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2019-05-06Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull rseq updates from Ingo Molnar: "A cleanup and a fix to comments" * 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: rseq: Remove superfluous rseq_len from task_struct rseq: Clean up comments by reflecting removal of event counter
2019-05-06Merge branch 'core-objtool-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-12/+25
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull objtool updates from Ingo Molnar: "This is a series from Peter Zijlstra that adds x86 build-time uaccess validation of SMAP to objtool, which will detect and warn about the following uaccess API usage bugs and weirdnesses: - call to %s() with UACCESS enabled - return with UACCESS enabled - return with UACCESS disabled from a UACCESS-safe function - recursive UACCESS enable - redundant UACCESS disable - UACCESS-safe disables UACCESS As it turns out not leaking uaccess permissions outside the intended uaccess functionality is hard when the interfaces are complex and when such bugs are mostly dormant. As a bonus we now also check the DF flag. We had at least one high-profile bug in that area in the early days of Linux, and the checking is fairly simple. The checks performed and warnings emitted are: - call to %s() with DF set - return with DF set - return with modified stack frame - recursive STD - redundant CLD It's all x86-only for now, but later on this can also be used for PAN on ARM and objtool is fairly cross-platform in principle. While all warnings emitted by this new checking facility that got reported to us were fixed, there might be GCC version dependent warnings that were not reported yet - which we'll address, should they trigger. The warnings are non-fatal build warnings" * 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits) mm/uaccess: Use 'unsigned long' to placate UBSAN warnings on older GCC versions x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch objtool: Add Direction Flag validation objtool: Add UACCESS validation objtool: Fix sibling call detection objtool: Rewrite alt->skip_orig objtool: Add --backtrace support objtool: Rewrite add_ignores() objtool: Handle function aliases objtool: Set insn->func for alternatives x86/uaccess, kcov: Disable stack protector x86/uaccess, ftrace: Fix ftrace_likely_update() vs. SMAP x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP x86/uaccess, kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP x86/smap: Ditch __stringify() x86/uaccess: Introduce user_access_{save,restore}() x86/uaccess, signal: Fix AC=1 bloat x86/uaccess: Always inline user_access_begin() x86/uaccess, xen: Suppress SMAP warnings ...
2019-05-06*: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_openKirill Smelkov1-1/+1
Using scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci added in 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock"), search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Among cases converted 14 were potentially vulnerable to read vs write deadlock (see details in 10dce8af3422): drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:988:1-17: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:401:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. and the rest were just safe to convert to stream_open because their read and write do not use ppos at all and corresponding file_operations do not have methods that assume @offset file access(*): arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:631:8-24: WARNING: mpc52xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/um/drivers/harddog_kern.c:88:8-24: WARNING: harddog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:430:33-49: WARNING: microcode_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ds1620.c:215:8-24: WARNING: ds1620_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/dtlk.c:301:1-17: WARNING: dtlk_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c:840:9-25: WARNING: ipmi_wdog_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c:95:8-24: WARNING: scr24x_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/tb0219.c:246:9-25: WARNING: tb0219_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/firewire/nosy.c:306:8-24: WARNING: nosy_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/fschmd.c:840:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/w83793.c:1344:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1747:8-24: WARNING: ucma_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1178:8-24: WARNING: ucm_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:1086:8-24: WARNING: uverbs_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/input/joydev.c:282:1-17: WARNING: joydev_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:393:1-17: WARNING: switchtec_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_debugfs.c:135:8-24: WARNING: cros_ec_console_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c:470:9-25: WARNING: ds1374_wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-m41t80.c:805:9-25: WARNING: wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/tape_char.c:293:2-18: WARNING: tape_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/zcore.c:194:8-24: WARNING: zcore_reipl_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c:528:8-24: WARNING: zcrypt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/spi/spidev.c:594:1-17: WARNING: spidev_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/staging/pi433/pi433_if.c:974:1-17: WARNING: pi433_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/acquirewdt.c:203:8-24: WARNING: acq_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/advantechwdt.c:202:8-24: WARNING: advwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim1535_wdt.c:252:8-24: WARNING: ali_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim7101_wdt.c:217:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ar7_wdt.c:166:8-24: WARNING: ar7_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/at91rm9200_wdt.c:113:8-24: WARNING: at91wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ath79_wdt.c:135:8-24: WARNING: ath79_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/bcm63xx_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: bcm63xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c:143:8-24: WARNING: cpu5wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpwd.c:397:8-24: WARNING: cpwd_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/eurotechwdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: eurwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c:528:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/gef_wdt.c:232:8-24: WARNING: gef_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/geodewdt.c:95:8-24: WARNING: geodewdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ib700wdt.c:241:8-24: WARNING: ibwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ibmasr.c:326:8-24: WARNING: asr_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/indydog.c:80:8-24: WARNING: indydog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/intel_scu_watchdog.c:307:8-24: WARNING: intel_scu_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/iop_wdt.c:104:8-24: WARNING: iop_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/it8712f_wdt.c:330:8-24: WARNING: it8712f_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ixp4xx_wdt.c:68:8-24: WARNING: ixp4xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ks8695_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: ks8695wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/m54xx_wdt.c:88:8-24: WARNING: m54xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/machzwd.c:336:8-24: WARNING: zf_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mixcomwd.c:153:8-24: WARNING: mixcomwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mtx-1_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: mtx1_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mv64x60_wdt.c:136:8-24: WARNING: mv64x60_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nuc900_wdt.c:134:8-24: WARNING: nuc900wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nv_tco.c:164:8-24: WARNING: nv_tco_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pc87413_wdt.c:289:8-24: WARNING: pc87413_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:698:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:737:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:581:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:623:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:488:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:527:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_temperature_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pika_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: pikawdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pnx833x_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: pnx833x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rc32434_wdt.c:153:8-24: WARNING: rc32434_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rdc321x_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: rdc321x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/riowd.c:79:1-17: WARNING: riowd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sa1100_wdt.c:62:8-24: WARNING: sa1100dog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc60xxwdt.c:211:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc7240_wdt.c:139:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc8360.c:274:8-24: WARNING: sbc8360_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_epx_c3.c:81:8-24: WARNING: epx_c3_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_fitpc2_wdt.c:78:8-24: WARNING: fitpc2_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sb_wdog.c:108:1-17: WARNING: sbwdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc1200wdt.c:181:8-24: WARNING: sc1200wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc520_wdt.c:261:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sch311x_wdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: sch311x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/scx200_wdt.c:105:8-24: WARNING: scx200_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/smsc37b787_wdt.c:369:8-24: WARNING: wb_smsc_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83877f_wdt.c:227:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83977f_wdt.c:301:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wafer5823wdt.c:200:8-24: WARNING: wafwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/watchdog_dev.c:828:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:379:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:445:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt285.c:104:1-17: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt977.c:276:8-24: WARNING: wdt977_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:424:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:484:8-24: WARNING: wdt_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:464:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:527:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. net/batman-adv/log.c:105:1-17: WARNING: batadv_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/control.c:57:7-23: WARNING: snd_ctl_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/rawmidi.c:385:7-23: WARNING: snd_rawmidi_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:310:7-23: WARNING: snd_seq_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/timer.c:1428:7-23: WARNING: snd_timer_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. One can also recheck/review the patch via generating it with explanation comments included via $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci SPFLAGS="-D explain" (*) This second group also contains cases with read/write deadlocks that stream_open.cocci don't yet detect, but which are still valid to convert to stream_open since ppos is not used. For example drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c calls wait_for_completion_interruptible() in its .read, but stream_open.cocci currently detects only "wait_event*" as blocking. Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James R. Van Zandt" <jrv@vanzandt.mv.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Acked-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> [scr24x_cs] Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> [watchdog/* hwmon/*] Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Kurt Schwemmer <kurt.schwemmer@microsemi.com> Acked-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org> Acked-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> [platform/chrome] Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> [rtc/*] Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com> Cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
2019-05-06Merge branch 'pm-x86'Rafael J. Wysocki6-68/+231
* pm-x86: x86: tsc: Rework time_cpufreq_notifier() admin-guide: pm: intel_epb: Add SPDX license tag and copyright notice PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs interface PM / arch: x86: Rework the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handling
2019-05-06x86/fpu: Fault-in user stack if copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() failsSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-16/+15
In the compacted form, XSAVES may save only the XMM+SSE state but skip FP (x87 state). This is denoted by header->xfeatures = 6. The fastpath (copy_fpregs_to_sigframe()) does that but _also_ initialises the FP state (cwd to 0x37f, mxcsr as we do, remaining fields to 0). The slowpath (copy_xstate_to_user()) leaves most of the FP state untouched. Only mxcsr and mxcsr_flags are set due to xfeatures_mxcsr_quirk(). Now that XFEATURE_MASK_FP is set unconditionally, see 04944b793e18 ("x86: xsave: set FP, SSE bits in the xsave header in the user sigcontext"), on return from the signal, random garbage is loaded as the FP state. Instead of utilizing copy_xstate_to_user(), fault-in the user memory and retry the fast path. Ideally, the fast path succeeds on the second attempt but may be retried again if the memory is swapped out due to memory pressure. If the user memory can not be faulted-in then get_user_pages() returns an error so we don't loop forever. Fault in memory via get_user_pages_unlocked() so copy_fpregs_to_sigframe() succeeds without a fault. Fixes: 69277c98f5eef ("x86/fpu: Always store the registers in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe()") Reported-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502171139.mqtegctsg35cir2e@linutronix.de
2019-04-30kvm, x86: Properly check whether a pfn is an MMIO or notKarimAllah Ahmed1-3/+15
pfn_valid check is not sufficient because it only checks if a page has a struct page or not, if "mem=" was passed to the kernel some valid pages won't have a struct page. This means that if guests were assigned valid memory that lies after the mem= boundary it will be passed uncached to the guest no matter what the guest caching attributes are for this memory. Introduce a new function e820__mapped_raw_any which is equivalent to e820__mapped_any but uses the original e820 unmodified and use it to identify real *RAM*. Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Add comment about module removal racesNadav Amit1-0/+5
Add a comment to clarify that users of text_poke() must ensure that no races with module removal take place. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-22-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flagRick Edgecombe1-6/+1
Use new flag VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS for handling freeing of special permissioned memory in vmalloc and remove places where memory was set NX and RW before freeing which is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-21-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flagRick Edgecombe1-8/+6
Use new flag VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS for handling freeing of special permissioned memory in vmalloc and remove places where memory was set NX and RW before freeing which is no longer needed. Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-20-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()Nadav Amit1-7/+4
The return value of text_poke_early() and text_poke_bp() is useless. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-14-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom text pokerNadav Amit1-16/+10
There are only two types of text poking: early and breakpoint based. The use of a function pointer to perform text poking complicates the code and is probably inefficient due to the use of indirect branches. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-13-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modulesNadav Amit2-8/+22
When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. Prevent having writable executable PTEs in this stage. In addition, avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and static-key), as would be done in the next patch. This was actually the main motivation for this patch. To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached (hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable), which would break the W^X protection. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-12-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executableNadav Amit1-4/+20
Set the page as executable after allocation. This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated pages non-executable. While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary masking. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-11-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executableNadav Amit1-0/+8
Since alloc_module() will not set the pages as executable soon, set ftrace trampoline pages as executable after they are allocated. For the time being, do not change ftrace to use the text_poke() interface. As a result, ftrace still breaks W^X. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-10-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched codeNadav Amit1-13/+1
text_poke() already ensures that the written value is the correct one and fails if that is not the case. There is no need for an additional comparison. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-9-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text pokingNadav Amit1-22/+86
text_poke() can potentially compromise security as it sets temporary PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the ability to write onto kernel memory. Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB. To address these potential security hazards, use a temporary mm for patching the code. Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages, as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient. So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-8-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patchingNadav Amit1-0/+3
To prevent improper use of the PTEs that are used for text patching, the next patches will use a temporary mm struct. Initailize it by copying the init mm. The address that will be used for patching is taken from the lower area that is usually used for the task memory. Doing so prevents the need to frequently synchronize the temporary-mm (e.g., when BPF programs are installed), since different PGDs are used for the task memory. Finally, randomize the address of the PTEs to harden against exploits that use these PTEs. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: deneen.t.dock@intel.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kristen@linux.intel.com Cc: linux_dti@icloud.com Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426232303.28381-8-nadav.amit@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early initNadav Amit1-1/+6
There is no apparent reason not to use text_poke_early() during early-init, since no patching of code that might be on the stack is done and only a single core is running. This is required for the next patches that would set a temporary mm for text poking, and this mm is only initialized after some static-keys are enabled/disabled. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-3-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Add text_poke_kgdb() to not assert the lock when debuggingNadav Amit2-19/+44
text_mutex is currently expected to be held before text_poke() is called, but kgdb does not take the mutex, and instead *supposedly* ensures the lock is not taken and will not be acquired by any other core while text_poke() is running. The reason for the "supposedly" comment is that it is not entirely clear that this would be the case if gdb_do_roundup is zero. Create two wrapper functions, text_poke() and text_poke_kgdb(), which do or do not run the lockdep assertion respectively. While we are at it, change the return code of text_poke() to something meaningful. One day, callers might actually respect it and the existing BUG_ON() when patching fails could be removed. For kgdb, the return value can actually be used. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 9222f606506c ("x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-2-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-29x86/stacktrace: Use common infrastructureThomas Gleixner1-97/+19
Replace the stack_trace_save*() functions with the new arch_stack_walk() interfaces. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094803.816485461@linutronix.de
2019-04-26Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm, to pick up dependent fixIngo Molnar7-14/+84
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-25x86: tsc: Rework time_cpufreq_notifier()Rafael J. Wysocki1-15/+14
There are problems with running time_cpufreq_notifier() on SMP systems. First off, the rdtsc() called from there runs on the CPU executing that code and not necessarily on the CPU whose sched_clock() rate is updated which is questionable at best. Second, in the cases when the frequencies of all CPUs in an SMP system are always in sync, it is not sufficient to update just one of them or the set associated with a given cpufreq policy on frequency changes - all CPUs in the system should be updated and that would require more than a simple transition notifier. Note, however, that the underlying issue (the TSC rate depending on the CPU frequency) has not been present in hardware shipping for the last few years and in quite a few relevant cases (acpi-cpufreq in particular) running time_cpufreq_notifier() will cause the TSC to be marked as unstable anyway. For this reason, make time_cpufreq_notifier() simply mark the TSC as unstable and give up when run on SMP and only try to carry out any adjustments otherwise. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
2019-04-25x86/apic: Unify duplicated local apic timer clockevent initializationJacob Pan1-26/+31
Local APIC timer clockevent parameters can be calculated based on platform specific methods. However the code is mostly duplicated with the interrupt based calibration. The commit which increased the max_delta parameter updated only one place and made the implementations diverge. Unify it to prevent further damage. [ tglx: Rename function to lapic_init_clockevent() and adjust changelog a bit ] Fixes: 4aed89d6b515 ("x86, lapic-timer: Increase the max_delta to 31 bits") Reported-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1556213272-63568-1-git-send-email-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
2019-04-24x86/build: Move _etext to actual end of .textKees Cook1-3/+3
When building x86 with Clang LTO and CFI, CFI jump regions are automatically added to the end of the .text section late in linking. As a result, the _etext position was being labelled before the appended jump regions, causing confusion about where the boundaries of the executable region actually are in the running kernel, and broke at least the fault injection code. This moves the _etext mark to outside (and immediately after) the .text area, as it already the case on other architectures (e.g. arm64, arm). Reported-and-tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423183827.GA4012@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-24Merge tag 'drm-intel-next-2019-04-17' of ↵Dave Airlie1-1/+3
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-intel into drm-next UAPI Changes: - uAPI "Fixes:" patch for the upcoming kernel 5.1, included here too We have an Ack from the media folks (only current user) for this late tweak Cross-subsystem Changes: - ALSA: hda: Fix racy display power access (Takashi, Chris) Driver Changes: - DDI and MIPI-DSI clocks fixes for Icelake (Vandita) - Fix Icelake frequency change/locking (RPS) (Mika) - Temporarily disable ppGTT read-only bit on Icelake (Mika) - Add missing Icelake W/As (Mika) - Enable 12 deep CSB status FIFO on Icelake (Mika) - Inherit more Icelake code for Elkhartlake (Bob, Jani) - Handle catastrophic error on engine reset (Mika) - Shortcut readiness to reset check (Mika) - Regression fix for GEM_BUSY causing us to report a mixed uabi-class request as not busy (Chris) - Revert back to max link rate and lane count on eDP (Jani) - Fix pipe BPP readout for BXT/GLK DSI (Ville) - Set DP min_bpp to 8*3 for non-RGB output formats (Ville) - Enable coarse preemption boundaries for Gen8 (Chris) - Do not enable FEC without DSC (Ville) - Restore correct BXT DDI latency optim setting calculation (Ville) - Always reset context's RING registers to avoid running workload twice during reset (Chris) - Set GPU wedged on driver unload (Janusz) - Consolidate two similar barries from timeline into one (Chris) - Only reset the pinned kernel contexts on resume (Chris) - Wakeref tracking improvements (Chris, Imre) - Lockdep fixes for shrinker interactions (Chris) - Bump ready tasks ahead of busywaits in prep of semaphore use (Chris) - Huge step in splitting display code into fine grained files (Jani) - Refactor the IRQ init/reset macros for code saving (Paulo) - Convert IRQ initialization code to uncore MMIO access (Paulo) - Convert workarounds code to use uncore MMIO access (Chris) - Nuke drm_crtc_state and use intel_atomic_state instead (Manasi) - Update SKL clock-gating WA (Radhakrishna, Ville) - Isolate GuC reset code flow (Chris) - Expose force_dsc_enable through debugfs (Manasi) - Header standalone compile testing framework (Jani) - Code cleanups to reduce driver footprint (Chris) - PSR code fixes and cleanups (Jose) - Sparse and kerneldoc updates (Chris) - Suppress spurious combo PHY B warning (Vile) Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> From: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190418080426.GA6409@jlahtine-desk.ger.corp.intel.com
2019-04-23x86/MCE/AMD: Don't report L1 BTB MCA errors on some family 17h modelsYazen Ghannam3-13/+48
AMD family 17h Models 10h-2Fh may report a high number of L1 BTB MCA errors under certain conditions. The errors are benign and can safely be ignored. However, the high error rate may cause the MCA threshold counter to overflow causing a high rate of thresholding interrupts. In addition, users may see the errors reported through the AMD MCE decoder module, even with the interrupt disabled, due to MCA polling. Clear the "Counter Present" bit in the Instruction Fetch bank's MCA_MISC0 register. This will prevent enabling MCA thresholding on this bank which will prevent the high interrupt rate due to this error. Define an AMD-specific function to filter these errors from the MCE event pool so that they don't get reported during early boot. Rename filter function in EDAC/mce_amd to avoid a naming conflict, while at it. [ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage/cleanup, fix typos. ] Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl> Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: c95b323dcd35: x86/MCE/AMD: Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding on all family 0x15 models Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 30aa3d26edb0: x86/MCE/AMD: Carve out the MC4_MISC thresholding quirk Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 9308fd407455: x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-2-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
2019-04-23x86/MCE: Add an MCE-record filtering functionYazen Ghannam3-0/+11
Some systems may report spurious MCA errors. In general, spurious MCA errors may be disabled by clearing a particular bit in MCA_CTL. However, clearing a bit in MCA_CTL may not be recommended for some errors, so the only option is to ignore them. An MCA error is printed and handled after it has been added to the MCE event pool. So an MCA error can be ignored by not adding it to that pool in the first place. Add such a filtering function. [ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage. ] Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: "rafal@milecki.pl" <rafal@milecki.pl> Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
2019-04-22x86/kdump: Fall back to reserve high crashkernel memoryDave Young1-8/+14
crashkernel=xM tries to reserve memory for the crash kernel under 4G, which is enough, usually. But this could fail sometimes, for example when one tries to reserve a big chunk like 2G, for example. So let the crashkernel=xM just fall back to use high memory in case it fails to find a suitable low range. Do not set the ,high as default because it allocates extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb, and this is not always necessary for all machines. Typically, crashkernel=128M usually works with low reservation under 4G, so keep <4G as default. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190422031905.GA8387@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
2019-04-22x86/kdump: Have crashkernel=X reserve under 4G by defaultDave Young1-5/+5
The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere. Some more tests/investigations about the background: a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under 2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools: b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere in the 64bit address space.") b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools, bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere: 82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G") c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels: 1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore, I built it in a RHEL6 vm. 2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with memory under 896M and gives an error: "ELF core (kcore) parse failed" For that it needs below kexec-tools fix: ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid") 3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels. So the situation is: * Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels. * We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very old kexec-tools. * If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y. * People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR makes the 0-896M space sparse. * Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand low as memory under 4G. Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to reserve under 4G by default. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: piliu@redhat.com Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
2019-04-20Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+46
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Misc fixes: - various tooling fixes - kretprobe fixes - kprobes annotation fixes - kprobes error checking fix - fix the default events for AMD Family 17h CPUs - PEBS fix - AUX record fix - address filtering fix" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/kprobes: Avoid kretprobe recursion bug kprobes: Mark ftrace mcount handler functions nokprobe x86/kprobes: Verify stack frame on kretprobe perf/x86/amd: Add event map for AMD Family 17h perf bpf: Return NULL when RB tree lookup fails in perf_env__find_btf() perf tools: Fix map reference counting perf evlist: Fix side band thread draining perf tools: Check maps for bpf programs perf bpf: Return NULL when RB tree lookup fails in perf_env__find_bpf_prog_info() tools include uapi: Sync sound/asound.h copy perf top: Always sample time to satisfy needs of use of ordered queuing perf evsel: Use hweight64() instead of hweight_long(attr.sample_regs_user) tools lib traceevent: Fix missing equality check for strcmp perf stat: Disable DIR_FORMAT feature for 'perf stat record' perf scripts python: export-to-sqlite.py: Fix use of parent_id in calls_view perf header: Fix lock/unlock imbalances when processing BPF/BTF info perf/x86: Fix incorrect PEBS_REGS perf/ring_buffer: Fix AUX record suppression perf/core: Fix the address filtering fix kprobes: Fix error check when reusing optimized probes
2019-04-19x86/topology: Make DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0 pr_info() more descriptiveJuri Lelli1-1/+1
DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0 debug feature offlines a CPU as early as possible allowing userspace to boot up without that CPU (so that it is possible to check for unwanted dependencies towards the offlined CPU). After doing so it emits a "CPU %u is now offline" pr_info, which is not enough descriptive of why the CPU was offlined (e.g., one might be running with a config that triggered some problem, not being aware that CONFIG_DEBUG_ HOTPLUG_CPU0 is set). Add a bit more of informative text to the pr_info, so that it is immediately obvious why a CPU has been offlined in early boot stages. Background: Got to scratch my head a bit while debugging a WARNING splat related to the offlining of CPU0. Without being aware yet of this debug option it wasn't immediately obvious why CPU0 was being offlined by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181219151647.15073-1-juri.lelli@redhat.com [ Merge line-broken line. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/power: Optimize C3 entry on Centaur CPUsDavid Wang1-0/+12
For new Centaur CPUs the ucode will take care of the preservation of cache coherence between CPU cores in C-states regardless of how deep the C-states are. So, it is not necessary to flush the caches in software befor entering C3. This useless operation will cause performance drop for the cores which share some caches with the idling core. Signed-off-by: David Wang <davidwang@zhaoxin.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: brucechang@via-alliance.com Cc: cooperyan@zhaoxin.com Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: linux-pm@kernel.org Cc: qiyuanwang@zhaoxin.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: timguo@zhaoxin.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545900110-2757-1-git-send-email-davidwang@zhaoxin.com [ Tidy up the comment. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/mce: Fix debugfs_simple_attr.cocci warningsYueHaibing1-4/+4
Use DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() rather than DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() for debugfs files. Semantic patch information: Rationale: DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file() imposes some significant overhead as compared to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file_unsafe(). Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/debugfs/debugfs_simple_attr.cocci Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545981853-70877-1-git-send-email-yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/cpu/intel: Lower the "ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: Set to normal" message's log ↵Hans de Goede1-2/+2
priority The "ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: Set to 'normal', was 'performance'" message triggers on pretty much every Intel machine. The purpose of log messages with a warning level is to notify the user of something which potentially is a problem, or at least somewhat unexpected. This message clearly does not match those criteria, so lower its log priority from warning to info. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181230172715.17469-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/kvm: Make steal_time visibleAndi Kleen1-1/+1
This per cpu variable is accessed from assembler code, so it needs to be visible for LTO. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-8-andi@firstfloor.org
2019-04-19x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit buildAndi Kleen1-0/+2
The "vide" inline assembler is only needed on 32bit kernels for old 32bit only CPUs. Guard it with an #ifdef so it's not included in 64bit builds. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-2-andi@firstfloor.org
2019-04-19x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .textAndi Kleen2-1/+3
With gcc toplevel assembler statements that do not mark themselves as .text may end up in other sections. This causes LTO boot crashes because various assembler statements ended up in the middle of the initcall section. It's also a latent problem without LTO, although it's currently not known to cause any real problems. According to the gcc team it's expected behavior. Always mark all the top level assembler statements as text so that they switch to the right section. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-1-andi@firstfloor.org
2019-04-19x86/cpu/bugs: Use __initconst for 'const' init dataAndi Kleen1-3/+3
Some of the recently added const tables use __initdata which causes section attribute conflicts. Use __initconst instead. Fixes: fa1202ef2243 ("x86/speculation: Add command line control") Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-9-andi@firstfloor.org
2019-04-19x86/kprobes: Avoid kretprobe recursion bugMasami Hiramatsu1-2/+20
Avoid kretprobe recursion loop bg by setting a dummy kprobes to current_kprobe per-CPU variable. This bug has been introduced with the asm-coded trampoline code, since previously it used another kprobe for hooking the function return placeholder (which only has a nop) and trampoline handler was called from that kprobe. This revives the old lost kprobe again. With this fix, we don't see deadlock anymore. And you can see that all inner-called kretprobe are skipped. event_1 235 0 event_2 19375 19612 The 1st column is recorded count and the 2nd is missed count. Above shows (event_1 rec) + (event_2 rec) ~= (event_2 missed) (some difference are here because the counter is racy) Reported-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Tested-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c9becf58d935 ("[PATCH] kretprobe: kretprobe-booster") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094064889.6137.972160690963039.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/kprobes: Verify stack frame on kretprobeMasami Hiramatsu1-0/+26
Verify the stack frame pointer on kretprobe trampoline handler, If the stack frame pointer does not match, it skips the wrong entry and tries to find correct one. This can happen if user puts the kretprobe on the function which can be used in the path of ftrace user-function call. Such functions should not be probed, so this adds a warning message that reports which function should be blacklisted. Tested-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094059185.6137.15527904013362842072.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19rseq: Clean up comments by reflecting removal of event counterMathieu Desnoyers1-4/+1
The "event counter" was removed from rseq before it was merged upstream. However, a few comments in the source code still refer to it. Adapt the comments to match reality. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190305194755.2602-2-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19x86/smpboot: Rename match_die() to match_pkg()Len Brown1-3/+3
Syntax only, no functional or semantic change. This routine matches packages, not die, so name it thus. Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7ca18c4ae7816a1f9eda37414725df676e63589d.1551160674.git.len.brown@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-18x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDSJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+3
Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-04-18x86/resctrl: Initialize a new resource group with default MBA valuesXiaochen Shen2-21/+35
Currently, when a new resource group is created, the allocation values of the MBA resource are not initialized and remain meaningless data. For example: mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p1 cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata MB:0=100;1=100 echo "MB:0=10;1=20" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata MB:0= 10;1= 20 rmdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p1 mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p2 cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p2/schemata MB:0= 10;1= 20 Therefore, when the new group is created, it is reasonable to initialize MBA resource with default values. Initialize the MBA resource and cache resources in separate functions. [ bp: Add newlines between code blocks for better readability. ] Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1555499329-1170-3-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
2019-04-17x86/resctrl: Move per RDT domain initialization to a separate functionXiaochen Shen1-59/+72
Carve out per rdt_domain initialization code from rdtgroup_init_alloc() into a separate function. No functional change, make the code more readable and save us at least two indentation levels. Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1555499329-1170-2-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
2019-04-17Merge branch 'core/speculation' of ↵Thomas Gleixner1-2/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git Pull in the command line updates from the tip tree so the MDS parts can be added.
2019-04-17x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+9
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-04-17x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations offKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk1-1/+2
This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not* affected by the other two MDS issues. For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to mitigate SMT. However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should not report that SMT is mitigated: $cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Vulnerable; SMT mitigated But rather: Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
2019-04-17x86/speculation/mds: Fix commentBoris Ostrovsky1-1/+1
s/L1TF/MDS/ Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-04-17x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug codeThomas Gleixner1-56/+0
All stack types on x86 64-bit have guard pages now. So there is no point in executing probabilistic overflow checks as the guard pages are a accurate and reliable overflow prevention. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.466354762@linutronix.de