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2012-12-20vfs: fix renameat to retry on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-3/+12
...as always, rename is the messiest of the bunch. We have to track whether to retry or not via a separate flag since the error handling is already quite complex. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: make do_unlinkat retry once on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-2/+8
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: make do_rmdir retry once on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-2/+7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: add a flags argument to user_path_parentJeff Layton1-6/+10
...so we can pass in LOOKUP_REVAL. For now, nothing does yet. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: fix linkat to retry once on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-2/+7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: fix symlinkat to retry on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-2/+7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: fix mkdirat to retry once on an ESTALE errorJeff Layton1-1/+7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: fix mknodat to retry on ESTALE errorsJeff Layton1-2/+7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: turn is_dir argument to kern_path_create into a lookup_flags argJeff Layton1-5/+16
Where we can pass in LOOKUP_DIRECTORY or LOOKUP_REVAL. Any other flags passed in here are currently ignored. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: remove DCACHE_NEED_LOOKUPJeff Layton1-10/+1
The code that relied on that flag was ripped out of btrfs quite some time ago, and never added back. Josef indicated that he was going to take a different approach to the problem in btrfs, and that we could just eliminate this flag. Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20path_init(): make -ENOTDIR failure exits consistentAl Viro1-2/+2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs: remove unneeded permission check from path_initJeff Layton1-6/+1
When path_init is called with a valid dfd, that code checks permissions on the open directory fd and returns an error if the check fails. This permission check is redundant, however. Both callers of path_init immediately call link_path_walk afterward. The first thing that link_path_walk does for pathnames that do not consist only of slashes is to check for exec permissions at the starting point of the path walk. And this check in path_init() is on the path taken only when *name != '/' && *name != '\0'. In most cases, these checks are very quick, but when the dfd is for a file on a NFS mount with the actimeo=0, each permission check goes out onto the wire. The result is 2 identical ACCESS calls. Given that these codepaths are fairly "hot", I think it makes sense to eliminate the permission check in path_init and simply assume that the caller will eventually check the permissions before proceeding. Reported-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-11-29lookup_one_len: don't accept . and ..Al Viro1-0/+5
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-26VFS: don't do protected {sym,hard}links by defaultLinus Torvalds1-2/+2
In commit 800179c9b8a1 ("This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS"), the new link protections were enabled by default, in the hope that no actual application would care, despite it being technically against legacy UNIX (and documented POSIX) behavior. However, it does turn out to break some applications. It's rare, and it's unfortunate, but it's unacceptable to break existing systems, so we'll have to default to legacy behavior. In particular, it has broken the way AFD distributes files, see http://www.dwd.de/AFD/ along with some legacy scripts. Distributions can end up setting this at initrd time or in system scripts: if you have security problems due to link attacks during your early boot sequence, you have bigger problems than some kernel sysctl setting. Do: echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks to re-enable the link protections. Alternatively, we may at some point introduce a kernel config option that sets these kinds of "more secure but not traditional" behavioural options automatically. Reported-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com> Reported-by: Holger Kiehl <Holger.Kiehl@dwd.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # v3.6 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-12vfs: embed struct filename inside of names_cache allocation if possibleJeff Layton1-20/+49
In the common case where a name is much smaller than PATH_MAX, an extra allocation for struct filename is unnecessary. Before allocating a separate one, try to embed the struct filename inside the buffer first. If it turns out that that's not long enough, then fall back to allocating a separate struct filename and redoing the copy. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: make audit_inode take struct filenameJeff Layton1-9/+7
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename. Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it directly. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12vfs: make path_openat take a struct filename pointerJeff Layton1-8/+10
...and fix up the callers. For do_file_open_root, just declare a struct filename on the stack and fill out the .name field. For do_filp_open, make it also take a struct filename pointer, and fix up its callers to call it appropriately. For filp_open, add a variant that takes a struct filename pointer and turn filp_open into a wrapper around it. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12vfs: turn do_path_lookup into wrapper around struct filename variantJeff Layton1-7/+23
...and make the user_path callers use that variant instead. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: allow audit code to satisfy getname requests from its names_listJeff Layton1-0/+4
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once, we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names records. Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation and audit_names records. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return itJeff Layton1-41/+67
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to the string. For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled, we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not need to recopy it from userspace. This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it. Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes convenient. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12vfs: unexport getname and putname symbolsJeff Layton1-2/+0
I see no callers in module code. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: overhaul __audit_inode_child to accomodate retryingJeff Layton1-1/+1
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete. If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if not. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: set the name_len in audit_inode for parent lookupsJeff Layton1-7/+7
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path but has the parent inode info attached. Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for the audit entry correctly from the get-go. While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: reverse arguments to audit_inode_childJeff Layton1-1/+1
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child. Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization. Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12audit: remove unnecessary NULL ptr checks from do_path_lookupJeff Layton1-6/+2
As best I can tell, whenever retval == 0, nd->path.dentry and nd->inode are also non-NULL. Eliminate those checks and the superfluous audit_context check. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-11vfs: bogus warnings in fs/namei.cArnd Bergmann1-0/+1
The follow_link() function always initializes its *p argument, or returns an error, but when building with 'gcc -s', the compiler gets confused by the __always_inline attribute to the function and can no longer detect where the cookie was initialized. The solution is to always initialize the pointer from follow_link, even in the error path. When building with -O2, this has zero impact on generated code and adds a single instruction in the error path for a -Os build on ARM. Without this patch, building with gcc-4.6 through gcc-4.8 and CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE results in: fs/namei.c: In function 'link_path_walk': fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/namei.c:1544:9: note: 'cookie' was declared here fs/namei.c: In function 'path_lookupat': fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/namei.c:1934:10: note: 'cookie' was declared here fs/namei.c: In function 'path_openat': fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/namei.c:2899:9: note: 'cookie' was declared here Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-09fs: prevent use after free in auditing when symlink following was deniedSasha Levin1-1/+1
Commit "fs: add link restriction audit reporting" has added auditing of failed attempts to follow symlinks. Unfortunately, the auditing was being done after the struct path structure was released earlier. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-02Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-23/+18
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs update from Al Viro: - big one - consolidation of descriptor-related logics; almost all of that is moved to fs/file.c (BTW, I'm seriously tempted to rename the result to fd.c. As it is, we have a situation when file_table.c is about handling of struct file and file.c is about handling of descriptor tables; the reasons are historical - file_table.c used to be about a static array of struct file we used to have way back). A lot of stray ends got cleaned up and converted to saner primitives, disgusting mess in android/binder.c is still disgusting, but at least doesn't poke so much in descriptor table guts anymore. A bunch of relatively minor races got fixed in process, plus an ext4 struct file leak. - related thing - fget_light() partially unuglified; see fdget() in there (and yes, it generates the code as good as we used to have). - also related - bits of Cyrill's procfs stuff that got entangled into that work; _not_ all of it, just the initial move to fs/proc/fd.c and switch of fdinfo to seq_file. - Alex's fs/coredump.c spiltoff - the same story, had been easier to take that commit than mess with conflicts. The rest is a separate pile, this was just a mechanical code movement. - a few misc patches all over the place. Not all for this cycle, there'll be more (and quite a few currently sit in akpm's tree)." Fix up trivial conflicts in the android binder driver, and some fairly simple conflicts due to two different changes to the sock_alloc_file() interface ("take descriptor handling from sock_alloc_file() to callers" vs "net: Providing protocol type via system.sockprotoname xattr of /proc/PID/fd entries" adding a dentry name to the socket) * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (72 commits) MAX_LFS_FILESIZE should be a loff_t compat: fs: Generic compat_sys_sendfile implementation fs: push rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() to filesystems btrfs: reada_extent doesn't need kref for refcount coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file coredump: prevent double-free on an error path in core dumper usb/gadget: fix misannotations fcntl: fix misannotations ceph: don't abuse d_delete() on failure exits hypfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative vfs: delete surplus inode NULL check switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget new helpers: fdget()/fdput() switch o2hb_region_dev_write() to fget_light() proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files make get_file() return its argument vhost_set_vring(): turn pollstart/pollstop into bool switch prctl_set_mm_exe_file() to fget_light() switch xfs_find_handle() to fget_light() switch xfs_swapext() to fget_light() ...
2012-10-02Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace support. This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user namespace. Everything is converted except for the most complex of the filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review. The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into subsystems and filesystems as reasonable. Leaving the make_kuid and from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network. Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues. The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int. Those places were converted into explicit unions. I made certain to handle those places with simple trivial patches. Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing quota by projid. I had never heard of the project identifiers before. Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts for most of the code size growth in my git tree. Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from "capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications. While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code I made a few other cleanups. I capitalized on the fact we process netlink messages in the context of the message sender. I removed usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current->tty. Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no problems from identical code from different trees showing up in linux-next. After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to win a game of kernel trivial pursuit." Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits) userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing. userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids userns: Add user namespace support to IMA userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation ...
2012-09-26switch simple cases of fget_light to fdgetAl Viro1-22/+17
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-09-26namei.c: fix BS commentAl Viro1-1/+1
get_write_access() is needed for nfsd, not binfmt_aout (the latter has no business doing anything of that kind, of course) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22fs: fix fs/namei.c kernel-doc warningsRandy Dunlap1-0/+2
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/namei.c: Warning(fs/namei.c:360): No description found for parameter 'inode' Warning(fs/namei.c:672): No description found for parameter 'nd' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-16vfs: fix propagation of atomic_open create error on negative dentrySage Weil1-0/+4
If ->atomic_open() returns -ENOENT, we take care to return the create error (e.g., EACCES), if any. Do the same when ->atomic_open() returns 1 and provides a negative dentry. This fixes a regression where an unprivileged open O_CREAT fails with ENOENT instead of EACCES, introduced with the new atomic_open code. It is tested by the open/08.t test in the pjd posix test suite, and was observed on top of fuse (backed by ceph-fuse). Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2012-08-15vfs: pass right create mode to may_o_create()Miklos Szeredi1-1/+1
Pass the umask-ed create mode to may_o_create() instead of the original one. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
2012-08-15vfs: atomic_open(): fix create mode usageMiklos Szeredi1-1/+1
Don't mask S_ISREG off the create mode before passing to ->atomic_open(). Other methods (->create, ->mknod) also get the complete file mode and filesystems expect it. Reported-by: Steve <steveamigauk@yahoo.co.uk> Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
2012-08-03userns: Fix link restrictions to use uid_eqEric W. Biederman1-3/+3
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-07-31fs: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutexJan Kara1-21/+25
Currently, mnt_want_write() is sometimes called with i_mutex held and sometimes without it. This isn't really a problem because mnt_want_write() is a non-blocking operation (essentially has a trylock semantics) but when the function starts to handle also frozen filesystems, it will get a full lock semantics and thus proper lock ordering has to be established. So move all mnt_want_write() calls outside of i_mutex. One non-trivial case needing conversion is kern_path_create() / user_path_create() which didn't include mnt_want_write() but now needs to because it acquires i_mutex. Because there are virtual file systems which don't bother with freeze / remount-ro protection we actually provide both versions of the function - one which calls mnt_want_write() and one which does not. [AV: scratch the previous, mnt_want_write() has been moved to kern_path_create() by now] Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-31simplify lookup_open()/atomic_open() - do the temporary mnt_want_write() earlyAl Viro1-22/+29
The write ref to vfsmount taken in lookup_open()/atomic_open() is going to be dropped; we take the one to stay in dentry_open(). Just grab the temporary in caller if it looks like we are going to need it (create/truncate/writable open) and pass (by value) "has it succeeded" flag. Instead of doing mnt_want_write() inside, check that flag and treat "false" as "mnt_want_write() has just failed". mnt_want_write() is cheap and the things get considerably simpler and more robust that way - we get it and drop it in the same function, to start with, rather than passing a "has something in the guts of really scary functions taken it" back to caller. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-30fix O_EXCL handling for devicesAl Viro1-2/+2
O_EXCL without O_CREAT has different semantics; it's "fail if already opened", not "fail if already exists". commit 71574865 broke that... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29fs: add link restriction audit reportingKees Cook1-0/+2
Adds audit messages for unexpected link restriction violations so that system owners will have some sort of potentially actionable information about misbehaving processes. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29fs: add link restrictionsKees Cook1-0/+122
This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS. Symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find: 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html 2010 May, Kees Cook https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144 Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as: - Violates POSIX. - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow a broken specification at the cost of security. - Might break unknown applications that use this feature. - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found that rely on this behavior. - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL. - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability. - This should live in the core VFS. - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135) - This should live in an LSM. - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188) Hardlinks: On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually upgrade a system fully. The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write access to the existing file. Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX, which states "the implementation may require that the calling process has permission to access the existing file"[1]. This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon, though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years. [1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html [2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279 This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected behavior, and documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29vfs: don't let do_last pass negative dentry to audit_inodeJeff Layton1-2/+3
I can reliably reproduce the following panic by simply setting an audit rule on a recent 3.5.0+ kernel: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040 IP: [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 PGD 7acd9067 PUD 7b8fb067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#86] SMP Modules linked in: nfs nfs_acl auth_rpcgss fscache lockd sunrpc tpm_bios btrfs zlib_deflate libcrc32c kvm_amd kvm joydev virtio_net pcspkr i2c_piix4 floppy virtio_balloon microcode virtio_blk cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] CPU 0 Pid: 1286, comm: abrt-dump-oops Tainted: G D 3.5.0+ #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d1250>] [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007aebfc38 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003692d860 RCX: 00000000000038c4 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88006baf5d80 RDI: ffff88003692d860 RBP: ffff88007aebfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880036d30f00 R14: ffff88006baf5d80 R15: ffff88003692d800 FS: 00007f7562634740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000003643d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process abrt-dump-oops (pid: 1286, threadinfo ffff88007aebe000, task ffff880079614530) Stack: ffff88007aebfdf8 ffff88007aebff28 ffff88007aebfc98 ffffffff81211358 ffff88003692d860 0000000000000000 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffffffff810d4968 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffff8800000038c4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81211358>] ? ext4_lookup+0xe8/0x160 [<ffffffff810d4968>] __audit_inode+0x118/0x2d0 [<ffffffff811955a9>] do_last+0x999/0xe80 [<ffffffff81191fe8>] ? inode_permission+0x18/0x50 [<ffffffff81171efa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11a/0x130 [<ffffffff81195b4a>] path_openat+0xba/0x420 [<ffffffff81196111>] do_filp_open+0x41/0xa0 [<ffffffff811a24bd>] ? alloc_fd+0x4d/0x120 [<ffffffff811855cd>] do_sys_open+0xed/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810d40cc>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xcc/0x300 [<ffffffff811856c1>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81611ca9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b RSP <ffff88007aebfc38> CR2: 0000000000000040 The problem is that do_last is passing a negative dentry to audit_inode. The comments on lookup_open note that it can pass back a negative dentry if O_CREAT is not set. This patch fixes the oops, but I'm not clear on whether there's a better approach. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29pull mnt_want_write()/mnt_drop_write() into ↵Al Viro1-39/+18
kern_path_create()/done_path_create() resp. One side effect - attempt to create a cross-device link on a read-only fs fails with EROFS instead of EXDEV now. Makes more sense, POSIX allows, etc. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29mknod: take sanity checks on mode into the very beginningAl Viro1-5/+3
Note that applying umask can't affect their results. While that affects errno in cases like mknod("/no_such_directory/a", 030000) yielding -EINVAL (due to impossible mode_t) instead of -ENOENT (due to inexistent directory), IMO that makes a lot more sense, POSIX allows to return either and any software that relies on getting -ENOENT instead of -EINVAL in that case deserves everything it gets. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-29new helper: done_path_create()Al Viro1-12/+12
releases what needs to be released after {kern,user}_path_create() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-23tidy up namei.c a bitAl Viro1-18/+21
locking/unlocking for rcu walk taken to a couple of inline helpers Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-23unobfuscate follow_up() a bitAl Viro1-1/+1
really convoluted test in there has grown up during struct mount introduction; what it checks is that we'd reached the root of mount tree.
2012-07-22use __lookup_hash() in kern_path_parent()Al Viro1-1/+1
No need to bother with lookup_one_len() here - it's an overkill Signed-off-by Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Split inode_permission()David Howells1-17/+49
Split inode_permission() into inode- and superblock-dependent parts. This is aimed at unionmounts where the superblock from the upper layer has to be checked rather than the superblock from the lower layer as the upper layer may be writable, thus allowing an unwritable file from the lower layer to be copied up and modified. Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (Further development) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Comment mount following codeDavid Howells1-0/+10
Add comments describing what the directions "up" and "down" mean and ref count handling to the VFS mount following family of functions. Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> (Original author) Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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