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2022-07-22PCI: Move isa_dma_bridge_buggy out of asm/dma.hStafford Horne1-6/+0
The isa_dma_bridge_buggy symbol is only used for x86_32, and only x86_32 platforms or quirks ever set it. Add a new linux/isa-dma.h header that #defines isa_dma_bridge_buggy to 0 except on x86_32, where we keep it as a variable, and remove all the arch- specific definitions. [bhelgaas: commit log] Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722214944.831438-3-shorne@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
2022-07-22PCI: Remove pci_get_legacy_ide_irq() and asm-generic/pci.hStafford Horne1-1/+0
pci_get_legacy_ide_irq() is only used on platforms that support PNP, so many architectures define it but never use it. Replace uses of it with ATA_PRIMARY_IRQ() and ATA_SECONDARY_IRQ(), which provide the same functionality. Since pci_get_legacy_ide_irq() is no longer used, remove all the architecture-specific definitions of it as well as asm-generic/pci.h, which only provides pci_get_legacy_ide_irq() [bhelgaas: commit log] Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722214944.831438-2-shorne@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2022-07-22s390/pci: allow zPCI zbus without a function zeroNiklas Schnelle1-62/+20
Currently the zPCI code blocks PCI bus creation and probing of a zPCI zbus unless there is a PCI function with devfn 0. This is always the case for the PCI functions with hidden RID, but may keep PCI functions from a multi-function PCI device with RID information invisible until the function 0 becomes visible. Worse, as a PCI bus is necessary to even present a PCI hotplug slot, even that remains invisible. With the probing of these so-called isolated PCI functions enabled for s390 in common code, this restriction is no longer necessary. On network cards with multiple ports and a PF per port this also allows using each port on its own while still providing the physical PCI topology information in the devfn needed to associate VFs with their parent PF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628143100.3228092-6-schnelle@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-21s390/archrandom: prevent CPACF trng invocations in interrupt contextHarald Freudenberger1-3/+6
This patch slightly reworks the s390 arch_get_random_seed_{int,long} implementation: Make sure the CPACF trng instruction is never called in any interrupt context. This is done by adding an additional condition in_task(). Justification: There are some constrains to satisfy for the invocation of the arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() functions: - They should provide good random data during kernel initialization. - They should not be called in interrupt context as the TRNG instruction is relatively heavy weight and may for example make some network loads cause to timeout and buck. However, it was not clear what kind of interrupt context is exactly encountered during kernel init or network traffic eventually calling arch_get_random_seed_long(). After some days of investigations it is clear that the s390 start_kernel function is not running in any interrupt context and so the trng is called: Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<00000001064e90ca>] arch_get_random_seed_long.part.0+0x32/0x70 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010715f246>] random_init+0xf6/0x238 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010712545c>] start_kernel+0x4a4/0x628 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010590402a>] startup_continue+0x2a/0x40 The condition in_task() is true and the CPACF trng provides random data during kernel startup. The network traffic however, is more difficult. A typical call stack looks like this: Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5600fc>] extract_entropy.constprop.0+0x23c/0x240 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b560136>] crng_reseed+0x36/0xd8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5604b8>] crng_make_state+0x78/0x340 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5607e0>] _get_random_bytes+0x60/0xf8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b56108a>] get_random_u32+0xda/0x248 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aefe7a8>] kfence_guarded_alloc+0x48/0x4b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aeff35e>] __kfence_alloc+0x18e/0x1b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aef7f10>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x368/0x4d8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611eac>] kmalloc_reserve+0x44/0xa0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611f98>] __alloc_skb+0x90/0x178 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b6120dc>] __napi_alloc_skb+0x5c/0x118 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f06b4>] qeth_extract_skb+0x13c/0x680 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f6526>] qeth_poll+0x256/0x3f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63d76e>] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x46/0x2f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63dbec>] net_rx_action+0x1cc/0x408 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b937302>] __do_softirq+0x132/0x6b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf46ce>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x13e/0x170 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf531a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x22/0x50 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b922506>] do_io_irq+0xe6/0x198 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935826>] io_int_handler+0xd6/0x110 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b9358a6>] psw_idle_exit+0x0/0xa Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: ([<000000008ab9c59a>] arch_cpu_idle+0x52/0xe0) Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b933cfe>] default_idle_call+0x6e/0xd0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac59f4e>] do_idle+0xf6/0x1b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac5a28e>] cpu_startup_entry+0x36/0x40 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abb0d90>] smp_start_secondary+0x148/0x158 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935b9e>] restart_int_handler+0x6e/0x90 which confirms that the call is in softirq context. So in_task() covers exactly the cases where we want to have CPACF trng called: not in nmi, not in hard irq, not in soft irq but in normal task context and during kernel init. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713131721.257907-1-freude@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e4f74400308c ("s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier") [agordeev@linux.ibm.com changed desc, added Fixes and Link, removed -stable] Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-21mmu_gather: Remove per arch tlb_{start,end}_vma()Peter Zijlstra2-3/+1
Scattered across the archs are 3 basic forms of tlb_{start,end}_vma(). Provide two new MMU_GATHER_knobs to enumerate them and remove the per arch tlb_{start,end}_vma() implementations. - MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE indicates the arch has flush_cache_range() but does *NOT* want to call it for each VMA. - MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS indicates the arch wants to merge the invalidate across multiple VMAs if possible. With these it is possible to capture the three forms: 1) empty stubs; select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE and MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS 2) start: flush_cache_range(), end: empty; select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS 3) start: flush_cache_range(), end: flush_tlb_range(); default Obviously, if the architecture does not have flush_cache_range() then it also doesn't need to select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-20s390/crash: support multi-segment iteratorsAlexander Gordeev3-109/+40
Make it possible to handle not only single-, but also multi- segment iterators in copy_oldmem_iter() callback. Change the semantics of called functions to match the iterator model - instead of an error code the exact number of bytes copied is returned. The swap page used to copy data to user space is adopted for kernel space too. That does not bring any performance impact. Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Fixes: cc02e6e21aa5 ("s390/crash: add missing iterator advance in copy_oldmem_page()") Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5af6da3a0bffe48a90b0b7139ecf6a818b2d18e8.1658206891.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20s390/crash: use static swap buffer for copy_to_user_real()Alexander Gordeev1-14/+12
Currently a temporary page-size buffer is allocated for copying oldmem to user space. That limits copy_to_user_real() operation only to stages when virtual memory is available and still makes it possible to fail while the system is being dumped. Instead of reallocating single page on each copy_oldmem_page() iteration use a statically allocated buffer. This also paves the way for a further memcpy_real() rework where no swap buffer is needed altogether. Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/334ed359680c4d45dd32feb104909f610312ef0f.1658206891.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20s390/crash: move copy_to_user_real() to crash_dump.cAlexander Gordeev3-27/+26
Function copy_to_user_real() does not really belong to maccess.c. It is only used for copying oldmem to user space, so let's move it to the friends. Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e8de968d40202d87caa09aef12e9c67ec23a1c1a.1658206891.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20s390/crash: fix incorrect number of bytes to copy to user spaceAlexander Gordeev1-1/+1
The number of bytes in a chunk is correctly calculated, but instead the total number of bytes is passed to copy_to_user_real() function. Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Fixes: df9694c7975f ("s390/dump: streamline oldmem copy functions") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20s390/crash: remove redundant panic() on save area allocation failureAlexander Gordeev1-1/+1
Make save_area_alloc() return classic NULL on allocation failure. The only caller smp_save_dump_cpus() does check the return value already and panics if NULL is returned. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20s390/mm: remove unused tprot() functionAlexander Gordeev1-14/+0
Since commit 461e0da7ddbb ("s390: remove broken hibernate / power management support") there are no users of tprot() left. Remove the function itself as well. Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20KVM: s390: resetting the Topology-Change-ReportPierre Morel2-0/+52
During a subsystem reset the Topology-Change-Report is cleared. Let's give userland the possibility to clear the MTCR in the case of a subsystem reset. To migrate the MTCR, we give userland the possibility to query the MTCR state. We indicate KVM support for the CPU topology facility with a new KVM capability: KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20220714194334.127812-1-pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220714194334.127812-1-pmorel@linux.ibm.com/ [frankja@linux.ibm.com: Simple conflict resolution in Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20KVM: s390: guest support for topology functionPierre Morel4-7/+70
We report a topology change to the guest for any CPU hotplug. The reporting to the guest is done using the Multiprocessor Topology-Change-Report (MTCR) bit of the utility entry in the guest's SCA which will be cleared during the interpretation of PTF. On every vCPU creation we set the MCTR bit to let the guest know the next time it uses the PTF with command 2 instruction that the topology changed and that it should use the STSI(15.1.x) instruction to get the topology details. STSI(15.1.x) gives information on the CPU configuration topology. Let's accept the interception of STSI with the function code 15 and let the userland part of the hypervisor handle it when userland supports the CPU Topology facility. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714101824.101601-2-pmorel@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220714101824.101601-2-pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-20KVM: s390: Cleanup ipte lock access and SIIF facility checksPierre Morel3-54/+54
We can check if SIIF is enabled by testing the sclp_info struct instead of testing the sie control block eca variable as that facility is always enabled if available. Also let's cleanup all the ipte related struct member accesses which currently happen by referencing the KVM struct via the VCPU struct. Making the KVM struct the parameter to the ipte_* functions removes one level of indirection which makes the code more readable. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220711084148.25017-2-pmorel@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19s390/uvdevice: autoload module based on CPU facilitySteffen Eiden2-0/+2
Make sure the uvdevice driver will be automatically loaded when facility 158 is available. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713125644.16121-4-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19s390/cpufeature: allow for facility bitsHeiko Carstens1-0/+3
Allow for facility bits to be used in cpu features. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713125644.16121-3-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19s390/cpufeature: rework to allow more than only hwcap bitsHeiko Carstens15-37/+61
Rework cpufeature implementation to allow for various cpu feature indications, which is not only limited to hwcap bits. This is achieved by adding a sequential list of cpu feature numbers, where each of them is mapped to an entry which indicates what this number is about. Each entry contains a type member, which indicates what feature name space to look into (e.g. hwcap, or cpu facility). If wanted this allows also to automatically load modules only in e.g. z/VM configurations. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713125644.16121-2-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19KVM: s390: pv: don't present the ecall interrupt twiceNico Boehr2-2/+17
When the SIGP interpretation facility is present and a VCPU sends an ecall to another VCPU in enabled wait, the sending VCPU receives a 56 intercept (partial execution), so KVM can wake up the receiving CPU. Note that the SIGP interpretation facility will take care of the interrupt delivery and KVM's only job is to wake the receiving VCPU. For PV, the sending VCPU will receive a 108 intercept (pv notify) and should continue like in the non-PV case, i.e. wake the receiving VCPU. For PV and non-PV guests the interrupt delivery will occur through the SIGP interpretation facility on SIE entry when SIE finds the X bit in the status field set. However, in handle_pv_notification(), there was no special handling for SIGP, which leads to interrupt injection being requested by KVM for the next SIE entry. This results in the interrupt being delivered twice: once by the SIGP interpretation facility and once by KVM through the IICTL. Add the necessary special handling in handle_pv_notification(), similar to handle_partial_execution(), which simply wakes the receiving VCPU and leave interrupt delivery to the SIGP interpretation facility. In contrast to external calls, emergency calls are not interpreted but also cause a 108 intercept, which is why we still need to call handle_instruction() for SIGP orders other than ecall. Since kvm_s390_handle_sigp_pei() is now called for all SIGP orders which cause a 108 intercept - even if they are actually handled by handle_instruction() - move the tracepoint in kvm_s390_handle_sigp_pei() to avoid possibly confusing trace messages. Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7 Fixes: da24a0cc58ed ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Instruction emulation") Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220718130434.73302-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220718130434.73302-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19KVM: s390: pv: destroy the configuration before its memoryClaudio Imbrenda1-3/+3
Move the Destroy Secure Configuration UVC before the loop to destroy the memory. If the protected VM has memory, it will be cleaned up and made accessible by the Destroy Secure Configuration UVC. The struct page for the relevant pages will still have the protected bit set, so the loop is still needed to clean that up. Switching the order of those two operations does not change the outcome, but it is significantly faster. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-13-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-13-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19KVM: s390: pv: refactoring of kvm_s390_pv_deinit_vmClaudio Imbrenda1-8/+8
Refactor kvm_s390_pv_deinit_vm to improve readability and simplify the improvements that are coming in subsequent patches. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-12-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-12-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> [frankja@linux.ibm.com: Dropped commit message line regarding review] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19s390/mm: KVM: pv: when tearing down, try to destroy protected pagesClaudio Imbrenda1-3/+16
When ptep_get_and_clear_full is called for a mm teardown, we will now attempt to destroy the secure pages. This will be faster than export. In case it was not a teardown, or if for some reason the destroy page UVC failed, we try with an export page, like before. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-11-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-11-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-19KVM: s390: pv: add mmu_notifierClaudio Imbrenda4-0/+39
Add an mmu_notifier for protected VMs. The callback function is triggered when the mm is torn down, and will attempt to convert all protected vCPUs to non-protected. This allows the mm teardown to use the destroy page UVC instead of export. Also make KVM select CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER, needed to use mmu_notifiers. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-10-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-10-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> [frankja@linux.ibm.com: Conflict resolution for mmu_notifier.h include and struct kvm_s390_pv] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-18random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOMJason A. Donenfeld5-22/+1
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch. Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps. Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select. The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability. Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route. Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-07-17mm/mmap: drop ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROTAnshuman Khandual1-1/+0
Now all the platforms enable ARCH_HAS_GET_PAGE_PROT. They define and export own vm_get_page_prot() whether custom or standard DECLARE_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT. Hence there is no need for default generic fallback for vm_get_page_prot(). Just drop this fallback and also ARCH_HAS_GET_PAGE_PROT mechanism. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711070600.2378316-27-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-17s390/mm: enable ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROTAnshuman Khandual3-17/+21
This enables ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT on the platform and exports standard vm_get_page_prot() implementation via DECLARE_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT, which looks up a private and static protection_map[] array. Subsequently all __SXXX and __PXXX macros can be dropped which are no longer needed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711070600.2378316-19-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-15kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature ↵Michal Suchanek1-5/+13
verification commit e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") adds support for KEXEC_SIG verification with keys from platform keyring but the built-in keys and secondary keyring are not used. Add support for the built-in keys and secondary keyring as x86 does. Fixes: e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-15kexec: drop weak attribute from functionsNaveen N. Rao1-0/+11
Drop __weak attribute from functions in kexec_core.c: - machine_kexec_post_load() - arch_kexec_protect_crashkres() - arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres() - crash_free_reserved_phys_range() Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c0f6219e03cb399d166d518ab505095218a902dd.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-15kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functionsNaveen N. Rao1-0/+3
As requested (http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ee0q7b92.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org), this series converts weak functions in kexec to use the #ifdef approach. Quoting the 3e35142ef99fe ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add]") changelog: : Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section symbols") : [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that it thought : were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with kexec_file.c, gcc : is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a separate : .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely" is being : dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak symbol in : .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against. This patch (of 2); Drop __weak attribute from functions in kexec_file.c: - arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe() - arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() - arch_kexec_kernel_image_load() - arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole() - arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() arch_kexec_kernel_image_load() calls into kexec_image_load_default(), so drop the static attribute for the latter. arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is not overridden by any architecture, so drop the __weak attribute. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cd7ca1fe4d6bb6ca38e3283c717878388ed6788.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: Add kvm_s390_cpus_from_pv to kvm-s390.h and add documentationClaudio Imbrenda2-6/+31
Future changes make it necessary to call this function from pv.c. While we are at it, let's properly document kvm_s390_cpus_from_pv() and kvm_s390_cpus_to_pv(). Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-9-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-9-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: clear the state without memsetClaudio Imbrenda1-1/+9
Do not use memset to clean the whole struct kvm_s390_pv; instead, explicitly clear the fields that need to be cleared. Upcoming patches will introduce new fields in the struct kvm_s390_pv that will not need to be cleared. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-8-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-8-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: add export before importClaudio Imbrenda1-0/+28
Due to upcoming changes, it will be possible to temporarily have multiple protected VMs in the same address space, although only one will be actually active. In that scenario, it is necessary to perform an export of every page that is to be imported, since the hardware does not allow a page belonging to a protected guest to be imported into a different protected guest. This also applies to pages that are shared, and thus accessible by the host. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flagClaudio Imbrenda4-8/+10
Use the new protected_count field as a counter instead of the old is_protected flag. This will be used in upcoming patches. Increment the counter when a secure configuration is created, and decrement it when it is destroyed. Previously the flag was set when the set secure parameters UVC was performed. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_accClaudio Imbrenda3-32/+116
Refactor s390_reset_acc so that it can be reused in upcoming patches. We don't want to hold all the locks used in a walk_page_range for too long, and the destroy page UVC does take some time to complete. Therefore we quickly gather the pages to destroy, and then destroy them without holding all the locks. The new refactored function optionally allows to return early without completing if a fatal signal is pending (and return and appropriate error code). Two wrappers are provided to call the new function. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-5-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-5-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guestsClaudio Imbrenda1-1/+12
With upcoming patches, normal guests might touch secure pages. This patch extends the existing exception handler to convert the pages to non secure also when the exception is triggered by a normal guest. This can happen for example when a secure guest reboots; the first stage of a secure guest is non secure, and in general a secure guest can reboot into non-secure mode. If the secure memory of the previous boot has not been cleared up completely yet (which will be allowed to happen in an upcoming patch), a non-secure guest might touch secure memory, which will need to be handled properly. This means that gmap faults must be handled and not cause termination of the process. The handling is the same as userspace accesses, it's enough to translate the gmap address to a user address and then let the normal user fault code handle it. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guestsClaudio Imbrenda3-0/+66
A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor. With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure storage violations in normal operation. This happens for example if a protected guest is rebooted with deferred destroy enabled and the new guest is also protected. When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a secure storage violation is raised. This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected guests. This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy should be possible. Note that a secure page can only be destroyed if its protected VM does not have any CPUs, which only happens when the protected VM is being terminated. If that fails, a normal export of the page is attempted. This means that pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure (in one way or another) before attempting to use them again for a different secure guest. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: pv: leak the topmost page table when destroy failsClaudio Imbrenda3-3/+94
Each secure guest must have a unique ASCE (address space control element); we must avoid that new guests use the same page for their ASCE, to avoid errors. Since the ASCE mostly consists of the address of the topmost page table (plus some flags), we must not return that memory to the pool unless the ASCE is no longer in use. Only a successful Destroy Secure Configuration UVC will make the ASCE reusable again. If the Destroy Configuration UVC fails, the ASCE cannot be reused for a secure guest (either for the ASCE or for other memory areas). To avoid a collision, it must not be used again. This is a permanent error and the page becomes in practice unusable, so we set it aside and leak it. On failure we already leak other memory that belongs to the ultravisor (i.e. the variable and base storage for a guest) and not leaking the topmost page table was an oversight. This error (and thus the leakage) should not happen unless the hardware is broken or KVM has some unknown serious bug. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 29b40f105ec8d55 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling") Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390: Add facility 197 to the allow listChristian Borntraeger1-0/+1
z16 also provides facility 197 (The processor-activity-instrumentation extension 1). Let's add it to KVM. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711115108.6494-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13s390/nospec: remove unneeded header includesVasily Gorbik2-3/+1
Commit 4efd417f298b ("s390: raise minimum supported machine generation to z10") removed the usage of alternatives and lowcore in expolines macros. Remove unneeded header includes as well. With that, expoline.S doesn't require asm-offsets.h and expoline_prepare target dependency could be removed. Tested-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/patch-2.thread-d13b6c.git-d13b6c96fb5f.your-ad-here.call-01656331067-ext-4899@work.hours Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13s390/nospec: build expoline.o for modules_prepare targetVasily Gorbik4-2/+12
When CONFIG_EXPOLINE_EXTERN is used expoline thunks are generated from arch/s390/lib/expoline.S and postlinked into every module. This is also true for external modules. Add expoline.o build to the modules_prepare target. Fixes: 1d2ad084800e ("s390/nospec: add an option to use thunk-extern") Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: C. Erastus Toe <ctoe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/patch-1.thread-d13b6c.git-a2387a74dc49.your-ad-here.call-01656331067-ext-4899@work.hours Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-13KVM: s390/pci: fix include duplicatesChristian Borntraeger1-3/+2
remove the duplicate includes. While at it sort the includes. Reported-by: kernel test robot <yujie.liu@intel.com> Fixes: 73f91b004321 ("KVM: s390: pci: enable host forwarding of Adapter Event Notifications") Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11s390: Add attestation query informationSteffen Eiden3-1/+28
We have information about the supported attestation header version and plaintext attestation flag bits. Let's expose it via the sysfs files. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220601100245.3189993-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: drop unexpected word 'and' in the commentsJiang Jian1-1/+1
there is an unexpected word 'and' in the comments that need to be dropped file: arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c line: 705 * Subsystem damage are the only two and and are indicated by changed to: * Subsystem damage are the only two and are indicated by Signed-off-by: Jiang Jian <jiangjian@cdjrlc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220622140720.7617-1-jiangjian@cdjrlc.com/ Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11Merge tag 'kvm-s390-pci-5.20' into kernelorgnextChristian Borntraeger17-37/+1102
KVM: s390/pci: enable zPCI for interpretive execution Add the necessary code in s390 base, pci and KVM to enable interpretion of PCI pasthru.
2022-07-11KVM: s390: add KVM_S390_ZPCI_OP to manage guest zPCI devicesMatthew Rosato3-0/+103
The KVM_S390_ZPCI_OP ioctl provides a mechanism for managing hardware-assisted virtualization features for s390x zPCI passthrough. Add the first 2 operations, which can be used to enable/disable the specified device for Adapter Event Notification interpretation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-21-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: pci: add routines to start/stop interpretive executionMatthew Rosato6-0/+205
These routines will be invoked at the time an s390x vfio-pci device is associated with a KVM (or when the association is removed), allowing the zPCI device to enable or disable load/store intepretation mode; this requires the host zPCI device to inform firmware of the unique token (GISA designation) that is associated with the owning KVM. Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-17-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: pci: provide routines for enabling/disabling interrupt forwardingMatthew Rosato3-0/+249
These routines will be wired into a kvm ioctl in order to respond to requests to enable / disable a device for Adapter Event Notifications / Adapter Interuption Forwarding. Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-16-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: mechanism to enable guest zPCI InterpretationMatthew Rosato3-0/+52
The guest must have access to certain facilities in order to allow interpretive execution of zPCI instructions and adapter event notifications. However, there are some cases where a guest might disable interpretation -- provide a mechanism via which we can defer enabling the associated zPCI interpretation facilities until the guest indicates it wishes to use them. Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-15-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: pci: enable host forwarding of Adapter Event NotificationsMatthew Rosato5-2/+103
In cases where interrupts are not forwarded to the guest via firmware, KVM is responsible for ensuring delivery. When an interrupt presents with the forwarding bit, we must process the forwarding tables until all interrupts are delivered. Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-14-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: pci: do initial setup for AEN interpretationMatthew Rosato7-0/+256
Initial setup for Adapter Event Notification Interpretation for zPCI passthrough devices. Specifically, allocate a structure for forwarding of adapter events and pass the address of this structure to firmware. Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-13-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
2022-07-11KVM: s390: pci: add basic kvm_zdev structureMatthew Rosato4-0/+61
This structure will be used to carry kvm passthrough information related to zPCI devices. Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203325.110625-12-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-08-06 13:40:29 +0000