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2018-04-01CIFS: fix sha512 check in cifs_crypto_secmech_releaseGustavo A. R. Silva1-1/+1
It seems this is a copy-paste error and that the proper variable to use in this particular case is _sha512_ instead of _md5_. Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1465358 ("Copy-paste error") Fixes: 1c6614d229e7 ("CIFS: add sha512 secmech") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2018-04-01CIFS: add sha512 secmechAurelien Aptel1-0/+7
* prepare for SMB3.11 pre-auth integrity * enable sha512 when SMB311 is enabled in Kconfig * add sha512 as a soft dependency Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
2018-04-01CIFS: refactor crypto shash/sdesc allocation&freeAurelien Aptel1-71/+7
shash and sdesc and always allocated and freed together. * abstract this in new functions cifs_alloc_hash() and cifs_free_hash(). * make smb2/3 crypto allocation independent from each other. Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2018-01-26CIFS: zero sensitive data when freeingAurelien Aptel1-2/+1
also replaces memset()+kfree() by kzfree(). Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2017-05-08fs: cifs: replace CURRENT_TIME by other appropriate apisDeepa Dinamani1-1/+3
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems. The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time() for filesystem times, and ktime_get_* functions for authentication timestamps and timezone calculations. This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe. CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned change. The inode timestamps read from the server are assumed to have correct granularity and range. The patch also assumes that the difference between server and client times lie in the range INT_MIN..INT_MAX. This is valid because this is the difference between current times between server and client, and the largest timezone difference is in the range of one day. All cifs timestamps currently use timespec representation internally. Authentication and timezone timestamps can also be transitioned into using timespec64 when all other timestamps for cifs is transitioned to use timespec64. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-4-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-01CIFS: Encrypt SMB3 requests before sendingPavel Shilovsky1-1/+12
This change allows to encrypt packets if it is required by a server for SMB sessions or tree connections. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
2017-02-01CIFS: Send RFC1001 length in a separate iovPavel Shilovsky1-16/+22
In order to simplify further encryption support we need to separate RFC1001 length and SMB2 header when sending a request. Put the length field in iov[0] and the rest of the packet into following iovs. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
2016-12-15Fix default behaviour for empty domains and add domainauto optionGermano Percossi1-5/+9
With commit 2b149f119 many things have been fixed/introduced. However, the default behaviour for RawNTLMSSP authentication seems to be wrong in case the domain is not passed on the command line. The main points (see below) of the patch are: - It alignes behaviour with Windows clients - It fixes backward compatibility - It fixes UPN I compared this behavour with the one from a Windows 10 command line client. When no domains are specified on the command line, I traced the packets and observed that the client does send an empty domain to the server. In the linux kernel case, the empty domain is replaced by the primary domain communicated by the SMB server. This means that, if the credentials are valid against the local server but that server is part of a domain, then the kernel module will ask to authenticate against that domain and we will get LOGON failure. I compared the packet trace from the smbclient when no domain is passed and, in that case, a default domain from the client smb.conf is taken. Apparently, connection succeeds anyway, because when the domain passed is not valid (in my case WORKGROUP), then the local one is tried and authentication succeeds. I tried with any kind of invalid domain and the result was always a connection. So, trying to interpret what to do and picking a valid domain if none is passed, seems the wrong thing to do. To this end, a new option "domainauto" has been added in case the user wants a mechanism for guessing. Without this patch, backward compatibility also is broken. With kernel 3.10, the default auth mechanism was NTLM. One of our testing servers accepted NTLM and, because no domains are passed, authentication was local. Moving to RawNTLMSSP forced us to change our command line to add a fake domain to pass to prevent this mechanism to kick in. For the same reasons, UPN is broken because the domain is specified in the username. The SMB server will work out the domain from the UPN and authenticate against the right server. Without the patch, though, given the domain is empty, it gets replaced with another domain that could be the wrong one for the authentication. Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-11-28CIFS: Fix BUG() in calc_seckey()Sachin Prabhu1-3/+8
Andy Lutromirski's new virtually mapped kernel stack allocations moves kernel stacks the vmalloc area. This triggers the bug kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:140! at calc_seckey()->sg_init() Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2016-07-20cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handlingRabin Vincent1-6/+10
The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-03-28cifs: merge the hash calculation helpersAl Viro1-43/+54
three practically identical copies... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-17Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-11/+21
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 4.6: API: - Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher. - Remove crypto_hash interface. - Remove crypto_pcomp interface. - Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers. - Add akcipher documentation. - Add skcipher documentation. Algorithms: - Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32. - Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer. Drivers: - Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver. - Add PIC32 hwrng driver. - Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver. - Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat. - Use crypto engine in omap-aes. - Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha. - Make atmel-sha available again. - Make sahara hashing available again. - Make ccp hashing available again. - Make sha1-mb available again. - Add support for multiple devices in ccp. - Improve DMA performance in caam. - Add hashing support to rockchip" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits) crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource() crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource() crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline" lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode. crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number lib/mpi: Endianness fix crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288 crypto: xts - fix compile errors crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling ...
2016-02-10cifs: fix erroneous return valueAnton Protopopov1-1/+1
The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure. Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-01-27cifs: Use skcipherHerbert Xu1-11/+21
This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-09-22cifs: use server timestamp for ntlmv2 authenticationPeter Seiderer1-2/+51
Linux cifs mount with ntlmssp against an Mac OS X (Yosemite 10.10.5) share fails in case the clocks differ more than +/-2h: digest-service: digest-request: od failed with 2 proto=ntlmv2 digest-service: digest-request: kdc failed with -1561745592 proto=ntlmv2 Fix this by (re-)using the given server timestamp for the ntlmv2 authentication (as Windows 7 does). A related problem was also reported earlier by Namjae Jaen (see below): Windows machine has extended security feature which refuse to allow authentication when there is time difference between server time and client time when ntlmv2 negotiation is used. This problem is prevalent in embedded enviornment where system time is set to default 1970. Modern servers send the server timestamp in the TargetInfo Av_Pair structure in the challenge message [see MS-NLMP 2.2.2.1] In [MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.2] it is explicitly mentioned that the client must use the server provided timestamp if present OR current time if it is not Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2015-04-01CIFS: session servername can't be nullSteve French1-1/+5
remove impossible check Pointed out by Coverity (CID 115422) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
2014-10-16Allow conversion of characters in Mac remap range. Part 1Steve French1-1/+1
This allows directory listings to Mac to display filenames correctly which have been created with illegal (to Windows) characters in their filename. It does not allow converting the other direction yet ie opening files with these characters (followon patch). There are seven reserved characters that need to be remapped when mounting to Windows, Mac (or any server without Unix Extensions) which are valid in POSIX but not in the other OS. : \ < > ? * | We used the normal UCS-2 remap range for this in order to convert this to/from UTF8 as did Windows Services for Unix (basically add 0xF000 to any of the 7 reserved characters), at least when the "mapchars" mount option was specified. Mac used a very slightly different "Services for Mac" remap range 0xF021 through 0xF027. The attached patch allows cifs.ko (the kernel client) to read directories on macs containing files with these characters and display their names properly. In theory this even might be useful on mounts to Samba when the vfs_catia or new "vfs_fruit" module is loaded. Currently the 7 reserved characters look very strange in directory listings from cifs.ko to Mac server. This patch allows these file name characters to be read (requires specifying mapchars on mount). Two additional changes are needed: 1) Make it more automatic: a way of detecting enough info so that we know to try to always remap these characters or not. Various have suggested that the SFM approach be made the default when the server does not support POSIX Unix extensions (cifs mounts to Samba for example) so need to make SFM remapping the default unless mapchars (SFU style mapping) specified on mount or no mapping explicitly requested or no mapping needed (cifs mounts to Samba). 2) Adding a patch to map the characters the other direction (ie UTF-8 to UCS-2 on open). This patch does it for translating readdir entries (ie UCS-2 to UTF-8) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2013-11-11cifs: Use data structures to compute NTLMv2 response offsetsTim Gardner1-16/+24
A bit of cleanup plus some gratuitous variable renaming. I think using structures instead of numeric offsets makes this code much more understandable. Also added a comment about current time range expected by the server. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto codeJeff Layton1-4/+8
Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-30cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() usingChen Gang1-1/+1
For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName' length may be "255 + '\0'". The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related buffer enough to hold all things. It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than 256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'. Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-04Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requiresSteve French1-110/+85
Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto secmech structures unless needed. Currently cifs allocates all crypto mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and 4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs two, the rest of the dialects only need one). Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-26[CIFS] SMB3 Signing enablementSteve French1-0/+29
SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways), AES-CMAC. With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1, but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features which we need to implement). This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case), and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul (setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon patches. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-26Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authenticationSteve French1-3/+3
This is RH bug 970891 Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars. Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage. [To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated by sparse -- steve f.] Reported-by: steve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-24move sectype to the cifs_ses instead of TCP_Server_InfoJeff Layton1-2/+2
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth. Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response. With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-24cifs: remove useless memset in LANMAN auth codeJeff Layton1-1/+0
It turns out that CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE == CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, so this memset doesn't do anything useful. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2013-05-04cifs: store the real expected sequence number in the midJeff Layton1-2/+2
Currently, the signing routines take a pointer to a place to store the expected sequence number for the mid response. It then stores a value that's one below what that sequence number should be, and then adds one to it when verifying the signature on the response. Increment the sequence number before storing the value in the mid, and eliminate the "+1" when checking the signature. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-05-04[CIFS] cifs: Rename cERROR and cFYI to cifs_dbgJoe Perches1-53/+49
It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros are for debugging. Convert the names to a single more typical kernel style cifs_dbg macro. cERROR(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...) cFYI(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...) cFYI(DBG2, ...) -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...) Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site. Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the "CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages. Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y) $ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko* text data bss dec hex filename 265245 2525 132 267902 4167e fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new 268359 2525 132 271016 422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions: o Miscellaneous typo fixes o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them from the macros to be more kernel style like. A few formats previously had defective \n's o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack o Coalesce formats to make grep easier, added missing spaces when coalescing formats o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc o Remove unused cifswarn macro Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24cifs: teach signing routines how to deal with arrays of pages in a smb_rqstJeff Layton1-0/+11
Use the smb_send_rqst helper function to kmap each page in the array and update the hash for that chunk. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24cifs: change signing routines to deal with smb_rqst structsJeff Layton1-8/+18
We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct. This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an array of pages. Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now, we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll teach them how to deal with arrays of pages. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24CIFS: Enable signing in SMB2Pavel Shilovsky1-1/+29
Use hmac-sha256 and rather than hmac-md5 that is used for CIFS/SMB. Signature field in SMB2 header is 16 bytes instead of 8 bytes. Automatically enable signing by client when requested by the server when signing ability is available to the client. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-07-23cifs: rename cifs_sign_smb2 to cifs_sign_smbvJeff Layton1-2/+2
"smb2" makes me think of the SMB2.x protocol, which isn't at all what this function is for... Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-07-23cifs: remove extraneous newlines from cERROR and cFYI callsJeff Layton1-24/+24
Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to embed one in the message itself. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-01-18CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16*Steve French1-6/+6
to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2012-01-17cifs: sanitize username handlingJeff Layton1-3/+8
Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't. Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that all the callers check for that. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-29cifs: Assume passwords are encoded according to iocharset (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar1-4/+4
Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after rebasing on 3.2. Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible (at least passwords with characters > 0xFF). The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so it will work as expected.) Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-12cifs: consolidate signature generating codeJeff Layton1-82/+21
We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the vectorized one. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-12cifs: use memcpy for magic string in cifs signature generation BSRSPYLJeff Layton1-2/+2
...it's more efficient since we know the length. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-09-19cifs: Fix broken sec=ntlmv2/i sec option (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar1-43/+11
Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares. cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly. All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2 "Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM, CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName) as Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion, Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)" is MsvAvNbDomainName. For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication. I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7. They all worked. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-31cifs: don't start signing too earlyJeff Layton1-2/+14
Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the same way. It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as possible here. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-25cifs: Cleanup: check return codes of crypto api callsShirish Pargaonkar1-21/+89
Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log an error and return from the calling function with error. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-07cifs: silence printk when establishing first session on socketJeff Layton1-1/+1
When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a socket will cause a printk like this to pop: CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-05-27[CIFS] Rename three structures to avoid camel caseSteve French1-7/+7
secMode to sec_mode and cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon and cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-05-19consistently use smb_buf_length as be32 for cifs (try 3)Steve French1-1/+1
There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001 length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2 implementation (which always treats the fields in their native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to be32. This version incorporates Christoph's comment about using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second version of the patch. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-05-19[CIFS] Use ecb des kernel crypto APIs instead ofSteve French1-5/+5
local cifs functions (repost) Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation instead of local functions within cifs. Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs. Remove function SMBOWFencrypt. Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash, SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-04-12cifs: wrap received signature check in srv_mutexJeff Layton1-6/+9
While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data structures. While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this function. This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably go to stable too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-04-12Allow user names longer than 32 bytesSteve French1-3/+3
We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-31cifs: No need to check crypto blockcipher allocationShirish Pargaonkar1-2/+3
Missed one change as per earlier suggestion. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-27cifs: More crypto cleanup (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar1-12/+20
Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in file md4.c are not needed anymore. Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations, and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included. Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-25[CIFS] Replace cifs md5 hashing functions with kernel crypto APIsSteve French1-1/+0
Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. Remove header and source file containing those local functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-09cifs: remove unnecessary locking around sequence_numberJeff Layton1-4/+2
The server->sequence_number is already protected by the srv_mutex. The GlobalMid_lock is unneeded here. Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-16 18:59:49 +0000