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2012-11-26futex: avoid wake_futex() for a PI futex_qDarren Hart1-1/+17
Dave Jones reported a bug with futex_lock_pi() that his trinity test exposed. Sometime between queue_me() and taking the q.lock_ptr, the lock_ptr became NULL, resulting in a crash. While futex_wake() is careful to not call wake_futex() on futex_q's with a pi_state or an rt_waiter (which are either waiting for a futex_unlock_pi() or a PI futex_requeue()), futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() do not perform the same test. Update futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() to test for q.pi_state and q.rt_waiter and abort with -EINVAL if detected. To ensure any future breakage is caught, add a WARN() to wake_futex() if the same condition is true. This fix has seen 3 hours of testing with "trinity -c futex" on an x86_64 VM with 4 CPUS. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up the WARN()] Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-11-01futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctlyThomas Gleixner1-19/+22
Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the owner died and provided a workaround. See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076 The detailed problem analysis shows: Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes. T1 lock_futex_pi(F); T2 lock_futex_pi(F); --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated to T1. T1 exits --> exit_robust_list() runs --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set. T3 lock_futex_pi(F); --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0 --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space T1 --> exit_pi_state_list() --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex) T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the pi_state --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space T3 --> observes inconsistent state This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that certain configurations are more likely to expose it. So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit: if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the futex unconditionally if that's true. AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale. Now the proposed change - if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { + if (unlikely(ownerdied || + !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) { solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the "stale WAITERS bit" case. What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3 to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved! Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set. Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3 blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the user space futex. lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with the hash bucket lock held. So the above scenario changes to: T1 lock_futex_pi(F); T2 lock_futex_pi(F); --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated to T1. T1 exits --> exit_robust_list() runs --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set. T3 lock_futex_pi(F); --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex T1 --> exit_pi_state_list() --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex) T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over. Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the possible wreckage which might be inflicted. As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should nevertheless :) Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-07-24futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()Darren Hart1-5/+8
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-07-24futex: Fix bug in WARN_ON for NULL q.pi_stateDarren Hart1-1/+1
The WARN_ON in futex_wait_requeue_pi() for a NULL q.pi_state was testing the address (&q.pi_state) of the pointer instead of the value (q.pi_state) of the pointer. Correct it accordingly. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c85d97f6e5f79ec389a4ead3e367363c74bd09a.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-07-24futex: Test for pi_mutex on fault in futex_wait_requeue_pi()Darren Hart1-1/+1
If fixup_pi_state_owner() faults, pi_mutex may be NULL. Test for pi_mutex != NULL before testing the owner against current and possibly unlocking it. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dc59890338fc413606f04e5c5b131530734dae3d.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-03-29futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecatedKees Cook1-0/+2
Notify get_robust_list users that the syscall is going away. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: spender@grsecurity.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120323190855.GA27213@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-03-29futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged processKees Cook1-23/+13
It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar info that comes out of /proc. Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had: cred->euid != pcred->euid cred->euid == pcred->uid so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure. (This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: spender@grsecurity.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2012-03-19Merge branch 'core-locking-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-28/+23
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull core/locking changes for v3.4 from Ingo Molnar * 'core-locking-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: futex: Simplify return logic futex: Cover all PI opcodes with cmpxchg enabled check
2012-02-15futex: Simplify return logicThomas Gleixner1-25/+13
No need to assign ret in each case and break. Simply return the result of the handler function directly. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
2012-02-15futex: Cover all PI opcodes with cmpxchg enabled checkThomas Gleixner1-6/+13
Some of the newer futex PI opcodes do not check the cmpxchg enabled variable and call unconditionally into the handling functions. Cover all PI opcodes in a separate check. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
2011-12-31futex: Fix uninterruptible loop due to gate_areaHugh Dickins1-8/+20
It was found (by Sasha) that if you use a futex located in the gate area we get stuck in an uninterruptible infinite loop, much like the ZERO_PAGE issue. While looking at this problem, PeterZ realized you'll get into similar trouble when hitting any install_special_pages() mapping. And are there still drivers setting up their own special mmaps without page->mapping, and without special VM or pte flags to make get_user_pages fail? In most cases, if page->mapping is NULL, we do not need to retry at all: Linus points out that even /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches poses no problem, because it ends up using remove_mapping(), which takes care not to interfere when the page reference count is raised. But there is still one case which does need a retry: if memory pressure called shmem_writepage in between get_user_pages_fast dropping page table lock and our acquiring page lock, then the page gets switched from filecache to swapcache (and ->mapping set to NULL) whatever the refcount. Fault it back in to get the page->mapping needed for key->shared.inode. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-10-31kernel: Map most files to use export.h instead of module.hPaul Gortmaker1-1/+1
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them onto the isolated export header for faster compile times. Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of: -#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/export.h> This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2011-09-15Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina1-12/+42
Fast-forward merge with Linus to be able to merge patches based on more recent version of the tree.
2011-09-15futex: Fix spelling in a source code commentBart Van Assche1-1/+1
Change a single occurrence of "unlcoked" into "unlocked". Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2011-09-15futex: uninitialized warning correctionsVitaliy Ivanov1-4/+4
The variables here are really not used uninitialized. kernel/futex.c: In function 'fixup_pi_state_owner.clone.17': kernel/futex.c:1582:6: warning: 'curval' may be used uninitialized in this function kernel/futex.c: In function 'handle_futex_death': kernel/futex.c:2486:6: warning: 'nval' may be used uninitialized in this function kernel/futex.c: In function 'do_futex': kernel/futex.c:863:11: warning: 'curval' may be used uninitialized in this function kernel/futex.c:828:6: note: 'curval' was declared here kernel/futex.c:898:5: warning: 'oldval' may be used uninitialized in this function kernel/futex.c:890:6: note: 'oldval' was declared here Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Ivanov <vitalivanov@gmail.com> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2011-08-04Merge branch 'linus' into core/urgentIngo Molnar1-3/+3
2011-07-26futex: Fix regression with read only mappingsShawn Bohrer1-12/+42
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE. This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast() fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address. This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap() man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping: It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region. So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case. Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A). get_futex_key() return inode based key. sleep on the key Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A) Thread-B: write memory-region-A. COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page. Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A). get_futex_key() return mm based key. IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A. Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do something like this get what they deserve. While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a userspace hang. This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access. Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com> Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com Cc: hughd@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-07-25mm/futex: fix futex writes on archs with SW tracking of dirty & youngBenjamin Herrenschmidt1-2/+2
I haven't reproduced it myself but the fail scenario is that on such machines (notably ARM and some embedded powerpc), if you manage to hit that futex path on a writable page whose dirty bit has gone from the PTE, you'll livelock inside the kernel from what I can tell. It will go in a loop of trying the atomic access, failing, trying gup to "fix it up", getting succcess from gup, go back to the atomic access, failing again because dirty wasn't fixed etc... So I think you essentially hang in the kernel. The scenario is probably rare'ish because affected architecture are embedded and tend to not swap much (if at all) so we probably rarely hit the case where dirty is missing or young is missing, but I think Shan has a piece of SW that can reliably reproduce it using a shared writable mapping & fork or something like that. On archs who use SW tracking of dirty & young, a page without dirty is effectively mapped read-only and a page without young unaccessible in the PTE. Additionally, some architectures might lazily flush the TLB when relaxing write protection (by doing only a local flush), and expect a fault to invalidate the stale entry if it's still present on another processor. The futex code assumes that if the "in_atomic()" access -EFAULT's, it can "fix it up" by causing get_user_pages() which would then be equivalent to taking the fault. However that isn't the case. get_user_pages() will not call handle_mm_fault() in the case where the PTE seems to have the right permissions, regardless of the dirty and young state. It will eventually update those bits ... in the struct page, but not in the PTE. Additionally, it will not handle the lazy TLB flushing that can be required by some architectures in the fault case. Basically, gup is the wrong interface for the job. The patch provides a more appropriate one which boils down to just calling handle_mm_fault() since what we are trying to do is simulate a real page fault. The futex code currently attempts to write to user memory within a pagefault disabled section, and if that fails, tries to fix it up using get_user_pages(). This doesn't work on archs where the dirty and young bits are maintained by software, since they will gate access permission in the TLB, and will not be updated by gup(). In addition, there's an expectation on some archs that a spurious write fault triggers a local TLB flush, and that is missing from the picture as well. I decided that adding those "features" to gup() would be too much for this already too complex function, and instead added a new simpler fixup_user_fault() which is essentially a wrapper around handle_mm_fault() which the futex code can call. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix some nits Darren saw, fiddle comment layout] Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Reported-by: Shan Hai <haishan.bai@gmail.com> Tested-by: Shan Hai <haishan.bai@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Darren Hart <darren.hart@intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-08plist: Remove the need to supply locks to plist headsDima Zavin1-1/+1
This was legacy code brought over from the RT tree and is no longer necessary. Signed-off-by: Dima Zavin <dima@android.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@codeaurora.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1310084879-10351-2-git-send-email-dima@android.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-04-15futex: Set FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT during futex_wait restart setupDarren Hart1-1/+1
The FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT flag was not getting set, causing the restart_block to restart futex_wait() without a timeout after a signal. Commit b41277dc7a18ee332d in 2.6.38 introduced the regression by accidentally removing the the FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT assignment from futex_wait() during the setup of the restart block. Restore the originaly behavior. Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32922 Reported-by: Tim Smith <tsmith201104@yahoo.com> Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/%3Cdaac0eb3af607f72b9a4d3126b2ba8fb5ed3b883.1302820917.git.dvhart%40linux.intel.com%3E Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-03-25Merge branch 'core-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: futex: Fix WARN_ON() test for UP WARN_ON_SMP(): Allow use in if() statements on UP x86, dumpstack: Use %pB format specifier for stack trace vsprintf: Introduce %pB format specifier lockdep: Remove unused 'factor' variable from lockdep_stats_show()
2011-03-25futex: Fix WARN_ON() test for UPSteven Rostedt1-2/+2
An update of the futex code had a WARN_ON(!spin_is_locked(q->lock_ptr)) But on UP, spin_is_locked() is always false, and will trigger this warning, and even worse, it will exit the function without doing the necessary work. Converting this to a WARN_ON_SMP() fixes the problem. Reported-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: <20110317192208.682654502@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-23userns: user namespaces: convert several capable() callsSerge E. Hallyn1-1/+10
CAP_IPC_OWNER and CAP_IPC_LOCK can be checked against current_user_ns(), because the resource comes from current's own ipc namespace. setuid/setgid are to uids in own namespace, so again checks can be against current_user_ns(). Changelog: Jan 11: Use task_ns_capable() in place of sched_capable(). Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank. Jan 11: Clarify (hopefully) some logic in futex and sched.c Feb 15: use ns_capable for ipc, not nsown_capable Feb 23: let copy_ipcs handle setting ipc_ns->user_ns Feb 23: pass ns down rather than taking it from current [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-15Merge branch 'core-locking-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-10/+12
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'core-locking-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: rtmutex: tester: Remove the remaining BKL leftovers lockdep/timers: Explain in detail the locking problems del_timer_sync() may cause rtmutex: Simplify PI algorithm and make highest prio task get lock rwsem: Remove redundant asmregparm annotation rwsem: Move duplicate function prototypes to linux/rwsem.h rwsem: Unify the duplicate rwsem_is_locked() inlines rwsem: Move duplicate init macros and functions to linux/rwsem.h rwsem: Move duplicate struct rwsem declaration to linux/rwsem.h x86: Cleanup rwsem_count_t typedef rwsem: Cleanup includes locking: Remove deprecated lock initializers cred: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization kthread: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization xtensa: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization um: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization sparc: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization mips: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization cris: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization alpha: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization rtmutex-tester: Remove BKL tests
2011-03-14futex: Deobfuscate handle_futex_death()Thomas Gleixner1-3/+14
handle_futex_death() uses futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() without disabling page faults. That's ok, but totally non obvious. We don't hold locks so we actually can and want to fault here, because the get_user() before futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() does not guarantee a R/W mapping. We could just add a big fat comment to explain this, but actually changing the code so that the functionality is entirely clear is better. Use the helper function which disables page faults around the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() and handle a fault with a call to fault_in_user_writeable() as all other places in the futex code do as well. Pointed-out-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> LKML-Reference: <alpine.LFD.2.00.1103141126590.2787@localhost6.localdomain6> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-03-12Merge branch 'tip/futex/devel' of ↵Thomas Gleixner1-17/+23
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-2.6-rt into core/futexes futex,plist: Pass the real head of the priority list to plist_del() futex,plist: Remove debug lock assignment from plist_node plist: Shrink struct plist_head plist: Add priority list test
2011-03-11futex,plist: Remove debug lock assignment from plist_nodeLai Jiangshan1-9/+0
The original code uses &plist_node->plist as the fake head of the priority list for plist_del(), these debug locks in the fake head are needed for CONFIG_DEBUG_PI_LIST. But now we always pass the real head to plist_del(), the debug locks in plist_node will not be used, so we remove these assignments. Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: <4D10797E.7040803@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-03-11futex,plist: Pass the real head of the priority list to plist_del()Lai Jiangshan1-8/+23
Some plist_del()s in kernel/futex.c are passed a faked head of the priority list. It does not fail because the current code does not require the real head in plist_del(). The current code of plist_del() just uses the head for checking, so it will not cause a bad result even when we use a faked head. But it is undocumented usage: /** * plist_del - Remove a @node from plist. * * @node: &struct plist_node pointer - entry to be removed * @head: &struct plist_head pointer - list head */ The document says that the @head is the "list head" head of the priority list. In futex code, several places use "plist_del(&q->list, &q->list.plist);", they pass a fake head. We need to fix them all. Thanks to Darren Hart for many suggestions. Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: <4D11984A.5030203@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-03-11futex: Sanitize cmpxchg_futex_value_locked APIMichel Lespinasse1-30/+15
The cmpxchg_futex_value_locked API was funny in that it returned either the original, user-exposed futex value OR an error code such as -EFAULT. This was confusing at best, and could be a source of livelocks in places that retry the cmpxchg_futex_value_locked after trying to fix the issue by running fault_in_user_writeable(). This change makes the cmpxchg_futex_value_locked API more similar to the get_futex_value_locked one, returning an error code and updating the original value through a reference argument. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [tile] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [ia64] Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> [microblaze] Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [frv] Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <20110311024851.GC26122@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-03-11futex: Avoid redudant evaluation of task_pid_vnr()Thomas Gleixner1-8/+8
The result is not going to change under us, so no need to reevaluate this over and over. Seems to be a leftover from the mechanical mass conversion of task->pid to task_pid_vnr(tsk). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-03-10futex: Update futex_wait_setup comments about lockingMichel Lespinasse1-5/+6
Reviving a cleanup I had done about a year ago as part of a larger futex_set_wait proposal. Over the years, the locking of the hashed futex queue got improved, so that some of the "rare but normal" race conditions described in comments can't actually happen anymore. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> LKML-Reference: <20110307020750.GA31188@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-01-27rtmutex: Simplify PI algorithm and make highest prio task get lockLai Jiangshan1-10/+12
In current rtmutex, the pending owner may be boosted by the tasks in the rtmutex's waitlist when the pending owner is deboosted or a task in the waitlist is boosted. This boosting is unrelated, because the pending owner does not really take the rtmutex. It is not reasonable. Example. time1: A(high prio) onwers the rtmutex. B(mid prio) and C (low prio) in the waitlist. time2 A release the lock, B becomes the pending owner A(or other high prio task) continues to run. B's prio is lower than A, so B is just queued at the runqueue. time3 A or other high prio task sleeps, but we have passed some time The B and C's prio are changed in the period (time2 ~ time3) due to boosting or deboosting. Now C has the priority higher than B. ***Is it reasonable that C has to boost B and help B to get the rtmutex? NO!! I think, it is unrelated/unneed boosting before B really owns the rtmutex. We should give C a chance to beat B and win the rtmutex. This is the motivation of this patch. This patch *ensures* only the top waiter or higher priority task can take the lock. How? 1) we don't dequeue the top waiter when unlock, if the top waiter is changed, the old top waiter will fail and go to sleep again. 2) when requiring lock, it will get the lock when the lock is not taken and: there is no waiter OR higher priority than waiters OR it is top waiter. 3) In any time, the top waiter is changed, the top waiter will be woken up. The algorithm is much simpler than before, no pending owner, no boosting for pending owner. Other advantage of this patch: 1) The states of a rtmutex are reduced a half, easier to read the code. 2) the codes become shorter. 3) top waiter is not dequeued until it really take the lock: they will retain FIFO when it is stolen. Not advantage nor disadvantage 1) Even we may wakeup multiple waiters(any time when top waiter changed), we hardly cause "thundering herd", the number of wokenup task is likely 1 or very little. 2) two APIs are changed. rt_mutex_owner() will not return pending owner, it will return NULL when the top waiter is going to take the lock. rt_mutex_next_owner() always return the top waiter. will not return NULL if we have waiters because the top waiter is not dequeued. I have fixed the code that use these APIs. need updated after this patch is accepted 1) Document/* 2) the testcase scripts/rt-tester/t4-l2-pi-deboost.tst Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: <4D3012D5.4060709@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-01-15Merge branches 'core-fixes-for-linus', 'x86-fixes-for-linus', ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+3
'timers-fixes-for-linus' and 'perf-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: rcu: avoid pointless blocked-task warnings rcu: demote SRCU_SYNCHRONIZE_DELAY from kernel-parameter status rtmutex: Fix comment about why new_owner can be NULL in wake_futex_pi() * 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: x86, olpc: Add missing Kconfig dependencies x86, mrst: Set correct APB timer IRQ affinity for secondary cpu x86: tsc: Fix calibration refinement conditionals to avoid divide by zero x86, ia64, acpi: Clean up x86-ism in drivers/acpi/numa.c * 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: timekeeping: Make local variables static time: Rename misnamed minsec argument of clocks_calc_mult_shift() * 'perf-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: tracing: Remove syscall_exit_fields tracing: Only process module tracepoints once perf record: Add "nodelay" mode, disabled by default perf sched: Fix list of events, dropping unsupported ':r' modifier Revert "perf tools: Emit clearer message for sys_perf_event_open ENOENT return" perf top: Fix annotate segv perf evsel: Fix order of event list deletion
2011-01-13thp: update futex compound knowledgeAndrea Arcangeli1-10/+45
Futex code is smarter than most other gup_fast O_DIRECT code and knows about the compound internals. However now doing a put_page(head_page) will not release the pin on the tail page taken by gup-fast, leading to all sort of refcounting bugchecks. Getting a stable head_page is a little tricky. page_head = page is there because if this is not a tail page it's also the page_head. Only in case this is a tail page, compound_head is called, otherwise it's guaranteed unnecessary. And if it's a tail page compound_head has to run atomically inside irq disabled section __get_user_pages_fast before returning. Otherwise ->first_page won't be a stable pointer. Disableing irq before __get_user_page_fast and releasing irq after running compound_head is needed because if __get_user_page_fast returns == 1, it means the huge pmd is established and cannot go away from under us. pmdp_splitting_flush_notify in __split_huge_page_splitting will have to wait for local_irq_enable before the IPI delivery can return. This means __split_huge_page_refcount can't be running from under us, and in turn when we run compound_head(page) we're not reading a dangling pointer from tailpage->first_page. Then after we get to stable head page, we are always safe to call compound_lock and after taking the compound lock on head page we can finally re-check if the page returned by gup-fast is still a tail page. in which case we're set and we didn't need to split the hugepage in order to take a futex on it. Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-11rtmutex: Fix comment about why new_owner can be NULL in wake_futex_pi()Steven Rostedt1-4/+3
The comment about why rt_mutex_next_owner() can return NULL in wake_futex_pi() is not the normal case. Tracing the cause of why this occurs is more likely that waiter simply timedout. But because it originally caused contention with the futex, the owner will go into the kernel when it unlocks the lock. Then it will hit this code path and rt_mutex_next_owner() will return NULL. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-11-10futex: Add futex_q static initializerDarren Hart1-15/+10
The futex_q struct has grown considerably over the last couple years. I believe it now merits a static initializer to avoid uninitialized data errors (having spent more time than I care to admit debugging an uninitialized q.bitset in an experimental new op code). With the key initializer built in, several of the FUTEX_KEY_INIT calls can be removed. V2: use a static variable instead of an init macro. use a C99 initializer and don't rely on variable ordering in the struct. V3: make futex_q_init const Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> LKML-Reference: <1289252428-18383-1-git-send-email-dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-11-10futex: Replace fshared and clockrt with combined flagsDarren Hart1-76/+70
In the early days we passed the mmap sem around. That became the "int fshared" with the fast gup improvements. Then we added "int clockrt" in places. This patch unifies these options as "flags". [ tglx: Split out the stale fshared cleanup ] Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> LKML-Reference: <1289250609-16304-1-git-send-email-dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-11-10futex: Cleanup stale fshared flag interfacesThomas Gleixner1-34/+30
The fast GUP changes stopped using the fshared flag in put_futex_keys(), but we kept the interface the same. Cleanup all stale users. This patch is split out from Darren Harts combo patch which also combines various flags. This way the changes are clearly separated. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> LKML-Reference: <1289250609-16304-1-git-send-email-dvhart@linux.intel.com>
2010-11-10futex: Address compiler warnings in exit_robust_listDarren Hart1-1/+2
Since commit 1dcc41bb (futex: Change 3rd arg of fetch_robust_entry() to unsigned int*) some gcc versions decided to emit the following warning: kernel/futex.c: In function ‘exit_robust_list’: kernel/futex.c:2492: warning: ‘next_pi’ may be used uninitialized in this function The commit did not introduce the warning as gcc should have warned before that commit as well. It's just gcc being silly. The code path really can't result in next_pi being unitialized (or should not), but let's keep the build clean. Annotate next_pi as an uninitialized_var. [ tglx: Addressed the same issue in futex_compat.c and massaged the changelog ] Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Tested-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> LKML-Reference: <1288897200-13008-1-git-send-email-dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-10-25new helper: ihold()Al Viro1-1/+1
Clones an existing reference to inode; caller must already hold one. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-10-21Merge branch 'futexes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-14/+21
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'futexes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: futex: Fix kernel-doc notation & typos futex: Add lock context annotations futex: Mark restart_block.futex.uaddr[2] __user futex: Change 3rd arg of fetch_robust_entry() to unsigned int*
2010-10-19futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-countingDarren Hart1-15/+16
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup() acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock() functions. Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged. Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com> Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2010-10-14futex: Fix kernel-doc notation & typosRandy Dunlap1-11/+14
Convert futex_requeue() function parameters to use @name kernel-doc notation and add @fshared & @cmpval to prevent kernel-doc warnings. Add @list to struct futex_q. Fix a few typos. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> LKML-Reference: <20101013110234.89b06043.randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-09-18futex: Add lock context annotationsNamhyung Kim1-0/+4
queue_lock/unlock/me() and unqueue_me_pi() grab/release spinlocks but are missing proper annotations. Add them. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <1284468228-8723-3-git-send-email-namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-09-18futex: Mark restart_block.futex.uaddr[2] __userNamhyung Kim1-2/+2
@uaddr and @uaddr2 fields in restart_block.futex are user pointers. Add __user and remove unnecessary casts. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <1284468228-8723-2-git-send-email-namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-09-18futex: Change 3rd arg of fetch_robust_entry() to unsigned int*Namhyung Kim1-1/+1
Sparse complains: kernel/futex.c:2495:59: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different signedness) Make 3rd argument of fetch_robust_entry() 'unsigned int'. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <1284468228-8723-1-git-send-email-namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2010-06-30futex: futex_find_get_task remove credentails checkMichal Hocko1-13/+4
futex_find_get_task is currently used (through lookup_pi_state) from two contexts, futex_requeue and futex_lock_pi_atomic. None of the paths looks it needs the credentials check, though. Different (e)uids shouldn't matter at all because the only thing that is important for shared futex is the accessibility of the shared memory. The credentail check results in glibc assert failure or process hang (if glibc is compiled without assert support) for shared robust pthread mutex with priority inheritance if a process tries to lock already held lock owned by a process with a different euid: pthread_mutex_lock.c:312: __pthread_mutex_lock_full: Assertion `(-(e)) != 3 || !robust' failed. The problem is that futex_lock_pi_atomic which is called when we try to lock already held lock checks the current holder (tid is stored in the futex value) to get the PI state. It uses lookup_pi_state which in turn gets task struct from futex_find_get_task. ESRCH is returned either when the task is not found or if credentials check fails. futex_lock_pi_atomic simply returns if it gets ESRCH. glibc code, however, doesn't expect that robust lock returns with ESRCH because it should get either success or owner died. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-03futex: Handle futex value corruption gracefullyThomas Gleixner1-2/+19
The WARN_ON in lookup_pi_state which complains about a mismatch between pi_state->owner->pid and the pid which we retrieved from the user space futex is completely bogus. The code just emits the warning and then continues despite the fact that it detected an inconsistent state of the futex. A conveniant way for user space to spam the syslog. Replace the WARN_ON by a consistency check. If the values do not match return -EINVAL and let user space deal with the mess it created. This also fixes the missing task_pid_vnr() when we compare the pi_state->owner pid with the futex value. Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2010-02-03futex: Handle user space corruption gracefullyThomas Gleixner1-0/+7
If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses. Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL. This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it. Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2010-02-03futex_lock_pi() key refcnt fixMikael Pettersson1-1/+1
This fixes a futex key reference count bug in futex_lock_pi(), where a key's reference count is incremented twice but decremented only once, causing the backing object to not be released. If the futex is created in a temporary file in an ext3 file system, this bug causes the file's inode to become an "undead" orphan, which causes an oops from a BUG_ON() in ext3_put_super() when the file system is unmounted. glibc's test suite is known to trigger this, see <http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14256>. The bug is a regression from 2.6.28-git3, namely Peter Zijlstra's 38d47c1b7075bd7ec3881141bb3629da58f88dab "[PATCH] futex: rely on get_user_pages() for shared futexes". That commit made get_futex_key() also increment the reference count of the futex key, and updated its callers to decrement the key's reference count before returning. Unfortunately the normal exit path in futex_lock_pi() wasn't corrected: the reference count is incremented by get_futex_key() and queue_lock(), but the normal exit path only decrements once, via unqueue_me_pi(). The fix is to put_futex_key() after unqueue_me_pi(), since 2.6.31 this is easily done by 'goto out_put_key' rather than 'goto out'. Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>