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2015-10-03ebpf: migrate bpf_prog's flags to bitfieldDaniel Borkmann1-1/+1
As we need to add further flags to the bpf_prog structure, lets migrate both bools to a bitfield representation. The size of the base structure (excluding insns) remains unchanged at 40 bytes. Add also tags for the kmemchecker, so that it doesn't throw false positives. Even in case gcc would generate suboptimal code, it's not being accessed in performance critical paths. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-09bpf: Make the bpf_prog_array_map more genericWang Nan1-3/+3
All the map backends are of generic nature. In order to avoid adding much special code into the eBPF core, rewrite part of the bpf_prog_array map code and make it more generic. So the new perf_event_array map type can reuse most of code with bpf_prog_array map and add fewer lines of special code. Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-31Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-4/+4
Conflicts: arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_ethss.c net/bridge/br_multicast.c net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c All four conflicts were cases of simple overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-30bpf, x86/sparc: show actual number of passes in bpf_jit_dumpDaniel Borkmann1-1/+1
When bpf_jit_compile() got split into two functions via commit f3c2af7ba17a ("net: filter: x86: split bpf_jit_compile()"), bpf_jit_dump() was changed to always show 0 as number of compiler passes. Change it to dump the actual number. Also on sparc, we count passes starting from 0, so add 1 for the debug dump as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-29ebpf, x86: fix general protection fault when tail call is invokedDaniel Borkmann1-4/+4
With eBPF JIT compiler enabled on x86_64, I was able to reliably trigger the following general protection fault out of an eBPF program with a simple tail call, f.e. tracex5 (or a stripped down version of it): [ 927.097918] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [...] [ 927.100870] task: ffff8801f228b780 ti: ffff880016a64000 task.ti: ffff880016a64000 [ 927.102096] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa002440d>] [<ffffffffa002440d>] 0xffffffffa002440d [ 927.103390] RSP: 0018:ffff880016a67a68 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 927.104683] RAX: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 927.105921] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88014e438000 RDI: ffff880016a67e00 [ 927.107137] RBP: ffff880016a67c90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 927.108351] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880016a67e00 [ 927.109567] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88026500e460 R15: ffff880220a81520 [ 927.110787] FS: 00007fe7d5c1f740(0000) GS:ffff880265000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 927.112021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 927.113255] CR2: 0000003e7bbb91a0 CR3: 000000006e04b000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 927.114500] Stack: [ 927.115737] ffffc90008cdb000 ffff880016a67e00 ffff88026500e460 ffff880220a81520 [ 927.117005] 0000000100000000 000000000000001b ffff880016a67aa8 ffffffff8106c548 [ 927.118276] 00007ffcdaf22e58 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880016a67ff0 [ 927.119543] Call Trace: [ 927.120797] [<ffffffff8106c548>] ? lookup_address+0x28/0x30 [ 927.122058] [<ffffffff8113d176>] ? __module_text_address+0x16/0x70 [ 927.123314] [<ffffffff8117bf0e>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x3e/0x70 [ 927.124562] [<ffffffff810c1a0f>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x5f/0x80 [ 927.125806] [<ffffffff8102086f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0 [ 927.127033] [<ffffffff810f7852>] ? __lock_acquire+0x572/0x2050 [ 927.128254] [<ffffffff810f7852>] ? __lock_acquire+0x572/0x2050 [ 927.129461] [<ffffffff8119edfa>] ? trace_call_bpf+0x3a/0x140 [ 927.130654] [<ffffffff8119ee4a>] trace_call_bpf+0x8a/0x140 [ 927.131837] [<ffffffff8119edfa>] ? trace_call_bpf+0x3a/0x140 [ 927.133015] [<ffffffff8119f008>] kprobe_perf_func+0x28/0x220 [ 927.134195] [<ffffffff811a1668>] kprobe_dispatcher+0x38/0x60 [ 927.135367] [<ffffffff81174b91>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x1/0x230 [ 927.136523] [<ffffffff81061400>] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0xf0/0x150 [ 927.137666] [<ffffffff81174b95>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230 [ 927.138802] [<ffffffff8117950c>] ftrace_ops_recurs_func+0x5c/0xb0 [ 927.139934] [<ffffffffa022b0d5>] 0xffffffffa022b0d5 [ 927.141066] [<ffffffff81174b91>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x1/0x230 [ 927.142199] [<ffffffff81174b95>] seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230 [ 927.143323] [<ffffffff8102c0a4>] syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0xc4/0x150 [ 927.144450] [<ffffffff81174b95>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x5/0x230 [ 927.145572] [<ffffffff8102c0a4>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0xc4/0x150 [ 927.146666] [<ffffffff817f9a9f>] tracesys+0xd/0x44 [ 927.147723] Code: 48 8b 46 10 48 39 d0 76 2c 8b 85 fc fd ff ff 83 f8 20 77 21 83 c0 01 89 85 fc fd ff ff 48 8d 44 d6 80 48 8b 00 48 83 f8 00 74 0a <48> 8b 40 20 48 83 c0 33 ff e0 48 89 d8 48 8b 9d d8 fd ff ff 4c [ 927.150046] RIP [<ffffffffa002440d>] 0xffffffffa002440d The code section with the instructions that traps points into the eBPF JIT image of the root program (the one invoking the tail call instruction). Using bpf_jit_disasm -o on the eBPF root program image: [...] 4e: mov -0x204(%rbp),%eax 8b 85 fc fd ff ff 54: cmp $0x20,%eax <--- if (tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT) 83 f8 20 57: ja 0x000000000000007a 77 21 59: add $0x1,%eax <--- tail_call_cnt++ 83 c0 01 5c: mov %eax,-0x204(%rbp) 89 85 fc fd ff ff 62: lea -0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- prog = array->prog[index] 48 8d 44 d6 80 67: mov (%rax),%rax 48 8b 00 6a: cmp $0x0,%rax <--- check for NULL 48 83 f8 00 6e: je 0x000000000000007a 74 0a 70: mov 0x20(%rax),%rax <--- GPF triggered here! fetch of bpf_func 48 8b 40 20 [ matches <48> 8b 40 20 ... from above ] 74: add $0x33,%rax <--- prologue skip of new prog 48 83 c0 33 78: jmpq *%rax <--- jump to new prog insns ff e0 [...] The problem is that rax has 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a, which suggests a tail call jump to map slot 0 is pointing to a poisoned page. The issue is the following: lea instruction has a wrong offset, i.e. it should be ... lea 0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax ... but it actually seems to be ... lea -0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax ... where 0x80 is offsetof(struct bpf_array, prog), thus the offset needs to be positive instead of negative. Disassembling the interpreter, we btw similarly do: [...] c88: lea 0x80(%rax,%rdx,8),%rax <--- prog = array->prog[index] 48 8d 84 d0 80 00 00 00 c90: add $0x1,%r13d 41 83 c5 01 c94: mov (%rax),%rax 48 8b 00 [...] Now the other interesting fact is that this panic triggers only when things like CONFIG_LOCKDEP are being used. In that case offsetof(struct bpf_array, prog) starts at offset 0x80 and in non-CONFIG_LOCKDEP case at offset 0x50. Reason is that the work_struct inside struct bpf_map grows by 48 bytes in my case due to the lockdep_map member (which also has CONFIG_LOCK_STAT enabled members). Changing the emitter to always use the 4 byte displacement in the lea instruction fixes the panic on my side. It increases the tail call instruction emission by 3 more byte, but it should cover us from various combinations (and perhaps other future increases on related structures). After patch, disassembly: [...] 9e: lea 0x80(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- CONFIG_LOCKDEP/CONFIG_LOCK_STAT 48 8d 84 d6 80 00 00 00 a6: mov (%rax),%rax 48 8b 00 [...] [...] 9e: lea 0x50(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax <--- No CONFIG_LOCKDEP 48 8d 84 d6 50 00 00 00 a6: mov (%rax),%rax 48 8b 00 [...] Fixes: b52f00e6a715 ("x86: bpf_jit: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-20bpf: introduce bpf_skb_vlan_push/pop() helpersAlexei Starovoitov1-38/+42
Allow eBPF programs attached to TC qdiscs call skb_vlan_push/pop via helper functions. These functions may change skb->data/hlen which are cached by some JITs to improve performance of ld_abs/ld_ind instructions. Therefore JITs need to recognize bpf_skb_vlan_push/pop() calls, re-compute header len and re-cache skb->data/hlen back into cpu registers. Note, skb->data/hlen are not directly accessible from the programs, so any changes to skb->data done either by these helpers or by other TC actions are safe. eBPF JIT supported by three architectures: - arm64 JIT is using bpf_load_pointer() without caching, so it's ok as-is. - x64 JIT re-caches skb->data/hlen unconditionally after vlan_push/pop calls (experiments showed that conditional re-caching is slower). - s390 JIT falls back to interpreter for now when bpf_skb_vlan_push() is present in the program (re-caching is tbd). These helpers allow more scalable handling of vlan from the programs. Instead of creating thousands of vlan netdevs on top of eth0 and attaching TC+ingress+bpf to all of them, the program can be attached to eth0 directly and manipulate vlans as necessary. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-24Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds1-24/+126
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Add TX fast path in mac80211, from Johannes Berg. 2) Add TSO/GRO support to ibmveth, from Thomas Falcon 3) Move away from cached routes in ipv6, just like ipv4, from Martin KaFai Lau. 4) Lots of new rhashtable tests, from Thomas Graf. 5) Run ingress qdisc lockless, from Alexei Starovoitov. 6) Allow servers to fetch TCP packet headers for SYN packets of new connections, for fingerprinting. From Eric Dumazet. 7) Add mode parameter to pktgen, for testing receive. From Alexei Starovoitov. 8) Cache access optimizations via simplifications of build_skb(), from Alexander Duyck. 9) Move page frag allocator under mm/, also from Alexander. 10) Add xmit_more support to hv_netvsc, from KY Srinivasan. 11) Add a counter guard in case we try to perform endless reclassify loops in the packet scheduler. 12) Extern flow dissector to be programmable and use it in new "Flower" classifier. From Jiri Pirko. 13) AF_PACKET fanout rollover fixes, performance improvements, and new statistics. From Willem de Bruijn. 14) Add netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels, from John W Linville. 15) Add ingress netfilter hooks and filtering, from Pablo Neira Ayuso. 16) Fix handling of epoll edge triggers in TCP, from Eric Dumazet. 17) Add an ECN retry fallback for the initial TCP handshake, from Daniel Borkmann. 18) Add tail call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov. 19) Add several pktgen helper scripts, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer. 20) Add zerocopy support to AF_UNIX, from Hannes Frederic Sowa. 21) Favor even port numbers for allocation to connect() requests, and odd port numbers for bind(0), in an effort to help avoid ip_local_port_range exhaustion. From Eric Dumazet. 22) Add Cavium ThunderX driver, from Sunil Goutham. 23) Allow bpf programs to access skb_iif and dev->ifindex SKB metadata, from Alexei Starovoitov. 24) Add support for T6 chips in cxgb4vf driver, from Hariprasad Shenai. 25) Double TCP Small Queues default to 256K to accomodate situations like the XEN driver and wireless aggregation. From Wei Liu. 26) Add more entropy inputs to flow dissector, from Tom Herbert. 27) Add CDG congestion control algorithm to TCP, from Kenneth Klette Jonassen. 28) Convert ipset over to RCU locking, from Jozsef Kadlecsik. 29) Track and act upon link status of ipv4 route nexthops, from Andy Gospodarek. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1670 commits) bridge: vlan: flush the dynamically learned entries on port vlan delete bridge: multicast: add a comment to br_port_state_selection about blocking state net: inet_diag: export IPV6_V6ONLY sockopt stmmac: troubleshoot unexpected bits in des0 & des1 net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down net: track link-status of ipv4 nexthops net: switchdev: ignore unsupported bridge flags net: Cavium: Fix MAC address setting in shutdown state drivers: net: xgene: fix for ACPI support without ACPI ip: report the original address of ICMP messages net/mlx5e: Prefetch skb data on RX net/mlx5e: Pop cq outside mlx5e_get_cqe net/mlx5e: Remove mlx5e_cq.sqrq back-pointer net/mlx5e: Remove extra spaces net/mlx5e: Avoid TX CQE generation if more xmit packets expected net/mlx5e: Avoid redundant dev_kfree_skb() upon NOP completion net/mlx5e: Remove re-assignment of wq type in mlx5e_enable_rq() net/mlx5e: Use skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs rather than counting them net/mlx5e: Static mapping of netdev priv resources to/from netdev TX queues net/mlx4_en: Use HW counters for rx/tx bytes/packets in PF device ...
2015-06-08Merge branch 'x86/asm' into x86/core, to prepare for new patchIngo Molnar1-1/+0
Collect all changes to arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, before applying patch that changes most of the file. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-06-02x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotationsIngo Molnar1-1/+0
So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-06-01Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-1/+6
Conflicts: drivers/net/phy/amd-xgbe-phy.c drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/Kconfig include/net/mac80211.h iwlwifi/Kconfig and mac80211.h were both trivial overlapping changes. The drivers/net/phy/amd-xgbe-phy.c file got removed in 'net-next' and the bug fix that happened on the 'net' side is already integrated into the rest of the amd-xgbe driver. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-25x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programsAlexei Starovoitov1-1/+6
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction. While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes. Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns. Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program. Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-21x86: bpf_jit: implement bpf_tail_call() helperAlexei Starovoitov1-24/+126
bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue, so the callee program reuses the same stack. The logic can be roughly expressed in C like: u32 tail_call_cnt; void *jumptable[2] = { &&label1, &&label2 }; int bpf_prog1(void *ctx) { label1: ... } int bpf_prog2(void *ctx) { label2: ... } int bpf_prog1(void *ctx) { ... if (tail_call_cnt++ < MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT) goto *jumptable[index]; ... and pass my 'ctx' to callee ... ... fall through if no entry in jumptable ... } Note that 'skip current program epilogue and next program prologue' is an optimization. Other JITs don't have to do it the same way. >From safety point of view it's valid as well, since programs always initialize the stack before use, so any residue in the stack left by the current program is not going be read. The same verifier checks are done for the calls from the kernel into all bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-12x86: bpf_jit: fix FROM_BE16 and FROM_LE16/32 instructionsAlexei Starovoitov1-0/+28
FROM_BE16: 'ror %reg, 8' doesn't clear upper bits of the register, so use additional 'movzwl' insn to zero extend 16 bits into 64 FROM_LE16: should zero extend lower 16 bits into 64 bit FROM_LE32: should zero extend lower 32 bits into 64 bit Fixes: 89aa075832b0 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-10Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-2/+4
Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-desc.c drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c Overlapping changes in both conflict cases. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-09x86: bpf_jit_comp: Remove inline from static function definitionsJoe Perches1-9/+9
Let the compiler decide instead. No change in object size x86-64 -O2 no profiling Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-09x86: bpf_jit_comp: Reduce is_ereg() code sizeJoe Perches1-5/+5
Use the (1 << reg) & mask trick to reduce code size. x86-64 size difference -O2 without profiling for various gcc versions: $ size arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o* text data bss dec hex filename 9266 4 0 9270 2436 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.4.new 10042 4 0 10046 273e arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.4.old 9109 4 0 9113 2399 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.6.new 9717 4 0 9721 25f9 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.6.old 8789 4 0 8793 2259 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.7.new 10245 4 0 10249 2809 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.7.old 9671 4 0 9675 25cb arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.9.new 10679 4 0 10683 29bb arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.o.4.9.old Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-05bpf: x86: fix epilogue generation for eBPF programsAlexei Starovoitov1-2/+4
classic BPF has a restriction that last insn is always BPF_RET. eBPF doesn't have BPF_RET instruction and this restriction. It has BPF_EXIT insn which can appear anywhere in the program one or more times and it doesn't have to be last insn. Fix eBPF JIT to emit epilogue when first BPF_EXIT is seen and all other BPF_EXIT instructions will be emitted as jump. Since jump offset to epilogue is computed as: jmp_offset = ctx->cleanup_addr - addrs[i] we need to change type of cleanup_addr to signed to compute the offset as: (long long) ((int)20 - (int)30) instead of: (long long) ((unsigned int)20 - (int)30) Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-14x86: bpf_jit: fix two bugs in eBPF JIT compilerAlexei Starovoitov1-6/+19
1. JIT compiler using multi-pass approach to converge to final image size, since x86 instructions are variable length. It starts with large gaps between instructions (so some jumps may use imm32 instead of imm8) and iterates until total program size is the same as in previous pass. This algorithm works only if program size is strictly decreasing. Programs that use LD_ABS insn need additional code in prologue, but it was not emitted during 1st pass, so there was a chance that 2nd pass would adjust imm32->imm8 jump offsets to the same number of bytes as increase in prologue, which may cause algorithm to erroneously decide that size converged. Fix it by always emitting largest prologue in the first pass which is detected by oldproglen==0 check. Also change error check condition 'proglen != oldproglen' to fail gracefully. 2. while staring at the code realized that 64-byte buffer may not be enough when 1st insn is large, so increase it to 128 to avoid buffer overflow (theoretical maximum size of prologue+div is 109) and add runtime check. Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Reported-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-09net: bpf: be friendly to kmemcheckDaniel Borkmann1-1/+1
Reported by Mikulas Patocka, kmemcheck currently barks out a false positive since we don't have special kmemcheck annotation for bitfields used in bpf_prog structure. We currently have jited:1, len:31 and thus when accessing len while CONFIG_KMEMCHECK enabled, kmemcheck throws a warning that we're reading uninitialized memory. As we don't need the whole bit universe for pages member, we can just split it to u16 and use a bool flag for jited instead of a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-09net: bpf: consolidate JIT binary allocatorDaniel Borkmann1-39/+11
Introduced in commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks") and later on replicated in aa2d2c73c21f ("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code") for s390 architecture, write protection for BPF JIT images got added and a random start address of the JIT code, so that it's not on a page boundary anymore. Since both use a very similar allocator for the BPF binary header, we can consolidate this code into the BPF core as it's mostly JIT independant anyway. This will also allow for future archs that support DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX to just reuse instead of reimplementing it. JIT tested on x86_64 and s390x with BPF test suite. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-09net: filter: add "load 64-bit immediate" eBPF instructionAlexei Starovoitov1-0/+17
add BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction to load 64-bit immediate value into a register. All previous instructions were 8-byte. This is first 16-byte instruction. Two consecutive 'struct bpf_insn' blocks are interpreted as single instruction: insn[0].code = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM insn[0].dst_reg = destination register insn[0].imm = lower 32-bit insn[1].code = 0 insn[1].imm = upper 32-bit All unused fields must be zero. Classic BPF has similar instruction: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_IMM which loads 32-bit immediate value into a register. x64 JITs it as single 'movabsq %rax, imm64' arm64 may JIT as sequence of four 'movk x0, #imm16, lsl #shift' insn Note that old eBPF programs are binary compatible with new interpreter. It helps eBPF programs load 64-bit constant into a register with one instruction instead of using two registers and 4 instructions: BPF_MOV32_IMM(R1, imm32) BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, R1, 32) BPF_MOV32_IMM(R2, imm32) BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, R1, R2) User space generated programs will use this instruction to load constants only. To tell kernel that user space needs a pointer the _pseudo_ variant of this instruction may be added later, which will use extra bits of encoding to indicate what type of pointer user space is asking kernel to provide. For example 'off' or 'src_reg' fields can be used for such purpose. src_reg = 1 could mean that user space is asking kernel to validate and load in-kernel map pointer. src_reg = 2 could mean that user space needs readonly data section pointer src_reg = 3 could mean that user space needs a pointer to per-cpu local data All such future pseudo instructions will not be carrying the actual pointer as part of the instruction, but rather will be treated as a request to kernel to provide one. The kernel will verify the request_for_a_pointer, then will drop _pseudo_ marking and will store actual internal pointer inside the instruction, so the end result is the interpreter and JITs never see pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insns and only operate on generic BPF_LD_IMM64 that loads 64-bit immediate into a register. User space never operates on direct pointers and verifier can easily recognize request_for_pointer vs other instructions. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-05net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-onlyDaniel Borkmann1-12/+6
With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-25bpf: x86: add missing 'shift by register' instructions to x64 eBPF JITAlexei Starovoitov1-0/+42
'shift by register' operations are supported by eBPF interpreter, but were accidently left out of x64 JIT compiler. Fix it and add a testcase. Reported-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-02net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf partsAlexei Starovoitov1-6/+6
clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-02net: filter: rename sk_convert_filter() -> bpf_convert_filter()Alexei Starovoitov1-1/+1
to indicate that this function is converting classic BPF into eBPF and not related to sockets Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-24net: filter: rename 'struct sock_filter_int' into 'struct bpf_insn'Alexei Starovoitov1-1/+1
eBPF is used by socket filtering, seccomp and soon by tracing and exposed to userspace, therefore 'sock_filter_int' name is not accurate. Rename it to 'bpf_insn' Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11net: filter: cleanup A/X name usageAlexei Starovoitov1-130/+130
The macro 'A' used in internal BPF interpreter: #define A regs[insn->a_reg] was easily confused with the name of classic BPF register 'A', since 'A' would mean two different things depending on context. This patch is trying to clean up the naming and clarify its usage in the following way: - A and X are names of two classic BPF registers - BPF_REG_A denotes internal BPF register R0 used to map classic register A in internal BPF programs generated from classic - BPF_REG_X denotes internal BPF register R7 used to map classic register X in internal BPF programs generated from classic - internal BPF instruction format: struct sock_filter_int { __u8 code; /* opcode */ __u8 dst_reg:4; /* dest register */ __u8 src_reg:4; /* source register */ __s16 off; /* signed offset */ __s32 imm; /* signed immediate constant */ }; - BPF_X/BPF_K is 1 bit used to encode source operand of instruction In classic: BPF_X - means use register X as source operand BPF_K - means use 32-bit immediate as source operand In internal: BPF_X - means use 'src_reg' register as source operand BPF_K - means use 32-bit immediate as source operand Suggested-by: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-24Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-1/+1
Conflicts: drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_msgdma.c drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c Several cases of overlapping changes. The xfrm6_output.c has a bug fix which overlaps the renaming of skb->local_df to skb->ignore_df. In the Altera TSE driver cases, the register access cleanups in net-next overlapped with bug fixes done in net. Similarly a bug fix to send ALB packets in the bonding driver using the right source address overlaps with cleanups in net-next. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-15net: filter: x86: internal BPF JITAlexei Starovoitov2-654/+737
Maps all internal BPF instructions into x86_64 instructions. This patch replaces original BPF x64 JIT with internal BPF x64 JIT. sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable is reused as on/off switch. Performance: 1. old BPF JIT and internal BPF JIT generate equivalent x86_64 code. No performance difference is observed for filters that were JIT-able before Example assembler code for BPF filter "tcpdump port 22" original BPF -> old JIT: original BPF -> internal BPF -> new JIT: 0: push %rbp 0: push %rbp 1: mov %rsp,%rbp 1: mov %rsp,%rbp 4: sub $0x60,%rsp 4: sub $0x228,%rsp 8: mov %rbx,-0x8(%rbp) b: mov %rbx,-0x228(%rbp) // prologue 12: mov %r13,-0x220(%rbp) 19: mov %r14,-0x218(%rbp) 20: mov %r15,-0x210(%rbp) 27: xor %eax,%eax // clear A c: xor %ebx,%ebx 29: xor %r13,%r13 // clear X e: mov 0x68(%rdi),%r9d 2c: mov 0x68(%rdi),%r9d 12: sub 0x6c(%rdi),%r9d 30: sub 0x6c(%rdi),%r9d 16: mov 0xd8(%rdi),%r8 34: mov 0xd8(%rdi),%r10 3b: mov %rdi,%rbx 1d: mov $0xc,%esi 3e: mov $0xc,%esi 22: callq 0xffffffffe1021e15 43: callq 0xffffffffe102bd75 27: cmp $0x86dd,%eax 48: cmp $0x86dd,%rax 2c: jne 0x0000000000000069 4f: jne 0x000000000000009a 2e: mov $0x14,%esi 51: mov $0x14,%esi 33: callq 0xffffffffe1021e31 56: callq 0xffffffffe102bd91 38: cmp $0x84,%eax 5b: cmp $0x84,%rax 3d: je 0x0000000000000049 62: je 0x0000000000000074 3f: cmp $0x6,%eax 64: cmp $0x6,%rax 42: je 0x0000000000000049 68: je 0x0000000000000074 44: cmp $0x11,%eax 6a: cmp $0x11,%rax 47: jne 0x00000000000000c6 6e: jne 0x0000000000000117 49: mov $0x36,%esi 74: mov $0x36,%esi 4e: callq 0xffffffffe1021e15 79: callq 0xffffffffe102bd75 53: cmp $0x16,%eax 7e: cmp $0x16,%rax 56: je 0x00000000000000bf 82: je 0x0000000000000110 58: mov $0x38,%esi 88: mov $0x38,%esi 5d: callq 0xffffffffe1021e15 8d: callq 0xffffffffe102bd75 62: cmp $0x16,%eax 92: cmp $0x16,%rax 65: je 0x00000000000000bf 96: je 0x0000000000000110 67: jmp 0x00000000000000c6 98: jmp 0x0000000000000117 69: cmp $0x800,%eax 9a: cmp $0x800,%rax 6e: jne 0x00000000000000c6 a1: jne 0x0000000000000117 70: mov $0x17,%esi a3: mov $0x17,%esi 75: callq 0xffffffffe1021e31 a8: callq 0xffffffffe102bd91 7a: cmp $0x84,%eax ad: cmp $0x84,%rax 7f: je 0x000000000000008b b4: je 0x00000000000000c2 81: cmp $0x6,%eax b6: cmp $0x6,%rax 84: je 0x000000000000008b ba: je 0x00000000000000c2 86: cmp $0x11,%eax bc: cmp $0x11,%rax 89: jne 0x00000000000000c6 c0: jne 0x0000000000000117 8b: mov $0x14,%esi c2: mov $0x14,%esi 90: callq 0xffffffffe1021e15 c7: callq 0xffffffffe102bd75 95: test $0x1fff,%ax cc: test $0x1fff,%rax 99: jne 0x00000000000000c6 d3: jne 0x0000000000000117 d5: mov %rax,%r14 9b: mov $0xe,%esi d8: mov $0xe,%esi a0: callq 0xffffffffe1021e44 dd: callq 0xffffffffe102bd91 // MSH e2: and $0xf,%eax e5: shl $0x2,%eax e8: mov %rax,%r13 eb: mov %r14,%rax ee: mov %r13,%rsi a5: lea 0xe(%rbx),%esi f1: add $0xe,%esi a8: callq 0xffffffffe1021e0d f4: callq 0xffffffffe102bd6d ad: cmp $0x16,%eax f9: cmp $0x16,%rax b0: je 0x00000000000000bf fd: je 0x0000000000000110 ff: mov %r13,%rsi b2: lea 0x10(%rbx),%esi 102: add $0x10,%esi b5: callq 0xffffffffe1021e0d 105: callq 0xffffffffe102bd6d ba: cmp $0x16,%eax 10a: cmp $0x16,%rax bd: jne 0x00000000000000c6 10e: jne 0x0000000000000117 bf: mov $0xffff,%eax 110: mov $0xffff,%eax c4: jmp 0x00000000000000c8 115: jmp 0x000000000000011c c6: xor %eax,%eax 117: mov $0x0,%eax c8: mov -0x8(%rbp),%rbx 11c: mov -0x228(%rbp),%rbx // epilogue cc: leaveq 123: mov -0x220(%rbp),%r13 cd: retq 12a: mov -0x218(%rbp),%r14 131: mov -0x210(%rbp),%r15 138: leaveq 139: retq On fully cached SKBs both JITed functions take 12 nsec to execute. BPF interpreter executes the program in 30 nsec. The difference in generated assembler is due to the following: Old BPF imlements LDX_MSH instruction via sk_load_byte_msh() helper function inside bpf_jit.S. New JIT removes the helper and does it explicitly, so ldx_msh cost is the same for both JITs, but generated code looks longer. New JIT has 4 registers to save, so prologue/epilogue are larger, but the cost is within noise on x64. Old JIT checks whether first insn clears A and if not emits 'xor %eax,%eax'. New JIT clears %rax unconditionally. 2. old BPF JIT doesn't support ANC_NLATTR, ANC_PAY_OFFSET, ANC_RANDOM extensions. New JIT supports all BPF extensions. Performance of such filters improves 2-4 times depending on a filter. The longer the filter the higher performance gain. Synthetic benchmarks with many ancillary loads see 20x speedup which seems to be the maximum gain from JIT Notes: . net.core.bpf_jit_enable=2 + tools/net/bpf_jit_disasm is still functional and can be used to see generated assembler . there are two jit_compile() functions and code flow for classic filters is: sk_attach_filter() - load classic BPF bpf_jit_compile() - try to JIT from classic BPF sk_convert_filter() - convert classic to internal bpf_int_jit_compile() - JIT from internal BPF seccomp and tracing filters will just call bpf_int_jit_compile() Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-15net: filter: x86: split bpf_jit_compile()Alexei Starovoitov1-65/+92
Split bpf_jit_compile() into two functions to improve readability of for(pass++) loop. The change follows similar style of JIT compilers for arm, powerpc, s390 The body of new do_jit() was not reformatted to reduce noise in this patch, since the following patch replaces most of it. Tested with BPF testsuite. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-13net: filter: x86: fix JIT address randomizationAlexei Starovoitov1-1/+1
bpf_alloc_binary() adds 128 bytes of room to JITed program image and rounds it up to the nearest page size. If image size is close to page size (like 4000), it is rounded to two pages: round_up(4000 + 4 + 128) == 8192 then 'hole' is computed as 8192 - (4000 + 4) = 4188 If prandom_u32() % hole selects a number >= PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*header) then kernel will crash during bpf_jit_free(): kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c:887! Call Trace: [<ffffffff81037285>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0x135/0x460 [<ffffffff81694cc0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50 [<ffffffff810378ff>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40 [<ffffffffa01a0d8d>] bpf_jit_free_deferred+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8106bf98>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x6a0 [<ffffffff8106bf38>] ? process_one_work+0x178/0x6a0 [<ffffffff8106c90c>] worker_thread+0x11c/0x370 since bpf_jit_free() does: unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func & PAGE_MASK; struct bpf_binary_header *header = (void *)addr; to compute start address of 'bpf_binary_header' and header->pages will pass junk to: set_memory_rw(addr, header->pages); Fix it by making sure that &header->image[prandom_u32() % hole] and &header are in the same page Fixes: 314beb9bcabfd ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-31net: filter: add jited flag to indicate jit compiled filtersDaniel Borkmann1-1/+2
This patch adds a jited flag into sk_filter struct in order to indicate whether a filter is currently jited or not. The size of sk_filter is not being expanded as the 32 bit 'len' member allows upper bits to be reused since a filter can currently only grow as large as BPF_MAXINSNS. Therefore, there's enough room also for other in future needed flags to reuse 'len' field if necessary. The jited flag also allows for having alternative interpreter functions running as currently, we can only detect jit compiled filters by testing fp->bpf_func to not equal the address of sk_run_filter(). Joint work with Alexei Starovoitov. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-26net: Rename skb->rxhash to skb->hashTom Herbert1-4/+4
The packet hash can be considered a property of the packet, not just on RX path. This patch changes name of rxhash and l4_rxhash skbuff fields to be hash and l4_hash respectively. This includes changing uses of the field in the code which don't call the access functions. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-11x86: bpf_jit: support negative offsetsAlexei Starovoitov1-1/+1
Commit a998d4342337 claimed to introduce negative offset support to x86 jit, but it couldn't be working, since at the time of the execution of LD+ABS or LD+IND instructions via call into bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper() the %edx (3rd argument of this func) had junk value instead of access size in bytes (1 or 2 or 4). Store size into %edx instead of %ecx (what original commit intended to do) Fixes: a998d4342337 ("bpf jit: Let the x86 jit handle negative offsets") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Jan Seiffert <kaffeemonster@googlemail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-15bpf: do not use reciprocal divideEric Dumazet1-4/+10
At first Jakub Zawadzki noticed that some divisions by reciprocal_divide were not correct. (off by one in some cases) http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/reciprocal-buggy.c He could also show this with BPF: http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/set-and-dump-filter-k-bug.c The reciprocal divide in linux kernel is not generic enough, lets remove its use in BPF, as it is not worth the pain with current cpus. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Cc: Mircea Gherzan <mgherzan@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dxchgb@gmail.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-07net: x86: bpf: don't forget to free sk_filter (v2)Andrey Vagin1-0/+2
sk_filter isn't freed if bpf_func is equal to sk_run_filter. This memory leak was introduced by v3.12-rc3-224-gd45ed4a4 "net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirq". Before this patch sk_filter was freed in sk_filter_release_rcu, now it should be freed in bpf_jit_free. Here is output of kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8800b774eab0 (size 128): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294669014 (age 124.062s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 20 63 7f b7 00 88 ff ff ........ c...... 60 d4 55 81 ff ff ff ff 30 d9 55 81 ff ff ff ff `.U.....0.U..... backtrace: [<ffffffff816444be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811845af>] __kmalloc+0xef/0x260 [<ffffffff81534028>] sock_kmalloc+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff8155d4dd>] sk_attach_filter+0x5d/0x190 [<ffffffff815378a1>] sock_setsockopt+0x991/0x9e0 [<ffffffff81531bd6>] SyS_setsockopt+0xb6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8165f3e9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff v2: add extra { } after else Fixes: d45ed4a4e33a ("net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirq") Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-07net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirqAlexei Starovoitov1-5/+13
on x86 system with net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1 sudo tcpdump -i eth1 'tcp port 22' causes the warning: [ 56.766097] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 56.766097] [ 56.780146] CPU0 [ 56.786807] ---- [ 56.793188] lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock); [ 56.799593] <Interrupt> [ 56.805889] lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock); [ 56.812266] [ 56.812266] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 56.812266] [ 56.830670] 1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/13: [ 56.836838] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8118f44c>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380 [ 56.849757] [ 56.849757] stack backtrace: [ 56.862194] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc3+ #45 [ 56.868721] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8Z77 WS, BIOS 3007 07/26/2012 [ 56.882004] ffffffff821944c0 ffff88080bbdb8c8 ffffffff8175a145 0000000000000007 [ 56.895630] ffff88080bbd5f40 ffff88080bbdb928 ffffffff81755b14 0000000000000001 [ 56.909313] ffff880800000001 ffff880800000000 ffffffff8101178f 0000000000000001 [ 56.923006] Call Trace: [ 56.929532] [<ffffffff8175a145>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 56.936067] [<ffffffff81755b14>] print_usage_bug+0x1f7/0x208 [ 56.942445] [<ffffffff8101178f>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2f/0x50 [ 56.948932] [<ffffffff810cc0a0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x150/0x150 [ 56.955470] [<ffffffff810ccb52>] mark_lock+0x282/0x2c0 [ 56.961945] [<ffffffff810ccfed>] __lock_acquire+0x45d/0x1d50 [ 56.968474] [<ffffffff810cce6e>] ? __lock_acquire+0x2de/0x1d50 [ 56.975140] [<ffffffff81393bf5>] ? cpumask_next_and+0x55/0x90 [ 56.981942] [<ffffffff810cef72>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0 [ 56.988745] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380 [ 56.995619] [<ffffffff817628f1>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 57.002493] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380 [ 57.009447] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380 [ 57.016477] [<ffffffff8118f44c>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380 [ 57.023607] [<ffffffff810436b0>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0xc0/0x460 [ 57.030818] [<ffffffff810cfb8d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 57.037896] [<ffffffff811a8330>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xb0/0x2b0 [ 57.044789] [<ffffffff811b59c3>] ? free_object_rcu+0x93/0xa0 [ 57.051720] [<ffffffff81043d9f>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40 [ 57.058727] [<ffffffff8104e17c>] bpf_jit_free+0x2c/0x40 [ 57.065577] [<ffffffff81642cba>] sk_filter_release_rcu+0x1a/0x30 [ 57.072338] [<ffffffff811108e2>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x202/0x7c0 [ 57.078962] [<ffffffff81057f17>] __do_softirq+0xf7/0x3f0 [ 57.085373] [<ffffffff81058245>] run_ksoftirqd+0x35/0x70 cannot reuse jited filter memory, since it's readonly, so use original bpf insns memory to hold work_struct defer kfree of sk_filter until jit completed freeing tested on x86_64 and i386 Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-19x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacksEric Dumazet1-6/+47
hpa bringed into my attention some security related issues with BPF JIT on x86. This patch makes sure the bpf generated code is marked read only, as other kernel text sections. It also splits the unused space (we vmalloc() and only use a fraction of the page) in two parts, so that the generated bpf code not starts at a known offset in the page, but a pseudo random one. Refs: http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html Reported-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-17x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any contextEric Dumazet1-17/+3
It looks like we can call module_free()/vfree() from softirq context, so no longer need a wrapper and a work_struct. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-21filter: bpf_jit_comp: refactor and unify BPF JIT image dump outputDaniel Borkmann1-7/+2
If bpf_jit_enable > 1, then we dump the emitted JIT compiled image after creation. Currently, only SPARC and PowerPC has similar output as in the reference implementation on x86_64. Make a small helper function in order to reduce duplicated code and make the dump output uniform across architectures x86_64, SPARC, PPC, ARM (e.g. on ARM flen, pass and proglen are currently not shown, but would be interesting to know as well), also for future BPF JIT implementations on other archs. Cc: Mircea Gherzan <mgherzan@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-30x86: bpf_jit_comp: add pkt_type supportEric Dumazet1-1/+39
Supporting access to skb->pkt_type is a bit tricky if we want to have a generic code, allowing pkt_type to be moved in struct sk_buff pkt_type is a bit field, so compiler cannot really help us to find its offset. Let's use a helper for this : It will throw a one time message if pkt_type no longer starts at a byte boundary or is no longer a 3bit field. Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-10-31x86: bpf_jit_comp: add vlan tag supportEric Dumazet1-0/+21
This patch is a follow-up for patch "net: filter: add vlan tag access" to support the new VLAN_TAG/VLAN_TAG_PRESENT accessors in BPF JIT. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ani Sinha <ani@aristanetworks.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <danborkmann@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-24x86: bpf_jit_comp: add XOR instruction for BPF JITDaniel Borkmann1-0/+9
This patch is a follow-up for patch "filter: add XOR instruction for use with X/K" that implements BPF x86 JIT parts for the BPF XOR operation. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel.borkmann@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-10x86 bpf_jit: support MOD operationEric Dumazet1-0/+25
commit b6069a9570 (filter: add MOD operation) added generic support for modulus operation in BPF. This patch brings JIT support for x86_64 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: George Bakos <gbakos@alpinista.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-06-06x86 bpf_jit: support BPF_S_ANC_ALU_XOR_X instructionEric Dumazet1-0/+4
commit ffe06c17afbb (filter: add XOR operation) added generic support for XOR operation. This patch implements the XOR instruction in x86 jit. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-04-03bpf jit: Let the x86 jit handle negative offsetsJan Seiffert2-48/+115
Now the helper function from filter.c for negative offsets is exported, it can be used it in the jit to handle negative offsets. First modify the asm load helper functions to handle: - know positive offsets - know negative offsets - any offset then the compiler can be modified to explicitly use these helper when appropriate. This fixes the case of a negative X register and allows to lift the restriction that bpf programs with negative offsets can't be jited. Signed-of-by: Jan Seiffert <kaffeemonster@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-03-29x86 bpf_jit: fix a bug in emitting the 16-bit immediate operand of ANDzhuangfeiran@ict.ac.cn1-1/+1
When K >= 0xFFFF0000, AND needs the two least significant bytes of K as its operand, but EMIT2() gives it the least significant byte of K and 0x2. EMIT() should be used here to replace EMIT2(). Signed-off-by: Feiran Zhuang <zhuangfeiran@ict.ac.cn> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-03-19net: bpf_jit: fix BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH compilationEric Dumazet1-9/+5
Matt Evans spotted that x86 bpf_jit was incorrectly handling negative constant offsets in BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH instruction. We need to abort JIT compilation like we do in common_load so that filter uses the interpreter code and can call __load_pointer() Reference: http://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2011/07/19/11 Thanks to Indan Zupancic to bring back this issue. Reported-by: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org> Reported-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-18net: bpf_jit: fix divide by 0 generationEric Dumazet1-14/+22
Several problems fixed in this patch : 1) Target of the conditional jump in case a divide by 0 is performed by a bpf is wrong. 2) Must 'generate' the full function prologue/epilogue at pass=0, or else we can stop too early in pass=1 if the proglen doesnt change. (if the increase of prologue/epilogue equals decrease of all instructions length because some jumps are converted to near jumps) 3) Change the wrong length detection at the end of code generation to issue a more explicit message, no need for a full stack trace. Reported-by: Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-19net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump targetMarkus Kötter1-2/+2
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6 bytes. In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump target is one byte past the start of target instruction. Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <nepenthesdev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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