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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Take care of faults occuring between the PARange and IPA range by
injecting an exception
- Fix S2 faults taken from a host EL0 in protected mode
- Work around Oops caused by a PMU access from a 32bit guest when PMU
has been created. This is a temporary bodge until we fix it for
good.
x86:
- Fix potential races when walking host page table
- Fix shadow page table leak when KVM runs nested
- Work around bug in userspace when KVM synthesizes leaf 0x80000021
on older (pre-EPYC) or Intel processors
Generic (but affects only RISC-V):
- Fix bad user ABI for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: work around QEMU issue with synthetic CPUID leaves
Revert "x86/mm: Introduce lookup_address_in_mm()"
KVM: x86/mmu: fix potential races when walking host page table
KVM: fix bad user ABI for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT
KVM: x86/mmu: Do not create SPTEs for GFNs that exceed host.MAXPHYADDR
KVM: arm64: Inject exception on out-of-IPA-range translation fault
KVM/arm64: Don't emulate a PMU for 32-bit guests if feature not set
KVM: arm64: Handle host stage-2 faults from 32-bit EL0
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- A fix to disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking for XEN_HVM guests as that is
solely controlled by the hypervisor
- A build fix to make the function prototype (__warn()) as visible as
the definition itself
- A bunch of objtool annotation fixes which have accumulated over time
- An ORC unwinder fix to handle bad input gracefully
- Well, we thought the microcode gets loaded in time in order to
restore the microcode-emulated MSRs but we thought wrong. So there's
a fix for that to have the ordering done properly
- Add new Intel model numbers
- A spelling fix
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.18_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/pci/xen: Disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking for XEN_HVM guests
bug: Have __warn() prototype defined unconditionally
x86/Kconfig: fix the spelling of 'becoming' in X86_KERNEL_IBT config
objtool: Use offstr() to print address of missing ENDBR
objtool: Print data address for "!ENDBR" data warnings
x86/xen: Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR to startup_xen()
x86/uaccess: Add ENDBR to __put_user_nocheck*()
x86/retpoline: Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR for retpolines
x86/static_call: Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR to static call trampoline
objtool: Enable unreachable warnings for CLANG LTO
x86,objtool: Explicitly mark idtentry_body()s tail REACHABLE
x86,objtool: Mark cpu_startup_entry() __noreturn
x86,xen,objtool: Add UNWIND hint
lib/strn*,objtool: Enforce user_access_begin() rules
MAINTAINERS: Add x86 unwinding entry
x86/unwind/orc: Recheck address range after stack info was updated
x86/cpu: Load microcode during restore_processor_state()
x86/cpu: Add new Alderlake and Raptorlake CPU model numbers
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull objtool fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"A bunch of objtool fixes to improve unwinding, sibling call detection,
fallthrough detection and relocation handling of weak symbols when the
toolchain strips section symbols"
* tag 'objtool_urgent_for_v5.18_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
objtool: Fix type of reloc::addend
objtool: Fix function fallthrough detection for vmlinux
objtool: Fix sibling call detection in alternatives
objtool: Don't set 'jump_dest' for sibling calls
x86/uaccess: Don't jump between functions
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Synthesizing AMD leaves up to 0x80000021 caused problems with QEMU,
which assumes the *host* CPUID[0x80000000].EAX is higher or equal
to what KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID reports.
This causes QEMU to issue bogus host CPUIDs when preparing the input
to KVM_SET_CPUID2. It can even get into an infinite loop, which is
only terminated by an abort():
cpuid_data is full, no space for cpuid(eax:0x8000001d,ecx:0x3e)
To work around this, only synthesize those leaves if 0x8000001d exists
on the host. The synthetic 0x80000021 leaf is mostly useful on Zen2,
which satisfies the condition.
Fixes: f144c49e8c39 ("KVM: x86: synthesize CPUID leaf 0x80000021h if useful")
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop lookup_address_in_mm() now that KVM is providing it's own variant
of lookup_address_in_pgd() that is safe for use with user addresses, e.g.
guards against page tables being torn down. A variant that provides a
non-init mm is inherently dangerous and flawed, as the only reason to use
an mm other than init_mm is to walk a userspace mapping, and
lookup_address_in_pgd() does not play nice with userspace mappings, e.g.
doesn't disable IRQs to block TLB shootdowns and doesn't use READ_ONCE()
to ensure an upper level entry isn't converted to a huge page between
checking the PAGE_SIZE bit and grabbing the address of the next level
down.
This reverts commit 13c72c060f1ba6f4eddd7b1c4f52a8aded43d6d9.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <YmwIi3bXr/1yhYV/@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Fixes for (relatively) old bugs, to be merged in both the -rc and next
development trees:
* Fix potential races when walking host page table
* Fix bad user ABI for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT
* Fix shadow page table leak when KVM runs nested
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KVM uses lookup_address_in_mm() to detect the hugepage size that the host
uses to map a pfn. The function suffers from several issues:
- no usage of READ_ONCE(*). This allows multiple dereference of the same
page table entry. The TOCTOU problem because of that may cause KVM to
incorrectly treat a newly generated leaf entry as a nonleaf one, and
dereference the content by using its pfn value.
- the information returned does not match what KVM needs; for non-present
entries it returns the level at which the walk was terminated, as long
as the entry is not 'none'. KVM needs level information of only 'present'
entries, otherwise it may regard a non-present PXE entry as a present
large page mapping.
- the function is not safe for mappings that can be torn down, because it
does not disable IRQs and because it returns a PTE pointer which is never
safe to dereference after the function returns.
So implement the logic for walking host page tables directly in KVM, and
stop using lookup_address_in_mm().
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429031757.2042406-1-mizhang@google.com>
[Inline in host_pfn_mapping_level, ensure no semantic change for its
callers. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT was introduced, it included a flags
member that at the time was unused. Unfortunately this extensibility
mechanism has several issues:
- x86 is not writing the member, so it would not be possible to use it
on x86 except for new events
- the member is not aligned to 64 bits, so the definition of the
uAPI struct is incorrect for 32- on 64-bit userspace. This is a
problem for RISC-V, which supports CONFIG_KVM_COMPAT, but fortunately
usage of flags was only introduced in 5.18.
Since padding has to be introduced, place a new field in there
that tells if the flags field is valid. To allow further extensibility,
in fact, change flags to an array of 16 values, and store how many
of the values are valid. The availability of the new ndata field
is tied to a system capability; all architectures are changed to
fill in the field.
To avoid breaking compilation of userspace that was using the flags
field, provide a userspace-only union to overlap flags with data[0].
The new field is placed at the same offset for both 32- and 64-bit
userspace.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220422103013.34832-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Disallow memslots and MMIO SPTEs whose gpa range would exceed the host's
MAXPHYADDR, i.e. don't create SPTEs for gfns that exceed host.MAXPHYADDR.
The TDP MMU bounds its zapping based on host.MAXPHYADDR, and so if the
guest, possibly with help from userspace, manages to coerce KVM into
creating a SPTE for an "impossible" gfn, KVM will leak the associated
shadow pages (page tables):
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 1122 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:57
kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 10 PID: 1122 Comm: set_memory_regi Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1+ #293
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm]
kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_release+0x1d/0x30 [kvm]
__fput+0x82/0x240
task_work_run+0x5b/0x90
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xd2/0xe0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
On bare metal, encountering an impossible gpa in the page fault path is
well and truly impossible, barring CPU bugs, as the CPU will signal #PF
during the gva=>gpa translation (or a similar failure when stuffing a
physical address into e.g. the VMCS/VMCB). But if KVM is running as a VM
itself, the MAXPHYADDR enumerated to KVM may not be the actual MAXPHYADDR
of the underlying hardware, in which case the hardware will not fault on
the illegal-from-KVM's-perspective gpa.
Alternatively, KVM could continue allowing the dodgy behavior and simply
zap the max possible range. But, for hosts with MAXPHYADDR < 52, that's
a (minor) waste of cycles, and more importantly, KVM can't reasonably
support impossible memslots when running on bare metal (or with an
accurate MAXPHYADDR as a VM). Note, limiting the overhead by checking if
KVM is running as a guest is not a safe option as the host isn't required
to announce itself to the guest in any way, e.g. doesn't need to set the
HYPERVISOR CPUID bit.
A second alternative to disallowing the memslot behavior would be to
disallow creating a VM with guest.MAXPHYADDR > host.MAXPHYADDR. That
restriction is undesirable as there are legitimate use cases for doing
so, e.g. using the highest host.MAXPHYADDR out of a pool of heterogeneous
systems so that VMs can be migrated between hosts with different
MAXPHYADDRs without running afoul of the allow_smaller_maxphyaddr mess.
Note that any guest.MAXPHYADDR is valid with shadow paging, and it is
even useful in order to test KVM with MAXPHYADDR=52 (i.e. without
any reserved physical address bits).
The now common kvm_mmu_max_gfn() is inclusive instead of exclusive.
The memslot and TDP MMU code want an exclusive value, but the name
implies the returned value is inclusive, and the MMIO path needs an
inclusive check.
Fixes: faaf05b00aec ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 524a1e4e381f ("KVM: x86/mmu: Don't leak non-leaf SPTEs when zapping all SPTEs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220428233416.2446833-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When a XEN_HVM guest uses the XEN PIRQ/Eventchannel mechanism, then
PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely controlled by the hypervisor, but contrary to
XEN_PV guests this does not disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking in the PCI/MSI
layer.
This can lead to a situation where the PCI/MSI layer masks an MSI[-X]
interrupt and the hypervisor grants the write despite the fact that it
already requested the interrupt. As a consequence interrupt delivery on the
affected device is not happening ever.
Set pci_msi_ignore_mask to prevent that like it's done for XEN_PV guests
already.
Fixes: 809f9267bbab ("xen: map MSIs into pirqs")
Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Dusty Mabe <dustymabe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Noah Meyerhans <noahm@debian.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuaduxj5.ffs@tglx
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add Sapphire Rapids CPU support
- Fix a perf vmalloc-ed buffer mapping error (PERF_USE_VMALLOC in use)
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.18_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/cstate: Add SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X CPU support
perf/core: Fix perf_mmap fail when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"The main and larger change here is a workaround for AMD's lack of
cache coherency for encrypted-memory guests.
I have another patch pending, but it's waiting for review from the
architecture maintainers.
RISC-V:
- Remove 's' & 'u' as valid ISA extension
- Do not allow disabling the base extensions 'i'/'m'/'a'/'c'
x86:
- Fix NMI watchdog in guests on AMD
- Fix for SEV cache incoherency issues
- Don't re-acquire SRCU lock in complete_emulated_io()
- Avoid NULL pointer deref if VM creation fails
- Fix race conditions between APICv disabling and vCPU creation
- Bugfixes for disabling of APICv
- Preserve BSP MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL across suspend/resume
selftests:
- Do not use bitfields larger than 32-bits, they differ between GCC
and clang"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
kvm: selftests: introduce and use more page size-related constants
kvm: selftests: do not use bitfields larger than 32-bits for PTEs
KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
KVM: SVM: Flush when freeing encrypted pages even on SME_COHERENT CPUs
KVM: SVM: Simplify and harden helper to flush SEV guest page(s)
KVM: selftests: Silence compiler warning in the kvm_page_table_test
KVM: x86/pmu: Update AMD PMC sample period to fix guest NMI-watchdog
x86/kvm: Preserve BSP MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL across suspend/resume
KVM: SPDX style and spelling fixes
KVM: x86: Skip KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ APICv update if APICv is disabled
KVM: x86: Pend KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE during vCPU creation to fix a race
KVM: nVMX: Defer APICv updates while L2 is active until L1 is active
KVM: x86: Tag APICv DISABLE inhibit, not ABSENT, if APICv is disabled
KVM: Initialize debugfs_dentry when a VM is created to avoid NULL deref
KVM: Add helpers to wrap vcpu->srcu_idx and yell if it's abused
KVM: RISC-V: Use kvm_vcpu.srcu_idx, drop RISC-V's unnecessary copy
KVM: x86: Don't re-acquire SRCU lock in complete_emulated_io()
RISC-V: KVM: Restrict the extensions that can be disabled
RISC-V: KVM: Remove 's' & 'u' as valid ISA extension
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Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use clflush_cache_range() to flush the confidential memory when
SME_COHERENT is supported in AMD CPU. Cache flush is still needed since
SME_COHERENT only support cache invalidation at CPU side. All confidential
cache lines are still incoherent with DMA devices.
Cc: stable@vger.kerel.org
Fixes: add5e2f04541 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-3-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework sev_flush_guest_memory() to explicitly handle only a single page,
and harden it to fall back to WBINVD if VM_PAGE_FLUSH fails. Per-page
flushing is currently used only to flush the VMSA, and in its current
form, the helper is completely broken with respect to flushing actual
guest memory, i.e. won't work correctly for an arbitrary memory range.
VM_PAGE_FLUSH takes a host virtual address, and is subject to normal page
walks, i.e. will fault if the address is not present in the host page
tables or does not have the correct permissions. Current AMD CPUs also
do not honor SMAP overrides (undocumented in kernel versions of the APM),
so passing in a userspace address is completely out of the question. In
other words, KVM would need to manually walk the host page tables to get
the pfn, ensure the pfn is stable, and then use the direct map to invoke
VM_PAGE_FLUSH. And the latter might not even work, e.g. if userspace is
particularly evil/clever and backs the guest with Secret Memory (which
unmaps memory from the direct map).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: add5e2f04541 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-2-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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NMI-watchdog is one of the favorite features of kernel developers,
but it does not work in AMD guest even with vPMU enabled and worse,
the system misrepresents this capability via /proc.
This is a PMC emulation error. KVM does not pass the latest valid
value to perf_event in time when guest NMI-watchdog is running, thus
the perf_event corresponding to the watchdog counter will enter the
old state at some point after the first guest NMI injection, forcing
the hardware register PMC0 to be constantly written to 0x800000000001.
Meanwhile, the running counter should accurately reflect its new value
based on the latest coordinated pmc->counter (from vPMC's point of view)
rather than the value written directly by the guest.
Fixes: 168d918f2643 ("KVM: x86: Adjust counter sample period after a wrmsr")
Reported-by: Dongli Cao <caodongli@kingsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220409015226.38619-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL is cleared on reset, thus reverting guests to
host-side polling after suspend/resume. Non-bootstrap CPUs are
restored correctly by the haltpoll driver because they are hot-unplugged
during suspend and hot-plugged during resume; however, the BSP
is not hotpluggable and remains in host-sde polling mode after
the guest resume. The makes the guest pay for the cost of vmexits
every time the guest enters idle.
Fix it by recording BSP's haltpoll state and resuming it during guest
resume.
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1650267752-46796-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Skip the APICv inhibit update for KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ if APICv is
disabled at the module level to avoid having to acquire the mutex and
potentially process all vCPUs. The DISABLE inhibit will (barring bugs)
never be lifted, so piling on more inhibits is unnecessary.
Fixes: cae72dcc3b21 ("KVM: x86: inhibit APICv when KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ active")
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Make a KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE request when creating a vCPU with an
in-kernel local APIC and APICv enabled at the module level. Consuming
kvm_apicv_activated() and stuffing vcpu->arch.apicv_active directly can
race with __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(), as vCPU creation happens
before the vCPU is fully onlined, i.e. it won't get the request made to
"all" vCPUs. If APICv is globally inhibited between setting apicv_active
and onlining the vCPU, the vCPU will end up running with APICv enabled
and trigger KVM's sanity check.
Mark APICv as active during vCPU creation if APICv is enabled at the
module level, both to be optimistic about it's final state, e.g. to avoid
additional VMWRITEs on VMX, and because there are likely bugs lurking
since KVM checks apicv_active in multiple vCPU creation paths. While
keeping the current behavior of consuming kvm_apicv_activated() is
arguably safer from a regression perspective, force apicv_active so that
vCPU creation runs with deterministic state and so that if there are bugs,
they are found sooner than later, i.e. not when some crazy race condition
is hit.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 484 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 484 Comm: syz-executor361 Not tainted 5.16.13 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1~cloud0 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10039 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x337/0x15e0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10234
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4d2/0xc80 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3727
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16d/0x1d0 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The bug was hit by a syzkaller spamming VM creation with 2 vCPUs and a
call to KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG.
r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x0)
r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0)
ioctl$KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP(r1, 0x4068aea3, &(0x7f0000000000)) (async)
r2 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x0) (async)
r3 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x400000000000002)
ioctl$KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG(r3, 0x4048ae9b, &(0x7f00000000c0)={0x5dda9c14aa95f5c5})
ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0)
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 8df14af42f00 ("kvm: x86: Add support for dynamic APICv activation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Defer APICv updates that occur while L2 is active until nested VM-Exit,
i.e. until L1 regains control. vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() assumes L1
is active and (a) stomps all over vmcs02 and (b) neglects to ever updated
vmcs01. E.g. if vmcs12 doesn't enable the TPR shadow for L2 (and thus no
APICv controls), L1 performs nested VM-Enter APICv inhibited, and APICv
becomes unhibited while L2 is active, KVM will set various APICv controls
in vmcs02 and trigger a failed VM-Entry. The kicker is that, unless
running with nested_early_check=1, KVM blames L1 and chaos ensues.
In all cases, ignoring vmcs02 and always deferring the inhibition change
to vmcs01 is correct (or at least acceptable). The ABSENT and DISABLE
inhibitions cannot truly change while L2 is active (see below).
IRQ_BLOCKING can change, but it is firmly a best effort debug feature.
Furthermore, only L2's APIC is accelerated/virtualized to the full extent
possible, e.g. even if L1 passes through its APIC to L2, normal MMIO/MSR
interception will apply to the virtual APIC managed by KVM.
The exception is the SELF_IPI register when x2APIC is enabled, but that's
an acceptable hole.
Lastly, Hyper-V's Auto EOI can technically be toggled if L1 exposes the
MSRs to L2, but for that to work in any sane capacity, L1 would need to
pass through IRQs to L2 as well, and IRQs must be intercepted to enable
virtual interrupt delivery. I.e. exposing Auto EOI to L2 and enabling
VID for L2 are, for all intents and purposes, mutually exclusive.
Lack of dynamic toggling is also why this scenario is all but impossible
to encounter in KVM's current form. But a future patch will pend an
APICv update request _during_ vCPU creation to plug a race where a vCPU
that's being created doesn't get included in the "all vCPUs request"
because it's not yet visible to other vCPUs. If userspaces restores L2
after VM creation (hello, KVM selftests), the first KVM_RUN will occur
while L2 is active and thus service the APICv update request made during
VM creation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Set the DISABLE inhibit, not the ABSENT inhibit, if APICv is disabled via
module param. A recent refactoring to add a wrapper for setting/clearing
inhibits unintentionally changed the flag, probably due to a copy+paste
goof.
Fixes: 4f4c4a3ee53c ("KVM: x86: Trace all APICv inhibit changes and capture overall status")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add wrappers to acquire/release KVM's SRCU lock when stashing the index
in vcpu->src_idx, along with rudimentary detection of illegal usage,
e.g. re-acquiring SRCU and thus overwriting vcpu->src_idx. Because the
SRCU index is (currently) either 0 or 1, illegal nesting bugs can go
unnoticed for quite some time and only cause problems when the nested
lock happens to get a different index.
Wrap the WARNs in PROVE_RCU=y, and make them ONCE, otherwise KVM will
likely yell so loudly that it will bring the kernel to its knees.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Don't re-acquire SRCU in complete_emulated_io() now that KVM acquires the
lock in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(). More importantly, don't overwrite
vcpu->srcu_idx. If the index acquired by complete_emulated_io() differs
from the one acquired by kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(), KVM will effectively
leak a lock and hang if/when synchronize_srcu() is invoked for the
relevant grace period.
Fixes: 8d25b7beca7e ("KVM: x86: pull kvm->srcu read-side to kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The first "if" condition in __memcpy_flushcache is supposed to align the
"dest" variable to 8 bytes and copy data up to this alignment. However,
this condition may misbehave if "size" is greater than 4GiB.
The statement min_t(unsigned, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest); casts both
arguments to unsigned int and selects the smaller one. However, the
cast truncates high bits in "size" and it results in misbehavior.
For example:
suppose that size == 0x100000001, dest == 0x200000002
min_t(unsigned, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest) == min_t(0x1, 0xe) == 0x1;
...
dest += 0x1;
so we copy just one byte "and" dest remains unaligned.
This patch fixes the bug by replacing unsigned with size_t.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
For unwinding sanity, a function shouldn't jump to the middle of another
function. Move the short string user copy code out to a separate
non-function code snippet.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9519e4853148b765e047967708f2b61e56c93186.1649718562.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
|
|
There is only one m in becoming.
Signed-off-by: Nur Hussein <hussein@unixcat.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220417192454.10247-1-hussein@unixcat.org
|
|
The startup_xen() kernel entry point is referenced by the ".note.Xen"
section, and is the real entry point of the VM. Control transfer is
through IRET, which *could* set NEED_ENDBR, however Xen currently does
no such thing.
Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR to silence future objtool warnings.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a87bd48b06d11ec4b98122a429e71e489b4e48c3.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
|
|
The __put_user_nocheck*() inner labels are exported, so in keeping with
the "allow exported functions to be indirectly called" policy, add
ENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/207f02177a23031091d1a608de6049a9e5e8ff80.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
|
|
The retpolines are exported, so they're referenced by ksymtab sections.
But they're never indirect-branched to, so add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6ec963dfd9301b6b1d74ef7758fcb0b540d6c6c.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
|
|
The static call trampoline is never indirect-branched to, but is
referenced by the static call key. Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b5b54aad7d81241dabe5e0c9b40dea64b540b00.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
|
|
Objtool can figure out that some \cfunc()s are noreturn and then
complains about certain instances having unreachable tails:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap()+0x16: unreachable instruction
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408094718.441854969@infradead.org
|
|
SYM_CODE_START*() doesn't get auto-validated and needs an UNWIND hint
to get checked, add one.
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pvh_start_xen()+0x0: unreachable
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408094718.321246297@infradead.org
|
|
A crash was observed in the ORC unwinder:
BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0)
kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1
RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame
Call Trace:
<NMI>
perf_callchain_kernel
get_perf_callchain
perf_callchain
perf_prepare_sample
perf_event_output_forward
__perf_event_overflow
perf_ibs_handle_irq
perf_ibs_nmi_handler
nmi_handle
default_do_nmi
do_nmi
end_repeat_nmi
This was really two bugs:
1) The perf IBS code passed inconsistent regs to the unwinder.
2) The unwinder didn't handle the bad input gracefully.
Fix the latter bug. The ORC unwinder needs to be immune against bad
inputs. The problem is that stack_access_ok() doesn't recheck the
validity of the full range of registers after switching to the next
valid stack with get_stack_info(). Fix that.
[ jpoimboe: rewrote commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650353656-956624-1-git-send-email-dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
|
|
From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters,
SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X is the same as ICELAKE_X.
Share the code with it. And update the comments for SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220415104520.2737004-1-rui.zhang@intel.com
|
|
When resuming from system sleep state, restore_processor_state()
restores the boot CPU MSRs. These MSRs could be emulated by microcode.
If microcode is not loaded yet, writing to emulated MSRs leads to
unchecked MSR access error:
...
PM: Calling lapic_suspend+0x0/0x210
unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0...0) at rIP: ... (native_write_msr)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? restore_processor_state
x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel
acpi_suspend_enter
suspend_devices_and_enter
pm_suspend.cold
state_store
kobj_attr_store
sysfs_kf_write
kernfs_fop_write_iter
new_sync_write
vfs_write
ksys_write
__x64_sys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
RIP: 0033:0x7fda13c260a7
To ensure microcode emulated MSRs are available for restoration, load
the microcode on the boot CPU before restoring these MSRs.
[ Pawan: write commit message and productize it. ]
Fixes: e2a1256b17b1 ("x86/speculation: Restore speculation related MSRs during S3 resume")
Reported-by: Kyle D. Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Kyle D. Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215841
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4350dfbf785cd482d3fafa72b2b49c83102df3ce.1650386317.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
|
|
Intel is subdividing the mobile segment with additional models
with the same codename. Using the Intel "N" and "P" suffices
for these will be less confusing than trying to map to some
different naming convention.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YlS7n7Xtso9BXZA2@agluck-desk3.sc.intel.com
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Two x86 fixes related to TSX:
- Use either MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT or MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL to disable TSX
to cover all CPUs which allow to disable it.
- Disable TSX development mode at boot so that a microcode update
which provides TSX development mode does not suddenly make the
system vulnerable to TSX Asynchronous Abort"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2022-04-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/tsx: Disable TSX development mode at boot
x86/tsx: Use MSR_TSX_CTRL to clear CPUID bits
|
|
Commit 3ee48b6af49c ("mm, x86: Saving vmcore with non-lazy freeing of
vmas") introduced set_iounmap_nonlazy(), which sets vmap_lazy_nr to
lazy_max_pages() + 1, ensuring that any future vunmaps() immediately
purge the vmap areas instead of doing it lazily.
Commit 690467c81b1a ("mm/vmalloc: Move draining areas out of caller
context") moved the purging from the vunmap() caller to a worker thread.
Unfortunately, set_iounmap_nonlazy() can cause the worker thread to spin
(possibly forever). For example, consider the following scenario:
1. Thread reads from /proc/vmcore. This eventually calls
__copy_oldmem_page() -> set_iounmap_nonlazy(), which sets
vmap_lazy_nr to lazy_max_pages() + 1.
2. Then it calls free_vmap_area_noflush() (via iounmap()), which adds 2
pages (one page plus the guard page) to the purge list and
vmap_lazy_nr. vmap_lazy_nr is now lazy_max_pages() + 3, so the
drain_vmap_work is scheduled.
3. Thread returns from the kernel and is scheduled out.
4. Worker thread is scheduled in and calls drain_vmap_area_work(). It
frees the 2 pages on the purge list. vmap_lazy_nr is now
lazy_max_pages() + 1.
5. This is still over the threshold, so it tries to purge areas again,
but doesn't find anything.
6. Repeat 5.
If the system is running with only one CPU (which is typicial for kdump)
and preemption is disabled, then this will never make forward progress:
there aren't any more pages to purge, so it hangs. If there is more
than one CPU or preemption is enabled, then the worker thread will spin
forever in the background. (Note that if there were already pages to be
purged at the time that set_iounmap_nonlazy() was called, this bug is
avoided.)
This can be reproduced with anything that reads from /proc/vmcore
multiple times. E.g., vmcore-dmesg /proc/vmcore.
It turns out that improvements to vmap() over the years have obsoleted
the need for this "optimization". I benchmarked `dd if=/proc/vmcore
of=/dev/null` with 4k and 1M read sizes on a system with a 32GB vmcore.
The test was run on 5.17, 5.18-rc1 with a fix that avoided the hang, and
5.18-rc1 with set_iounmap_nonlazy() removed entirely:
|5.17 |5.18+fix|5.18+removal
4k|40.86s| 40.09s| 26.73s
1M|24.47s| 23.98s| 21.84s
The removal was the fastest (by a wide margin with 4k reads). This
patch removes set_iounmap_nonlazy().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/52f819991051f9b865e9ce25605509bfdbacadcd.1649277321.git.osandov@fb.com
Fixes: 690467c81b1a ("mm/vmalloc: Move draining areas out of caller context")
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"x86:
- Miscellaneous bugfixes
- A small cleanup for the new workqueue code
- Documentation syntax fix
RISC-V:
- Remove hgatp zeroing in kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
- Fix alignment of the guest_hang() in KVM selftest
- Fix PTE A and D bits in KVM selftest
- Missing #include in vcpu_fp.c
ARM:
- Some PSCI fixes after introducing PSCIv1.1 and SYSTEM_RESET2
- Fix the MMU write-lock not being taken on THP split
- Fix mixed-width VM handling
- Fix potential UAF when debugfs registration fails
- Various selftest updates for all of the above"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (24 commits)
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Avoid writing to TSC page without an active vCPU
KVM: SVM: Do not activate AVIC for SEV-enabled guest
Documentation: KVM: Add SPDX-License-Identifier tag
selftests: kvm: add tsc_scaling_sync to .gitignore
RISC-V: KVM: include missing hwcap.h into vcpu_fp
KVM: selftests: riscv: Fix alignment of the guest_hang() function
KVM: selftests: riscv: Set PTE A and D bits in VS-stage page table
RISC-V: KVM: Don't clear hgatp CSR in kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
selftests: KVM: Free the GIC FD when cleaning up in arch_timer
selftests: KVM: Don't leak GIC FD across dirty log test iterations
KVM: Don't create VM debugfs files outside of the VM directory
KVM: selftests: get-reg-list: Add KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3)
KVM: avoid NULL pointer dereference in kvm_dirty_ring_push
KVM: arm64: selftests: Introduce vcpu_width_config
KVM: arm64: mixed-width check should be skipped for uninitialized vCPUs
KVM: arm64: vgic: Remove unnecessary type castings
KVM: arm64: Don't split hugepages outside of MMU write lock
KVM: arm64: Drop unneeded minor version check from PSCI v1.x handler
KVM: arm64: Actually prevent SMC64 SYSTEM_RESET2 from AArch32
KVM: arm64: Generally disallow SMC64 for AArch32 guests
...
|
|
struct stat (defined in arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/stat.h) has 32-bit
st_dev and st_rdev; struct compat_stat (defined in
arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h) has 16-bit st_dev and st_rdev followed by
a 16-bit padding.
This patch fixes struct compat_stat to match struct stat.
[ Historical note: the old x86 'struct stat' did have that 16-bit field
that the compat layer had kept around, but it was changes back in 2003
by "struct stat - support larger dev_t":
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/?id=e95b2065677fe32512a597a79db94b77b90c968d
and back in those days, the x86_64 port was still new, and separate
from the i386 code, and had already picked up the old version with a
16-bit st_dev field ]
Note that we can't change compat_dev_t because it is used by
compat_loop_info.
Also, if the st_dev and st_rdev values are 32-bit, we don't have to use
old_valid_dev to test if the value fits into them. This fixes
-EOVERFLOW on filesystems that are on NVMe because NVMe uses the major
number 259.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The following WARN is triggered from kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock():
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 579353 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3161 mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
CPU: 10 PID: 579353 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G W O 5.16.0.stable #20
Hardware name: LENOVO 20UF001CUS/20UF001CUS, BIOS R1CET65W(1.34 ) 06/17/2021
RIP: 0010:mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? kvm_write_guest+0x114/0x120 [kvm]
kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x9e/0xf0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa26/0xc50 [kvm]
? schedule+0x4e/0xc0
? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
? futex_wait+0x166/0x250
? __send_signal+0x1f1/0x3d0
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x747/0xda0 [kvm]
...
The WARN was introduced by commit 03c0304a86bc ("KVM: Warn if
mark_page_dirty() is called without an active vCPU") but the change seems
to be correct (unlike Hyper-V TSC page update mechanism). In fact, there's
no real need to actually write to guest memory to invalidate TSC page, this
can be done by the first vCPU which goes through kvm_guest_time_update().
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407201013.963226-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
|
|
Since current AVIC implementation cannot support encrypted memory,
inhibit AVIC for SEV-enabled guest.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220408133710.54275-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions
to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to
re-enable TSX for development purposes. With this microcode loaded, if
tsx=on was passed on the cmdline, and TSX development mode was already
enabled before the kernel boot, it may make the system vulnerable to TSX
Asynchronous Abort (TAA).
To be on safer side, unconditionally disable TSX development mode during
boot. If a viable use case appears, this can be revisited later.
[*]: Intel TSX Disable Update for Selected Processors, doc ID: 643557
[ bp: Drop unstable web link, massage heavily. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/347bd844da3a333a9793c6687d4e4eb3b2419a3e.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
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tsx_clear_cpuid() uses MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT to clear CPUID.RTM and
CPUID.HLE. Not all CPUs support MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, alternatively use
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL when supported.
[ bp: Document how and why TSX gets disabled. ]
Fixes: 293649307ef9 ("x86/tsx: Clear CPUID bits when TSX always force aborts")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5b323e77e251a9c8bcdda498c5cc0095be1e1d3c.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix the MSI message data struct definition
- Use local labels in the exception table macros to avoid symbol
conflicts with clang LTO builds
- A couple of fixes to objtool checking of the relatively newly added
SLS and IBT code
- Rename a local var in the WARN* macro machinery to prevent shadowing
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/msi: Fix msi message data shadow struct
x86/extable: Prefer local labels in .set directives
x86,bpf: Avoid IBT objtool warning
objtool: Fix SLS validation for kcov tail-call replacement
objtool: Fix IBT tail-call detection
x86/bug: Prevent shadowing in __WARN_FLAGS
x86/mm/tlb: Revert retpoline avoidance approach
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- A couple of fixes to cgroup-related handling of perf events
- A couple of fixes to event encoding on Sapphire Rapids
- Pass event caps of inherited events so that perf doesn't fail wrongly
at fork()
- Add support for a new Raptor Lake CPU
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Always set cpuctx cgrp when enable cgroup event
perf/core: Fix perf_cgroup_switch()
perf/core: Use perf_cgroup_info->active to check if cgroup is active
perf/core: Don't pass task around when ctx sched in
perf/x86/intel: Update the FRONTEND MSR mask on Sapphire Rapids
perf/x86/intel: Don't extend the pseudo-encoding to GP counters
perf/core: Inherit event_caps
perf/x86/uncore: Add Raptor Lake uncore support
perf/x86/msr: Add Raptor Lake CPU support
perf/x86/cstate: Add Raptor Lake support
perf/x86: Add Intel Raptor Lake support
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Allow the compiler to optimize away unused percpu accesses and change
the local_lock_* macros back to inline functions
- A couple of fixes to static call insn patching
* tag 'locking_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Revert "mm/page_alloc: mark pagesets as __maybe_unused"
Revert "locking/local_lock: Make the empty local_lock_*() function a macro."
x86/percpu: Remove volatile from arch_raw_cpu_ptr().
static_call: Remove __DEFINE_STATIC_CALL macro
static_call: Properly initialise DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_RET0()
static_call: Don't make __static_call_return0 static
x86,static_call: Fix __static_call_return0 for i386
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The x86 MSI message data is 32 bits in total and is either in
compatibility or remappable format, see Intel Virtualization Technology
for Directed I/O, section 5.1.2.
Fixes: 6285aa50736 ("x86/msi: Provide msi message shadow structs")
Co-developed-by: Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger <ken@codelabs.ch>
Signed-off-by: Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger <ken@codelabs.ch>
Signed-off-by: Reto Buerki <reet@codelabs.ch>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407110647.67372-1-reet@codelabs.ch
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Bernardo reported an error that Nathan bisected down to
(x86_64) defconfig+LTO_CLANG_FULL+X86_PMEM_LEGACY.
LTO vmlinux.o
ld.lld: error: <instantiation>:1:13: redefinition of 'found'
.set found, 0
^
<inline asm>:29:1: while in macro instantiation
extable_type_reg reg=%eax, type=(17 | ((0) << 16))
^
This appears to be another LTO specific issue similar to what was folded
into commit 4b5305decc84 ("x86/extable: Extend extable functionality"),
where the `.set found, 0` in DEFINE_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG in
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h conflicts with the symbol for the static
function `found` in arch/x86/kernel/pmem.c.
Assembler .set directive declare symbols with global visibility, so the
assembler may not rename such symbols in the event of a conflict. LTO
could rename static functions if there was a conflict in C sources, but
it cannot see into symbols defined in inline asm.
The symbols are also retained in the symbol table, regardless of LTO.
Give the symbols .L prefixes making them locally visible, so that they
may be renamed for LTO to avoid conflicts, and to drop them from the
symbol table regardless of LTO.
Fixes: 4b5305decc84 ("x86/extable: Extend extable functionality")
Reported-by: Bernardo Meurer Costa <beme@google.com>
Debugged-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329202148.2379697-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
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Clang can inline emit_indirect_jump() and then folds constants, which
results in:
| vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: emit_bpf_dispatcher()+0x6a4: relocation to !ENDBR: .text.__x86.indirect_thunk+0x40
| vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: emit_bpf_dispatcher()+0x67d: relocation to !ENDBR: .text.__x86.indirect_thunk+0x40
| vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect()+0x386: relocation to !ENDBR: .text.__x86.indirect_thunk+0x20
| vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect()+0x35d: relocation to !ENDBR: .text.__x86.indirect_thunk+0x20
Suppress the optimization such that it must emit a code reference to
the __x86_indirect_thunk_array[] base.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405075531.GB30877@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
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