do this.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: little fixes, per David]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is purely arch specific setting,
so it should be in arch's Kconfig file.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1435828178-10975-7-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The documentation shows a need for gcc > 4.9.2, but it's really >=. The
Kconfig entries don't show require versions so add them. Correct a
latter/later typo too. Also mention that gcc 5 required to catch out of
bounds accesses to global and stack variables.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables.
This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules.
Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g.
__init, __read_mostly, ...)
The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by
redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals()
function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with
redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison
variable's redzone.
This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned
address making shadow memory handling (
kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment
guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond
to only one module_alloc() allocation.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is a test module doing various nasty things like out of bounds
accesses, use after free. It is useful for testing kernel debugging
features like kernel address sanitizer.
It mostly concentrates on testing of slab allocator, but we might want to
add more different stuff here in future (like stack/global variables out
of bounds accesses and so on).
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).
We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.
Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer.
16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory. It's located in range
[ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup
stacks.
At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page. Latter, after
pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from
corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real
shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function.
Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized. __pa with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr)
__phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow
area initialized.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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