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2011-05-24Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris1-0/+100
2011-05-17kmod: always provide usermodehelper_disable()Kay Sievers1-7/+0
We need to prevent kernel-forked processes during system poweroff. Such processes try to access the filesystem whose disks we are trying to shutdown at the same time. This causes delays and exceptions in the storage drivers. A follow-up patch will add these calls and need usermodehelper_disable() also on systems without suspend support. Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
2011-05-17PM: Print a warning if firmware is requested when tasks are frozenRafael J. Wysocki1-0/+9
Some drivers erroneously use request_firmware() from their ->resume() (or ->thaw(), or ->restore()) callbacks, which is not going to work unless the firmware has been built in. This causes system resume to stall until the firmware-loading timeout expires, which makes users think that the resume has failed and reboot their machines unnecessarily. For this reason, make _request_firmware() print a warning and return immediately with error code if it has been called when tasks are frozen and it's impossible to start any new usermode helpers. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
2011-04-04capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpersEric Paris1-0/+100
There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with cap_net_admin was able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't have cap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers. /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritable You must have CAP_SYS_MODULE and CAP_SETPCAP to change these (changes are &= ONLY). When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI. -v2: make globals static create spinlock to protect globals -v3: require both CAP_SETPCAP and CAP_SYS_MODULE -v4: fix the typo s/CAP_SET_PCAP/CAP_SETPCAP/ because I didn't commit Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> No-objection-from: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-17Make do_execve() take a const filename pointerDavid Howells1-1/+3
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles correctly on ARM: arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel(). do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as const should be fine. Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match. This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27call_usermodehelper: UMH_WAIT_EXEC ignores kernel_thread() failureOleg Nesterov1-2/+2
UMH_WAIT_EXEC should report the error if kernel_thread() fails, like UMH_WAIT_PROC does. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27call_usermodehelper: simplify/fix UMH_NO_WAIT caseOleg Nesterov1-6/+4
__call_usermodehelper(UMH_NO_WAIT) has 2 problems: - if kernel_thread() fails, call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() is not called. - for unknown reason UMH_NO_WAIT has UMH_WAIT_PROC logic, we spawn yet another thread which waits until the user mode application exits. Change the UMH_NO_WAIT code to use ____call_usermodehelper() instead of wait_for_helper(), and do call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() unconditionally. We can rely on CLONE_VFORK, do_fork(CLONE_VFORK) until the child exits or execs. With or without this patch UMH_NO_WAIT does not report the error if kernel_thread() fails, this is correct since the caller doesn't wait for result. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27wait_for_helper: SIGCHLD from user-space can lead to use-after-freeOleg Nesterov1-5/+5
1. wait_for_helper() calls allow_signal(SIGCHLD) to ensure the child can't autoreap itself. However, this means that a spurious SIGCHILD from user-space can set TIF_SIGPENDING and: - kernel_thread() or sys_wait4() can fail due to signal_pending() - worse, wait4() can fail before ____call_usermodehelper() execs or exits. In this case the caller may kfree(subprocess_info) while the child still uses this memory. Change the code to use SIG_DFL instead of magic "(void __user *)2" set by allow_signal(). This means that SIGCHLD won't be delivered, yet the child won't autoreap itsefl. The problem is minor, only root can send a signal to this kthread. 2. If sys_wait4(&ret) fails it doesn't populate "ret", in this case wait_for_helper() reports a random value from uninitialized var. With this patch sys_wait4() should never fail, but still it makes sense to initialize ret = -ECHILD so that the caller can notice the problem. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27call_usermodehelper: no need to unblock signalsOleg Nesterov1-3/+0
____call_usermodehelper() correctly calls flush_signal_handlers() to set SIG_DFL, but sigemptyset(->blocked) and recalc_sigpending() are not needed. This kthread was forked by workqueue thread, all signals must be unblocked and ignored, no pending signal is possible. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27umh: creds: kill subprocess_info->cred logicOleg Nesterov1-19/+0
Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member and related code. ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its parent kthread, keventd. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27umh: creds: convert call_usermodehelper_keys() to use subprocess_info->init()Oleg Nesterov1-18/+0
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing kernel thread. Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup() are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred() which does key_get() on success. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27exec: replace call_usermodehelper_pipe with use of umh init function and ↵Neil Horman1-82/+0
resolve limit The first patch in this series introduced an init function to the call_usermodehelper api so that processes could be customized by caller. This patch takes advantage of that fact, by customizing the helper in do_coredump to create the pipe and set its core limit to one (for our recusrsion check). This lets us clean up the previous uglyness in the usermodehelper internals and factor call_usermodehelper out entirely. While I'm at it, we can also modify the helper setup to look for a core limit value of 1 rather than zero for our recursion check Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27kmod: add init function to usermodehelperNeil Horman1-22/+29
About 6 months ago, I made a set of changes to how the core-dump-to-a-pipe feature in the kernel works. We had reports of several races, including some reports of apps bypassing our recursion check so that a process that was forked as part of a core_pattern setup could infinitely crash and refork until the system crashed. We fixed those by improving our recursion checks. The new check basically refuses to fork a process if its core limit is zero, which works well. Unfortunately, I've been getting grief from maintainer of user space programs that are inserted as the forked process of core_pattern. They contend that in order for their programs (such as abrt and apport) to work, all the running processes in a system must have their core limits set to a non-zero value, to which I say 'yes'. I did this by design, and think thats the right way to do things. But I've been asked to ease this burden on user space enough times that I thought I would take a look at it. The first suggestion was to make the recursion check fail on a non-zero 'special' number, like one. That way the core collector process could set its core size ulimit to 1, and enable the kernel's recursion detection. This isn't a bad idea on the surface, but I don't like it since its opt-in, in that if a program like abrt or apport has a bug and fails to set such a core limit, we're left with a recursively crashing system again. So I've come up with this. What I've done is modify the call_usermodehelper api such that an extra parameter is added, a function pointer which will be called by the user helper task, after it forks, but before it exec's the required process. This will give the caller the opportunity to get a call back in the processes context, allowing it to do whatever it needs to to the process in the kernel prior to exec-ing the user space code. In the case of do_coredump, this callback is ues to set the core ulimit of the helper process to 1. This elimnates the opt-in problem that I had above, as it allows the ulimit for core sizes to be set to the value of 1, which is what the recursion check looks for in do_coredump. This patch: Create new function call_usermodehelper_fns() and allow it to assign both an init and cleanup function, as we'll as arbitrary data. The init function is called from the context of the forked process and allows for customization of the helper process prior to calling exec. Its return code gates the continuation of the process, or causes its exit. Also add an arbitrary data pointer to the subprocess_info struct allowing for data to be passed from the caller to the new process, and the subsequent cleanup process Also, use this patch to cleanup the cleanup function. It currently takes an argp and envp pointer for freeing, which is ugly. Lets instead just make the subprocess_info structure public, and pass that to the cleanup and init routines Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-01-11kmod: fix resource leak in call_usermodehelper_pipe()Masami Hiramatsu1-5/+7
Fix resource (write-pipe file) leak in call_usermodehelper_pipe(). When call_usermodehelper_exec() fails, write-pipe file is opened and call_usermodehelper_pipe() just returns an error. Since it is hard for caller to determine whether the error occured when opening the pipe or executing the helper, the caller cannot close the pipe by themselves. I've found this resoruce leak when testing coredump. You can check how the resource leaks as below; $ echo "|nocommand" > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern $ ulimit -c unlimited $ while [ 1 ]; do ./segv; done &> /dev/null & $ cat /proc/meminfo (<- repeat it) where segv.c is; //----- int main () { char *p = 0; *p = 1; } //----- This patch closes write-pipe file if call_usermodehelper_exec() failed. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-11-10security: report the module name to security_module_requestEric Paris1-4/+4
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-11Merge branch 'tracing-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'tracing-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (105 commits) ring-buffer: only enable ring_buffer_swap_cpu when needed ring-buffer: check for swapped buffers in start of committing tracing: report error in trace if we fail to swap latency buffer tracing: add trace_array_printk for internal tracers to use tracing: pass around ring buffer instead of tracer tracing: make tracing_reset safe for external use tracing: use timestamp to determine start of latency traces tracing: Remove mentioning of legacy latency_trace file from documentation tracing/filters: Defer pred allocation, fix memory leak tracing: remove users of tracing_reset tracing: disable buffers and synchronize_sched before resetting tracing: disable update max tracer while reading trace tracing: print out start and stop in latency traces ring-buffer: disable all cpu buffers when one finds a problem ring-buffer: do not count discarded events ring-buffer: remove ring_buffer_event_discard ring-buffer: fix ring_buffer_read crossing pages ring-buffer: remove unnecessary cpu_relax ring-buffer: do not swap buffers during a commit ring-buffer: do not reset while in a commit ...
2009-09-02CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]David Howells1-0/+1
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes all references, not just those from task_structs). Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid. This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the credential struct has been previously released): http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17tracing/events: Add module tracepointsLi Zefan1-0/+4
Add trace points to trace module_load, module_free, module_get, module_put and module_request, and use trace_event facility to get the trace output. Here's the sample output: TASK-PID CPU# TIMESTAMP FUNCTION | | | | | <...>-42 [000] 1.758380: module_request: fb0 wait=1 call_site=fb_open ... <...>-60 [000] 3.269403: module_load: scsi_wait_scan <...>-60 [000] 3.269432: module_put: scsi_wait_scan call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=0 <...>-61 [001] 3.273168: module_free: scsi_wait_scan ... <...>-1021 [000] 13.836081: module_load: sunrpc <...>-1021 [000] 13.840589: module_put: sunrpc call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=-1 <...>-1027 [000] 13.848098: module_get: sunrpc call_site=try_module_get refcnt=0 <...>-1027 [000] 13.848308: module_get: sunrpc call_site=get_filesystem refcnt=1 <...>-1027 [000] 13.848692: module_put: sunrpc call_site=put_filesystem refcnt=0 ... modprobe-2587 [001] 1088.437213: module_load: trace_events_sample F modprobe-2587 [001] 1088.437786: module_put: trace_events_sample call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=0 Note: - the taints flag can be 'F', 'C' and/or 'P' if mod->taints != 0 - the module refcnt is percpu, so it can be negative in a specific cpu Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> LKML-Reference: <4A891B3C.5030608@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-14security: introducing security_request_moduleEric Paris1-0/+4
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-08headers: mnt_namespace.h reduxAlexey Dobriyan1-1/+0
Fix various silly problems wrt mnt_namespace.h: - exit_mnt_ns() isn't used, remove it - done that, sched.h and nsproxy.h inclusions aren't needed - mount.h inclusion was need for vfsmount_lock, but no longer - remove mnt_namespace.h inclusion from files which don't use anything from mnt_namespace.h Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-05-26kmod: Release sub_info on cred allocation failure.Tetsuo Handa1-1/+3
call_usermodehelper_setup() forgot to kfree(sub_info) when prepare_usermodehelper_creds() failed. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31module: create a request_module_nowait()Arjan van de Ven1-4/+6
There seems to be a common pattern in the kernel where drivers want to call request_module() from inside a module_init() function. Currently this would deadlock. As a result, several drivers go through hoops like scheduling things via kevent, or creating custom work queues (because kevent can deadlock on them). This patch changes this to use a request_module_nowait() function macro instead, which just fires the modprobe off but doesn't wait for it, and thus avoids the original deadlock entirely. On my laptop this already results in one less kernel thread running.. (Includes Jiri's patch to use enum umh_wait) Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (bool-ified) Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
2009-03-30cpumask: remove dangerous CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR, &CPU_MASK_ALLRusty Russell1-1/+1
Impact: cleanup (Thanks to Al Viro for reminding me of this, via Ingo) CPU_MASK_ALL is the (deprecated) "all bits set" cpumask, defined as so: #define CPU_MASK_ALL (cpumask_t) { { ... } } Taking the address of such a temporary is questionable at best, unfortunately 321a8e9d (cpumask: add CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR macro) added CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR: #define CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR (&CPU_MASK_ALL) Which formalizes this practice. One day gcc could bite us over this usage (though we seem to have gotten away with it so far). So replace everywhere which used &CPU_MASK_ALL or CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR with the modern "cpu_all_mask" (a real const struct cpumask *). Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
2009-01-06kmod: fix varargs kernel-docRandy Dunlap1-2/+2
Fix varargs kernel-doc format in kmod.c: Use @... instead of @varargs. Warning(kernel/kmod.c:67): Excess function parameter or struct member 'varargs' description in 'request_module' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-14CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells1-7/+23
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argumentDavid Howells1-1/+1
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-16Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linusLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus: module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif remove CONFIG_KMOD from fs remove CONFIG_KMOD from drivers Manually fix conflict due to include cleanups in drivers/md/md.c
2008-10-16pm: rework disabling of user mode helpers during suspend/hibernationRafael J. Wysocki1-37/+28
We currently use a PM notifier to disable user mode helpers before suspend and hibernation and to re-enable them during resume. However, this is not an ideal solution, because if any drivers want to upload firmware into memory before suspend, they have to use a PM notifier for this purpose and there is no guarantee that the ordering of PM notifiers will be as expected (ie. the notifier that disables user mode helpers has to be run after the driver's notifier used for uploading the firmware). For this reason, it seems better to move the disabling and enabling of user mode helpers to separate functions that will be called by the PM core as necessary. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded ifdefs] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-17module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endifRusty Russell1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2008-07-25call_usermodehelper(): increase reliabilityKOSAKI Motohiro1-4/+5
Presently call_usermodehelper_setup() uses GFP_ATOMIC. but it can return NULL _very_ easily. GFP_ATOMIC is needed only when we can't sleep. and, GFP_KERNEL is robust and better. thus, I add gfp_mask argument to call_usermodehelper_setup(). So, its callers pass the gfp_t as below: call_usermodehelper() and call_usermodehelper_keys(): depend on 'wait' argument. call_usermodehelper_pipe(): always GFP_KERNEL because always run under process context. orderly_poweroff(): pass to GFP_ATOMIC because may run under interrupt context. Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "Paul Menage" <menage@google.com> Reviewed-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24flag parameters: NONBLOCK in pipeUlrich Drepper1-2/+2
This patch adds O_NONBLOCK support to pipe2. It is minimally more involved than the patches for eventfd et.al but still trivial. The interfaces of the create_write_pipe and create_read_pipe helper functions were changed and the one other caller as well. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_pipe2 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_pipe2 293 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_pipe2 331 # else # error "need __NR_pipe2" # endif #endif int main (void) { int fds[2]; if (syscall (__NR_pipe2, fds, 0) == -1) { puts ("pipe2(0) failed"); return 1; } for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { int fl = fcntl (fds[i], F_GETFL); if (fl == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (fl & O_NONBLOCK) { printf ("pipe2(0) set non-blocking mode for fds[%d]\n", i); return 1; } close (fds[i]); } if (syscall (__NR_pipe2, fds, O_NONBLOCK) == -1) { puts ("pipe2(O_NONBLOCK) failed"); return 1; } for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { int fl = fcntl (fds[i], F_GETFL); if (fl == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((fl & O_NONBLOCK) == 0) { printf ("pipe2(O_NONBLOCK) does not set non-blocking mode for fds[%d]\n", i); return 1; } close (fds[i]); } puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-22remove CONFIG_KMOD from core kernel codeJohannes Berg1-1/+1
Always compile request_module when the kernel allows modules. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2008-05-01[PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro1-0/+1
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19generic: use new set_cpus_allowed_ptr functionMike Travis1-1/+1
* Use new set_cpus_allowed_ptr() function added by previous patch, which instead of passing the "newly allowed cpus" cpumask_t arg by value, pass it by pointer: -int set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, cpumask_t new_mask) +int set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p, const cpumask_t *new_mask) * Modify CPU_MASK_ALL Depends on: [sched-devel]: sched: add new set_cpus_allowed_ptr function Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-02-14Dont touch fs_struct in usermodehelperJan Blunck1-4/+1
This test seems to be unnecessary since we always have rootfs mounted before calling a usermodehelper. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-01-17Fix unbalanced helper_lock in kernel/kmod.cNigel Cunningham1-7/+6
call_usermodehelper_exec() has an exit path that can leave the helper_lock() call at the top of the routine unbalanced. The attached patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@tuxonice.net> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-09-11Restore call_usermodehelper_pipe() behaviourMichael Ellerman1-1/+1
The semantics of call_usermodehelper_pipe() used to be that it would fork the helper, and wait for the kernel thread to be started. This was implemented by setting sub_info.wait to 0 (implicitly), and doing a wait_for_completion(). As part of the cleanup done in 0ab4dc92278a0f3816e486d6350c6652a72e06c8, call_usermodehelper_pipe() was changed to pass 1 as the value for wait to call_usermodehelper_exec(). This is equivalent to setting sub_info.wait to 1, which is a change from the previous behaviour. Using 1 instead of 0 causes __call_usermodehelper() to start the kernel thread running wait_for_helper(), rather than directly calling ____call_usermodehelper(). The end result is that the calling kernel code blocks until the user mode helper finishes. As the helper is expecting input on stdin, and now no one is writing anything, everything locks up (observed in do_coredump). The fix is to change the 1 to UMH_WAIT_EXEC (aka 0), indicating that we want to wait for the kernel thread to be started, but not for the helper to finish. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-26kernel-doc fix for kmod.cRandy Dunlap1-4/+4
Fix kmod.c: Warning(linux-2.6.23-rc1//kernel/kmod.c:364): No description found for parameter 'envp' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19PM: prevent frozen user mode helpers from failing the freezing of tasksRafael J. Wysocki1-10/+68
At present, if a user mode helper is running while usermodehelper_pm_callback() is executed, the helper may be frozen and the completion in call_usermodehelper_exec() won't be completed until user space processes are thawed. As a result, the freezing of kernel threads may fail, which is not desirable. Prevent this from happening by introducing a counter of running user mode helpers and allowing usermodehelper_pm_callback() to succeed for action = PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE or action = PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE only if there are no helpers running. [Namely, usermodehelper_pm_callback() waits for at most RUNNING_HELPERS_TIMEOUT for the number of running helpers to become zero and fails if that doesn't happen.] Special thanks to Uli Luckas <u.luckas@road.de>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> and Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> for reviewing the previous versions of this patch and for very useful comments. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Acked-by: Uli Luckas <u.luckas@road.de> Acked-by: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19PM: disable usermode helper before hibernation and suspendRafael J. Wysocki1-1/+30
Use a hibernation and suspend notifier to disable the user mode helper before a hibernation/suspend and enable it after the operation. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-18usermodehelper: Tidy up waitingJeremy Fitzhardinge1-11/+16
Rather than using a tri-state integer for the wait flag in call_usermodehelper_exec, define a proper enum, and use that. I've preserved the integer values so that any callers I've missed should still work OK. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com> Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@in.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2007-07-18usermodehelper: split setup from executionJeremy Fitzhardinge1-56/+135
Rather than having hundreds of variations of call_usermodehelper for various pieces of usermode state which could be set up, split the info allocation and initialization from the actual process execution. This means the general pattern becomes: info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp); /* basic state */ call_usermodehelper_<SET EXTRA STATE>(info, stuff...); /* extra state */ call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait); /* run process and free info */ This patch introduces wrappers for all the existing calling styles for call_usermodehelper_*, but folds their implementations into one. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Bj?rn Steinbrink <B.Steinbrink@gmx.de> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
2007-05-09wait_for_helper: remove unneeded do_sigaction()Oleg Nesterov1-5/+0
allow_signal(SIGCHLD) does all necessary job, no need to call do_sigaction() prior to. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09____call_usermodehelper: don't flush_signals()Oleg Nesterov1-1/+0
____call_usermodehelper() has no reason for flush_signals(). It is a fresh forked process which is going to exec a user-space application or exit on failure. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08Fix kevent's childs priority greedinessJan Engelhardt1-0/+6
Fix kevent's childs priority greediness. Such tasks were always scheduled at nice level -5 and, at that time, udev stole us the CPU time with -5. Already posted at http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/1/10/85 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment] Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@gmx.de> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not usedRandy Dunlap1-1/+0
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed. Suggested by Al Viro. Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc, sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs). Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-23Revert "Driver core: let request_module() send a /sys/modules/kmod/-uevent"Greg Kroah-Hartman1-120/+0
This reverts commit c353c3fb0700a3c17ea2b0237710a184232ccd7f. It turns out that we end up with a loop trying to load the unix module and calling netfilter to do that. Will redo the patch later to not have this loop. Acked-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-02-23make kernel/kmod.c:kmod_mk staticAdrian Bunk1-1/+1
This patch makes the needlessly global struct kmod_mk static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-02-16Driver core: let request_module() send a /sys/modules/kmod/-ueventKay Sievers1-0/+120
On recent systems, calls to /sbin/modprobe are handled by udev depending on the kind of device the kernel has discovered. This patch creates an uevent for the kernels internal request_module(), to let udev take control over the request, instead of forking the binary directly by the kernel. The direct execution of /sbin/modprobe can be disabled by setting: /sys/module/kmod/mod_request_helper (/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe) to an empty string, the same way /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug is disabled on an udev system. Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-02-13[PATCH] x86-64: Allow to run a program when a machine check event is detectedAndi Kleen1-14/+30
When a machine check event is detected (including a AMD RevF threshold overflow event) allow to run a "trigger" program. This allows user space to react to such events sooner. The trigger is configured using a new trigger entry in the machinecheck sysfs interface. It is currently shared between all CPUs. I also fixed the AMD threshold handler to run the machine check polling code immediately to actually log any events that might have caused the threshold interrupt. Also added some documentation for the mce sysfs interface. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>