| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Commit c74a3bdd9b52 ("ocfs2: add clustername to cluster connection") is
trying to strlcpy a string which was explicitly passed as NULL in the
very same patch, triggering a NULL ptr deref.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: strlcpy (lib/string.c:388 lib/string.c:151)
CPU: 19 PID: 19426 Comm: trinity-c19 Tainted: G W 3.14.0-rc7-next-20140325-sasha-00014-g9476368-dirty #274
RIP: strlcpy (lib/string.c:388 lib/string.c:151)
Call Trace:
ocfs2_cluster_connect (fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c:350)
ocfs2_cluster_connect_agnostic (fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c:396)
user_dlm_register (fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c:679)
dlmfs_mkdir (fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c:503)
vfs_mkdir (fs/namei.c:3467)
SyS_mkdirat (fs/namei.c:3488 fs/namei.c:3472)
tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:749)
akpm: this patch probably disables the feature. A temporary thing to
avoid triviel oopses.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently we allocated anon_inode_inode in anon_inodefs_mount. This is
somewhat fragile as if that function ever gets called again, it will
overwrite anon_inode_inode pointer. So move the initialization of
anon_inode_inode to anon_inode_init().
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[ Further simplified on suggestion from Dave Jones ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The previous commit removed the register_filesystem() call and the
associated error handling, but left the label for the error path that no
longer exists. Remove that too.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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anon_inodefs filesystem is a kernel internal filesystem userspace
shouldn't mess with. Remove registration of it so userspace cannot
even try to mount it (which would fail anyway because the filesystem is
MS_NOUSER).
This fixes an oops triggered by trinity when it tried mounting
anon_inodefs which overwrote anon_inode_inode pointer while other CPU
has been in anon_inode_getfile() between ihold() and d_instantiate().
Thus effectively creating dentry pointing to an inode without holding a
reference to it.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull nfsd fix frm Bruce Fields:
"J R Okajima sent this early and I was just slow to pass it along,
apologies. Fortunately it's a simple fix"
* 'nfsd-next' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
nfsd: fix lost nfserrno() call in nfsd_setattr()
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We can get false negative from __lookup_mnt() if an unrelated vfsmount
gets moved. In that case legitimize_mnt() is guaranteed to fail,
and we will fall back to non-RCU walk... unless we end up running
into a hard error on a filesystem object we wouldn't have reached
if not for that false negative. IOW, delaying that check until
the end of pathname resolution is wrong - we should recheck right
after we attempt to cross the mountpoint. We don't need to recheck
unless we see d_mountpoint() being true - in that case even if
we have just raced with mount/umount, we can simply go on as if
we'd come at the moment when the sucker wasn't a mountpoint; if we
run into a hard error as the result, it was a legitimate outcome.
__lookup_mnt() returning NULL is different in that respect, since
it might've happened due to operation on completely unrelated
mountpoint.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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In all callchains leading to prepend_name(), the value left in *buflen
is eventually discarded unused if prepend_name() has returned a negative.
So we are free to do what prepend() does, and subtract from *buflen
*before* checking for underflow (which turns into checking the sign
of subtraction result, of course).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit bd2a31d522344 ("get rid of fget_light()") introduced the
__fdget_pos() function, which returns the resulting file pointer and
fdput flags combined in an 'unsigned long'. However, it also changed the
behavior to return files with FMODE_PATH set, which shouldn't happen
because read(), write(), lseek(), etc. aren't allowed on such files.
This commit restores the old behavior.
This regression actually had no effect on read() and write() since
FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE are not set on file descriptors opened with
O_PATH, but it did cause lseek() on a file descriptor opened with O_PATH
to fail with ESPIPE rather than EBADF.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit 9c225f2655e36a4 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") changed
several system calls to use fdget_pos() instead of fdget(), but missed
sys_llseek(). Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull CIFS fixes from Steve French:
"A fix for the problem which Al spotted in cifs_writev and a followup
(noticed when fixing CVE-2014-0069) patch to ensure that cifs never
sends more than the smb frame length over the socket (as we saw with
that cifs_iovec_write problem that Jeff fixed last month)"
* 'for-next' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
cifs: mask off top byte in get_rfc1002_length()
cifs: sanity check length of data to send before sending
CIFS: Fix wrong pos argument of cifs_find_lock_conflict
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Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"Nine fixes"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
cris: convert ffs from an object-like macro to a function-like macro
hfsplus: add HFSX subfolder count support
tools/testing/selftests/ipc/msgque.c: handle msgget failure return correctly
MAINTAINERS: blackfin: add git repository
revert "kallsyms: fix absolute addresses for kASLR"
mm/Kconfig: fix URL for zsmalloc benchmark
fs/proc/base.c: fix GPF in /proc/$PID/map_files
mm/compaction: break out of loop on !PageBuddy in isolate_freepages_block
mm: fix GFP_THISNODE callers and clarify
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Adds support for HFSX 'HasFolderCount' flag and a corresponding
'folderCount' field in folder records. (For reference see
HFS_FOLDERCOUNT and kHFSHasFolderCountBit/kHFSHasFolderCountMask in
Apple's source code.)
Ignoring subfolder count leads to fs errors found by Mac:
...
Checking catalog hierarchy.
HasFolderCount flag needs to be set (id = 105)
(It should be 0x10 instead of 0)
Incorrect folder count in a directory (id = 2)
(It should be 7 instead of 6)
...
Steps to reproduce:
Format with "newfs_hfs -s /dev/diskXXX".
Mount in Linux.
Create a new directory in root.
Unmount.
Run "fsck_hfs /dev/diskXXX".
The patch handles directory creation, deletion, and rename.
Signed-off-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The expected logic of proc_map_files_get_link() is either to return 0
and initialize 'path' or return an error and leave 'path' uninitialized.
By the time dname_to_vma_addr() returns 0 the corresponding vma may have
already be gone. In this case the path is not initialized but the
return value is still 0. This results in 'general protection fault'
inside d_path().
Steps to reproduce:
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y
fd = open(...);
while (1) {
mmap(fd, ...);
munmap(fd, ...);
}
ls -la /proc/$PID/map_files
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68991
Signed-off-by: Artem Fetishev <artem_fetishev@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Terekhov <aleksandr_terekhov@epam.com>
Reported-by: <wiebittewas@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro.
Clean up file table accesses (get rid of fget_light() in favor of the
fdget() interface), add proper file position locking.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
get rid of fget_light()
sockfd_lookup_light(): switch to fdget^W^Waway from fget_light
vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX
ocfs2 syncs the wrong range...
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instead of returning the flags by reference, we can just have the
low-level primitive return those in lower bits of unsigned long,
with struct file * derived from the rest.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Our write() system call has always been atomic in the sense that you get
the expected thread-safe contiguous write, but we haven't actually
guaranteed that concurrent writes are serialized wrt f_pos accesses, so
threads (or processes) that share a file descriptor and use "write()"
concurrently would quite likely overwrite each others data.
This violates POSIX.1-2008/SUSv4 Section XSI 2.9.7 that says:
"2.9.7 Thread Interactions with Regular File Operations
All of the following functions shall be atomic with respect to each
other in the effects specified in POSIX.1-2008 when they operate on
regular files or symbolic links: [...]"
and one of the effects is the file position update.
This unprotected file position behavior is not new behavior, and nobody
has ever cared. Until now. Yongzhi Pan reported unexpected behavior to
Michael Kerrisk that was due to this.
This resolves the issue with a f_pos-specific lock that is taken by
read/write/lseek on file descriptors that may be shared across threads
or processes.
Reported-by: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
- Fix another nfs4_sequence corruptor in RELEASE_LOCKOWNER
- Fix an Oopsable delegation callback race
- Fix another bad stateid infinite loop
- Fail the data server I/O is the stateid represents a lost lock
- Fix an Oopsable sunrpc trace event"
* tag 'nfs-for-3.14-5' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
SUNRPC: Fix oops when trace sunrpc_task events in nfs client
NFSv4: Fail the truncate() if the lock/open stateid is invalid
NFSv4.1 Fail data server I/O if stateid represents a lost lock
NFSv4: Fix the return value of nfs4_select_rw_stateid
NFSv4: nfs4_stateid_is_current should return 'true' for an invalid stateid
NFS: Fix a delegation callback race
NFSv4: Fix another nfs4_sequence corruptor
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Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Small collection of fixes for 3.14-rc. It contains:
- Three minor update to blk-mq from Christoph.
- Reduce number of unaligned (< 4kb) in-flight writes on mtip32xx to
two. From Micron.
- Make the blk-mq CPU notify spinlock raw, since it can't be a
sleeper spinlock on RT. From Mike Galbraith.
- Drop now bogus BUG_ON() for bio iteration with blk integrity. From
Nic Bellinger.
- Properly propagate the SYNC flag on requests. From Shaohua"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
blk-mq: add REQ_SYNC early
rt,blk,mq: Make blk_mq_cpu_notify_lock a raw spinlock
bio-integrity: Drop bio_integrity_verify BUG_ON in post bip->bip_iter world
blk-mq: support partial I/O completions
blk-mq: merge blk_mq_insert_request and blk_mq_run_request
blk-mq: remove blk_mq_alloc_rq
mtip32xx: Reduce the number of unaligned writes to 2
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If the open stateid could not be recovered, or the file locks were lost,
then we should fail the truncate() operation altogether.
Reported-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1393954269-3974-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1393954269-3974-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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In commit 5521abfdcf4d6 (NFSv4: Resend the READ/WRITE RPC call
if a stateid change causes an error), we overloaded the return value of
nfs4_select_rw_stateid() to cause it to return -EWOULDBLOCK if an RPC
call is outstanding that would cause the NFSv4 lock or open stateid
to change.
That is all redundant when we actually copy the stateid used in the
read/write RPC call that failed, and check that against the current
stateid. It is doubly so, when we consider that in the NFSv4.1 case,
we also set the stateid's seqid to the special value '0', which means
'match the current valid stateid'.
Reported-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1393954269-3974-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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When nfs4_set_rw_stateid() can fails by returning EIO to indicate that
the stateid is completely invalid, then it makes no sense to have it
trigger a retry of the READ or WRITE operation. Instead, we should just
have it fall through and attempt a recovery.
This fixes an infinite loop in which the client keeps replaying the same
bad stateid back to the server.
Reported-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1393954269-3974-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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Current implementation of HFS+ driver has small issue with remount
option. Namely, for example, you are unable to remount from RO mode
into RW mode by means of command "mount -o remount,rw /dev/loop0
/mnt/hfsplus". Trying to execute sequence of commands results in an
error message:
mount /dev/loop0 /mnt/hfsplus
mount -o remount,ro /dev/loop0 /mnt/hfsplus
mount -o remount,rw /dev/loop0 /mnt/hfsplus
mount: you must specify the filesystem type
mount -t hfsplus -o remount,rw /dev/loop0 /mnt/hfsplus
mount: /mnt/hfsplus not mounted or bad option
The reason of such issue is failure of mount syscall:
mount("/dev/loop0", "/mnt/hfsplus", 0x2282a60, MS_MGC_VAL|MS_REMOUNT, NULL) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
Namely, hfsplus_parse_options_remount() method receives empty "input"
argument and return false in such case. As a result, hfsplus_remount()
returns -EINVAL error code.
This patch fixes the issue by means of return true for the case of empty
"input" argument in hfsplus_parse_options_remount() method.
Signed-off-by: Vyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Global quota files are accessed from different nodes. Thus we cannot
cache offset of quota structure in the quota file after we drop our node
reference count to it because after that moment quota structure may be
freed and reallocated elsewhere by a different node resulting in
corruption of quota file.
Fix the problem by clearing dq_off when we are releasing dquot structure.
We also remove the DB_READ_B handling because it is useless -
DQ_ACTIVE_B is set iff DQ_READ_B is set.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit bf6bddf1924e ("mm: introduce compaction and migration for
ballooned pages") introduces page_count(page) into memory compaction
which dereferences page->first_page if PageTail(page).
This results in a very rare NULL pointer dereference on the
aforementioned page_count(page). Indeed, anything that does
compound_head(), including page_count() is susceptible to racing with
prep_compound_page() and seeing a NULL or dangling page->first_page
pointer.
This patch uses Andrea's implementation of compound_trans_head() that
deals with such a race and makes it the default compound_head()
implementation. This includes a read memory barrier that ensures that
if PageTail(head) is true that we return a head page that is neither
NULL nor dangling. The patch then adds a store memory barrier to
prep_compound_page() to ensure page->first_page is set.
This is the safest way to ensure we see the head page that we are
expecting, PageTail(page) is already in the unlikely() path and the
memory barriers are unfortunately required.
Hugetlbfs is the exception, we don't enforce a store memory barrier
during init since no race is possible.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Holger Kiehl <Holger.Kiehl@dwd.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The clean-up in commit 36281caa839f ended up removing a NULL pointer check
that is needed in order to prevent an Oops in
nfs_async_inode_return_delegation().
Reported-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5313E9F6.2020405@intel.com
Fixes: 36281caa839f (NFSv4: Further clean-ups of delegation stateid validation)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull sysfs fix from Greg KH:
"Here is a single sysfs fix for 3.14-rc5. It fixes a reported problem
with the namespace code in sysfs"
* tag 'driver-core-3.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
sysfs: fix namespace refcnt leak
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nfs4_release_lockowner needs to set the rpc_message reply to point to
the nfs4_sequence_res in order to avoid another Oopsable situation
in nfs41_assign_slot.
Fixes: fbd4bfd1d9d21 (NFS: Add nfs4_sequence calls for RELEASE_LOCKOWNER)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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The rfc1002 length actually includes a type byte, which we aren't
masking off. In most cases, it's not a problem since the
RFC1002_SESSION_MESSAGE type is 0, but when doing a RFC1002 session
establishment, the type is non-zero and that throws off the returned
length.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull filesystem fixes from Jan Kara:
"Notification, writeback, udf, quota fixes
The notification patches are (with one exception) a fallout of my
fsnotify rework which went into -rc1 (I've extented LTP to cover these
cornercases to avoid similar breakage in future).
The UDF patch is a nasty data corruption Al has recently reported,
the revert of the writeback patch is due to possibility of violating
sync(2) guarantees, and a quota bug can lead to corruption of quota
files in ocfs2"
* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fsnotify: Allocate overflow events with proper type
fanotify: Handle overflow in case of permission events
fsnotify: Fix detection whether overflow event is queued
Revert "writeback: do not sync data dirtied after sync start"
quota: Fix race between dqput() and dquot_scan_active()
udf: Fix data corruption on file type conversion
inotify: Fix reporting of cookies for inotify events
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As mount() and kill_sb() is not a one-to-one match, we shoudn't get
ns refcnt unconditionally in sysfs_mount(), and instead we should
get the refcnt only when kernfs_mount() allocated a new superblock.
v2:
- Changed the name of the new argument, suggested by Tejun.
- Made the argument optional, suggested by Tejun.
v3:
- Make the new argument as second-to-last arg, suggested by Tejun.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
---
fs/kernfs/mount.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/sysfs/mount.c | 5 +++--
include/linux/kernfs.h | 9 +++++----
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 7053aee26a35 "fsnotify: do not share events between notification
groups" used overflow event statically allocated in a group with the
size of the generic notification event. This causes problems because
some code looks at type specific parts of event structure and gets
confused by a random data it sees there and causes crashes.
Fix the problem by allocating overflow event with type corresponding to
the group type so code cannot get confused.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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If the event queue overflows when we are handling permission event, we
will never get response from userspace. So we must avoid waiting for it.
Change fsnotify_add_notify_event() to return whether overflow has
happened so that we can detect it in fanotify_handle_event() and act
accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Currently we didn't initialize event's list head when we removed it from
the event list. Thus a detection whether overflow event is already
queued wasn't working. Fix it by always initializing the list head when
deleting event from a list.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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We had a bug discovered recently where an upper layer function
(cifs_iovec_write) could pass down a smb_rqst with an invalid amount of
data in it. The length of the SMB frame would be correct, but the rqst
struct would cause smb_send_rqst to send nearly 4GB of data.
This should never be the case. Add some sanity checking to the beginning
of smb_send_rqst that ensures that the amount of data we're going to
send agrees with the length in the RFC1002 header. If it doesn't, WARN()
and return -EIO to the upper layers.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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and use generic_file_aio_write rather than __generic_file_aio_write
in cifs_writev.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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Pull xfs fixes from Dave Chinner:
"This is the first pull request I've had to do for you, so I'm still
sorting things out. The reason I'm sending this and not Ben should be
obvious from the first commit below - SGI has stepped down from the
XFS maintainership role. As such, I'd like to take another
opportunity to thank them for their many years of effort maintaining
XFS and supporting the XFS community that they developed from the
ground up.
So I haven't had time to work things like signed tags into my
workflows yet, so this is just a repo branch I'm asking you to pull
from. And yes, I named the branch -rc4 because I wanted the fixes in
rc4, not because the branch was for merging into -rc3. Probably not
right, either.
Anyway, I should have everything sorted out by the time the next merge
window comes around. If there's anything that you don't like in the
pull req, feel free to flame me unmercifully.
The changes are fixes for recent regressions and important thinkos in
verification code:
- a log vector buffer alignment issue on ia32
- timestamps on truncate got mangled
- primary superblock CRC validation fixes and error message
sanitisation"
* 'xfs-fixes-for-3.14-rc4' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs:
xfs: limit superblock corruption errors to actual corruption
xfs: skip verification on initial "guess" superblock read
MAINTAINERS: SGI no longer maintaining XFS
xfs: xfs_sb_read_verify() doesn't flag bad crcs on primary sb
xfs: ensure correct log item buffer alignment
xfs: ensure correct timestamp updates from truncate
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This reverts commit c4a391b53a72d2df4ee97f96f78c1d5971b47489. Dave
Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> has reported the commit may cause some
inodes to be left out from sync(2). This is because we can call
redirty_tail() for some inode (which sets i_dirtied_when to current time)
after sync(2) has started or similarly requeue_inode() can set
i_dirtied_when to current time if writeback had to skip some pages. The
real problem is in the functions clobbering i_dirtied_when but fixing
that isn't trivial so revert is a safer choice for now.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 3.13
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Given that bip->bip_iter.bi_size is decremented after bio_advance() ->
bio_integrity_advance() is called, the BUG_ON() in bio_integrity_verify()
ends up tripping in v3.14-rc1 code with the advent of immutable biovecs
in:
commit d57a5f7c6605f15f3b5134837e68b448a7cea88e
Author: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Date: Sat Nov 23 17:20:16 2013 -0800
bio-integrity: Convert to bvec_iter
Given that there is no easy way to ascertain the original bi_size
value, go ahead and drop this BUG_ON().
Reported-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Reported-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Currently last dqput() can race with dquot_scan_active() causing it to
call callback for an already deactivated dquot. The race is as follows:
CPU1 CPU2
dqput()
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock);
if (atomic_read(&dquot->dq_count) > 1) {
- not taken
if (test_bit(DQ_ACTIVE_B, &dquot->dq_flags)) {
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
->release_dquot(dquot);
if (atomic_read(&dquot->dq_count) > 1)
- not taken
dquot_scan_active()
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock);
if (!test_bit(DQ_ACTIVE_B, &dquot->dq_flags))
- not taken
atomic_inc(&dquot->dq_count);
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
- proceeds to release dquot
ret = fn(dquot, priv);
- called for inactive dquot
Fix the problem by making sure possible ->release_dquot() is finished by
the time we call the callback and new calls to it will notice reference
dquot_scan_active() has taken and bail out.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.29
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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UDF has two types of files - files with data stored in inode (ICB in
UDF terminology) and files with data stored in external data blocks. We
convert file from in-inode format to external format in
udf_file_aio_write() when we find out data won't fit into inode any
longer. However the following race between two O_APPEND writes can happen:
CPU1 CPU2
udf_file_aio_write() udf_file_aio_write()
down_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
checks that i_size + count1 fits within inode
=> no need to convert
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
down_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
checks that i_size + count2 fits
within inode => no need to convert
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
generic_file_aio_write()
- extends file by count1 bytes
generic_file_aio_write()
- extends file by count2 bytes
Clearly if count1 + count2 doesn't fit into the inode, we overwrite
kernel buffers beyond inode, possibly corrupting the filesystem as well.
Fix the problem by acquiring i_mutex before checking whether write fits
into the inode and using __generic_file_aio_write() afterwards which
puts check and write into one critical section.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"Quite a few fixes this time.
Three locking fixes, all marked for -stable. A couple error path
fixes and some misc fixes. Hugh found a bug in memcg offlining
sequence and we thought we could fix that from cgroup core side but
that turned out to be insufficient and got reverted. A different fix
has been applied to -mm"
* 'for-3.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
cgroup: update cgroup_enable_task_cg_lists() to grab siglock
Revert "cgroup: use an ordered workqueue for cgroup destruction"
cgroup: protect modifications to cgroup_idr with cgroup_mutex
cgroup: fix locking in cgroup_cfts_commit()
cgroup: fix error return from cgroup_create()
cgroup: fix error return value in cgroup_mount()
cgroup: use an ordered workqueue for cgroup destruction
nfs: include xattr.h from fs/nfs/nfs3proc.c
cpuset: update MAINTAINERS entry
arm, pm, vmpressure: add missing slab.h includes
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include stable fixes for the following bugs:
- General performance regression due to NFS_INO_INVALID_LABEL being
set when the server doesn't support labeled NFS
- Hang in the RPC code due to a socket out-of-buffer race
- Infinite loop when trying to establish the NFSv4 lease
- Use-after-free bug in the RPCSEC gss code.
- nfs4_select_rw_stateid is returning with a non-zero error value on
success
Other bug fixes:
- Potential memory scribble in the RPC bi-directional RPC code
- Pipe version reference leak
- Use the correct net namespace in the new NFSv4 migration code"
* tag 'nfs-for-3.14-4' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFS fix error return in nfs4_select_rw_stateid
NFSv4: Use the correct net namespace in nfs4_update_server
SUNRPC: Fix a pipe_version reference leak
SUNRPC: Ensure that gss_auth isn't freed before its upcall messages
SUNRPC: Fix potential memory scribble in xprt_free_bc_request()
SUNRPC: Fix races in xs_nospace()
SUNRPC: Don't create a gss auth cache unless rpc.gssd is running
NFS: Do not set NFS_INO_INVALID_LABEL unless server supports labeled NFS
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Do not return an error when nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid succeeds.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392737765-41942-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Fixes: ef1820f9be27b (NFSv4: Don't try to recover NFSv4 locks when...)
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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Today, if
xfs_sb_read_verify
xfs_sb_verify
xfs_mount_validate_sb
detects superblock corruption, it'll be extremely noisy, dumping
2 stacks, 2 hexdumps, etc.
This is because we call XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR in xfs_mount_validate_sb
as well as in xfs_sb_read_verify.
Also, *any* errors in xfs_mount_validate_sb which are not corruption
per se; things like too-big-blocksize, bad version, bad magic, v1 dirs,
rw-incompat etc - things which do not return EFSCORRUPTED - will
still do the whole XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR spew when xfs_sb_read_verify
sees any error at all. And it suggests to the user that they
should run xfs_repair, even if the root cause of the mount failure
is a simple incompatibility.
I'll submit that the probably-not-corrupted errors don't warrant
this much noise, so this patch removes the warning for anything
other than EFSCORRUPTED returns, and replaces the lower-level
XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR with an xfs_notice().
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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When xfs_readsb() does the very first read of the superblock,
it makes a guess at the length of the buffer, based on the
sector size of the underlying storage. This may or may
not match the filesystem sector size in sb_sectsize, so
we can't i.e. do a CRC check on it; it might be too short.
In fact, mounting a filesystem with sb_sectsize larger
than the device sector size will cause a mount failure
if CRCs are enabled, because we are checksumming a length
which exceeds the buffer passed to it.
So always read twice; the first time we read with NULL
buffer ops to skip verification; then set the proper
read length, hook up the proper verifier, and give it
another go.
Once we are sure that we've got the right buffer length,
we can also use bp->b_length in the xfs_sb_read_verify,
rather than the less-trusted on-disk sectorsize for
secondary superblocks. Before this we ran the risk of
passing junk to the crc32c routines, which didn't always
handle extreme values.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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My earlier commit 10e6e65 deserves a layer or two of brown paper
bags. The logic in that commit means that a CRC failure on the
primary superblock will *never* result in an error return.
Hopefully this fixes it, so that we always return the error
if it's a primary superblock, otherwise only if the filesystem
has CRCs enabled.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Pull jfs fix from David Kleikamp:
"Another ACL regression. This one more subtle"
* tag 'jfs-3.14-rc4' of git://github.com/kleikamp/linux-shaggy:
jfs: set i_ctime when setting ACL
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes for v3.14"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
jbd2: fix use after free in jbd2_journal_start_reserved()
ext4: don't leave i_crtime.tv_sec uninitialized
ext4: fix online resize with a non-standard blocks per group setting
ext4: fix online resize with very large inode tables
ext4: don't try to modify s_flags if the the file system is read-only
ext4: fix error paths in swap_inode_boot_loader()
ext4: fix xfstest generic/299 block validity failures
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