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2019-05-24treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner1-5/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-03-28kallsyms: store type information in its own arrayEugene Loh1-1/+1
When a module is loaded, its symbols' Elf_Sym information is stored in a symtab. Further, type information is also captured. Since Elf_Sym has no type field, historically the st_info field has been hijacked for storing type: st_info was overwritten. commit 5439c985c5a83a8419f762115afdf560ab72a452 ("module: Overwrite st_size instead of st_info") changes that practice, as its one-liner indicates. Unfortunately, this change overwrites symbol size, information that a tool like DTrace expects to find. Allocate a typetab array to store type information so that no Elf_Sym field needs to be overwritten. Fixes: 5439c985c5a8 ("module: Overwrite st_size instead of st_info") Signed-off-by: Eugene Loh <eugene.loh@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Alcock <nick.alcock@oracle.com> [jeyu: renamed typeoff -> typeoffs ] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
2018-07-02modsign: log module name in the event of an errorJessica Yu1-1/+24
Now that we have the load_info struct all initialized (including info->name, which contains the name of the module) before module_sig_check(), make the load_info struct and hence module name available to mod_verify_sig() so that we can log the module name in the event of an error. Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
2013-09-25KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signingDavid Howells1-2/+0
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-19MODSIGN: Move the magic string to the end of a module and eliminate the searchDavid Howells1-2/+1
Emit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the signature data instead of before it. This allows module_sig_check() to be made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the magic string. Instead we just need to do a single memcmp(). This works because at the end of the signature data there is the fixed-length signature information block. This block then falls immediately prior to the magic number. From the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate the size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-10MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernelDavid Howells1-0/+2
Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public keys found in the PGP keyring. These can be seen by root: [root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys 07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd [] 15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 ... It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-10module: signature checking hookRusty Russell1-0/+13
We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module (which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with unsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key. If module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is loaded that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't have the key. (Useful feedback and tweaks by David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>) Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>