summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2020-10-14Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov: "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks. With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between the guest and the hypervisor. Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one. The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two SEV-ES-specific files: arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups. Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others" * tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits) x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events ...
2020-10-02x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error messageMark Mossberg1-1/+2
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code() calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page fault handling. This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm users. Change the message to state the error condition more precisely. [ bp: Massage a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg <mark.mossberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
2020-09-09x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info()Joerg Roedel1-3/+4
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the #VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr section which can be called safely from there. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
2020-08-03Merge tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-10/+13
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar: "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as the backtrace" * tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs() x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
2020-07-22x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log levelDmitry Safonov1-5/+5
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always used. Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently slow (9600 bps). Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED (which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1]) the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with higher log level). After all preparations are done, provide log_lvl parameter for show_regs_if_on_stack() and wire up to actual log level used as an argument for show_trace_log_lvl(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/ Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-4-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()Dmitry Safonov1-3/+6
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always used. Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently slow (9600 bps). Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED (which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1]) the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with higher log level). Add log_lvl parameter to __show_regs(). Keep the used log level intact to separate visible change. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/ Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-3-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()Dmitry Safonov1-4/+4
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always used. Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently slow (9600 bps). Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED (which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1]) the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with higher log level). Add log_lvl parameter to show_iret_regs() as a preparation to add it to __show_regs() and show_regs_if_on_stack(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/ Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-2-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22x86/dumpstack: Dump user space code correctly againThomas Gleixner1-10/+17
H.J. reported that post 5.7 a segfault of a user space task does not longer dump the Code bytes when /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace is enabled. It prints 'Code: Bad RIP value.' instead. This was broken by a recent change which made probe_kernel_read() reject non-kernel addresses. Update show_opcodes() so it retrieves user space opcodes via copy_from_user_nmi(). Fixes: 98a23609b103 ("maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read") Reported-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87h7tz306w.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2020-06-17maccess: rename probe_kernel_{read,write} to copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofaultChristoph Hellwig1-1/+1
Better describe what these functions do. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09kernel: rename show_stack_loglvl() => show_stack()Dmitry Safonov1-6/+1
Now the last users of show_stack() got converted to use an explicit log level, show_stack_loglvl() can drop it's redundant suffix and become once again well known show_stack(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-51-dima@arista.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09x86: add show_stack_loglvl()Dmitry Safonov1-2/+8
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or user). Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred. Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate printings with headers. Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute show_stack(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-42-dima@arista.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09x86: add missing const qualifiers for log_lvlDmitry Safonov1-2/+2
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or user). Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred. Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate printings with headers. Keep log_lvl const show_trace_log_lvl() and printk_stack_address() as the new generic show_stack_loglvl() wants to have a proper const qualifier. And gcc rightfully produces warnings in case it's not keept: arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c: In function `show_stack': arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:294:37: warning: passing argument 4 of `show_trace_log_lv ' discards `const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers] 294 | show_trace_log_lvl(task, NULL, sp, loglvl); | ^~~~~~ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:163:32: note: expected `char *' but argument is of type `const char *' 163 | unsigned long *stack, char *log_lvl) | ~~~~~~^~~~~~~ [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-41-dima@arista.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-31x86/kasan: Print original address on #GPJann Horn1-0/+2
Make #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier to understand by computing the address of the original access and printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch. This turns an error like this: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI into this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef] The hook is placed in architecture-independent code, but is currently only wired up to the X86 exception handler because I'm not sufficiently familiar with the address space layout and exception handling mechanisms on other architectures. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-4-jannh@google.com
2019-12-31x86/dumpstack: Introduce die_addr() for die() with #GP fault addressJann Horn1-1/+23
Split __die() into __die_header() and __die_body(). This allows inserting extra information below the header line that initiates the bug report. Introduce a new function die_addr() that behaves like die(), but is for faults only and uses __die_header() and __die_body() so that a future commit can print extra information after the header line. [ bp: Comment the KASAN-specific usage of gp_addr. ] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-3-jannh@google.com
2019-07-31x86/dumpstack: Indicate PREEMPT_RT in dumpsThomas Gleixner1-1/+6
Stack dumps print whether the kernel has preemption enabled or not. Extend it so a PREEMPT_RT enabled kernel can be identified. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726212124.699136351@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-09-06x86/process: Don't mix user/kernel regs in 64bit __show_regs()Jann Horn1-8/+3
When the kernel.print-fatal-signals sysctl has been enabled, a simple userspace crash will cause the kernel to write a crash dump that contains, among other things, the kernel gsbase into dmesg. As suggested by Andy, limit output to pt_regs, FS_BASE and KERNEL_GS_BASE in this case. This also moves the bitness-specific logic from show_regs() into process_{32,64}.c. Fixes: 45807a1df9f5 ("vdso: print fatal signals") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831194151.123586-1-jannh@google.com
2018-08-31x86/dumpstack: Don't dump kernel memory based on usermode RIPJann Horn1-3/+13
show_opcodes() is used both for dumping kernel instructions and for dumping user instructions. If userspace causes #PF by jumping to a kernel address, show_opcodes() can be reached with regs->ip controlled by the user, pointing to kernel code. Make sure that userspace can't trick us into dumping kernel memory into dmesg. Fixes: 7cccf0725cf7 ("x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828154901.112726-1-jannh@google.com
2018-08-30x86/entry/64: Wipe KASAN stack shadow before rewind_stack_do_exit()Jann Horn1-0/+4
Reset the KASAN shadow state of the task stack before rewinding RSP. Without this, a kernel oops will leave parts of the stack poisoned, and code running under do_exit() can trip over such poisoned regions and cause nonsensical false-positive KASAN reports about stack-out-of-bounds bugs. This does not wipe the exception stacks; if an oops happens on an exception stack, it might result in random KASAN false-positives from other tasks afterwards. This is probably relatively uninteresting, since if the kernel oopses on an exception stack, there are most likely bigger things to worry about. It'd be more interesting if vmapped stacks and KASAN were compatible, since then handle_stack_overflow() would oops from exception stack context. Fixes: 2deb4be28077 ("x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit()") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828184033.93712-1-jannh@google.com
2018-07-19x86: Avoid pr_cont() in show_opcodes()Rasmus Villemoes1-19/+9
If concurrent printk() messages are emitted, then pr_cont() is making it extremly hard to decode which part of the output belongs to what. See the convoluted example at: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashReport&x=139d342c400000 Avoid this by using a proper prefix for each line and by using %ph format in show_opcodes() which emits the 'Code:' line in one go. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: joe@perches.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532009278-5953-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Explain the reasoning for the prologue and buffer sizeBorislav Petkov1-0/+19
The whole reasoning behind the amount of opcode bytes dumped and prologue length isn't very clear so write down some of the reasons for why it is done the way it is. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-10-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Save first regs set for the executive summaryBorislav Petkov1-20/+12
Save the regs set when __die() is onvoked for the first time and print it in oops_end(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-9-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() functionBorislav Petkov1-10/+13
... which shows the Instruction Pointer along with the insn bytes around it. Use it whenever rIP is printed. Drop the rIP < PAGE_OFFSET check since probe_kernel_read() can handle any address properly. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-8-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Add loglevel argument to show_opcodes()Borislav Petkov1-3/+3
Will be used in the next patch. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-6-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Improve opcodes dumping in the code sectionBorislav Petkov1-16/+15
The code used to iterate byte-by-byte over the bytes around RIP and that is expensive: disabling pagefaults around it, copy_from_user, etc... Make it read the whole buffer of OPCODE_BUFSIZE size in one go. Use a statically allocated 64 bytes buffer so that concurrent show_opcodes() do not interleave in the output even though in the majority of the cases it's serialized via die_lock. Except the #PF path which doesn't... Also, do the PAGE_OFFSET check outside of the function because latter will be reused in other context. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-5-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Carve out code-dumping into a functionBorislav Petkov1-27/+30
No functionality change, carve it out into a separate function for later changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-4-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Unexport oops_begin()Borislav Petkov1-1/+0
The only user outside of arch/ is not a module since 86cd47334b00 ("ACPI, APEI, GHES, Prevent GHES to be built as module") No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-3-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-26x86/dumpstack: Remove code_bytesBorislav Petkov1-23/+4
This was added by 86c418374223 ("[PATCH] i386: add option to show more code in oops reports") long time ago but experience shows that 64 instruction bytes are plenty when deciphering an oops. So get rid of it. Removing it will simplify further enhancements to the opcodes dumping machinery coming in the following patches. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-2-bp@alien8.de
2018-03-08x86/dumpstack: Unify show_regs()Borislav Petkov1-1/+48
The 32-bit version uses KERN_EMERG and commit b0f4c4b32c8e ("bugs, x86: Fix printk levels for panic, softlockups and stack dumps") changed the 64-bit version to KERN_DEFAULT. The same justification in that commit that those messages do not belong in the terminal, holds true for 32-bit also, so make it so. Make code_bytes static, while at it. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306094920.16917-4-bp@alien8.de
2018-02-02x86/dumpstack: Avoid uninitlized variableArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
In some configurations, 'partial' does not get initialized, as shown by this gcc-8 warning: arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c: In function 'show_trace_log_lvl': arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:156:4: error: 'partial' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] show_regs_if_on_stack(&stack_info, regs, partial); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This initializes it to false, to get the previous behavior in this case. Fixes: a9cdbe72c4e8 ("x86/dumpstack: Fix partial register dumps") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-1-arnd@arndb.de
2018-01-03x86/dumpstack: Print registers for first stack frameJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+2
In the stack dump code, if the frame after the starting pt_regs is also a regs frame, the registers don't get printed. Fix that. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3b3fa11bc700 ("x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/396f84491d2f0ef64eda4217a2165f5712f6a115.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-03x86/dumpstack: Fix partial register dumpsJosh Poimboeuf1-8/+20
The show_regs_safe() logic is wrong. When there's an iret stack frame, it prints the entire pt_regs -- most of which is random stack data -- instead of just the five registers at the end. show_regs_safe() is also poorly named: the on_stack() checks aren't for safety. Rename the function to show_regs_if_on_stack() and add a comment to explain why the checks are needed. These issues were introduced with the "partial register dump" feature of the following commit: b02fcf9ba121 ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully") That patch had gone through a few iterations of development, and the above issues were artifacts from a previous iteration of the patch where 'regs' pointed directly to the iret frame rather than to the (partially empty) pt_regs. Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b02fcf9ba121 ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5b05b8b344f59db2d3d50dbdeba92d60f2304c54.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabledVlastimil Babka1-2/+4
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is relatively new and intrusive feature that may still have some corner cases which could take some time to manifest and be fixed. It would be useful to have Oops messages indicate whether it was enabled for building the kernel, and whether it was disabled during boot. Example of fully enabled: Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP PTI Example of enabled during build, but disabled during boot: Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP NOPTI We can decide to remove this after the feature has been tested in the field long enough. [ tglx: Made it use boot_cpu_has() as requested by Borislav ] Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: bpetkov@suse.de Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: jkosina@suse.cz Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmapThomas Gleixner1-0/+1
Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by cleanup_highmap(). Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stackDave Hansen1-5/+5
If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print "<SYSENTER>" even if SYSENTER is not involved. That is rather confusing. The "SYSENTER" stack is used for a lot more than SYSENTER now. Give it a better string to display in stack dumps, and rename the kernel code to match. Also move the 32-bit code over to the new naming even though it still uses the entry stack only for SYSENTER. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack codeAndy Lutomirski1-4/+3
The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty. Turn SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the obvious cleanups this enables. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canaryAndy Lutomirski1-2/+1
Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary to detect overflow after the fact. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry areaAndy Lutomirski1-1/+2
This has a secondary purpose: it puts the entry stack into a region with a well-controlled layout. A subsequent patch will take advantage of this to streamline the SYSCALL entry code to be able to find it more easily. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.962042855@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacksAndy Lutomirski1-10/+14
We currently special-case stack overflow on the task stack. We're going to start putting special stacks in the fixmap with a custom layout, so they'll have guard pages, too. Teach the unwinder to be able to unwind an overflow of any of the stacks. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.802057305@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stackAndy Lutomirski1-0/+19
get_stack_info() doesn't currently know about the SYSENTER stack, so unwinding will fail if we entered the kernel on the SYSENTER stack and haven't fully switched off. Teach get_stack_info() about the SYSENTER stack. With future patches applied that run part of the entry code on the SYSENTER stack and introduce an intentional BUG(), I would get: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0 ... RIP: 0010:do_error_trap+0x33/0x1c0 ... Call Trace: Code: ... With this patch, I get: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0 ... Call Trace: <SYSENTER> ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60 ? invalid_op+0x22/0x40 ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60 ? sync_regs+0x3c/0x40 ? sync_regs+0x2e/0x40 ? error_entry+0x6c/0xd0 ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60 </SYSENTER> Code: ... which is a lot more informative. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.392711508@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefullyJosh Poimboeuf1-5/+27
There are at least two unwinder bugs hindering the debugging of stack-overflow crashes: - It doesn't deal gracefully with the case where the stack overflows and the stack pointer itself isn't on a valid stack but the to-be-dereferenced data *is*. - The ORC oops dump code doesn't know how to print partial pt_regs, for the case where if we get an interrupt/exception in *early* entry code before the full pt_regs have been saved. Fix both issues. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171126024031.uxi4numpbjm5rlbr@treble Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.071425003@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-30x86/asm/32: Remove a bunch of '& 0xffff' from pt_regs segment readsAndy Lutomirski1-1/+1
Now that pt_regs properly defines segment fields as 16-bit on 32-bit CPUs, there's no need to mask off the high word. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18x86/dumpstack: Fix occasionally missing registersJosh Poimboeuf1-5/+7
If two consecutive stack frames have pt_regs, the oops dump code fails to print the second frame's registers. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3b3fa11bc700 ("x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/269c5c00c7d45c699f3dcea42a3a594c6cf7a9a3.1499786555.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-04-18x86/unwind: Ensure stack pointer is alignedJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+1
With frame pointers disabled, on some older versions of GCC (like 4.8.3), it's possible for the stack pointer to get aligned at a half-word boundary: 00000000000004d0 <fib_table_lookup>: 4d0: 41 57 push %r15 4d2: 41 56 push %r14 4d4: 41 55 push %r13 4d6: 41 54 push %r12 4d8: 55 push %rbp 4d9: 53 push %rbx 4da: 48 83 ec 24 sub $0x24,%rsp In such a case, the unwinder ends up reading the entire stack at the wrong alignment. Then the last read goes past the end of the stack, hitting the stack guard page: BUG: stack guard page was hit at ffffc900217c4000 (stack is ffffc900217c0000..ffffc900217c3fff) kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP ... Fix it by ensuring the stack pointer is properly aligned before unwinding. Reported-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Fixes: 7c7900f89770 ("x86/unwind: Add new unwind interface and implementations") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cff33847cc9b02fa548625aa23268ac574460d8d.1492436590.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-27x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0Peter Zijlstra1-3/+0
By using "UD0" for WARN()s we remove the function call and its possible __FILE__ and __LINE__ immediate arguments from the instruction stream. Total image size will not change much, what we win in the instruction stream we'll lose because of the __bug_table entries. Still, saves on I$ footprint and the total image size does go down a bit. text data filename 10702123 4530992 defconfig-build/vmlinux.orig 10682460 4530992 defconfig-build/vmlinux.patched (UML didn't seem to use GENERIC_BUG at all, so remove it) Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/task_stack.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/task_stack.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task_stack.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/debug.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/debug.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-12Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-40/+28
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this development cycle were: - a large number of call stack dumping/printing improvements: higher robustness, better cross-context dumping, improved output, etc. (Josh Poimboeuf) - vDSO getcpu() performance improvement for future Intel CPUs with the RDPID instruction (Andy Lutomirski) - add two new Intel AVX512 features and the CPUID support infrastructure for it: AVX512IFMA and AVX512VBMI. (Gayatri Kammela, He Chen) - more copy-user unification (Borislav Petkov) - entry code assembly macro simplifications (Alexander Kuleshov) - vDSO C/R support improvements (Dmitry Safonov) - misc fixes and cleanups (Borislav Petkov, Paul Bolle)" * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (40 commits) scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: Fix address line detection on x86 x86/boot/64: Use defines for page size x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensible selftests/x86: Add test_vdso to test getcpu() x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available x86/dumpstack: Handle NULL stack pointer in show_trace_log_lvl() x86/cpufeatures: Enable new AVX512 cpu features x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() x86/cpuid: Cleanup cpuid_regs definitions x86/copy_user: Unify the code by removing the 64-bit asm _copy_*_user() variants x86/unwind: Ensure stack grows down x86/vdso: Set vDSO pointer only after success x86/prctl/uapi: Remove #ifdef for CHECKPOINT_RESTORE x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address x86/dumpstack: Warn on stack recursion x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer x86/decoder: Use stderr if insn sanity test fails x86/decoder: Use stdout if insn decoder test is successful mm/page_alloc: Remove kernel address exposure in free_reserved_area() x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump ...
2016-11-21x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensibleJosh Poimboeuf1-6/+6
NMI stack dumps are bracketed by the following tags: <NMI> ... <EOE> The ending tag is kind of confusing if you don't already know what "EOE" means (end of exception). The same ending tag is also used to mark the end of all other exceptions' stacks. For example: <#DF> ... <EOE> And similarly, "EOI" is used as the ending tag for interrupts: <IRQ> ... <EOI> Change the tags to be more comprehensible by making them symmetrical and more XML-esque: <NMI> ... </NMI> <#DF> ... </#DF> <IRQ> ... </IRQ> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/180196e3754572540b595bc56b947d43658979a7.1479491159.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-11-18x86/dumpstack: Prevent KASAN false positive warningsJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+1
The oops stack dump code scans the entire stack, which can cause KASAN "stack-out-of-bounds" false positive warnings. Tell KASAN to ignore it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: davej@codemonkey.org.uk Cc: dvyukov@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f6e80c4b0c7f7f0b6211900847a247cdaad753c.1479398226.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-11-17x86/dumpstack: Handle NULL stack pointer in show_trace_log_lvl()Josh Poimboeuf1-0/+1
When show_trace_log_lvl() is called from show_regs(), it completely fails to dump the stack. This bug was introduced when show_stack_log_lvl() was removed with the following commit: 0ee1dd9f5e7e ("x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump") Previous callers of that function now call show_trace_log_lvl() directly. That resulted in a subtle change, in that the 'stack' argument can now be NULL in certain cases. A NULL 'stack' pointer means that the stack dump should start from the topmost stack frame unless 'regs' is valid, in which case it should start from 'regs->sp'. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 0ee1dd9f5e7e ("x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c551842302a9c222d96a14e42e4003f059509f69.1479362652.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-07-25 06:59:45 +0000