| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"More EFI fixes forwarded from Ard Biesheuvel:
- revert efivarfs kmemleak fix again - it was a false positive
- make CONFIG_EFI_EARLYCON depend on CONFIG_EFI explicitly so it does
not pull in other dependencies unnecessarily if CONFIG_EFI is not
set
- defer attempts to load SSDT overrides from EFI vars until after the
efivar layer is up"
* tag 'efi-urgent-for-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi: EFI_EARLYCON should depend on EFI
efivarfs: revert "fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()"
efi/efivars: Set generic ops before loading SSDT
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
- Out of bounds fix for the cq size cap from earlier this release (Joseph)
- iov_iter type check fix (Pavel)
- Files grab + cancelation fix (Pavel)
* tag 'io_uring-5.10-2020-11-27' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix files grab/cancel race
io_uring: fix ITER_BVEC check
io_uring: fix shift-out-of-bounds when round up cq size
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few fixes for various warnings that accumulated over past two weeks:
- tree-checker: add missing return values for some errors
- lockdep fixes
- when reading qgroup config and starting quota rescan
- reverse order of quota ioctl lock and VFS freeze lock
- avoid accessing potentially stale fs info during device scan,
reported by syzbot
- add scope NOFS protection around qgroup relation changes
- check for running transaction before flushing qgroups
- fix tracking of new delalloc ranges for some cases"
* tag 'for-5.10-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: fix lockdep splat when enabling and disabling qgroups
btrfs: do nofs allocations when adding and removing qgroup relations
btrfs: fix lockdep splat when reading qgroup config on mount
btrfs: tree-checker: add missing returns after data_ref alignment checks
btrfs: don't access possibly stale fs_info data for printing duplicate device
btrfs: tree-checker: add missing return after error in root_item
btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already hold the handle
btrfs: fix missing delalloc new bit for new delalloc ranges
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When one task is in io_uring_cancel_files() and another is doing
io_prep_async_work() a race may happen. That's because after accounting
a request inflight in first call to io_grab_identity() it still may fail
and go to io_identity_cow(), which migh briefly keep dangling
work.identity and not only.
Grab files last, so io_prep_async_work() won't fail if it did get into
->inflight_list.
note: the bug shouldn't exist after making io_uring_cancel_files() not
poking into other tasks' requests.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The memory leak addressed by commit fe5186cf12e3 is a false positive:
all allocations are recorded in a linked list, and freed when the
filesystem is unmounted. This leads to double frees, and as reported
by David, leads to crashes if SLUB is configured to self destruct when
double frees occur.
So drop the redundant kfree() again, and instead, mark the offending
pointer variable so the allocation is ignored by kmemleak.
Cc: Vamshi K Sthambamkadi <vamshi.k.sthambamkadi@gmail.com>
Fixes: fe5186cf12e3 ("efivarfs: fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
"Four smb3 fixes for stable: one fixes a memleak, the other three
address a problem found with decryption offload that can cause a use
after free"
* tag '5.10-rc5-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
smb3: Handle error case during offload read path
smb3: Avoid Mid pending list corruption
smb3: Call cifs reconnect from demultiplex thread
cifs: fix a memleak with modefromsid
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iov_iter::type is a bitmask that also keeps direction etc., so it
shouldn't be directly compared against ITER_*. Use proper helper.
Fixes: ff6165b2d7f6 ("io_uring: retain iov_iter state over io_read/io_write calls")
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Abaci Fuzz reported a shift-out-of-bounds BUG in io_uring_create():
[ 59.598207] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
[ 59.599665] shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
[ 59.601230] CPU: 0 PID: 963 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #3
[ 59.602502] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 59.603673] Call Trace:
[ 59.604286] dump_stack+0x107/0x163
[ 59.605237] ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a
[ 59.606094] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb2/0x20e
[ 59.607335] ? lock_downgrade+0x6c0/0x6c0
[ 59.608182] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xaf/0xe0
[ 59.609166] io_uring_create.cold+0x99/0x149
[ 59.610114] io_uring_setup+0xd6/0x140
[ 59.610975] ? io_uring_create+0x2510/0x2510
[ 59.611945] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400
[ 59.613007] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x27/0x80
[ 59.614038] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x5b/0x180
[ 59.615056] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[ 59.615940] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 59.617007] RIP: 0033:0x7f2bb8a0b239
This is caused by roundup_pow_of_two() if the input entries larger
enough, e.g. 2^32-1. For sq_entries, it will check first and we allow
at most IORING_MAX_ENTRIES, so it is okay. But for cq_entries, we do
round up first, that may overflow and truncate it to 0, which is not
the expected behavior. So check the cq size first and then do round up.
Fixes: 88ec3211e463 ("io_uring: round-up cq size before comparing with rounded sq size")
Reported-by: Abaci Fuzz <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When running test case btrfs/017 from fstests, lockdep reported the
following splat:
[ 1297.067385] ======================================================
[ 1297.067708] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 1297.068022] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted
[ 1297.068322] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 1297.068629] btrfs/189080 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1297.068929] ffff9f2725731690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.069274]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 1297.069868] ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.070219]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 1297.071131]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 1297.071721]
-> #1 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 1297.072375] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 1297.072710] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
[ 1297.073061] btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x59/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.073421] create_subvol+0x194/0x990 [btrfs]
[ 1297.073780] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.074133] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.074498] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 1297.074872] btrfs_ioctl+0x1a90/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.075245] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 1297.075617] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[ 1297.075993] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1297.076380]
-> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 1297.077166] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
[ 1297.077572] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
[ 1297.077984] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 1297.078411] start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
[ 1297.078853] btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.079323] btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.079789] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 1297.080232] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[ 1297.080680] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1297.081139]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1297.082536] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1297.083510] CPU0 CPU1
[ 1297.084005] ---- ----
[ 1297.084500] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
[ 1297.084994] lock(sb_internal#2);
[ 1297.085485] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
[ 1297.085974] lock(sb_internal#2);
[ 1297.086454]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1297.087880] 3 locks held by btrfs/189080:
[ 1297.088324] #0: ffff9f2725731470 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0xa73/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.088799] #1: ffff9f2702b60cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.089284] #2: ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.089771]
stack backtrace:
[ 1297.090662] CPU: 5 PID: 189080 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
[ 1297.091132] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1297.092123] Call Trace:
[ 1297.092629] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5
[ 1297.093115] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110
[ 1297.093596] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
[ 1297.094076] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[ 1297.094553] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
[ 1297.095029] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
[ 1297.095510] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 1297.095993] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.096476] start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
[ 1297.096962] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.097451] btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
[ 1297.097941] ? btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.098429] btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
[ 1297.098904] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x430
[ 1297.099382] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[ 1297.099854] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
[ 1297.100328] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[ 1297.100801] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0x180
[ 1297.101272] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 1297.101739] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 1297.102207] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[ 1297.102673] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1297.103148] RIP: 0033:0x7f773ff65d87
This is because during the quota enable ioctl we lock first the mutex
qgroup_ioctl_lock and then start a transaction, and starting a transaction
acquires a fs freeze semaphore (at the VFS level). However, every other
code path, except for the quota disable ioctl path, we do the opposite:
we start a transaction and then lock the mutex.
So fix this by making the quota enable and disable paths to start the
transaction without having the mutex locked, and then, after starting the
transaction, lock the mutex and check if some other task already enabled
or disabled the quotas, bailing with success if that was the case.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When adding or removing a qgroup relation we are doing a GFP_KERNEL
allocation which is not safe because we are holding a transaction
handle open and that can make us deadlock if the allocator needs to
recurse into the filesystem. So just surround those calls with a
nofs context.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Lockdep reported the following splat when running test btrfs/190 from
fstests:
[ 9482.126098] ======================================================
[ 9482.126184] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 9482.126281] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted
[ 9482.126365] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 9482.126456] mount/24187 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 9482.126534] ffffa0c869a7dac0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.126647]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 9482.126777] ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
[ 9482.126886]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 9482.127078]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 9482.127213]
-> #1 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 9482.127366] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 9482.127436] down_read_nested+0x45/0x220
[ 9482.127528] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
[ 9482.127613] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x41/0x130 [btrfs]
[ 9482.127702] btrfs_search_slot+0x514/0xc30 [btrfs]
[ 9482.127788] update_qgroup_status_item+0x72/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 9482.127877] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xde/0x680 [btrfs]
[ 9482.127964] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs]
[ 9482.128039] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0
[ 9482.128110] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[ 9482.128181] kthread+0x153/0x170
[ 9482.128256] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 9482.128327]
-> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 9482.128464] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
[ 9482.128551] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
[ 9482.128623] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 9482.130029] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
[ 9482.130590] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.131577] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs]
[ 9482.132175] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.132756] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs]
[ 9482.133325] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
[ 9482.133866] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
[ 9482.134392] fc_mount+0xe/0x40
[ 9482.134908] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90
[ 9482.135428] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.135942] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
[ 9482.136444] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
[ 9482.136949] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70
[ 9482.137438] do_mount+0x75/0x90
[ 9482.137923] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
[ 9482.138400] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[ 9482.138873] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 9482.139346]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 9482.140735] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 9482.141594] CPU0 CPU1
[ 9482.142011] ---- ----
[ 9482.142411] lock(btrfs-quota-00);
[ 9482.142806] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
[ 9482.143216] lock(btrfs-quota-00);
[ 9482.143629] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
[ 9482.144056]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 9482.145242] 2 locks held by mount/24187:
[ 9482.145637] #0: ffffa0c8411c40e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb9/0x400
[ 9482.146061] #1: ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
[ 9482.146509]
stack backtrace:
[ 9482.147350] CPU: 1 PID: 24187 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
[ 9482.147788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 9482.148709] Call Trace:
[ 9482.149169] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5
[ 9482.149628] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110
[ 9482.150090] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
[ 9482.150561] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[ 9482.151017] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
[ 9482.151470] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
[ 9482.151941] ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
[ 9482.152402] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
[ 9482.152887] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.153354] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
[ 9482.153826] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.154301] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.154768] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.155226] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.155690] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs]
[ 9482.156160] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.156643] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs]
[ 9482.157108] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90
[ 9482.157567] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0
[ 9482.158030] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
[ 9482.158489] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
[ 9482.158947] fc_mount+0xe/0x40
[ 9482.159403] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90
[ 9482.159875] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs]
[ 9482.160335] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90
[ 9482.160805] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0
[ 9482.161260] ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
[ 9482.161714] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
[ 9482.162166] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
[ 9482.162616] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70
[ 9482.163070] do_mount+0x75/0x90
[ 9482.163525] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
[ 9482.163986] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[ 9482.164437] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 9482.164902] RIP: 0033:0x7f51e907caaa
This happens because at btrfs_read_qgroup_config() we can call
qgroup_rescan_init() while holding a read lock on a quota btree leaf,
acquired by the previous call to btrfs_search_slot_for_read(), and
qgroup_rescan_init() acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock.
A qgroup rescan worker does the opposite: it acquires the mutex
qgroup_rescan_lock, at btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(), and then tries to
update the qgroup status item in the quota btree through the call to
update_qgroup_status_item(). This inversion of locking order
between the qgroup_rescan_lock mutex and quota btree locks causes the
splat.
Fix this simply by releasing and freeing the path before calling
qgroup_rescan_init() at btrfs_read_qgroup_config().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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There are sectorsize alignment checks that are reported but then
check_extent_data_ref continues. This was not intended, wrong alignment
is not a minor problem and we should return with error.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: 0785a9aacf9d ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add EXTENT_DATA_REF check")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Syzbot reported a possible use-after-free when printing a duplicate device
warning device_list_add().
At this point it can happen that a btrfs_device::fs_info is not correctly
setup yet, so we're accessing stale data, when printing the warning
message using the btrfs_printk() wrappers.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880878e06a8 by task syz-executor225/7068
CPU: 1 PID: 7068 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x66/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:383
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245
device_list_add+0x1a88/0x1d60 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:943
btrfs_scan_one_device+0x196/0x490 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1359
btrfs_mount_root+0x48f/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1634
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x44840a
RSP: 002b:00007ffedfffd608 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffedfffd670 RCX: 000000000044840a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffedfffd630
RBP: 00007ffedfffd630 R08: 00007ffedfffd670 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000001a
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000003
Allocated by task 6945:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x100/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:461
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:577 [inline]
kvmalloc_node+0x81/0x110 mm/util.c:574
kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:757 [inline]
kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:765 [inline]
btrfs_mount_root+0xd0/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1613
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 6945:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x17/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0xdd/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:422
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
kfree+0x113/0x200 mm/slab.c:3756
deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:335
btrfs_mount_root+0x72b/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1678
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880878e0000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16k of size 16384
The buggy address is located 1704 bytes inside of
16384-byte region [ffff8880878e0000, ffff8880878e4000)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000060704f30 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x878e0
head:0000000060704f30 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfffe0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 00fffe0000010200 ffffea00028e9a08 ffffea00021e3608 ffff8880aa440b00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880878e0000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880878e0580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880878e0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880878e0680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880878e0700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880878e0780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The syzkaller reproducer for this use-after-free crafts a filesystem image
and loop mounts it twice in a loop. The mount will fail as the crafted
image has an invalid chunk tree. When this happens btrfs_mount_root() will
call deactivate_locked_super(), which then cleans up fs_info and
fs_info::sb. If a second thread now adds the same block-device to the
filesystem, it will get detected as a duplicate device and
device_list_add() will reject the duplicate and print a warning. But as
the fs_info pointer passed in is non-NULL this will result in a
use-after-free.
Instead of printing possibly uninitialized or already freed memory in
btrfs_printk(), explicitly pass in a NULL fs_info so the printing of the
device name will be skipped altogether.
There was a slightly different approach discussed in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20200114060920.4527-1-anand.jain@oracle.com/t/#u
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000c9e14b05afcc41ba@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+582e66e5edf36a22c7b0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"Forwarded EFI fixes from Ard Biesheuvel:
- fix memory leak in efivarfs driver
- fix HYP mode issue in 32-bit ARM version of the EFI stub when built
in Thumb2 mode
- avoid leaking EFI pgd pages on allocation failure"
* tag 'efi-urgent-for-v5.10-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/x86: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()
efivarfs: fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()
efi/arm: set HSCTLR Thumb2 bit correctly for HVC calls from HYP
|
|
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"8 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (madvise, pagemap,
readahead, memcg, userfaultfd), kbuild, and vfs"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
mm: fix madvise WILLNEED performance problem
libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()
mm/userfaultfd: do not access vma->vm_mm after calling handle_userfault()
mm: memcg/slab: fix root memcg vmstats
mm: fix readahead_page_batch for retry entries
mm: fix phys_to_target_node() and memory_add_physaddr_to_nid() exports
compiler-clang: remove version check for BPF Tracing
mm/madvise: fix memory leak from process_madvise
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"A final set of miscellaneous bug fixes for ext4"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_fixes2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix bogus warning in ext4_update_dx_flag()
jbd2: fix kernel-doc markups
ext4: drop fast_commit from /proc/mounts
|
|
When doing a lookup in a directory, the afs filesystem uses a bulk
status fetch to speculatively retrieve the statuses of up to 48 other
vnodes found in the same directory and it will then either update extant
inodes or create new ones - effectively doing 'lookup ahead'.
To avoid the possibility of deadlocking itself, however, the filesystem
doesn't lock all of those inodes; rather just the directory inode is
locked (by the VFS).
When the operation completes, afs_inode_init_from_status() or
afs_apply_status() is called, depending on whether the inode already
exists, to commit the new status.
A case exists, however, where the speculative status fetch operation may
straddle a modification operation on one of those vnodes. What can then
happen is that the speculative bulk status RPC retrieves the old status,
and whilst that is happening, the modification happens - which returns
an updated status, then the modification status is committed, then we
attempt to commit the speculative status.
This results in something like the following being seen in dmesg:
kAFS: vnode modified {100058:861} 8->9 YFS.InlineBulkStatus
showing that for vnode 861 on volume 100058, we saw YFS.InlineBulkStatus
say that the vnode had data version 8 when we'd already recorded version
9 due to a local modification. This was causing the cache to be
invalidated for that vnode when it shouldn't have been. If it happens
on a data file, this might lead to local changes being lost.
Fix this by ignoring speculative status updates if the data version
doesn't match the expected value.
Note that it is possible to get a DV regression if a volume gets
restored from a backup - but we should get a callback break in such a
case that should trigger a recheck anyway. It might be worth checking
the volume creation time in the volsync info and, if a change is
observed in that (as would happen on a restore), invalidate all caches
associated with the volume.
Fixes: 5cf9dd55a0ec ("afs: Prospectively look up extra files when doing a single lookup")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The attr->set() receive a value of u64, but simple_strtoll() is used for
doing the conversion. It will lead to the error cast if user inputs a
negative value.
Use kstrtoull() instead of simple_strtoll() to convert a string got from
the user to an unsigned value. The former will return '-EINVAL' if it
gets a negetive value, but the latter can't handle the situation
correctly. Make 'val' unsigned long long as what kstrtoull() takes,
this will eliminate the compile warning on no 64-bit architectures.
Fixes: f7b88631a897 ("fs/libfs.c: fix simple_attr_write() on 32bit machines")
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1605341356-11872-1-git-send-email-yangyicong@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong:
"The critical fixes are for a crash that someone reported in the xattr
code on 32-bit arm last week; and a revert of the rmap key comparison
change from last week as it was totally wrong. I need a vacation. :(
Summary:
- Fix various deficiencies in online fsck's metadata checking code
- Fix an integer casting bug in the xattr code on 32-bit systems
- Fix a hang in an inode walk when the inode index is corrupt
- Fix error codes being dropped when initializing per-AG structures
- Fix nowait directio writes that partially succeed but return EAGAIN
- Revert last week's rmap comparison patch because it was wrong"
* tag 'xfs-5.10-fixes-7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
xfs: revert "xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions"
xfs: don't allow NOWAIT DIO across extent boundaries
xfs: return corresponding errcode if xfs_initialize_perag() fail
xfs: ensure inobt record walks always make forward progress
xfs: fix forkoff miscalculation related to XFS_LITINO(mp)
xfs: directory scrub should check the null bestfree entries too
xfs: strengthen rmap record flags checking
xfs: fix the minrecs logic when dealing with inode root child blocks
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fanotify fix from Jan Kara:
"A single fanotify fix from Amir"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fanotify: fix logic of reporting name info with watched parent
|
|
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Mostly regression or stable fodder:
- Disallow async path resolution of /proc/self
- Tighten constraints for segmented async buffered reads
- Fix double completion for a retry error case
- Fix for fixed file life times (Pavel)"
* tag 'io_uring-5.10-2020-11-20' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: order refnode recycling
io_uring: get an active ref_node from files_data
io_uring: don't double complete failed reissue request
mm: never attempt async page lock if we've transferred data already
io_uring: handle -EOPNOTSUPP on path resolution
proc: don't allow async path resolution of /proc/self components
|
|
The idea of the warning in ext4_update_dx_flag() is that we should warn
when we are clearing EXT4_INODE_INDEX on a filesystem with metadata
checksums enabled since after clearing the flag, checksums for internal
htree nodes will become invalid. So there's no need to warn (or actually
do anything) when EXT4_INODE_INDEX is not set.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118153032.17281-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: 48a34311953d ("ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
Kernel-doc markup should use this format:
identifier - description
They should not have any type before that, as otherwise
the parser won't do the right thing.
Also, some identifiers have different names between their
prototypes and the kernel-doc markup.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/72f5c6628f5f278d67625f60893ffbc2ca28d46e.1605521731.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
This reverts commit 6ff646b2ceb0eec916101877f38da0b73e3a5b7f.
Your maintainer committed a major braino in the rmap code by adding the
attr fork, bmbt, and unwritten extent usage bits into rmap record key
comparisons. While XFS uses the usage bits *in the rmap records* for
cross-referencing metadata in xfs_scrub and xfs_repair, it only needs
the owner and offset information to distinguish between reverse mappings
of the same physical extent into the data fork of a file at multiple
offsets. The other bits are not important for key comparisons for index
lookups, and never have been.
Eric Sandeen reports that this causes regressions in generic/299, so
undo this patch before it does more damage.
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
Fixes: 6ff646b2ceb0 ("xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
|
|
The options in /proc/mounts must be valid mount options --- and
fast_commit is not a mount option. Otherwise, command sequences like
this will fail:
# mount /dev/vdc /vdc
# mkdir -p /vdc/phoronix_test_suite /pts
# mount --bind /vdc/phoronix_test_suite /pts
# mount -o remount,nodioread_nolock /pts
mount: /pts: mount point not mounted or bad option.
And in the system logs, you'll find:
EXT4-fs (vdc): Unrecognized mount option "fast_commit" or missing value
Fixes: 995a3ed67fc8 ("ext4: add fast_commit feature and handling for extended mount options")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
Jens has reported a situation where partial direct IOs can be issued
and completed yet still return -EAGAIN. We don't want this to report
a short IO as we want XFS to complete user DIO entirely or not at
all.
This partial IO situation can occur on a write IO that is split
across an allocated extent and a hole, and the second mapping is
returning EAGAIN because allocation would be required.
The trivial reproducer:
$ sudo xfs_io -fdt -c "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite -V 1 -b 8k -N 0 8k" /mnt/scr/foo
wrote 4096/4096 bytes at offset 0
4 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0001 sec (27.509 MiB/sec and 7042.2535 ops/sec)
pwrite: Resource temporarily unavailable
$
The pwritev2(0, 8kB, RWF_NOWAIT) call returns EAGAIN having done
the first 4kB write:
xfs_file_direct_write: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 size 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 0x2000
iomap_apply: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 pos 0 length 8192 flags WRITE|DIRECT|NOWAIT (0x31) ops xfs_direct_write_iomap_ops caller iomap_dio_rw actor iomap_dio_actor
xfs_ilock_nowait: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_ilock_for_iomap
xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin
xfs_iomap_found: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 size 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 8192 fork data startoff 0x0 startblock 24 blockcount 0x1
iomap_apply_dstmap: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 bdev 259:1 addr 102400 offset 0 length 4096 type MAPPED flags DIRTY
Here the first iomap loop has mapped the first 4kB of the file and
issued the IO, and we enter the second iomap_apply loop:
iomap_apply: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 pos 4096 length 4096 flags WRITE|DIRECT|NOWAIT (0x31) ops xfs_direct_write_iomap_ops caller iomap_dio_rw actor iomap_dio_actor
xfs_ilock_nowait: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_ilock_for_iomap
xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin
And we exit with -EAGAIN out because we hit the allocate case trying
to make the second 4kB block.
Then IO completes on the first 4kB and the original IO context
completes and unlocks the inode, returning -EAGAIN to userspace:
xfs_end_io_direct_write: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 isize 0x1000 disize 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 4096
xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags IOLOCK_SHARED caller xfs_file_dio_aio_write
There are other vectors to the same problem when we re-enter the
mapping code if we have to make multiple mappinfs under NOWAIT
conditions. e.g. failing trylocks, COW extents being found,
allocation being required, and so on.
Avoid all these potential problems by only allowing IOMAP_NOWAIT IO
to go ahead if the mapping we retrieve for the IO spans an entire
allocated extent. This avoids the possibility of subsequent mappings
to complete the IO from triggering NOWAIT semantics by any means as
NOWAIT IO will now only enter the mapping code once per NOWAIT IO.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
|
In xfs_initialize_perag(), if kmem_zalloc(), xfs_buf_hash_init(), or
radix_tree_preload() failed, the returned value 'error' is not set
accordingly.
Reported-as-fixing: 8b26c5825e02 ("xfs: handle ENOMEM correctly during initialisation of perag structures")
Fixes: 9b2471797942 ("xfs: cache unlinked pointers in an rhashtable")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
|
The aim of the inode btree record iterator function is to call a
callback on every record in the btree. To avoid having to tear down and
recreate the inode btree cursor around every callback, it caches a
certain number of records in a memory buffer. After each batch of
callback invocations, we have to perform a btree lookup to find the
next record after where we left off.
However, if the keys of the inode btree are corrupt, the lookup might
put us in the wrong part of the inode btree, causing the walk function
to loop forever. Therefore, we add extra cursor tracking to make sure
that we never go backwards neither when performing the lookup nor when
jumping to the next inobt record. This also fixes an off by one error
where upon resume the lookup should have been for the inode /after/ the
point at which we stopped.
Found by fuzzing xfs/460 with keys[2].startino = ones causing bulkstat
and quotacheck to hang.
Fixes: a211432c27ff ("xfs: create simplified inode walk function")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
|
|
Currently, commit e9e2eae89ddb dropped a (int) decoration from
XFS_LITINO(mp), and since sizeof() expression is also involved,
the result of XFS_LITINO(mp) is simply as the size_t type
(commonly unsigned long).
Considering the expression in xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit():
offset = (XFS_LITINO(mp) - bytes) >> 3;
let "bytes" be (int)340, and
"XFS_LITINO(mp)" be (unsigned long)336.
on 64-bit platform, the expression is
offset = ((unsigned long)336 - (int)340) >> 3 =
(int)(0xfffffffffffffffcUL >> 3) = -1
but on 32-bit platform, the expression is
offset = ((unsigned long)336 - (int)340) >> 3 =
(int)(0xfffffffcUL >> 3) = 0x1fffffff
instead.
so offset becomes a large positive number on 32-bit platform, and
cause xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit() returns maxforkoff rather than 0.
Therefore, one result is
"ASSERT(new_size <= XFS_IFORK_SIZE(ip, whichfork));"
assertion failure in xfs_idata_realloc(), which was also the root
cause of the original bugreport from Dennis, see:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1894177
And it can also be manually triggered with the following commands:
$ touch a;
$ setfattr -n user.0 -v "`seq 0 80`" a;
$ setfattr -n user.1 -v "`seq 0 80`" a
on 32-bit platform.
Fix the case in xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit() by bailing out
"XFS_LITINO(mp) < bytes" in advance suggested by Eric and a misleading
comment together with this bugfix suggested by Darrick. It seems the
other users of XFS_LITINO(mp) are not impacted.
Fixes: e9e2eae89ddb ("xfs: only check the superblock version for dinode size calculation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7+
Reported-and-tested-by: Dennis Gilmore <dgilmore@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
|
Teach the directory scrubber to check all the bestfree entries,
including the null ones. We want to be able to detect the case where
the entry is null but there actually /is/ a directory data block.
Found by fuzzing lbests[0] = ones in xfs/391.
Fixes: df481968f33b ("xfs: scrub directory freespace")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
We always know the correct state of the rmap record flags (attr, bmbt,
unwritten) so check them by direct comparison.
Fixes: d852657ccfc0 ("xfs: cross-reference reverse-mapping btree")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
The comment and logic in xchk_btree_check_minrecs for dealing with
inode-rooted btrees isn't quite correct. While the direct children of
the inode root are allowed to have fewer records than what would
normally be allowed for a regular ondisk btree block, this is only true
if there is only one child block and the number of records don't fit in
the inode root.
Fixes: 08a3a692ef58 ("xfs: btree scrub should check minrecs")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Patch 541656d3a513 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts") changed
the check for glock state in function freeze_go_sync() from "gl->gl_state
== LM_ST_SHARED" to "gl->gl_req == LM_ST_EXCLUSIVE". That's wrong and it
regressed gfs2's freeze/thaw mechanism because it caused only the freezing
node (which requests the glock in EX) to queue freeze work.
All nodes go through this go_sync code path during the freeze to drop their
SHared hold on the freeze glock, allowing the freezing node to acquire it
in EXclusive mode. But all the nodes must freeze access to the file system
locally, so they ALL must queue freeze work. The freeze_work calls
freeze_func, which makes a request to reacquire the freeze glock in SH,
effectively blocking until the thaw from the EX holder. Once thawed, the
freezing node drops its EX hold on the freeze glock, then the (blocked)
freeze_func reacquires the freeze glock in SH again (on all nodes, including
the freezer) so all nodes go back to a thawed state.
This patch changes the check back to gl_state == LM_ST_SHARED like it was
prior to 541656d3a513.
Fixes: 541656d3a513 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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Don't recycle a refnode until we're done with all requests of nodes
ejected before.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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An active ref_node always can be found in ctx->files_data, it's much
safer to get it this way instead of poking into files_data->ref_list.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Zorro reports that an xfstest test case is failing, and it turns out that
for the reissue path we can potentially issue a double completion on the
request for the failure path. There's an issue around the retry as well,
but for now, at least just make sure that we handle the error path
correctly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b63534c41e20 ("io_uring: re-issue block requests that failed because of resources")
Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Mid callback needs to be called only when valid data is
read into pages.
These patches address a problem found during decryption offload:
CIFS: VFS: trying to dequeue a deleted mid
that could cause a refcount use after free:
Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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When reconnect happens Mid queue can be corrupted when both
demultiplex and offload thread try to dequeue the MID from the
pending list.
These patches address a problem found during decryption offload:
CIFS: VFS: trying to dequeue a deleted mid
that could cause a refcount use after free:
Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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cifs_reconnect needs to be called only from demultiplex thread.
skip cifs_reconnect in offload thread. So, cifs_reconnect will be
called by demultiplex thread in subsequent request.
These patches address a problem found during decryption offload:
CIFS: VFS: trying to dequeue a deleted mid
that can cause a refcount use after free:
[ 1271.389453] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
[ 1271.389456] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xae/0xf0
[ 1271.389457] Code: fa 1d 6a 01 01 e8 c7 44 b1 ff 0f 0b 5d c3 80 3d e7 1d 6a 01 00 75 91 48 c7 c7 d8 be 1d a2 c6 05 d7 1d 6a 01 01 e8 a7 44 b1 ff <0f> 0b 5d c3 80 3d c5 1d 6a 01 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 30 bf
[ 1271.389458] RSP: 0018:ffffa4cdc1f87e30 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1271.389458] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9974d2809f00 RCX: ffff9974df898cc8
[ 1271.389459] RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9974df898cc0
[ 1271.389460] RBP: ffffa4cdc1f87e30 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00000000000002c0
[ 1271.389460] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9974b7fdb5c0
[ 1271.389461] R13: ffff9974d2809f00 R14: ffff9974ccea0a80 R15: ffff99748e60db80
[ 1271.389462] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9974df880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1271.389462] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1271.389463] CR2: 000055c60f344fe4 CR3: 0000001031a3c002 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 1271.389465] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1271.389465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1271.389466] Call Trace:
[ 1271.389483] cifs_mid_q_entry_release+0xce/0x110 [cifs]
[ 1271.389499] smb2_decrypt_offload+0xa9/0x1c0 [cifs]
[ 1271.389501] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3b0
[ 1271.389503] worker_thread+0x50/0x370
[ 1271.389504] kthread+0x12f/0x150
[ 1271.389506] ? process_one_work+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 1271.389507] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x70/0x70
[ 1271.389509] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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kmemleak reported a memory leak allocated in query_info() when cifs is
working with modefromsid.
backtrace:
[<00000000aeef6a1e>] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x58/0x510
[<00000000b2f7a440>] __kmalloc+0x1a0/0x390
[<000000006d470ebc>] query_info+0x5b5/0x700 [cifs]
[<00000000bad76ce0>] SMB2_query_acl+0x2b/0x30 [cifs]
[<000000001fa09606>] get_smb2_acl_by_path+0x2f3/0x720 [cifs]
[<000000001b6ebab7>] get_smb2_acl+0x75/0x90 [cifs]
[<00000000abf43904>] cifs_acl_to_fattr+0x13b/0x1d0 [cifs]
[<00000000a5372ec3>] cifs_get_inode_info+0x4cd/0x9a0 [cifs]
[<00000000388e0a04>] cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x1cd/0x510 [cifs]
[<0000000046b6b352>] cifs_getattr+0x8a/0x260 [cifs]
[<000000007692c95e>] vfs_getattr_nosec+0xa1/0xc0
[<00000000cbc7d742>] vfs_getattr+0x36/0x40
[<00000000de8acf67>] vfs_statx_fd+0x4a/0x80
[<00000000a58c6adb>] __do_sys_newfstat+0x31/0x70
[<00000000300b3b4e>] __x64_sys_newfstat+0x16/0x20
[<000000006d8e9c48>] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80
This patch add missing kfree for pntsd when mounting modefromsid option.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Merge fixes from Andrew Morton:
"14 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (migration, vmscan, slub,
gup, memcg, hugetlbfs), mailmap, kbuild, reboot, watchdog, panic, and
ocfs2"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
ocfs2: initialize ip_next_orphan
panic: don't dump stack twice on warn
hugetlbfs: fix anon huge page migration race
mm: memcontrol: fix missing wakeup polling thread
kernel/watchdog: fix watchdog_allowed_mask not used warning
reboot: fix overflow parsing reboot cpu number
Revert "kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint"
compiler.h: fix barrier_data() on clang
mm/gup: use unpin_user_pages() in __gup_longterm_locked()
mm/slub: fix panic in slab_alloc_node()
mailmap: fix entry for Dmitry Baryshkov/Eremin-Solenikov
mm/vmscan: fix NR_ISOLATED_FILE corruption on 64-bit
mm/compaction: stop isolation if too many pages are isolated and we have pages to migrate
mm/compaction: count pages and stop correctly during page isolation
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When afs_write_end() is called with copied == 0, it tries to set the
dirty region, but there's no way to actually encode a 0-length region in
the encoding in page->private.
"0,0", for example, indicates a 1-byte region at offset 0. The maths
miscalculates this and sets it incorrectly.
Fix it to just do nothing but unlock and put the page in this case. We
don't actually need to mark the page dirty as nothing presumably
changed.
Fixes: 65dd2d6072d3 ("afs: Alter dirty range encoding in page->private")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Though problem if found on a lower 4.1.12 kernel, I think upstream has
same issue.
In one node in the cluster, there is the following callback trace:
# cat /proc/21473/stack
__ocfs2_cluster_lock.isra.36+0x336/0x9e0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x121/0x520 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x152/0x820 [ocfs2]
evict+0xae/0x1a0
iput+0x1c6/0x230
ocfs2_orphan_filldir+0x5d/0x100 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk+0x490/0x4f0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_dir_foreach+0x29/0x30 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x1b6/0x9a0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x1de/0x5c0 [ocfs2]
process_one_work+0x169/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x5b/0x560
kthread+0xcb/0xf0
ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90
The above stack is not reasonable, the final iput shouldn't happen in
ocfs2_orphan_filldir() function. Looking at the code,
2067 /* Skip inodes which are already added to recover list, since dio may
2068 * happen concurrently with unlink/rename */
2069 if (OCFS2_I(iter)->ip_next_orphan) {
2070 iput(iter);
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073
The logic thinks the inode is already in recover list on seeing
ip_next_orphan is non-NULL, so it skip this inode after dropping a
reference which incremented in ocfs2_iget().
While, if the inode is already in recover list, it should have another
reference and the iput() at line 2070 should not be the final iput
(dropping the last reference). So I don't think the inode is really in
the recover list (no vmcore to confirm).
Note that ocfs2_queue_orphans(), though not shown up in the call back
trace, is holding cluster lock on the orphan directory when looking up
for unlinked inodes. The on disk inode eviction could involve a lot of
IOs which may need long time to finish. That means this node could hold
the cluster lock for very long time, that can lead to the lock requests
(from other nodes) to the orhpan directory hang for long time.
Looking at more on ip_next_orphan, I found it's not initialized when
allocating a new ocfs2_inode_info structure.
This causes te reflink operations from some nodes hang for very long
time waiting for the cluster lock on the orphan directory.
Fix: initialize ip_next_orphan as NULL.
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109171746.27884-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Any attempt to do path resolution on /proc/self from an async worker will
yield -EOPNOTSUPP. We can safely do that resolution from the task itself,
and without blocking, so retry it from there.
Ideally io_uring would know this upfront and not have to go through the
worker thread to find out, but that doesn't currently seem feasible.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Pull fs freeze fix and cleanups from Darrick Wong:
"A single vfs fix for 5.10, along with two subsequent cleanups.
A very long time ago, a hack was added to the vfs fs freeze protection
code to work around lockdep complaints about XFS, which would try to
run a transaction (which requires intwrite protection) to finalize an
xfs freeze (by which time the vfs had already taken intwrite).
Fast forward a few years, and XFS fixed the recursive intwrite problem
on its own, and the hack became unnecessary. Fast forward almost a
decade, and latent bugs in the code converting this hack from freeze
flags to freeze locks combine with lockdep bugs to make this reproduce
frequently enough to notice page faults racing with freeze.
Since the hack is unnecessary and causes thread race errors, just get
rid of it completely. Making this kind of vfs change midway through a
cycle makes me nervous, but a large enough number of the usual
VFS/ext4/XFS/btrfs suspects have said this looks good and solves a
real problem vector.
And once that removal is done, __sb_start_write is now simple enough
that it becomes possible to refactor the function into smaller,
simpler static inline helpers in linux/fs.h. The cleanup is
straightforward.
Summary:
- Finally remove the "convert to trylock" weirdness in the fs freezer
code. It was necessary 10 years ago to deal with nested
transactions in XFS, but we've long since removed that; and now
this is causing subtle race conditions when lockdep goes offline
and sb_start_* aren't prepared to retry a trylock failure.
- Minor cleanups of the sb_start_* fs freeze helpers"
* tag 'vfs-5.10-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
vfs: move __sb_{start,end}_write* to fs.h
vfs: separate __sb_start_write into blocking and non-blocking helpers
vfs: remove lockdep bogosity in __sb_start_write
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Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong:
- Fix a fairly serious problem where the reverse mapping btree key
comparison functions were silently ignoring parts of the keyspace
when doing comparisons
- Fix a thinko in the online refcount scrubber
- Fix a missing unlock in the pnfs code
* tag 'xfs-5.10-fixes-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
xfs: fix a missing unlock on error in xfs_fs_map_blocks
xfs: fix brainos in the refcount scrubber's rmap fragment processor
xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions
xfs: set the unwritten bit in rmap lookup flags in xchk_bmap_get_rmapextents
xfs: fix flags argument to rmap lookup when converting shared file rmaps
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If this is attempted by a kthread, then return -EOPNOTSUPP as we don't
currently support that. Once we can get task_pid_ptr() doing the right
thing, then this can go away again.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"A single fix in here, for a missed rounding case at setup time, which
caused an otherwise legitimate setup case to return -EINVAL if used
with unaligned ring size values"
* tag 'io_uring-5.10-2020-11-13' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: round-up cq size before comparing with rounded sq size
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There's a missing return statement after an error is found in the
root_item, this can cause further problems when a crafted image triggers
the error.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210181
Fixes: 259ee7754b67 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add ROOT_ITEM check")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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[BUG]
When running the following script, btrfs will trigger an ASSERT():
#/bin/bash
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
mount $dev $mnt
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1G" $mnt/file
sync
btrfs quota enable $mnt
btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt
# Manually set the limit below current usage
btrfs qgroup limit 512M $mnt $mnt
# Crash happens
touch $mnt/file
The dmesg looks like this:
assertion failed: refcount_read(&trans->use_count) == 1, in fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2022
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3230!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction.cold+0x11/0x5d [btrfs]
try_flush_qgroup+0x67/0x100 [btrfs]
__btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta+0x3a/0x60 [btrfs]
btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0xaa/0x350 [btrfs]
btrfs_update_inode+0x9d/0x110 [btrfs]
btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xd0 [btrfs]
touch_atime+0xb5/0x100
iterate_dir+0xf1/0x1b0
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fb5afe588db
[CAUSE]
In try_flush_qgroup(), we assume we don't hold a transaction handle at
all. This is true for data reservation and mostly true for metadata.
Since data space reservation always happens before we start a
transaction, and for most metadata operation we reserve space in
start_transaction().
But there is an exception, btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata().
It holds a transaction handle, while still trying to reserve extra
metadata space.
When we hit EDQUOT inside btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata(), we
will join current transaction and commit, while we still have
transaction handle from qgroup code.
[FIX]
Let's check current->journal before we join the transaction.
If current->journal is unset or BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB, it means
we are not holding a transaction, thus are able to join and then commit
transaction.
If current->journal is a valid transaction handle, we avoid committing
transaction and just end it
This is less effective than committing current transaction, as it won't
free metadata reserved space, but we may still free some data space
before new data writes.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1178634
Fixes: c53e9653605d ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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