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2021-05-01Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+7
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well. Also six trivial changes and bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments. ima: Fix function name error in comment. ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key keys: cleanup build time module signing keys ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
2021-04-26Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers Algorithms: - Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names - Add NIST P384 curve parameters - Add ECDSA Drivers: - Add support for Green Sardine in ccp - Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre - Add support for AM64 in sa2ul" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits) fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256 fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO" crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe() crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block. crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument crypto: chelsio - remove unused function crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64 crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64 crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info' crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c ...
2021-04-26Merge tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+15
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull x509 dbx/mokx UEFI support from David Howells: "Here's a set of patches from Eric Snowberg[1] that add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries in the dbx and mokx UEFI tables (such entries cause matching certificates to be rejected). These are currently ignored and only the hash entries are made use of. Additionally Eric included his patches to allow such certificates to be preloaded. These patches deal with CVE-2020-26541. To quote Eric: 'This is the fifth patch series for adding support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries [2]. It has been expanded to not only include dbx entries but also entries in the mokx. Additionally my series to preload these certificate [3] has also been included'" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com [1] Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1315485/ [3] * tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
2021-04-14KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted KeysSumit Garg1-0/+16
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys frameworkSumit Garg2-21/+61
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device. Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this, which contains necessary functions of a backend. Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which has initiazed successfully during iteration. Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via aforementioned module parameter. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobsJames Bottomley1-0/+1
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizationsJames Bottomley1-0/+1
In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-09ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyringNayna Jain1-0/+7
The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring as well. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-03-26ima: Support EC keys for signature verificationStefan Berger1-0/+6
Add support for IMA signature verification for EC keys. Since SHA type of hashes can be used by RSA and ECDSA signature schemes we need to look at the key and derive from the key which signature scheme to use. Since this can be applied to all types of keys, we change the selection of the encoding type to be driven by the key's signature scheme rather than by the hash type. Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-03-11certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entriesEric Snowberg1-0/+15
This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled.[1][2] - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
2021-01-21encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS onesAlexander A. Klimov1-1/+1
Rationale: Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate. Deterministic algorithm: For each file: If not .svg: For each line: If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`: For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`: If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`: If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions return 200 OK and serve the same content: Replace HTTP with HTTPS. Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2020-11-23rxrpc: Don't leak the service-side session key to userspaceDavid Howells1-0/+1
Don't let someone reading a service-side rxrpc-type key get access to the session key that was exchanged with the client. The server application will, at some point, need to be able to read the information in the ticket, but this probably shouldn't include the key material. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-11-23rxrpc: Remove the rxk5 security class as it's now defunctDavid Howells1-55/+0
Remove the rxrpc rxk5 security class as it's now defunct and nothing uses it anymore. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-08-04Merge tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds3-3/+3
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet: "It's been a busy cycle for documentation - hopefully the busiest for a while to come. Changes include: - Some new Chinese translations - Progress on the battle against double words words and non-HTTPS URLs - Some block-mq documentation - More RST conversions from Mauro. At this point, that task is essentially complete, so we shouldn't see this kind of churn again for a while. Unless we decide to switch to asciidoc or something...:) - Lots of typo fixes, warning fixes, and more" * tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (195 commits) scripts/kernel-doc: optionally treat warnings as errors docs: ia64: correct typo mailmap: add entry for <alobakin@marvell.com> doc/zh_CN: add cpu-load Chinese version Documentation/admin-guide: tainted-kernels: fix spelling mistake MAINTAINERS: adjust kprobes.rst entry to new location devices.txt: document rfkill allocation PCI: correct flag name docs: filesystems: vfs: correct flag name docs: filesystems: vfs: correct sync_mode flag names docs: path-lookup: markup fixes for emphasis docs: path-lookup: more markup fixes docs: path-lookup: fix HTML entity mojibake CREDITS: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones docs: process: Add an example for creating a fixes tag doc/zh_CN: add Chinese translation prefer section doc/zh_CN: add clearing-warn-once Chinese version doc/zh_CN: add admin-guide index doc:it_IT: process: coding-style.rst: Correct __maybe_unused compiler label futex: MAINTAINERS: Re-add selftests directory ...
2020-06-19docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReSTMauro Carvalho Chehab3-3/+3
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes were needed: - Adjust document and titles markups; - Adjust numbered list markups; - Add a comments markup for the Contents section; - Add markups for literal blocks. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-06-15RxRPC: Replace zero-length array with flexible-arrayGustavo A. R. Silva1-2/+2
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-06-15keys: encrypted-type: Replace zero-length array with flexible-arrayGustavo A. R. Silva1-1/+1
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-06-02keys: Implement update for the big_key typeDavid Howells1-0/+1
Implement the ->update op for the big_key type. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2020-06-02KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-arrayGustavo A. R. Silva1-1/+1
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2], introduced in C99: struct foo { int stuff; struct boo array[]; }; By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on. Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by this change: "Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1] sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues. This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle. [1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 [3] commit 76497732932f ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-03-29KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphoreWaiman Long2-3/+2
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-11-30Merge tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: "Highlights: - Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems. - A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state. - Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP). - Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB. - Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of generic mm code. - A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle unaligned watchpoint addresses. Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups. Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing" * tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits) powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM x86/efi: remove unused variables powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init() selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir. powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT. powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat() powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap() powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt() powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset() powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions ...
2019-11-12KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys codeSumit Garg1-0/+7
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely. Also, utilize existing tpm_send() exported API which wraps the internal tpm_transmit_cmd() API. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12KEYS: trusted: Create trusted keys subsystemSumit Garg1-2/+5
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12KEYS: Use common tpm_buf for trusted and asymmetric keysSumit Garg1-36/+1
Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12tpm: Move tpm_buf code to include/linux/Sumit Garg1-6/+6
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc. Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12certs: Add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hashNayna Jain1-0/+6
The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a binary. This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return -EPERM error if binary is blacklisted. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
2019-07-08Merge tag 'keys-request-20190626' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull request_key improvements from David Howells: "These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements: - Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still grant Write permission). Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be found. - Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than hanging around till the expiry time is passed. - Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode. - Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key() calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y. It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused for the next step too. Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME, just before userspace resumes, and on exit" * tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata} keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct keys: Provide request_key_rcu() keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
2019-06-19keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functionsDavid Howells1-0/+1
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key() function in a later commit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-05treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441Thomas Gleixner2-8/+2
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner5-25/+5
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-24treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner5-25/+5
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-08KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warningndesaulniers@google.com1-1/+1
Fixes the warning reported by Clang: security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that undergoes default argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs] va_start(argp, h3); ^ security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned char' is declared here unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) ^ Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4) standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior: The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a type that is not compatible with the type that results after application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is undefined. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41 Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-03-10Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
2019-02-22KEYS: user: Align the payload bufferEric Biggers1-1/+1
Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than 2-byte alignment. fscrypt currently does this which results in the read of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment. Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment. Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Fixes: 2aa349f6e37c ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations") Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth keyDavid Howells1-0/+36
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned. Fix this by the following changes: (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead. (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/. (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name. Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked. Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-04integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyringKairui Song1-0/+8
commit 9dc92c45177a ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring") introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature stored in xattr. This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for verifying PE signed kernel images as well. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+136
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]David Howells1-0/+9
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this: int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *enc, void *data); int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the encoding for verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-15docs: Fix some broken referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab2-2/+2
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few false-positives. Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-29net: rxrpc: Replace time_t type with time64_t typeBaolin Wang1-0/+23
Since the 'expiry' variable of 'struct key_preparsed_payload' has been changed to 'time64_t' type, which is year 2038 safe on 32bits system. In net/rxrpc subsystem, we need convert 'u32' type to 'time64_t' type when copying ticket expires time to 'prep->expiry', then this patch introduces two helper functions to help convert 'u32' to 'time64_t' type. This patch also uses ktime_get_real_seconds() to get current time instead of get_seconds() which is not year 2038 safe on 32bits system. Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-03KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau1-2/+4
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyringDavid Howells1-0/+12
Add the following: (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about blacklisted certificates and signatures. (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts no payload. (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel at build time. This is done by setting CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes that are in the form: "<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>" where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size. The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING. Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed: root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist Keyring 723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist 676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database. A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in here too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-03-02KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells1-2/+7
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-06-14KEYS: Strip trailing spacesDavid Howells1-1/+1
Strip some trailing spaces. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mokDavid Howells1-11/+2
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the system trusted keyrings. EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned. If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain - provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings. The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamicallyDavid Howells1-0/+9
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring. Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys). The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to .builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched too if the secondary keyring is searched. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTEDDavid Howells1-1/+0
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure. Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to restrict_link(). Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells1-12/+7
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells1-4/+4
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>