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2017-12-22Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-35/+36
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - fix chacha20 crash on zero-length input due to unset IV - fix potential race conditions in mcryptd with spinlock - only wait once at top of algif recvmsg to avoid inconsistencies - fix potential use-after-free in algif_aead/algif_skcipher" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: af_alg - fix race accessing cipher request crypto: mcryptd - protect the per-CPU queue with a lock crypto: af_alg - wait for data at beginning of recvmsg crypto: skcipher - set walk.iv for zero-length inputs
2017-12-11Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds6-18/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This push fixes the following issues: - buffer overread in RSA - potential use after free in algif_aead. - error path null pointer dereference in af_alg - forbid combinations such as hmac(hmac(sha3)) which may crash - crash in salsa20 due to incorrect API usage" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed crypto: af_alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in crypto: algif_aead - fix reference counting of null skcipher crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes
2017-12-11crypto: af_alg - fix race accessing cipher requestStephan Mueller2-10/+10
When invoking an asynchronous cipher operation, the invocation of the callback may be performed before the subsequent operations in the initial code path are invoked. The callback deletes the cipher request data structure which implies that after the invocation of the asynchronous cipher operation, this data structure must not be accessed any more. The setting of the return code size with the request data structure must therefore be moved before the invocation of the asynchronous cipher operation. Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-12-11crypto: mcryptd - protect the per-CPU queue with a lockSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-13/+10
mcryptd_enqueue_request() grabs the per-CPU queue struct and protects access to it with disabled preemption. Then it schedules a worker on the same CPU. The worker in mcryptd_queue_worker() guards access to the same per-CPU variable with disabled preemption. If we take CPU-hotplug into account then it is possible that between queue_work_on() and the actual invocation of the worker the CPU goes down and the worker will be scheduled on _another_ CPU. And here the preempt_disable() protection does not work anymore. The easiest thing is to add a spin_lock() to guard access to the list. Another detail: mcryptd_queue_worker() is not processing more than MCRYPTD_BATCH invocation in a row. If there are still items left, then it will invoke queue_work() to proceed with more later. *I* would suggest to simply drop that check because it does not use a system workqueue and the workqueue is already marked as "CPU_INTENSIVE". And if preemption is required then the scheduler should do it. However if queue_work() is used then the work item is marked as CPU unbound. That means it will try to run on the local CPU but it may run on another CPU as well. Especially with CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU=y. Again, the preempt_disable() won't work here but lock which was introduced will help. In order to keep work-item on the local CPU (and avoid RR) I changed it to queue_work_on(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-12-11crypto: af_alg - wait for data at beginning of recvmsgStephan Mueller3-6/+12
The wait for data is a non-atomic operation that can sleep and therefore potentially release the socket lock. The release of the socket lock allows another thread to modify the context data structure. The waiting operation for new data therefore must be called at the beginning of recvmsg. This prevents a race condition where checks of the members of the context data structure are performed by recvmsg while there is a potential for modification of these values. Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-12-11crypto: skcipher - set walk.iv for zero-length inputsEric Biggers1-6/+4
All the ChaCha20 algorithms as well as the ARM bit-sliced AES-XTS algorithms call skcipher_walk_virt(), then access the IV (walk.iv) before checking whether any bytes need to be processed (walk.nbytes). But if the input is empty, then skcipher_walk_virt() doesn't set the IV, and the algorithms crash trying to use the uninitialized IV pointer. Fix it by setting the IV earlier in skcipher_walk_virt(). Also fix it for the AEAD walk functions. This isn't a perfect solution because we can't actually align the IV to ->cra_alignmask unless there are bytes to process, for one because the temporary buffer for the aligned IV is freed by skcipher_walk_done(), which is only called when there are bytes to process. Thus, algorithms that require aligned IVs will still need to avoid accessing the IV when walk.nbytes == 0. Still, many algorithms/architectures are fine with IVs having any alignment, and even for those that aren't, a misaligned pointer bug is much less severe than an uninitialized pointer bug. This change also matches the behavior of the older blkcipher_walk API. Fixes: 0cabf2af6f5a ("crypto: skcipher - Fix crash on zero-length input") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-12-08X.509: fix comparisons of ->pkey_algoEric Biggers2-2/+2
->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp(). This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations, depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not. Fixes: 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08X.509: use crypto_shash_digest()Eric Biggers1-5/+1
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08KEYS: be careful with error codes in public_key_verify_signature()Eric Biggers1-2/+5
In public_key_verify_signature(), if akcipher_request_alloc() fails, we return -ENOMEM. But that error code was set 25 lines above, and by accident someone could easily insert new code in between that assigns to 'ret', which would introduce a signature verification bypass. Make the code clearer by moving the -ENOMEM down to where it is used. Additionally, the callers of public_key_verify_signature() only consider a negative return value to be an error. This means that if any positive return value is accidentally introduced deeper in the call stack (e.g. 'return EBADMSG' instead of 'return -EBADMSG' somewhere in RSA), signature verification will be bypassed. Make things more robust by having public_key_verify_signature() warn about positive errors and translate them into -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08pkcs7: use crypto_shash_digest()Eric Biggers1-5/+2
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08pkcs7: fix check for self-signed certificateEric Biggers1-1/+1
pkcs7_validate_trust_one() used 'x509->next == x509' to identify a self-signed certificate. That's wrong; ->next is simply the link in the linked list of certificates in the PKCS#7 message. It should be checking ->signer instead. Fix it. Fortunately this didn't actually matter because when we re-visited 'x509' on the next iteration via 'x509->signer', it was already seen and not verified, so we returned -ENOKEY anyway. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-08pkcs7: return correct error code if pkcs7_check_authattrs() failsEric Biggers1-1/+3
If pkcs7_check_authattrs() returns an error code, we should pass that error code on, rather than using ENOMEM. Fixes: 99db44350672 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-08X.509: reject invalid BIT STRING for subjectPublicKeyEric Biggers1-0/+2
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab(). This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are never supposed to be user-triggerable. Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8. It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder() instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a length that is not a whole number of bytes. Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000 Call Trace: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-29crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usageEric Biggers1-7/+0
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-29crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyedEric Biggers2-3/+8
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-29crypto: af_alg - fix NULL pointer dereference inEric Biggers1-6/+7
af_alg_free_areq_sgls() If allocating the ->tsgl member of 'struct af_alg_async_req' failed, during cleanup we dereferenced the NULL ->tsgl pointer in af_alg_free_areq_sgls(), because ->tsgl_entries was nonzero. Fix it by only freeing the ->tsgl list if it is non-NULL. This affected both algif_skcipher and algif_aead. Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-29crypto: algif_aead - fix reference counting of null skcipherEric Biggers1-1/+1
In the AEAD interface for AF_ALG, the reference to the "null skcipher" held by each tfm was being dropped in the wrong place -- when each af_alg_ctx was freed instead of when the aead_tfm was freed. As discovered by syzkaller, a specially crafted program could use this to cause the null skcipher to be freed while it is still in use. Fix it by dropping the reference in the right place. Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-29crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroesEric Biggers1-1/+1
In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'. This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type "asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER). KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196 CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328 rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106 x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141 x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 196: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 5a7de97309f5 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-28Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-38/+65
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: - avoid potential bogus alignment for some AEAD operations - fix crash in algif_aead - avoid sleeping in softirq context with async af_alg * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: skcipher - Fix skcipher_walk_aead_common crypto: af_alg - remove locking in async callback crypto: algif_aead - skip SGL entries with NULL page
2017-11-25crypto: skcipher - Fix skcipher_walk_aead_commonOndrej Mosnáček1-0/+3
The skcipher_walk_aead_common function calls scatterwalk_copychunks on the input and output walks to skip the associated data. If the AD end at an SG list entry boundary, then after these calls the walks will still be pointing to the end of the skipped region. These offsets are later checked for alignment in skcipher_walk_next, so the skcipher_walk may detect the alignment incorrectly. This patch fixes it by calling scatterwalk_done after the copychunks calls to ensure that the offsets refer to the right SG list entry. Fixes: b286d8b1a690 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-24crypto: af_alg - remove locking in async callbackStephan Mueller3-29/+38
The code paths protected by the socket-lock do not use or modify the socket in a non-atomic fashion. The actions pertaining the socket do not even need to be handled as an atomic operation. Thus, the socket-lock can be safely ignored. This fixes a bug regarding scheduling in atomic as the callback function may be invoked in interrupt context. In addition, the sock_hold is moved before the AIO encrypt/decrypt operation to ensure that the socket is always present. This avoids a tiny race window where the socket is unprotected and yet used by the AIO operation. Finally, the release of resources for a crypto operation is moved into a common function of af_alg_free_resources. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: e870456d8e7c8 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Fixes: d887c52d6ae43 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Tested-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-24crypto: algif_aead - skip SGL entries with NULL pageStephan Mueller1-9/+24
The TX SGL may contain SGL entries that are assigned a NULL page. This may happen if a multi-stage AIO operation is performed where the data for each stage is pointed to by one SGL entry. Upon completion of that stage, af_alg_pull_tsgl will assign NULL to the SGL entry. The NULL cipher used to copy the AAD from TX SGL to the destination buffer, however, cannot handle the case where the SGL starts with an SGL entry having a NULL page. Thus, the code needs to advance the start pointer into the SGL to the first non-NULL entry. This fixes a crash visible on Intel x86 32 bit using the libkcapi test suite. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 72548b093ee38 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-24Merge tag 'keys-next-20171123' of ↵James Morris4-0/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next-keys Merge keys subsystem changes from David Howells, for v4.15.
2017-11-15kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACKLevin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)1-6/+1
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-15pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent taintingDavid Howells4-0/+9
Set the module licence to prevent the kernel from being tainted if loaded as a module. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-11-14Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds32-540/+613
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 4.15: API: - Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC. This change touches code outside the crypto API. - Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current. Algorithms: - Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash. Drivers: - Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa). - Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx. - Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx. - Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200. - Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss. - Fix fallback-induced error in vmx. - Fix output IV in atmel-aes. - Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek. Others: - Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi. - Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits) lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g' crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret() crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p' crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0 crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278 dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[] hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume crypto: atmel - remove empty functions crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit() MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg() crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current ...
2017-11-10crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'Eric Biggers1-3/+0
Neither 'p' nor 'g' can be NULL, as they were unpacked using crypto_dh_decode_key(). And it makes no sense for them to be optional. So remove the NULL checks that were copy-and-pasted into both modules. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-10crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'Eric Biggers1-0/+8
The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied into a buffer with size 'p_size'. However it was never checked that that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE. Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition for all DH implementations. Fixes: c9839143ebbf ("crypto: qat - Add DH support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-10crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0Eric Biggers1-0/+8
If 'p' is 0 for the software Diffie-Hellman implementation, then dh_max_size() returns 0. In the case of KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, this causes ZERO_SIZE_PTR to be passed to sg_init_one(), which with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y triggers the 'BUG_ON(!virt_addr_valid(buf));' in sg_set_buf(). Fix this by making crypto_dh_decode_key() reject 0 for 'p'. p=0 makes no sense for any DH implementation because 'p' is supposed to be a prime number. Moreover, 'mod 0' is not mathematically defined. Bug report: kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:140! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 27112 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00010-gf5dbb5d0ce32-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.3-20171021_125229-anatol 04/01/2014 task: ffff88006caac0c0 task.stack: ffff88006c7c8000 RIP: 0010:sg_set_buf include/linux/scatterlist.h:140 [inline] RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x1b3/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:156 RSP: 0018:ffff88006c7cfb08 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: ffff88006c7cfe30 RCX: 00000000000064ee RDX: ffffffff81cf64c3 RSI: ffffc90000d72000 RDI: ffffffff92e937e0 RBP: ffff88006c7cfb30 R08: ffffed000d8f9fab R09: ffff88006c7cfd30 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: ffffed000d8f9faa R12: ffff88006c7cfd30 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88006c7cfc50 FS: 00007fce190fa700(0000) GS:ffff88003ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fffc6b33db8 CR3: 000000003cf64000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: __keyctl_dh_compute+0xa95/0x19b0 security/keys/dh.c:360 keyctl_dh_compute+0xac/0x100 security/keys/dh.c:434 SYSC_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:1745 [inline] SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1641 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4585c9 RSP: 002b:00007fce190f9bd8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000738020 RCX: 00000000004585c9 RDX: 000000002000d000 RSI: 0000000020000ff4 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000020008000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007fff6e610cde R13: 00007fff6e610cdf R14: 00007fce190fa700 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 33 5b 45 89 6c 24 14 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 fd 8f 68 ff <0f> 0b e8 f6 8f 68 ff 0f 0b e8 ef 8f 68 ff 0f 0b e8 e8 8f 68 ff 20 RIP: sg_set_buf include/linux/scatterlist.h:140 [inline] RSP: ffff88006c7cfb08 RIP: sg_init_one+0x1b3/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:156 RSP: ffff88006c7cfb08 Fixes: 802c7f1c84e4 ("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-10crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->pEric Biggers1-20/+13
When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation, if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed. Fix it by using dh_free_ctx() (renamed to dh_clear_ctx()) in the error paths, as that correctly sets the pointers to NULL. KASAN report: MPI: mpi too large (32760 bits) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mpi_free+0x131/0x170 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006c7cdf90 by task reproduce_doubl/367 CPU: 1 PID: 367 Comm: reproduce_doubl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00040-g05298abde6fe #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b ? mpi_free+0x131/0x170 print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0 ? mpi_free+0x131/0x170 kasan_report+0x236/0x340 ? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mpi_free+0x131/0x170 ? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90 dh_exit_tfm+0x3d/0x140 crypto_kpp_exit_tfm+0x52/0x70 crypto_destroy_tfm+0xb3/0x250 __keyctl_dh_compute+0x640/0xe90 ? kasan_slab_free+0x12f/0x180 ? dh_data_from_key+0x240/0x240 ? key_create_or_update+0x1ee/0xb20 ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x440/0x440 ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0 ? kfree+0xcf/0x210 ? SyS_add_key+0x268/0x340 keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1 ? __keyctl_dh_compute+0xe90/0xe90 ? SyS_add_key+0x26d/0x340 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3f4/0x560 SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x43ccf9 RSP: 002b:00007ffeeec96158 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000248b9b9 RCX: 000000000043ccf9 RDX: 00007ffeeec96170 RSI: 00007ffeeec96160 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0248b9b9143dc936 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000409670 R14: 0000000000409700 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 367: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 kasan_kmalloc+0xeb/0x180 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x114/0x300 mpi_alloc+0x4b/0x230 mpi_read_raw_data+0xbe/0x360 dh_set_secret+0x1dc/0x460 __keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90 keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1 SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed by task 367: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 kasan_slab_free+0xab/0x180 kfree+0xb5/0x210 mpi_free+0xcb/0x170 dh_set_secret+0x2d7/0x460 __keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90 keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1 SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Fixes: 802c7f1c84e4 ("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-06Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes an unaligned panic in x86/sha-mb and a bug in ccm that triggers with certain underlying implementations" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ccm - preserve the IV buffer crypto: x86/sha1-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access crypto: x86/sha256-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access
2017-11-06crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()Tudor-Dan Ambarus1-6/+0
Pointer members of an object with static storage duration, if not explicitly initialized, will be initialized to a NULL pointer. The crypto API checks if this pointer is not NULL before using it, we are safe to remove the function. Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: tcrypt - move to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef1-59/+25
tcrypt starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completions. Move it over to generic code doing the same. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: testmgr - move to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef1-138/+66
testmgr is starting async. crypto ops and waiting for them to complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same. This also provides a test of the generic crypto async. wait code. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: gcm - move to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef1-26/+6
gcm is starting an async. crypto op and waiting for it complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: drbg - move to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef1-27/+9
DRBG is starting an async. crypto op and waiting for it complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same. The code now also passes CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flag indicating crypto request memory allocation may use GFP_KERNEL which should be perfectly fine as the code is obviously sleeping for the completion of the request any way. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: move pub key to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef1-24/+4
public_key_verify_signature() is starting an async crypto op and waiting for it to complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: algif - move to generic async completionGilad Ben-Yossef4-52/+22
algif starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completion. Move it over to generic code doing the same. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: introduce crypto wait for async opGilad Ben-Yossef1-0/+13
Invoking a possibly async. crypto op and waiting for completion while correctly handling backlog processing is a common task in the crypto API implementation and outside users of it. This patch adds a generic implementation for doing so in preparation for using it across the board instead of hand rolled versions. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> CC: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: remove redundant backlog checks on EBUSYGilad Ben-Yossef5-37/+13
Now that -EBUSY return code only indicates backlog queueing we can safely remove the now redundant check for the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag when -EBUSY is returned. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: change transient busy return code to -ENOSPCGilad Ben-Yossef2-5/+5
The crypto API was using the -EBUSY return value to indicate both a hard failure to submit a crypto operation into a transformation provider when the latter was busy and the backlog mechanism was not enabled as well as a notification that the operation was queued into the backlog when the backlog mechanism was enabled. Having the same return code indicate two very different conditions depending on a flag is both error prone and requires extra runtime check like the following to discern between the cases: if (err == -EINPROGRESS || (err == -EBUSY && (ahash_request_flags(req) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))) This patch changes the return code used to indicate a crypto op failed due to the transformation provider being transiently busy to -ENOSPC. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: tcrypt - fix buffer lengths in test_aead_speed()Robert Baronescu1-2/+4
Fix the way the length of the buffers used for encryption / decryption are computed. For e.g. in case of encryption, input buffer does not contain an authentication tag. Signed-off-by: Robert Baronescu <robert.baronescu@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: tcrypt - mark expected switch fall-throughs in do_test()Gustavo A. R. Silva1-57/+51
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: gf128mul - The x8_ble multiplication functionsHarsh Jain1-0/+13
It multiply GF(2^128) elements in the ble format. It will be used by chelsio driver to speed up gf multiplication. Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <harsh@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: ccm - preserve the IV bufferRomain Izard1-1/+3
The IV buffer used during CCM operations is used twice, during both the hashing step and the ciphering step. When using a hardware accelerator that updates the contents of the IV buffer at the end of ciphering operations, the value will be modified. In the decryption case, the subsequent setup of the hashing algorithm will interpret the updated IV instead of the original value, which can lead to out-of-bounds writes. Reuse the idata buffer, only used in the hashing step, to preserve the IV's value during the ciphering step in the decryption case. Signed-off-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman8-0/+8
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-19Merge commit 'tags/keys-fixes-20171018' into fixes-v4.14-rc5James Morris2-1/+6
2017-10-18pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set.Eric Sesterhenn1-0/+3
The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field, this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken input. Fixes: 99db44350672 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type") Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
2017-10-18KEYS: checking the input id parameters before finding asymmetric keyChun-Yi Lee1-0/+2
For finding asymmetric key, the input id_0 and id_1 parameters can not be NULL at the same time. This patch adds the BUG_ON checking for id_0 and id_1. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18KEYS: Fix the wrong index when checking the existence of second idChun-Yi Lee1-1/+1
Fix the wrong index number when checking the existence of second id in function of finding asymmetric key. The id_1 is the second id that the index in array must be 1 but not 0. Fixes: 9eb029893ad5 (KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()) Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>