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Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to
__uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are
using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and
clac().
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416438.33451.17309465232057176966.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We already have the same functionality in usercopy_32.c. Share it with
64-bit and get rid of some more asm glue which is not needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161031151015.22087-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage
in doing so is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers;
adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what
headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h was the source for init.h (for __init) and for
export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each obj-y/bool instance
for the presence of either and replace as needed. Build testing
revealed a couple implicit header usage issues that were fixed.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160714001901.31603-5-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1459266123-21878-8-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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enabled
In general, non-atomic variants of user access functions must not sleep
if pagefaults are disabled.
Let's update all relevant comments in uaccess code. This also reflects
the might_sleep() checks in might_fault().
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: airlied@linux.ie
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com
Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: hocko@suse.cz
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: mst@redhat.com
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-4-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Similarly to copy_from_user(), where the range check is to
protect against kernel memory corruption, copy_to_user() can
benefit from such checking too: Here it protects against kernel
information leaks.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265059502000078000FC4F6@nat28.tlf.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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Commits 4a3127693001c61a21d1ce680db6340623f52e93 ("x86: Turn the
copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning")
and 63312b6a6faae3f2e5577f2b001e3b504f10a2aa ("x86: Add a
Kconfig option to turn the copy_from_user warnings into errors")
touched only the 32-bit variant of copy_from_user(), whereas the
original commit 9f0cf4adb6aa0bfccf675c938124e68f7f06349d ("x86:
Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for
copy_from_user()") also added the same code to the 64-bit one.
Further the earlier conversion from an inline WARN() to the call
to copy_from_user_overflow() went a little too far: When the
number of bytes to be copied is not a constant (e.g. [looking at
3.11] in drivers/net/tun.c:__tun_chr_ioctl() or
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aer_inject.c:aer_inject_write()), the
compiler will always have to keep the funtion call, and hence
there will always be a warning. By using __builtin_constant_p()
we can avoid this.
And then this slightly extends the effect of
CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS in that apart from
converting warnings to errors in the constant size case, it
retains the (possibly wrong) warnings in the non-constant size
case, such that if someone is prepared to get a few false
positives, (s)he'll be able to recover the current behavior
(except that these diagnostics now will never be converted to
errors).
Since the 32-bit variant (intentionally) didn't call
might_fault(), the unification results in this being called
twice now. Adding a suitable #ifdef would be the alternative if
that's a problem.
I'd like to point out though that with
__compiletime_object_size() being restricted to gcc before 4.6,
the whole construct is going to become more and more pointless
going forward. I would question however that commit
2fb0815c9ee6b9ac50e15dd8360ec76d9fa46a2 ("gcc4: disable
__compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") was really necessary,
and instead this should have been dealt with as is done here
from the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265056D02000078000FC4F3@nat28.tlf.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The help text for this config is duplicated across the x86, parisc, and
s390 Kconfig.debug files. Arnd Bergman noted that the help text was
slightly misleading and should be fixed to state that enabling this
option isn't a problem when using pre 4.4 gcc.
To simplify the rewording, consolidate the text into lib/Kconfig.debug
and modify it there to be more explicit about when you should say N to
this config.
Also, make the text a bit more generic by stating that this option
enables compile time checks so we can cover architectures which emit
warnings vs. ones which emit errors. The details of how an
architecture decided to implement the checks isn't as important as the
concept of compile time checking of copy_from_user() calls.
While we're doing this, remove all the copy_from_user_overflow() code
that's duplicated many times and place it into lib/ so that any
architecture supporting this option can get the function for free.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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All 486+ CPUs support WP in supervisor mode, so remove the fallback
386 support code.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1354132230-21854-7-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
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When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to
userspace from the kernel is controlled by the AC flag. To make the
performance of manipulating that flag acceptable, there are two new
instructions, STAC and CLAC, to set and clear it.
This patch adds those instructions, via alternative(), when the SMAP
feature is enabled. It also adds X86_EFLAGS_AC unconditionally to the
SYSCALL entry mask; there is simply no reason to make that one
conditional.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
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This throws away the old x86-specific functions in favor of the generic
optimized version.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c,
and replace them with _ASM_EXTABLE() macros; this will allow us to
change the format and type of the exception table entries.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com
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This merges the 32- and 64-bit versions of the x86 strncpy_from_user()
by just rewriting it in C rather than the ancient inline asm versions
that used lodsb/stosb and had been duplicated for (trivial) differences
between the 32-bit and 64-bit versions.
While doing that, it also speeds them up by doing the accesses a word at
a time. Finally, the new routines also properly handle the case of
hitting the end of the address space, which we have never done correctly
before (fs/namei.c has a hack around it for that reason).
Despite all these improvements, it actually removes more lines than it
adds, due to the de-duplication. Also, we no longer export (or define)
the legacy __strncpy_from_user() function (that was defined to not do
the user permission checks), since it's not actually used anywhere, and
the user address space checks are built in to the new code.
Other architecture maintainers have been notified that the old hack in
fs/namei.c will be going away in the 3.5 merge window, in case they
copied the x86 approach of being a bit cavalier about the end of the
address space.
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Acked-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
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A previous patch added the buffer size check to copy_from_user().
One of the things learned from analyzing the result of the previous
patch is that in general, gcc is really good at proving that the
code contains sufficient security checks to not need to do a
runtime check. But that for those cases where gcc could not prove
this, there was a relatively high percentage of real security
issues.
This patch turns the case of "gcc cannot prove" into a compile time
warning, as long as a sufficiently new gcc is in use that supports
this. The objective is that these warnings will trigger developers
checking new cases out before a security hole enters a linux kernel
release.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090930130523.348ae6c4@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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copy_from_user()
gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which
reports the size of an object that a pointer point to, when known
at compile time. If the buffer size is not known at compile time, a
constant -1 is returned.
This patch uses this feature to add a sanity check to
copy_from_user(); if the target buffer is known to be smaller than
the copy size, the copy is aborted and a WARNing is emitted in
memory debug mode.
These extra checks compile away when the object size is not known,
or if both the buffer size and the copy length are constants.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090926143301.2c396b94@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Commit 1faa16d22877f4839bd433547d770c676d1d964c accidentally broke
the bdi congestion wait queue logic, causing us to wait on congestion
for WRITE (== 1) when we really wanted BLK_RW_ASYNC (== 0) instead.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
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Impact: fix rare (but currently harmless) miscompile with certain configs and gcc versions
Hugh Dickins noticed that strncpy_from_user() was miscompiled
in some circumstances with gcc 4.3.
Thanks to Hugh's excellent analysis it was easy to track down.
Hugh writes:
> Try building an x86_64 defconfig 2.6.29-rc1 kernel tree,
> except not quite defconfig, switch CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y
> and CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY off (because it expands a
> might_fault() there, which hides the issue): using a
> gcc 4.3.2 (I've checked both openSUSE 11.1 and Fedora 10).
>
> It generates the following:
>
> 0000000000000000 <__strncpy_from_user>:
> 0: 48 89 d1 mov %rdx,%rcx
> 3: 48 85 c9 test %rcx,%rcx
> 6: 74 0e je 16 <__strncpy_from_user+0x16>
> 8: ac lods %ds:(%rsi),%al
> 9: aa stos %al,%es:(%rdi)
> a: 84 c0 test %al,%al
> c: 74 05 je 13 <__strncpy_from_user+0x13>
> e: 48 ff c9 dec %rcx
> 11: 75 f5 jne 8 <__strncpy_from_user+0x8>
> 13: 48 29 c9 sub %rcx,%rcx
> 16: 48 89 c8 mov %rcx,%rax
> 19: c3 retq
>
> Observe that "sub %rcx,%rcx; mov %rcx,%rax", whereas gcc 4.2.1
> (and many other configs) say "sub %rcx,%rdx; mov %rdx,%rax".
> Isn't it returning 0 when it ought to be returning strlen?
The asm constraints for the strncpy_from_user() result were missing an
early clobber, which tells gcc that the last output arguments
are written before all input arguments are read.
Also add more early clobbers in the rest of the file and fix 32-bit
usercopy.c in the same way.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
[ since this API is rarely used and no in-kernel user relies on a 'len'
return value (they only rely on negative return values) this miscompile
was never noticed in the field. But it's worth fixing it nevertheless. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Conflicts:
arch/um/include/asm/system.h
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- add annotation back to clear_user()
- change probe_kernel_address() to _inatomic*() method
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- introduce might_fault()
- handle the atomic user copy paths correctly
[ mingo@elte.hu: move might_sleep() outside of in_atomic(). ]
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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copy_to/from_user and all its variants (except the atomic ones) can take a
page fault and perform non-trivial work like taking mmap_sem and entering
the filesyste/pagecache.
Unfortunately, this often escapes lockdep because a common pattern is to
use it to read in some arguments just set up from userspace, or write data
back to a hot buffer. In those cases, it will be unlikely for page reclaim
to get a window in to cause copy_*_user to fault.
With the new might_lock primitives, add some annotations to x86. I don't
know if I caught all possible faulting points (it's a bit of a maze, and I
didn't really look at 32-bit). But this is a starting point.
Boots and runs OK so far.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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movsl_mask is currently defined in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c, which
contains code specific to Intel CPUs. However, movsl_mask is used in
the non-CPU specific code in arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c, which breaks
the compilation when support for Intel CPUs is compiled out.
This patch solves this problem by moving movsl_mask's definition close
to its users in arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Cc: michael@free-electrons.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Before:
total: 63 errors, 2 warnings, 878 lines checked
After:
total: 0 errors, 2 warnings, 878 lines checked
Compile tested, no change in the binary output:
text data bss dec hex filename
3231 0 0 3231 c9f usercopy_32.o.after
3231 0 0 3231 c9f usercopy_32.o.before
md5sum:
9f9a3eb43970359ae7cecfd1c9e7cf42 usercopy_32.o.after
9f9a3eb43970359ae7cecfd1c9e7cf42 usercopy_32.o.before
Signed-off-by: Paolo Ciarrocchi <paolo.ciarrocchi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Use the _ASM_EXTABLE macro from <asm/asm.h>, instead of open-coding
__ex_table entires in arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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is_init() is an ambiguous name for the pid==1 check. Split it into
is_global_init() and is_container_init().
A cgroup init has it's tsk->pid == 1.
A global init also has it's tsk->pid == 1 and it's active pid namespace
is the init_pid_ns. But rather than check the active pid namespace,
compare the task structure with 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper', which is
initialized during boot to the /sbin/init process and never changes.
Changelog:
2.6.22-rc4-mm2-pidns1:
- Use 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper' to determine if a given task is the
global init (/sbin/init) process. This would improve performance
and remove dependence on the task_pid().
2.6.21-mm2-pidns2:
- [Sukadev Bhattiprolu] Changed is_container_init() calls in {powerpc,
ppc,avr32}/traps.c for the _exception() call to is_global_init().
This way, we kill only the cgroup if the cgroup's init has a
bug rather than force a kernel panic.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Use is_global_init() in arch/m32r/mm/fault.c]
[bunk@stusta.de: kernel/pid.c: remove unused exports]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Fix capability.c to work with threaded init]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzel <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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