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Now that __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL has a reasonable semantic regardless of the
request size we can drop the hackish implementation for !costly orders.
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL retries as long as the reclaim makes a forward
progress and backs of when we are out of memory for the requested size.
Therefore we do not need to enforce__GFP_NORETRY for !costly orders just
to silent the oom killer anymore.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-5-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alex Belits <alex.belits@cavium.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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KM_MAYFAIL didn't have any suitable GFP_FOO counterpart until recently
so it relied on the default page allocator behavior for the given set of
flags. This means that small allocations actually never failed.
Now that we have __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL flag which works independently on
the allocation request size we can map KM_MAYFAIL to it. The allocator
will try as hard as it can to fulfill the request but fails eventually
if the progress cannot be made. It does so without triggering the OOM
killer which can be seen as an improvement because KM_MAYFAIL users
should be able to deal with allocation failures.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-4-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alex Belits <alex.belits@cavium.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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semantic
__GFP_REPEAT was designed to allow retry-but-eventually-fail semantic to
the page allocator. This has been true but only for allocations
requests larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER. It has been always
ignored for smaller sizes. This is a bit unfortunate because there is
no way to express the same semantic for those requests and they are
considered too important to fail so they might end up looping in the
page allocator for ever, similarly to GFP_NOFAIL requests.
Now that the whole tree has been cleaned up and accidental or misled
usage of __GFP_REPEAT flag has been removed for !costly requests we can
give the original flag a better name and more importantly a more useful
semantic. Let's rename it to __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL which tells the user
that the allocator would try really hard but there is no promise of a
success. This will work independent of the order and overrides the
default allocator behavior. Page allocator users have several levels of
guarantee vs. cost options (take GFP_KERNEL as an example)
- GFP_KERNEL & ~__GFP_RECLAIM - optimistic allocation without _any_
attempt to free memory at all. The most light weight mode which even
doesn't kick the background reclaim. Should be used carefully because
it might deplete the memory and the next user might hit the more
aggressive reclaim
- GFP_KERNEL & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM (or GFP_NOWAIT)- optimistic
allocation without any attempt to free memory from the current
context but can wake kswapd to reclaim memory if the zone is below
the low watermark. Can be used from either atomic contexts or when
the request is a performance optimization and there is another
fallback for a slow path.
- (GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_HIGH) & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM (aka GFP_ATOMIC) -
non sleeping allocation with an expensive fallback so it can access
some portion of memory reserves. Usually used from interrupt/bh
context with an expensive slow path fallback.
- GFP_KERNEL - both background and direct reclaim are allowed and the
_default_ page allocator behavior is used. That means that !costly
allocation requests are basically nofail but there is no guarantee of
that behavior so failures have to be checked properly by callers
(e.g. OOM killer victim is allowed to fail currently).
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY - overrides the default allocator behavior
and all allocation requests fail early rather than cause disruptive
reclaim (one round of reclaim in this implementation). The OOM killer
is not invoked.
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL - overrides the default allocator
behavior and all allocation requests try really hard. The request
will fail if the reclaim cannot make any progress. The OOM killer
won't be triggered.
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL - overrides the default allocator behavior
and all allocation requests will loop endlessly until they succeed.
This might be really dangerous especially for larger orders.
Existing users of __GFP_REPEAT are changed to __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL
because they already had their semantic. No new users are added.
__alloc_pages_slowpath is changed to bail out for __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL if
there is no progress and we have already passed the OOM point.
This means that all the reclaim opportunities have been exhausted except
the most disruptive one (the OOM killer) and a user defined fallback
behavior is more sensible than keep retrying in the page allocator.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/sparc/kernel/mdesc.c]
[mhocko@suse.com: semantic fix]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626123847.GM11534@dhcp22.suse.cz
[mhocko@kernel.org: address other thing spotted by Vlastimil]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626124233.GN11534@dhcp22.suse.cz
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-3-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alex Belits <alex.belits@cavium.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "mm: give __GFP_REPEAT a better semantic".
The main motivation for the change is that the current implementation of
__GFP_REPEAT is not very much useful.
The documentation says:
* __GFP_REPEAT: Try hard to allocate the memory, but the allocation attempt
* _might_ fail. This depends upon the particular VM implementation.
It just fails to mention that this is true only for large (costly) high
order which has been the case since the flag was introduced. A similar
semantic would be really helpful for smal orders as well, though,
because we have places where a failure with a specific fallback error
handling is preferred to a potential endless loop inside the page
allocator.
The earlier cleanup dropped __GFP_REPEAT usage for low (!costly) order
users so only those which might use larger orders have stayed. One new
user added in the meantime is addressed in patch 1.
Let's rename the flag to something more verbose and use it for existing
users. Semantic for those will not change. Then implement low
(!costly) orders failure path which is hit after the page allocator is
about to invoke the oom killer. With that we have a good counterpart
for __GFP_NORETRY and finally can tell try as hard as possible without
the OOM killer.
Xfs code already has an existing annotation for allocations which are
allowed to fail and we can trivially map them to the new gfp flag
because it will provide the semantic KM_MAYFAIL wants. Christoph didn't
consider the new flag really necessary but didn't respond to the OOM
killer aspect of the change so I have kept the patch. If this is still
seen as not really needed I can drop the patch.
kvmalloc will allow also !costly high order allocations to retry hard
before falling back to the vmalloc.
drm/i915 asked for the new semantic explicitly.
Memory migration code, especially for the memory hotplug, should back
off rather than invoking the OOM killer as well.
This patch (of 6):
Commit 3377e227af44 ("MIPS: Add 48-bit VA space (and 4-level page
tables) for 4K pages.") has added a new __GFP_REPEAT user but using this
flag doesn't really make any sense for order-0 request which is the case
here because PUD_ORDER is 0. __GFP_REPEAT has historically effect only
on allocation requests with order > PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER.
This doesn't introduce any functional change. This is a preparatory
patch for later work which renames the flag and redefines its semantic.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alex Belits <alex.belits@cavium.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a
gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take
into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In
other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
Inspired by Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-4-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a
gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take
into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In
other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
Obtained from Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a
gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take
into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In
other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
Obtained from Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-5-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-4-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2.
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in
order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
This patch (of 5):
Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long
canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in
order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and
Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When building the sh architecture, the compiler doesn't realize that
BUG() doesn't return, so it will complain about functions using BUG()
that are marked with the noreturn attribute:
lib/string.c: In function 'fortify_panic':
>> lib/string.c:986:1: warning: 'noreturn' function does return
}
^
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627192050.GA66784@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on
boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp.
This boils down to things like this:
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1;
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig;
check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);
We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size'
bytes at those addresses.
However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to
memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single
unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic
at runtime.
We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels
unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't
incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe
memcmp and no panic.
[1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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prom_init is a bit special; in theory it should be able to be linked
separately to the kernel. To keep this from getting too complex, the
symbols that prom_init.c uses are checked.
Fortification adds symbols, and it gets quite messy as it includes
things like panic(). So just don't fortify prom_init.c for now.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This fixes a over-read condition detected by FORTIFY_SOURCE for this
line:
memcpy(SKB_TO_PKT(skb), &ack_pkt, sizeof(skb->cb));
The error was:
In file included from ./include/linux/bitmap.h:8:0,
from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:11,
from ./include/linux/mm_types_task.h:13,
from ./include/linux/mm_types.h:4,
from ./include/linux/kmemcheck.h:4,
from ./include/linux/skbuff.h:18,
from drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:34:
In function 'memcpy',
inlined from 'send_atomic_ack.constprop' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:998:2,
inlined from 'acknowledge' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1026:3,
inlined from 'rxe_responder' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1286:10:
./include/linux/string.h:309:4: error: call to '__read_overflow2' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object passed as 2nd parameter
__read_overflow2();
Daniel Micay noted that struct rxe_pkt_info is 32 bytes on 32-bit
architectures, but skb->cb is still 64. The memcpy() over-reads 32
bytes. This fixes it by zeroing the unused bytes in skb->cb.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Defining kexec_purgatory as a zero-length char array upsets compile time
size checking. Since this is built on a per-arch basis, define it as an
unsized char array (like is done for other similar things, e.g. linker
sections). This silences the warning generated by the future
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, which did not like the memcmp() of a "0 byte"
array. This drops the __weak and uses an extern instead, since both
users define kexec_purgatory.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This avoids CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE from being enabled during the EFI stub
build, as adding a panic() implementation may not work well. This can
be adjusted in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Implement an arch-speicfic watchdog rather than use the perf-based
hardlockup detector.
The new watchdog takes the soft-NMI directly, rather than going through
perf. Perf interrupts are to be made maskable in future, so that would
prevent the perf detector from working in those regions.
Additionally, implement a SMP based detector where all CPUs watch one
another by pinging a shared cpumask. This is because powerpc Book3S
does not have a true periodic local NMI, but some platforms do implement
a true NMI IPI.
If a CPU is stuck with interrupts hard disabled, the soft-NMI watchdog
does not work, but the SMP watchdog will. Even on platforms without a
true NMI IPI to get a good trace from the stuck CPU, other CPUs will
notice the lockup sufficiently to report it and panic.
[npiggin@gmail.com: honor watchdog disable at boot/hotplug]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621001346.5bb337c9@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com
[npiggin@gmail.com: fix false positive warning at CPU unplug]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630080740.20766-1-npiggin@gmail.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-6-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
After reconfiguring watchdog sysctls etc., architecture specific
watchdogs may not get all their parameters updated.
watchdog_nmi_reconfigure() can be implemented to pull the new values in
and set the arch NMI watchdog.
[npiggin@gmail.com: add code comments]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617125933.774d3858@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com
[arnd@arndb.de: hide unused function]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170620204854.966601-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-5-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split
HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR.
LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming
interfaces for the lockup detectors.
An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.
Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the
minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and
does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces.
sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the
interfaces, but not fully yet. It should probably be converted to a full
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.
[npiggin@gmail.com: fix]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
For architectures that define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, instead of having them
provide the complete touch_nmi_watchdog() function, just have them
provide arch_touch_nmi_watchdog().
This gives the generic code more flexibility in implementing this
function, and arch implementations don't miss out on touching the
softlockup watchdog or other generic details.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-3-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "Improve watchdog config for arch watchdogs", v4.
A series to make the hardlockup watchdog more easily replaceable by arch
code. The last patch provides some justification for why we want to do
this (existing sparc watchdog is another that could benefit).
This patch (of 5):
Remove unused declaration.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
xt_alloc_table_info() basically opencodes kvmalloc() so use the library
function instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170531155145.17111-4-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Now that ipc_rcu_alloc() and ipc_rcu_free() are removed, document when
it is valid to use ipc_getref() and ipc_putref().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-21-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The remaining users of __sem_free() can simply call kvfree() instead for
better readability.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff to keep rcu protection for security_sem_alloc()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-20-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There is nothing special about the msg_alloc/free routines any more, so
remove them to make code more readable.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff to keep rcu protection for security_msg_queue_alloc()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-19-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There is nothing special about the shm_alloc/free routines any more, so
remove them to make code more readable.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff, to continue to keep rcu for free calls after a successful security_shm_alloc()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-18-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Only after ipc_addid() has succeeded will refcounting be used, so move
initialization into ipc_addid() and remove from open-coded *_alloc()
routines.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-17-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Loosely based on a patch from Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:
- id and retval can be merged
- if ipc_addid() fails, then use call_rcu() directly.
The difference is that call_rcu is used for failed ipc_addid() calls, to
continue to guaranteed an rcu delay for security_msg_queue_free().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-16-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Loosely based on a patch from Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:
- id and error can be merged
- if operations before ipc_addid() fail, then use call_rcu() directly.
The difference is that call_rcu is used for failures after
security_shm_alloc(), to continue to guaranteed an rcu delay for
security_sem_free().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-15-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Loosely based on a patch from Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>:
- id and retval can be merged
- if ipc_addid() fails, then use call_rcu() directly.
The difference is that call_rcu is used for failed ipc_addid() calls, to
continue to guaranteed an rcu delay for security_sem_free().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-14-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
No callers remain for ipc_rcu_alloc(). Drop the function.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff because the memset was temporarily inside ipc_rcu_free()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-13-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Instead of using ipc_rcu_alloc() which only performs the refcount bump,
open code it. This also allows for msg_queue structure layout to be
randomized in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-12-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Instead of using ipc_rcu_alloc() which only performs the refcount bump,
open code it. This also allows for shmid_kernel structure layout to be
randomized in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-11-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Instead of using ipc_rcu_alloc() which only performs the refcount bump,
open code it to perform better sem-specific checks. This also allows
for sem_array structure layout to be randomized in the future.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff, because the memset was temporarily inside ipc_rcu_alloc()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-10-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There are no more callers of ipc_rcu_free(), so remove it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-9-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Avoid using ipc_rcu_free, since it just re-finds the original structure
pointer. For the pre-list-init failure path, there is no RCU needed,
since it was just allocated. It can be directly freed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-8-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Avoid using ipc_rcu_free, since it just re-finds the original structure
pointer. For the pre-list-init failure path, there is no RCU needed,
since it was just allocated. It can be directly freed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-7-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Avoid using ipc_rcu_free, since it just re-finds the original structure
pointer. For the pre-list-init failure path, there is no RCU needed,
since it was just allocated. It can be directly freed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-6-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The only users of ipc_alloc() were ipc_rcu_alloc() and the on-heap
sem_io fall-back memory. Better to just open-code these to make things
easier to read.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: Rediff due to inclusion of memset() into ipc_rcu_alloc()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-5-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
sem_ctime is initialized to the semget() time and then updated at every
semctl() that changes the array.
Thus it does not represent the time of the last change.
Especially, semop() calls are only stored in sem_otime, not in
sem_ctime.
This is already described in ipc/sem.c, I just overlooked that there is
a comment in include/linux/sem.h and man semctl(2) as well.
So: Correct wrong comments.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170515171912.6298-4-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <1vier1@web.de>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ipc has two management structures that exist for every id:
- struct kern_ipc_perm, it contains e.g. the permissions.
- struct ipc_rcu, it contains the rcu head for rcu handling and the
refcount.
The patch merges both structures.
As a bonus, we may save one cacheline, because both structures are
cacheline aligned. In addition, it reduces the number of casts, instead
most codepaths can use container_of.
To simplify code, the ipc_rcu_alloc initializes the allocation to 0.
[manfred@colorfullife.com: really include the memset() into ipc_alloc_rcu()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/564f8612-0601-b267-514f-a9f650ec9b32@colorfullife.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-3-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
sma->sem_base is initialized with
sma->sem_base = (struct sem *) &sma[1];
The current code has four problems:
- There is an unnecessary pointer dereference - sem_base is not needed.
- Alignment for struct sem only works by chance.
- The current code causes false positive for static code analysis.
- This is a cast between different non-void types, which the future
randstruct GCC plugin warns on.
And, as bonus, the code size gets smaller:
Before:
0 .text 00003770
After:
0 .text 0000374e
[manfred@colorfullife.com: s/[0]/[]/, per hch]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525185107.12869-2-manfred@colorfullife.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170515171912.6298-2-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <1vier1@web.de>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add /proc/self/task/<current-tid>/fail-nth file that allows failing
0-th, 1-st, 2-nd and so on calls systematically.
Excerpt from the added documentation:
"Write to this file of integer N makes N-th call in the current task
fail (N is 0-based). Read from this file returns a single char 'Y' or
'N' that says if the fault setup with a previous write to this file
was injected or not, and disables the fault if it wasn't yet injected.
Note that this file enables all types of faults (slab, futex, etc).
This setting takes precedence over all other generic settings like
probability, interval, times, etc. But per-capability settings (e.g.
fail_futex/ignore-private) take precedence over it. This feature is
intended for systematic testing of faults in a single system call. See
an example below"
Why add a new setting:
1. Existing settings are global rather than per-task.
So parallel testing is not possible.
2. attr->interval is close but it depends on attr->count
which is non reset to 0, so interval does not work as expected.
3. Trying to model this with existing settings requires manipulations
of all of probability, interval, times, space, task-filter and
unexposed count and per-task make-it-fail files.
4. Existing settings are per-failure-type, and the set of failure
types is potentially expanding.
5. make-it-fail can't be changed by unprivileged user and aggressive
stress testing better be done from an unprivileged user.
Similarly, this would require opening the debugfs files to the
unprivileged user, as he would need to reopen at least times file
(not possible to pre-open before dropping privs).
The proposed interface solves all of the above (see the example).
We want to integrate this into syzkaller fuzzer. A prototype has found
10 bugs in kernel in first day of usage:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/syzkaller/%22FAULT_INJECTION%22%7Csort:relevance
I've made the current interface work with all types of our sandboxes.
For setuid the secret sauce was prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) to
make /proc entries non-root owned. So I am fine with the current
version of the code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170328130128.101773-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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kcmp syscall is build iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is selected, so wrap
appropriate helpers in epoll code with the config to build it
conditionally.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513083456.GG1881@uranus.lan
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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With current epoll architecture target files are addressed with
file_struct and file descriptor number, where the last is not unique.
Moreover files can be transferred from another process via unix socket,
added into queue and closed then so we won't find this descriptor in the
task fdinfo list.
Thus to checkpoint and restore such processes CRIU needs to find out
where exactly the target file is present to add it into epoll queue.
For this sake one can use kcmp call where some particular target file
from the queue is compared with arbitrary file passed as an argument.
Because epoll target files can have same file descriptor number but
different file_struct a caller should explicitly specify the offset
within.
To test if some particular file is matching entry inside epoll one have
to
- fill kcmp_epoll_slot structure with epoll file descriptor,
target file number and target file offset (in case if only
one target is present then it should be 0)
- call kcmp as kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_EPOLL_TFD, fd, &kcmp_epoll_slot)
- the kernel fetch file pointer matching file descriptor @fd of pid1
- lookups for file struct in epoll queue of pid2 and returns traditional
0,1,2 result for sorting purpose
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.511592110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Since it is possbile to have same number in tfd field (say file added,
closed, then nother file dup'ed to same number and added back) it is
imposible to distinguish such target files solely by their numbers.
Strictly speaking regular applications don't need to recognize these
targets at all but for checkpoint/restore sake we need to collect
targets to be able to push them back on restore stage in a proper order.
Thus lets add file position, inode and device number where this target
lays. This three fields can be used as a primary key for sorting, and
together with kcmp help CRIU can find out an exact file target (from the
whole set of processes being checkpointed).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.436491881@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is a layering violation so we replace the uses with calls to
sg_page(). This is a prep patch for replacing page_link and this is one
of the very few uses outside of scatterlist.h.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495663199-22234-1-git-send-email-logang@deltatee.com
Signed-off-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Bates <sbates@raithlin.com>
Acked-by: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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